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This thesis confronts the semantic/pragmatic issues raised by identi-
fication - based descriptive uses of pronouns. The phenomenon, also
known as deferred uses (Nunberg, 1993), arises when the correct un-
derstanding of a pronoun is dependent on the identification of a specific
individual in the context that provides it with a descriptive (as opposed
to a singular) interpretation. Moreover, the identification of the salient
individual makes the interpretation available in a rather indirect way.
For example, by pointing at a huge footprint in the sand and uttering
‘He must be a giant’, the speaker can convey the proposition that the
footprint maker must be a giant, where the mental representation foot-
print (necessary for identification) and the representation the footprint-
maker (the pronoun’s interpretation) are not identical. These uses also
display interesting properties when it comes to their ability to provide
antecedents for other pronouns. As such, they are at the cross-road of
many topics in philosophy of language and linguistics, including index-
icality, anaphora, and figurative uses of language (metonymy). In this
thesis, I propose that the data is best accounted for by a combination
of relevance-theoretic pragmatics (Sperber and Wilson 1995, Carston
2002), certain motivated assumptions about visual information process-
ing, and the grammar formalism of Dynamic Syntax (Kempson et al
2001; Cann et al 2005). DS models pronouns as encoding procedures
that introduce a variable-like entity (e.g. a metavariable), which needs
to be replaced by a semantic value (of the appropriate type), allow-
ing for descriptive constituents, which emerge as a result of relevance-
driven processes of identification and inference, to provide the pronoun
with the relevant descriptive interpretation. Alternatively, the pronoun
can be replaced by a singular value that communicates a descriptive
proposition as an implicature. The context and the pronominal form
used determine which of these approaches is the best suited.
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of pronouns: the data
1.1 Introduction
This thesis deals with a phenomenon described in the literature as ‘deferred osten-
tion’ (Quine, 1968, 194), ‘deferred uses’, ‘deferrals’ (Nunberg, 1993), or simply
‘descriptive indexicals’ (Nunberg, 2004a,b). It can be illustrated by the examples
below (a use of a sentence in a particular occasion is stated in (a), whose intuitive
truth-conditions are in (b); in this thesis, italics mark emphasis or the interpretation
of linguistic stimuli, small caps represent concepts, quotes refer to the linguistic
form (spoken or written) of a word or sentence use, and the asterisk for ungrammat-
icality/infelicity):
(1) a. Someone pointing at a huge footprint in the sand says: ‘He must be a
giant!’ (Schiffer, 1981, 49)
b. The person whose foot made the print must be a giant.
According to this example, a natural language expression, in this case, a pronoun,
seems to depend on some aspect of the immediate context, in this case, a footprint,
in order to convey truth-conditions that are descriptive or general, as opposed to
singular. That is, the proposition in (1)b does not say anything about a specific
person, but rather about whomever happens to have made that footprint. I will
clarify these notions shortly.
Since the two main features of cases exemplified by (1) are (i) the expression’s
dependence on some identifiable entity in the environment (e.g. the footprint in
(1)a) and (ii) the expression’s descriptive truth-conditional contribution, I shall de-
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scribe the phenomenon by ‘identification-based descriptive uses’ of pronouns, or
just ‘descriptive pronouns’, for short. This terminology serves a double purpose.
First, it allows a neutral characterisation of the data to be reviewed below, which
names such as ‘descriptive indexicals’ do not achieve. Secondly, it is a promissory
note for an account that unifies this phenomenon with other types of descriptive
interpretations, such as bound pronouns or cross-sentential dependencies; to be re-
viewed in sections below. Also, I take it that the relevant descriptive interpretations
correspond to information (propositions) communicated by these pronominal uses
without being committed to any particular level of content at which this takes places.
Grice (1969) notoriously proposed a distinction between what is said by an utter-
ance, which roughly amounts to its assertoric content, and what the speaker merely
suggests or implicates by it. The descriptive content in question could - in principle
- belong to either one of these (or other) levels of information. This distinction will
be discussed in detail in chapter 2.
At this point, one may argue that such interpretations are not intrinsically tied to
natural language pronouns. For example, had the speaker of (1) used ‘Joe’ instead of
‘he’ in the example above, an interpretation similar to (1)b would be communicated.
I agree with the observation, but I will confine myself to a treatment of pronominal
expressions only. Names and other expressions would involve complications that
go beyond the aims of this thesis.
The main goal of this chapter is to introduce the interpretative properties of the
pronominal uses just mentioned. In section 1.2, I review the features of the phe-
nomenon that are more or less common ground in the literature. This constitutes
the core data that theories of descriptive pronouns must account for. Afterwards,
I will compare these data to other types of pronominal interpretation. Section 1.3
deals with deictic or indexical uses of pronouns. Section 1.4 deals with pronom-
inal binding. Section 1.5 deals with cross-sentential anaphora or donkey uses of
pronouns. Section 1.6 discusses generics. Section 1.7 makes some introductory re-
lations between identification-based descriptive pronouns and metonymy. Section
1.8 discusses data which builds on the core data, namely, the extended properties of
descriptive pronouns. Section 1.9 summarises what this chapter achieves and lays
out the plan for the remaining chapters in the thesis.
Although this amounts to a long introduction to the various ways in which
pronominal expressions can be used, it is far from exhaustive. For example, re-
sumptive pronouns 1 are not mentioned. I have opted to concentrate on phenomena
1Resumptive pronouns are expressions that appear twice, often distributed over main and relative
clauses, as in ‘Voici l’homme que Marie lui a parle´’ (French) [gloss: here is the man that Marie to
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that seem to be usually confounded with identification dependent descriptive uses




In descriptive pronominal uses, a general or descriptive (as opposed to singular)
proposition is communicated via the saliency of a particular individual or object
at a given occasion. I am using the words ‘individual’ and ‘object’ with enough
flexibility to include inanimate objects, people, places, geographical formations,
mathematical entities, and so on. In addition to (1), a variety of examples has been
regarded as instances of descriptive uses in the literature. Consider:
(2) a. US Supreme Court O’Connor saying: ‘We might have been liberals.’
(Nunberg, 1993, 14-15)
b. The US Supreme Court Justices might have been liberals.
(3) a. Bill Clinton saying: ‘The founders invested me with the sole responsi-
bility for appointing Supreme Court Justices.’ (Nunberg, 1993, 20)
b. The founders invested the US President with the sole responsibility for
appointing Supreme Court Justices.
(4) a. A professor pointing to a PhD thesis in his shelf and saying: ‘AHRC
gave a post-doc grant to her.’
b. AHRC gave a post doc grant to the author of that thesis.
(5) a. John, expecting a call from his mother, answers a phone call from his
colleague and says: ‘Oh, I thought you were my mother.’ (Nunberg,
1990)
b. John thought that the person calling was his mother.
(6) a. Bill, to a friend at an art gallery on a Sunday: ‘John dined yesterday...
with her [pointing to a painting].’
b. John had dinner with the artist who painted that picture on the 18th of
June 2011.
him has talked] (Haegeman, 1994, 409), where ‘que’ and ‘lui’ refer to the same individual.
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The phenomenon can be illustrated by use of the pronoun in (a), which com-
municates the information in (b). The pronouns and their respective interpretations
can be summarised as the following pairs: ‘he’ - the person whose foot made the
print in (1), ‘we’ - the American Supreme Court Justices in (2), ‘me’ - the American
President in (3), ‘her’ - the author of that thesis in (4), ‘you’ - the person calling
in (5), and ‘her’ as ‘the artist who painted that picture’ in (6). In some cases, such
as (2) and (3) a referential interpretation about Clinton and O’Connor might also
be available. This, however, does not exclude the descriptive feel of the utterances
(more on that in chapter 2).
These examples suggest that descriptive interpretations are available regardless
of the expression’s number (singular or plural), case marking (nominative or ac-
cusative or dative, data about other cases is needed), person (first, second or third),
and gender (masculine vs. feminine). Issues may arise for the genderless ‘it’ be-
cause a clash between the features of the word and the most salient object in the
context may trigger descriptive interpretations (see Nunberg 1993). The examples
also show that the interpretations stated in (b) are not blocked by the type of argu-
ment taken by the verb or its adjuncts. For instance, in (1) and (2) the pronoun is
the external argument of the verb ‘to be’ plus its modal auxiliary, whereas in (3) the
pronoun is the internal argument of ‘invest’, in (4) ‘her’ is the goal argument of the
ditransitive ‘give’, and in (6) ‘her’ occurs in an adjunct to the verb ‘to dine’.
Moreover, descriptive interpretations seem to be available throughout a variety
of speech acts and syntactic environments. Consider the following utterances.
(7) A politician at a press conference, worried about a certain controversial
news team, utters to one of his secretaries:
a. Who is he [pointing at a copy of The Financial Times]?
b. Make sure he [pointing at a copy of The Financial Times] shuts up!
Above, the use of ‘he’ contributes the editor/journalist of the FT to the communi-
cated content, regardless of the speech act (assertion, question or order) used. Now,
consider different ways in which this dialogue can continue, below.
(8) The secretary (Ann) protests to the politician’s request by uttering:
a. It is them [pointing to the copy of the FT] who make your policies
known to the public!
b. Your policies have been made known to the public by them [pointing
to the copy of the FT]!
c. They [pointing to the copy of the FT] seem to make your policies
14
known to the public.
Above, the use of ‘them’ conveys the interpretation the FT people, which is pre-
served under whatever mechanisms govern the interpretations of: (i) clefts, as in
(8)a (note the exhaustivity effect: no one, but the FT people, makes the politician’s
policies known to the public, see Ward 2008), (ii) passives, as in (8)b, and con-
structions where the subject of the embedded clause has been ‘raised’ to the subject
position of the main clause (raising constructions), as in (8)c.
It seems that the descriptive interpretations of pronouns are not constrained to
a particular speech act or syntactic environment. This claim will be revisited when
we consider the extended properties of such uses.
At this point, a few remarks on the descriptive status of the communicated
propositions must be made. Imagine a context where the salient entity in it, say, the
Thriller album, is related to another specific entity, say, Michael Jackson. In this
scenario, illustrated below, the speaker may communicate a singular (as opposed to
descriptive) proposition. Consider:
(9) a. Pointing to a Michael Jackson album at a music shop: He surely died
young.
b. Michael Jackson died young.
If (9)a communicates the singular proposition in (9)b and the case above is struc-
turally identical to the ones previously reviewed, then communicating descriptive
information is not an essential property of the phenomenon. The approximation
between (9), on the one hand, and the other interpretations reviewed so far, misses
an important point: (9) can be reduced to a simple case of pronominal deixis (to be
discussed in section 1.3). If we assume that pronouns are place holders for certain
representations and that pointing to Thriller is an efficient way of making Michael
Jackson the salient value of the expression, then there is no difference between
pointing to the album or the individual himself. In other words, (9) is more similar
to a situation where someone points to a picture of Michael Jackson intending to
refer to him. In this case, we resist saying that there is any form of indirect medi-
ation between individuals (i.e. the copy of Thriller and Michael Jackson himself).
Thus, the fact that I confine my interest to cases that receive descriptive interpreta-
tions is partially justified on methodological grounds. If the interpretations were not
descriptive, the phenomenon illustrated above would be an instance of indexical-
ity. But this discussion raises an important question. If communicating descriptive
propositions is one of the hallmarks of the pronominal uses discussed in this thesis,
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how should this notion be understood?
Answers partially depend on one’s positions regarding the nature of information
that is expressed linguistically. Putting rather simplistically, there are two main
takes on this issue. On the one hand, some claim that every piece of communicated
information must result from the audience’s attempt to retrieve what the speaker
intended by her utterance. This is the Intentionalist position (Grice, 1957; Sperber
and Wilson, 1995; Carston, 2002). On the other hand, some claim that much of what
is communicated results from a similar process, but some information is determined
solely in virtue of the words used and facts about the context (Montague 1970a;
Kaplan 1977 are good examples, but many others fall here). This is the Non- (or
semi-) Intentionalist position (these positions will be better discussed in chapter 2).
In the intentionalist picture, the fact that a given piece of linguistically expressed
information is descriptive depends on (rationally constrained) intentions the speaker
wishes to convey and the audience’s ability to rationally reconstruct the intended
information. If the speaker has a particular person in mind (mutually known by
the audience) when using the pronoun, then the hearer faces the task to retrieve a
proposition about that particular individual. If the speaker did not have a particu-
lar individual in mind, then the communicated information is about whomever fits
some descriptive content (see the discussion on attributive descriptions in Donnel-
lan 1966). In some cases, the audience may know of a particular someone who does
fit the intended description, but this may fall outside the intentions of the speaker
and might not be easily classifiable as communicated: the audience matches the de-
scriptive content with its unique satisfier at its own expense. For example, in cases
where the audience - but not the speaker - knows who made the footprint in example
(1).
In the non-intentionalist picture, things are more complicated. In the literature,
it has been argued that there are facts that determine whether a content expressed
by an utterance is singular or not. If one or more of these facts do not hold, the
expressed content is descriptive. Following Neale (1990), three types of facts -
(E)pistemic, (M)etaphysical, and (L)inguistic - have been assumed, although not
uncontroversially, as definiens of singular propositions (the definitions below are
based in Galery 2008, 160).
(E) One who entertains the singular proposition must know which object is referred
to by the constituent expression e of the utterance used to convey it (see Russell,
1910).
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(M) The truth-conditional contribution of the constituent expression e is exhausted
by the object it denotes (i.e. the existence and individuation of a singular proposition
depends on the existence and individuation of the object it is about) (see Russell,
1904).
(L) If the utterance describes situations different from the actual, the constituent
expression e still denotes the same individual in such situations (see Kripke, 1972).
For the moment, I take it that these definitions are neutral with regards to whether
e is an expression type or token. Thus, there are many sources for the descriptive
status of the relevant pronominal interpretations, according to the non-Intentionalist
picture. Some of the previous examples, such as, (1), (4), and (6) can be described
as resulting from violations of (E): the audience simply does not know who made
the footprint, wrote the thesis, or painted the picture, respectively. However, many
have proposed that (E) should not be regarded as a constraint on the expression of
singular propositions (Kripke 1972; for a recent example, see Borg 2004). Still,
other examples, such as (2) and (3) seem to violate (L) as opposed to (E). For ex-
ample, ‘we’ in (2) is interpreted as the American Supreme Court Justices, which
selects different individuals in different non-actual situations. Thus, on the assump-
tion that our semantic/pragmatic theories must explain what is intuitively communi-
cated both intentionalists and non intentionalists agree that some of the pronominal
uses reviewed above are indeed descriptive (although for different reasons or via
different processes). Let us now systematise the basic properties of the examples
examined so far.
1.2.2 Core properties
If the paraphrases stated in (b) adequately capture linguistic intuitions concerning
what is communicated from (1) to (8), it seems that descriptive uses of pronouns
display the following property:
Descriptiveness: The information conveyed by the relevant pronominal uses is de-
scriptive or general.
For the moment, I will also remain neutral on the kind of determiner that con-
stitutes the descriptive truth-conditions. So far I have been using the definite ‘the’
in expressing the relevant truth-conditions in (b), but that corresponds only to an
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approximation to the communicated content. Now, the descriptive uses in ques-
tion seem to display other interpretative properties. Consider an example based on
Quine (1968):
(10) a. Someone pointing at a car whose windshield is full of tickets: ‘He is
going to be sorry.’
b. The owner of the car is going to be sorry.
Let us now ask the following question. Under what circumstances is the content
in (b) unavailable to the audience? Two situations spring to mind. First, consider a
situation in which the audience is unable to single out the salient object as belonging
to any particular kind. We could imagine the hearer seeing some amorphous blur
in his visual field. Under these circumstances, what would (a) convey? Maybe
the hearer would assume that the blur corresponds to a person, given the lexical
material of ‘he’, but, in this case, the interpretation in (b) does not seem to be
easily accessible. That is, descriptive pronouns seem to require the contextually
salient individual to be classified by the audience as belonging to a certain kind.
In (10) above, the relevant kind is car or vehicle. Without its identification, the
interpretation in (b) would not be retrieved.
This intuition concerning the availability of descriptive interpretations can help
to determine another necessary requirement that an account of descriptive uses must
meet. More specifically, it motivates:
Identification Dependency: Descriptive uses of pronouns depend on the identifica-
tion of a particular entity as belonging to a certain kind.
The property above illuminates the identification-based nature of descriptive
pronouns. Now, the notion of identification has raised a great amount of contro-
versy in the philosophical literature. At this point, I assume, following Strawson
(1959) and Evans (1982, ch. 5), that an agent can employ various cognitive mech-
anisms, sensory modalities, memory, lexical information and full blown commu-
nicative practices (testimony), to identify an individual across a variety of situa-
tions2. Still, this thesis focuses on cases exploiting visual information. Empiri-
cally grounded notions of visual individuation and identification will be proposed
in chapter 3.
Note also that, under a certain understanding, deictic uses of pronouns can also
2I personally think, however, that this unification requires empirical support and does not sustain
merely on conceptual grounds.
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be described as identification dependent uses. For example, when Bill points to
Susan and says ‘She is brilliant’, the proposition expressed depends on the iden-
tification of a particular person. Whether this is done by context and word alone,
on the one hand, or by the audience, on the other, is another matter. Despite such
similarities, there are reasons to claim that the forms of identification present in de-
scriptive and deictic cases are slightly different from one another. Kahneman et al.
(1992) consider the example below:
(11) Someone seeing an object moving very fast in the sky utters: ‘It’s a bird...
It’s....a plane.... Ohh no...It’s superman’ (Kahneman et al., 1992).
In this case, ‘it’ seems to refer to the same thing regardless of the kind (bird,
aeroplane, superhero) which the speaker classifies the object as belonging to. That
is, in some cases of deixis, a bare individual seems to be all that is needed for the
expression of the proposition (this notion will be developed in chapter 3).
It may be also noted that the entities mentioned so far have clear boundaries.
But are descriptive interpretations only available when prototypical instances of
solid, bound material objects are demonstrated? The answer seems to be negative.
Consider the following example:
(12) a. A student in a demonstration pointing at a cloud of tear gas thrown by
the police warns two citizens who walk into the violent demonstration:
‘They are bringing reinforcements’.
b. The policemen are bringing reinforcements.
In this scenario, a huge amount of tear gas has been used, so that both students and
the surprised citizens were engulfed in it. There is no single entity that is singled
out in the context, just some amorphous stuff. This situation, however, poses no
problem for the definition of Identification Dependency. The audience seems to
identify something in the environment - some stuff - as an instance of the kind
gas. This classification makes some knowledge accessible, namely that the police
uses tear gas to suppress violent demonstrators, which then paves the way to the
right descriptive interpretation of the pronoun. That being said, it seems that most
examples of identification-based descriptive uses of pronouns seem to depend on
the saliency of prototypical material objects.
Now, let us take a look at a second reason for the unavailability of descriptive
interpretations, namely, the audience’s lack of knowledge associated with the con-
cept used in the identification of the salient individual. Imagine a scenario where
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the audience does classify the salient object in (10) as an instance of the kind car,
but lacks the knowledge that cars have owners, who are typically responsible for
paying fines (providing reasons for one’s being sorry), as in a case where the hearer
does not have a proper sense of ownership, nor a good idea about the financial bur-
den that comes with illegal parking. That is, the hearer is able to discriminate cars
in the environment, but lacks that right kind of information the speaker seems to
hint at. In this case, the proposition that the owner of the car is going to be sorry
is not so easily accessible. This scenario shows that classifying an individual under
a concept serves as a gateway to information (world knowledge) that is relevant for
establishing the the right descriptive interpretation. If the concept is not associated
with the right body of information, the hearer fails to interpret the pronoun correctly.
These observations motivate the following interpretative property:
Connection: The mental representations used to identify or classify the salient ob-
ject in the context must make information available so it can provide the right de-
scriptive content for the pronominal use.
Connection seems to be a property relating the other two, more basic, interpre-
tative properties. That is, an adequate account of descriptive uses must explain the
relation between Descriptiveness and Identification Dependency, namely, how the
concepts used to represent objects as falling under a certain kind make the descrip-
tive interpretation available in a principled way. These three features of descriptive
pronominal interpretations constitute their core interpretative properties.
Now that we have covered a variety of examples of descriptive cases and high-
lighted their key features, I will compare the examples stated here with other pronom-
inal uses.
1.3 Deictic or indexical uses
Similar to identification-dependent uses, deictic or indexical uses of pronouns (the
names will be used interchangeably) depend on certain features of the occasion of
speaking (or writing). For example, the truth-conditional contribution of words like
‘I’ depends on who utters it and similar rules can be written for ‘you’, ‘she’, ‘now’,
‘tomorrow’, ‘today’, and analogous expressions. Given the properties discussed
in the previous chapter, indexical uses seem to share with descriptive pronouns an
interpretative property similar to Identification Dependency. That is, the under-
standing of the utterance below depends on the identification of the referent of the
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pronoun.
(13) Thiago Galery introducing himself to an undergrad student: ‘I’m your
backup tutor’.
The understanding of the utterance above attributes to a certain identified person,
who happens to be speaking, the property of being a backup tutor. However, in
the definition of Identification Dependency, the salient individual must be classified
as belonging to a certain kind. As mentioned in the previous section, one could
imagine a scenario where someone sees an object moving very fast in the sky and
utters ‘It’s a bird... It’s....a plane.... Ohh no...It’s Superman’, where ‘it’ refers to
the same entity throughout, even though the concepts used to classify the object
change. Examples like this motivate the idea that at least some cases of deictic
pronominal interpretation do not require the notion of identifying as C, where C is a
place holder for some concept, used in the definition of Identification Dependency.
Or else, these cases do involve such a notion, but the concept that performs the
necessary identification is highly general, like MATERIAL OBJECT or PERSON. I
will refrain from commenting on these issues until the notions of individuation and
identification are properly discussed in chapter 3. For now, let us assume that the
first interpretative property of indexical uses of pronouns is a more basic, possibly
disjunctive, form of identification dependency, namely:
Identification Dependency (indexical): Deictic or Indexical uses of pronouns de-
pend on the identification of an object as a bare particular or as an entity that belongs
to a very general kind (e.g. MATERIAL OBJECT or PERSON).
There are two ways to understand what the necessary identification in the defi-
nition above does. On the one hand, one could claim that the words themselves (not
the hearer) identify the relevant object in the context, as in the non-intentionalist pic-
ture mentioned in the previous section. Consequently, the audience does not need to
know who the pronoun picks out in order for information to be expressed (Montague
1970a; Kaplan 1977, that is, condition (E) on singular thinking, in the previous sec-
tion, does not govern the level of information determined by indexical uses). On
the other hand, one could say that the notion of identification is communicator-
based, that is, in order for information to be expressed, the hearer must know who
the pronoun picks out (indexically induced thoughts would obey condition (E) in
the previous section). Besides its intuitive appeal, this position might be motivated
by certain differences between utterances that are true in the same circumstances.
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As Frege (1967, 1948, 1956) observes, the thought constituents determined by in-
dexicals display a peculiar form of cognitive significance. For example, Anna, an
undergrad student who is addressed by my utterance of ‘I’m your backup tutor’
(i.e.(13)) may learn something new, whereas an utterance of ‘The UCL pragmatics
backup tutor is the UCL pragmatics backup tutor’ does not inform anyone of any-
thing, even though this utterance and (13) have the same truth-conditions (in the
actual world / current time, say).
There are many proposals in the literature in support of each of the two ways
of understanding the mechanisms responsible for identification (on the words as
individuators side, see Kripke (1972); Kaplan (1977); Salmon (1986), on the com-
municator or Fregean senses as individuators side, see Perry (1977); Evans (1982);
Wettstein (1986), among many others). I will not review this controversial topic
here, although the discussion in chapters 2 and 3 argues for the latter position. On
more neutral grounds, one could argue that whatever the mode of identification in
indexical uses is, it must be non-descriptive. This can be attested by the following
contrast, pointed out by Kripke (1972).
(14) a. A person pointing at Pele´, the great Brazilian football player in the
50s and 60s: He could have been Argentinian.
b. Someone utters out of the blue: The best football player in the 50s and
60s could have been Argentinian.
As Kripke (1972) observed, (14)a asserts that the history of the world could have
been such that Pele´ - the best football player in the 50s and 60s - was born some-
where in Argentina. But in addition to this reading, (14)b can convey that the history
of the world could have been such that an Argentinian, different from Pele´, is the
best football player in the 50s and 60s. In order to capture the presence of this
ambiguity3 in (14)b and the lack of it in (14)a, a distinction between expressions:
referring or singular vs. descriptive or general has been proposed. An argument
for this distinction can be schematically represented as follows (see Kripke 1972,
48-49, 71-77):
(15) Modal argument
a. Premise 1: If an expression e differs from an expression e* in terms of
modal behaviour, they belong to different classes of expression (e.g.
3Note that this ambiguity can also be observed if we replace the modal operator by other scope
taking elements, such as negation. However, the notion of rigidity does not coincide with that of
scope, because scope is understood as relative to other scope taking elements in the sentence and
rigidity is not a relative notion.
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referring vs. descriptive) (assumption) .
b. Premise 2: Pronouns and definite descriptions differ in terms of modal
behaviour (motivated by the examples in (14)a and (14)b).
c. Conclusion: Pronouns and definite descriptions belong to different
classes (types) of expression.
In the first premise, two expressions e and e* differ in modal behaviour if and only
if one of them designates the same individual in every possible world (i.e. ways
the world could have been) and the other does not. Kripke (1972) calls the for-
mer kind of expression a rigid designator. His point is the following. The con-
tent expressed by an utterance corresponds to the utterance’s possible world truth-
conditions. When we embed pronouns and definite descriptions under modal oper-
ators, the resulting utterances express different modal behaviour: the first arguably
select the same individual across worlds, while the later selects different individuals
according to different worlds. Therefore, these expressions must be distinguished4.
The following property, which Kripke took to hold of lexical types, seems to be
motivated.
Rigidity: Deictic pronouns refer to the same entity in every possible world/situation.
Finally, let us consider issues of existential order. Suppose I hallucinate a person
in front of me and say ‘He has a funny hat’, whilst pointing to the illusory man. Have
I conveyed information or have I conveyed nothing at all? To many, empty cases of
deixis carry no information and thus the following property of deictic interpretations
has been proposed:
4Kaplan (1977) laid out a machinery that is able to capture the contributions of indexicals that
roughly correspond to the intuitions invoked by Kripke’s argument. The gist of the proposal follows a
strategy originally pursed by Kamp (1971), namely, double-indexing. It involves the assumption that
a given parameter (possible world) figures twice in the formal description of the utterance content
(sentences relativised to contexts). Kaplan distinguishes two relevant aspects of semantic evaluation:
the context of utterance, modelled as a set of parameters which includes the actual world, and the
circumstance of evaluation, modelled as a set of parameters which includes a possible world slot
(not necessarily restricted to the actual). The linguistic meaning of indexicals (characters) is then
modelled as functions from contexts to contents, the latter being functions from circumstances of
evaluation to truth-values. Since the context only includes the actual world, pronouns only refer to
entities (who are speaking, being addressed, or demonstrated) in the actual world. This content then
is evaluated for truth or falsity against a circumstance of evaluation. This guarantees that pronouns
refer to the same thing in different worlds, i.e. they are rigid designators. Descriptions on the other
hand are not restricted to select their referents from the context set and can pick out different entities
according to parameters in the circumstances of evaluation.
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Non-emptiness: The content of utterances containing indexicals depends on the ex-
istence and individuation of the objects they refer to.
The definition above roughly corresponds to the constraint (M) on singular
thinking stated in the previous section. Dependence on existence means that if the
referent of an indexical does not exist, the utterance where it occurs does not have
any content. This rules out the empty case just considered. Now, dependence on
individuation means that the content of utterance containing an indexical is individ-
uated according to the individuation of its referent, and here we could either say that
words themselves are individuators or that communicators/agents/senses are. It is
worth noting that a circularity emerges at this point. Non-emptiness is supposed to
be a metaphysical aspect of indexical content, but it draws upon an epistemic notion,
namely, individuation (i.e. objects are individuated by cognitive agents), in its defi-
nition. Rather than solving such circularity, I will assume a meta-property, namely,
Content singularity: which states that utterances containing indexicals express sin-
gular (i.e. not descriptive) content about a contextually salient entity (i.e. the sum
of Identification Dependency (indexical), Rigidity and Non-emptiness, whatever the
best way for these to be understood is).
On the basis of this property, one can conclude that indexical uses of pronouns
differ from descriptive uses. One way to see this is the following: if the referents
of deixis do not exist or cannot be individuated, it could be argued that nothing is
expressed. In this picture, if both speaker and hearer hallucinate the referents of
deixis, no information is expressed, because Content Singularity is violated. Now,
like pronominal deixis, identification-based descriptive interpretations require an
individual to be individuated (under a kind), but they do not communicate content
about any specific individual. Thus, if speaker and hearer hallucinate an individual,
which is classified under the same concept in the context, then it could be argued
that some form of descriptive content is communicated (i.e. descriptive cases are
not constrained by Content Singularity5). In conclusion, deixis and identification-
based descriptive uses seem to be constrained by different contextual requirements
6
.
5In other words, like violations of epistemic constraints on singular content, the violation of
metaphysical constraints may characterise the content imparted by the utterance as descriptive.
6As will emerge in chapter 2, I assume an intentionalist picture of reference. Thus, I would be
prepared to bite the bullet and say that in cases where speaker and hearer jointly hallucinate an object
or experience virtual reality, say, singular or descriptive content can be communicated (as long as
the hearer figures what is intended by the speaker).
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This asymmetry poses a challenge for accounts of pronominal interpretations.
How can pronouns express descriptive readings in certain contexts but singular ones
in others? From a meta-theoretical point of view, a unified theory is preferable.
Now, if we take a look at Kripke’s argument above, its conclusion states that pro-
nouns must be different from descriptions because of their modal behaviour. Impor-
tant consequences follow from this. If indexical uses convey singular interpretations
in virtue of the linguistic rules they encode, the descriptive interpretations reviewed
in the previous section (and others to come) cannot be explained solely in virtue of
their linguistic meaning.
Two ways of accommodating this consequence are worth mentioning. First, one
could say that the pronouns are ambiguous between lexical types that govern singu-
lar and descriptive readings. The desired explanatory unification would be lost. Sec-
ond, one could claim that the indexical uses are governed by the linguistic meaning
of pronouns, while identification-based descriptive pronouns would be accounted
for by rules governing cooperative communicative behaviour: the level of Gricean
conversational implicatures (see Stokke 2008 for a recent defence). I reserve a full
assessment of this possibility for chapter 2, but for now I would like to say that
there are other descriptive uses of pronouns that seem to be governed by linguistic
rules, such as bound uses and cross-sentential dependencies. On the assumption that
such cases exist, why cannot such rules be extended to cover identification-based
descriptive uses? This strategy would be supported by the fact that the descriptive
interpretations reviewed in the previous section constitute evidence against Kripke’s
claim that indexical pronouns behave like rigid designators in virtue of their linguis-
tic type (see Nunberg 1993 for the expression of such view). In other words, the
modal argument may be invalid, because premises 1 and 2 in (15) are not true. Al-
though descriptive uses share the identification-based aspect of interpretation with
indexical uses, the two seem to be quite different phenomena. Let us now turn to
the bound uses of pronouns.
1.4 Pronominal binding
In many cases, pronouns display a form of dependency that is different from that
of deictic interpretations. Instead of picking out a salient individual in the context,
the interpretation of the pronoun depends on another expression in the neighbouring
linguistic environment. Consider:
(16) John thinks he is smart.
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a. John thinks John is smart.
b. John thinks Bill is smart.
The utterance in (16) has two possible interpretations: one where the pronoun refers
to a salient individual in the context, (16)b, another where the pronoun is bound by
an antecedent expression, such as ‘John’ in (16)a. The bound reading is usually
represented by sameness of index (e.g. John1 thinks he1 is smart) and the non-
dependent reading by different indices. Dependency here indicates an asymmetric
relationship: the bound pronoun depends on an antecedent (the binder) in order to
establish its interpretation, but not vice versa. Natural numbers usually indicate this
relationship, but letters or any other symbol to achieve this goal could be used7.
Here I take these symbols only to indicate the prima facie intuitive relation between
expressions.
For my purposes, it is interesting to see whether bound pronouns convey de-
scriptive or singular interpretations, hence siding with either the descriptive or in-
dexical interpretations reviewed previously. The example above, however, cannot
illuminate this issue, for it does not rule out the following possibility. The proper
name ‘John’ is used to refer to a particular man in the context and then the pronoun
is just used to refer to the same entity. In short, there is nothing that blocks (16)a,
which we would describe as an instance of binding, from being assimilated to cases
of indexicality (as the reading in (16)b may be). In what follows, I will look at en-
vironments where the claim that bound pronouns result from coincidental reference
with their antecedents seems to give the wrong predictions, namely, dependencies
in complex antecedents and dependencies in ellipsis sites. Both raise some rep-
resentational properties of binding that underlie the complementary distribution of
pronouns and reflexives; to be examined immediately afterwards.
The first environment in which the descriptive nature of bound pronouns can be
attested emerges when we consider utterances with complex antecedents (as pointed
out by Geach 1962). Consider the examples below:
(17) Binding by quantificational antecedents.
a. Every lawyer believes he is smart.
b. No mother thinks she is wrong.
7Note that in the Chomskyan tradition, (Chomsky, 1981; Heim and Kratzer, 1998; Bu¨ring, 2005;
Elbourne, 2005) the use of numerals as indices distinct from variables paves the way for a distinction
between syntactic and semantic binding, modulo a specific understanding of these terms.
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The examples above have a reading where the pronoun does not depend on any
antecedent (‘he’ refers to John and ‘she’ to Mary, say) as well as the bound reading.
The former will not be considered. Now, if pronominal binding reduced to referring
to whatever the antecedent refers to (see Evans, 1977), the cases above would be
difficult to explain. In the case of (17)a, the best candidate for this alleged reference
relation would be all the individuals belonging to the set of lawyers (in the model).
However, this misses an important point. (17)a does not express that all lawyers
think of themselves (as a collection) to be smart. It rather expresses that for each
lawyer, that lawyer thinks he is smart (and may be sceptical about the smartness of
other lawyers). Things are even more complicated for (17)b. The antecedent ‘No
mother’ does not refer to anything, so how can the pronoun be co-referential to it
8? Still, what is expressed by this second utterance is straightforward: there is no
individual such that this individual is a mother and thinks herself to be wrong.
These examples highlight an important interpretative property of bound uses;
one which is one of the hallmarks of Descriptiveness, namely:
Co-variation: the interpretation of the pronoun co-varies with another expression in
discourse.
If bound pronouns co-vary with other expressions in the utterance, no proposi-
tion about a specific entity (i.e. a singular proposition) is expressed. In short, the
presence of Co-variation entails Descriptiveness.
In addition to environments containing complex quantificational antecedents,
the idea that binding reduces to coincidental co-reference can be rejected, when
we consider evidence from VP ellipsis (∆ indicates unpronounced but interpreted
material, * ungrammatical/infelicitous utterances, and strikethrough reconstructed
material)9. Consider:
(18) John saw his sister and Bill did ∆, too.
a. John1 saw his1,i.e.John′s sister and Bill3 did see his1,i.e.John′s sister, too.
(strict)
b. John1 saw his1,i.e.John′s sister and Bill3 did see his3,i.e.Bill′s sister, too.
(sloppy)
c. John1 saw his4,i.e.Andrew′s sister and Bill3 did see his4,i.e.Andrew′s sister,
too. (identical deictic)
8Evans (1977) replies by assuming that the pronoun refers to the empty set.
9Focus can also be used to illustrate the same point, see Bu¨ring (2005).
27
d. *John1 saw his4,i.e.Andrew′s sister and Bill3 did see his5,i.e.Marc′s sister,
too. (different deictic)
According to the view that pronominal binding amounts to cases where the pro-
noun refers to whatever the antecedents refer to, sameness of indices does not entail
any structural constraint: it just indicates that two expressions co-refer in virtue
of the context, say. This assumes that linguistic information is completely neutral
with regards to the pronoun’s referential possibilities: the pronouns would induce a
variable like entity that could refer to anything in principle.
On the assumption that ellipsis is an operation where some linguistic material
is unpronounced but still interpreted, it is natural to take the reconstruction of the
elided fragment as having the same interpretative possibilities as the material it de-
pends on (against this claim, Fiengo and May 1994 argue for the idea that ellipsis
targets co-arguments). Now, if the copied structures were free to refer to anything,
the interpretation in (18)d would be possible. However, an utterance of (18) cannot
give rise to it. Thus, many have assumed that binding cannot merely be a by prod-
uct of ‘accidental’ co-reference. Rather, binding seems to exploit some structural
configuration between antecedent and pronoun which VP ellipsis is sensitive to. On
the basis of this claim, one could ask: under which conditions can a bound pronoun
co-vary with its antecedent? Consider the following binding possibilities:
(19) a. John2 loves himself2.
b. *John2 loves him2.
c. *John2 thinks Peter3 despises himself2.
d. John2 thinks Peter3 despises him2.
The pattern above is usually referred to as ‘the complementary distribution’ of pro-
nouns and reflexives. It indicates that some antecedents are accessible for binding
purposes depending on the type of pronominal expression (pronoun or reflexive
pronoun). This motivates the following interpretative property:
Accessibility (binding): Certain expressions/representations can provide antecedents
for (bound) pronouns, while others cannot.
As for the binding possibilities above, it seems that whether an expression is
accessible as a binder of a pronominal depends on the position it occupies in some
form of structure. In other words, the complementary distribution of pronouns and
reflexives is one of the early evidences for the commonly held assumption that lin-
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guistic representations are structured. Tree-like representations are one way to cap-
ture such structure, allowing the definition of constraints on the binding between
pronouns and their antecedents, as illustrated below (I am using a toy phrase struc-
ture loosely based on an old labelling system of transformational grammar, where
sentences, verb phrases and noun phrases are represented by their corresponding let-
ters. For the sake of simplicity, many important nodes, i.e. tense, complementiser,
have been omitted):
(20) Tree structure I S
NP[John1] VP
V[loves] NP [himself1/*him1]





The point is quite simple. Based on these structures, it is quite easy to see
that, in English, reflexive (‘self’) pronouns require a closer antecedent, whereas the
accessible referents of non reflexive pronouns cannot be that close.
In the tradition of generative grammar (Reinhart, 1976; Chomsky, 1981), the
distribution between pronouns and reflexives motivates the notion of c-command,
which was then used as one of the ingredients for capturing a plethora of phenomena
related to linguistic structure. Loosely following Reinhart (1976), a tree node A c-
commands a tree node B if and only if: (i) A is a different tree node from B, (ii) A
does not dominate B and B does not dominate A, and (iii) the first branching node
dominating A also dominates B. Domination occurs under node motherhood: if tree
node A has B and C as daughters, A dominates B and C. It is also transitive: if B
has E as daughter and A dominates B, then A dominates E.
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In our tree structures above, all potential antecedents - the NPs ‘John’ and ‘Pe-
ter’ c-command the pronouns. We go up one node from the NP and down in the
other direction in the tree as much as we like and we find the node that could be
occupied by ‘him’ or ‘himself’. Thus, although the notion of c-command captures
some hierarchical relation between antecedent and pronoun (remember, binding is
asymmetric) it is not sufficient for explaining the complementary distribution al-
luded to. In the generative tradition, this theoretical demand was met by principles
that invoked the notion of c-command in their formulation. Following Bu¨ring (2005,
ch. 1), the general format of such principles is:
General Form of Binding Theory: An expression class must (or must not) be bound
by a c-commanding or expression class within its domain.
Expression class includes pronouns (e.g. ‘him’), reflexives (‘himself’), and R-
expressions (i.e. full determiner phrases, such as ‘some man’, ‘that girl’ or ,‘John’).
Domain would be a part of the whole structure which binding principles seem
to be sensitive to: it aims to capture a notion of locality with regards to possi-
ble antecedents. In tree structure II, our toy tree labelling suggests that S (sentential
clause) might be a binding domain, but a more minimal constituent containing tense
information may be better suited. This allows the definitions of principles such as:
(22) Binding Principles (Chomsky, 1981)
(A) An anaphor (e.g. ‘himself’) must be bound in its binding domain.
(B) A pronoun (e.g. ‘he’) must not be bound in its binding domain.
(C) An R-expression (e.g ‘John’) must not be bound.
Rather simplistically, the binding principles correspond to the generative grammar-
ian’s way of capturing the Accessibility property of bound pronouns10 . It is by no
means the only way (see Pollard and Sag 1992 and also Kempson et al. 2001; Cann
et al. 2005 for alternatives).
The take home lesson that I would like to draw attention to is this. The com-
plementary distribution of pronouns and reflexives, which motivated Accessibility,
necessitates some form of structured representation that underlies not only binding
10I do not intend to debate on the most appropriate notion of expression or domain to be used in
the formulation of the principles nor on the status of these principles vis-a-vis the grammar architec-
ture. For example, Chomsky (1995) proposes that the principles should be explicable in terms of the
lexical properties of the expressions (pronouns, reflexives, r-expressions). Some have argued that
the binding patterns follow from more general principles of economy (Reinhart and Reuland, 1993;
Fox, 2000; Levinson, 2000).
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possibilities above but also the interpretation of VP ellipsis, and a variety of other
phenomena. In order to capture this structure, the Chomskyan used tree structures
to define the notion of c-command and formulated the binding principles using this
notion. These offer some characterisation of the structure underlying linguistic rep-
resentations11. Note, though, that trees themselves are not properly explained (and
are rather presupposed) by these theoretical elements. A proper explanation of tree-
structured representations will emerge in chapter 5. With all the properties of bound
pronouns in mind, let us now compare such uses to the pronominal uses reviewed
in previous sections.
From the discussion in this section, it is clear that bound uses are more similar
to identification-based descriptive uses than indexical uses in virtue of Descriptive-
ness. This was supported by the fact that bound uses co-vary with other expressions
in the utterance (Co-variation). However, this is what also makes bound uses dif-
ferent from descriptive uses. The latter do not seem to co-vary with anything in
previous discourse, nor seem to be subject to the Accessibility constraint that gov-
erns bound pronouns, which exploits linguistic structure unavailable in the case of
identification-based descriptive pronouns. On the other hand, bound pronouns do
not seem to display Identification Dependency as descriptive pronouns do. Some of
these claims will be revisited in the last sections of this chapter. Still, the conclusion
is that all the pronominal uses reviewed so far seem to be distinct phenomena. Let
us move now to the interpretative properties underlying unbound dependencies (i.e.
donkey pronouns).
1.5 Donkey pronouns
Donkey pronouns constitute a linguistic phenomenon whereby a pronoun depends
on an antecedent, but the nature of this relation cannot be easily explained in terms
of pronominal binding (as described in the previous section). The term ‘donkey
pronouns’, which I will use throughout and interchangeably with ‘unbound/cross-
sentential dependency/anaphora’, is an alternative terminology and was introduced
in the literature 12 due to the enormous quantity of examples involving donkeys, as
illustrated below (see Geach 1962; relevant dependencies in boldface):
(23) a. If a farmer owns a donkey, he feeds it.
b. Every farmer who owns a donkey feeds it.
11For the moment, I am neutral with regards to whether structure here is syntactic or semantic in
nature.
12Additional terminology includes ‘E-type pronouns’ (Evans, 1977).
31
c. A farmer bought a donkey. He feeds it.
Above, the interpretation of the pronoun ‘it’ depends on the antecedent ‘A don-
key’. Intuitively, the pronoun seems to co-vary with its antecedent. For example,
(23)b conveys that the donkeys which are fed covary with the farmers who own
them. Thus, like pronominal binding, donkey pronouns display Co-variation and
therefore also display Descriptiveness.
Despite the similarities between donkey and bound pronouns, the former can-
not be so easily reduced to instances of the latter. As reviewed in the previous
section, an explanation of the complementary distribution of (bound) pronouns and
reflexives (i.e. Accessibility) depends on some structural configuration between an-
tecedent and pronoun within the same structured representation). In the framework
of generative grammar (Chomsky, 1981), accessible binders would have to occupy a
node that c-commands the node where the pronoun sits. In (23)b, ‘a donkey’ occurs
in a relative clause that modifies the subject. This means that the first branching
node that dominates ‘a donkey’ does not dominate ‘it’: there is no c-command re-
lation. The example in (23)c illustrates this more dramatically, for the dependency
occurs across sentences. According to Chomsky (1986), grammar can be roughly
described as a set of rules (comprising an I-language) induced from the stimuli pro-
vided by a specific linguistic environment modulo a universal set of constraints (a
Universal Grammar). For him, the rules of this I-language are limited to the gener-
ation of well formed strings. This assumption 13 together with the assumption that
pronominal binding involves structural configurations described by the grammar
(see previous section) precludes the cross-sentential dependency in (23)c from be-
ing governed by grammatical principles and must be different from that of binding
proper.
The last point can also be made in frameworks different from generative gram-
mar. For example, if we attempt to treat the formal properties of language by trans-
lating a fragment of it into first order predicate logic (see Geach 1962 for an at-
tempt and an appraisal of the limitations involved), the same problem would arise.
The first string of (23)c would translate as [∃x ∃y (farmer(x) ∧ donkey(y) ∧
owns(x, y))] and the second as (feeds(x, y)). In the second formula the variables
occur free and in principle could not be bound by the quantifiers. Of course, one
could stipulate that quantifier scope has been extended, but this cannot be a matter
13Note that it is perfectly possible to reject a string based view of grammar even within the gen-
erative tradition, see Bu¨ring (2001) for the idea of discourse trees. The grammar model eventually
adopted to describe the data raised by descriptive pronouns, namely, Dynamic Syntax (Kempson
et al. 2001; Cann et al. 2005, described in my chapter 5) departs from this string-based view.
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of stipulation; we want a principled mechanism that can account for the conveyed
readings (see Kamp 1981, for an explanation based on the idea that meanings are
updates of representational states).
These remarks suggest that donkey pronouns do not relate to their antecedents
in the same way as bound pronouns do. Three environments reinforce this claim
(i.e. that donkey pronouns do not display Accessibility (binding)). Consider:
(24) Negative quantifiers
a. No lawyer thinks he earns enough.
b. *No lawyer earns enough. He does work, though.
(25) Incremental and (occasionally) maximal interpretations
a. A donkey thinks it is happy.
b. If a farmer feeds a donkey, it gets happy.
In (24), the quantifier ‘no lawyer’ can be an antecedent for a bound pronoun but not
for a donkey pronoun. Moreover, in (25)a ‘it’ seems to have existential force, that
is, conveys that there is an individual that is a donkey and thinks to be happy. The
utterance could describe a situation where not all donkeys think they are happy. In
(25)b, on the other hand, ‘it’ seems to have universal force, that is, it is interpreted as
all the donkeys a certain farmer feeds get happy. This asymmetry was prominently
noted by Evans (1977) and Cooper (1979) and it suggests two interrelated points.
The first concerns the cardinality of the interpretation induced by the dependent
pronoun. In bound cases, the pronoun seems to be entirely governed by the quan-
tificational force of the antecedent (‘it’ in (25)a is interpreted as some donkey via
quantifier binding). In cases of cross-sentential anaphora, the pronoun, although de-
pendent on antecedents with certain quantificational force, may14 express readings
about the maximum number of entities in the relevant set (i.e. maximal or universal
readings: ‘it’ in (25)b is interpreted as all the donkeys fed by a certain farmer). This
is yet another reason for rejecting the naive translation in first order predicate logic
suggested a few paragraphs above. If donkey pronouns were bound by existential
quantifiers, this interpretative effect could not be accounted for. The second point is
related to the incremental nature of donkey pronouns (described as ‘e-type’ effects,
after Evans 1977). While the interpretation of bound uses seem to rely solely on
that of their antecedents, donkey pronouns seem to pack a lot of information from
14They must not express such readings. Consider: ‘If a farmer owns a donkey and beats it, he will
be prosecuted’ (Breheny, 1999). Here, ‘it’ depends on ‘a donkey’, but it does not seem that all the
donkeys must be beaten in order for their owner to be prosecuted.
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previous discourse, that is, ‘it’ in (25)b is not only interpreted as the donkey, but ac-
tually the donkey which is fed by a certain farmer. Evans (1977) and Cooper (1979)
account for these properties by postulating that donkey pronouns are disguised defi-
nite descriptions (i.e. e- or d- type theories of unbound dependencies), which under
certain theories (e.g. Russell 1905) are maximal quantifiers15. Many have built on
this proposal (e.g. Neale 1990; Heim 1990; Elbourne 2005).
Thus, it seems that donkey pronouns cannot be reduced to bound cases because
they differ with respect to how their antecedents are accessible. One could go further
and argue that donkey pronouns do not related to their antecedents in any formal
way, but this would be a hasty conclusion. As early as Postal (1969), the following
type of example was used to illustrate that the relations between donkey pronoun
and antecedent are rather intricate:
(26) a. Every man who has a wife should bring her to the party.
b. #?Every married man should bring her to the party (intended reading: as
(a) above).
(27) a. Followers of McCarthy are now puzzled by his intentions (from Postal
1969, 213).
b. #?McCarthyites are now puzzled by his intentions (intended reading: as
(a) above).
Such cases motivate the following argument. If there were no formal relation-
ship between antecedents and donkey pronouns, the utterances in (b) could be used
to express what the utterances in (a) do. Since the consequent of this conditional
statement is not true, there must be a formal relationship between pronoun and an-
tecedent (known as the formal link condition, after Kadmon 1987). The first attempt
in the literature to capture what this formal relationship is comes from Postal (1969),
below:
Anaphoric Island Constraint: An anaphorically dependent pronoun must have: (i)
an overt NP antecedent (ii) that is not part of a word.
15For Russell, the meaning of The F is G corresponds to ∃x (F (x) ∧ ∀y (F (y) → x = y) ∧
G(x)). This formula contains three different assertions: (i) that there is an F (Existence), (ii) that
at most one thing is F (Uniqueness), and (iii) that everything that is F is G (Maximality). Strawson
(1950) followed up by arguing that some of these components (Uniqueness) should hold at the level
of what the utterance presupposes rather than asserts. See Elbourne (2005) for an updated version
of the Strawsonian position.
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Condition (i) of the constraint is meant to rule out (26)b and condition (ii) (27)b.
Note that Postal’s constraint also applies to bound cases. However, bound uses ad-
ditionally require a c-commanding antecedent, whereas donkey cases do not. This
goes to show that the Accessibility feature seems to be relative to the kind of depen-
dency. Bound pronouns require accessible antecedents that occur in certain posi-
tions within the structure of the string itself. Donkey pronouns require antecedents
that are less stringently described. In conclusion, both bound and donkey uses seem
to display Accessibility, although the ways in which antecedents are available are
specific to each case. Whether Postal’s anaphoric constraint figures in the right char-
acterisation of the Accessibility properties of donkey pronouns will be discussed in
the section on the extended properties of identification-based descriptive uses and
in chapter 3.
At this point, the properties of donkey uses should be compared to the other
pronominal data reviewed previously. Like bound pronouns, donkey cases are sim-
ilar to identification-based descriptive cases in virtue of Descriptiveness. However,
the similarities seem to stop here. On the one hand, identification-based descrip-
tive uses do not depend on any antecedent in previous discourse, simply because
there is not any. On the other hand, donkey cases do not seem to depend on the
identification of an individual in the environment or context in a broad sense of
the term (a property that indexical and identification-based descriptive uses might
share). As the examples in (26) and (27) indicate, donkey pronouns might depend
solely on a linguistically given antecedent. Therefore, let us assume for now that
donkey pronouns and descriptive pronouns that rely on singling out a contextually
salient object are different phenomena. This tentative conclusion will be revisited
in the section on the extended properties of the data. We now turn to other cases
that might be similar to descriptive uses, namely, generic pronouns.
1.6 Pronouns and generics
There is another phenomenon that might be similar to descriptive uses of pronouns:
genericity. In some generic uses, the pronoun is interpreted as a bare plural noun
(Carlson, 1977). Nunberg (1993, 12) compares some descriptive interpretations of
‘we’ to uses which Carlson (1977) analyses as bare plurals. For example, in the
same way that in (28), below, ‘we’ can be interpreted as women, O’Connor’s use
of ‘we’ in (2), reprinted below as (29)a, can be interpreted as American Supreme
Court Justices. That is, the same bare plural construction that seems to be available
for the generic use, below, also could be used for the descriptive case. Consider:
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(28) Generic Use
a. Said by a woman: We contract less diseases than men (based on Carl-
son 1977).
b. Women contract less diseases than men.
(29) Descriptive uses as generics
a. US Supreme Court O’Connor saying: We might have been liberals
(Nunberg, 1993, 14-15).
b. American Supreme Court Justices might have been liberals.
The idea is this. Since pronouns can be used in generic statements conveying
bare plural interpretations, as in (28), the descriptive feel of descriptive uses might
result from a similar interpretative process, as suggested in (29). Although to some
speakers (Robyn Carston, personal communication) the information in (29)b does
not quite capture what is expressed by (29)a, we must evaluate the approximation
between generics and descriptive uses from a theoretical standpoint. In order to do
so, we must first understand what generics are, besides being uses that can convey
bare plural readings.
Essentially, generic statements express certain generalisations. The speaker of
(28) seems to express that, in general, women contract less diseases than men. Sim-
ilar expressive power can be attained by uses of adverbs such as ‘usually’, ‘gener-
ally’, or, better yet, ‘roughly’. Adding any of these to the generic statement above
would not change its truth-conditions. Such generalisations, however, are not so
easily captured in terms of quantification. The statement in (28) is true even though
not all women satisfy the predicate: some of them might contract diseases quite
easily16. In short, the relevant generalisations are immune to counter examples and
seem to be connected to certain stereotypical properties of the relevant individuals
or kinds, as, for example, women’s tendency to take better care of their health, diet
and well being. This is supported by the observation that genericity is connected
to ‘well-established’ or ‘essential’ properties. Consider the following example (at-
tributed to Barbara Partee by Carlson 1977):
(30) a. The coke bottle has a narrow neck.
b. ?The green bottle has a narrow neck.
16In many cases, the relevant generalisation does not seem to be true of most members of a class.
For example, the generic statements ‘Mosquitoes carry diseases’ might be true even though only 25
% of mosquitoes carry diseases.
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In (30)a the generic reading is quite salient, whereas in (30)b, it seems that the
speaker is talking about a unique bottle. Thus, the first property that generic uses
seem to display is:
Expressive Genericity: Generic uses express generalisations about the relevant in-
dividuals or kinds that seem to be immune to certain counter examples and are
connected to stereotypical or well established properties.
The definition above suggests another property of generics. They can be used
to refer to either individuals or the kind to which they pertain. The two forms of
reference are described as individual vs stage level generics (Carlson, 1977) or I- vs
D- generics (Krifka, 1987). Consider the pronominal/bare plural uses below:
(31) Reference to individuals or kinds
a. They [pointing to tigers]/Tigers are striped.
b. They [pointing to tigers]/Tigers are extinct.
In (31)a, ‘they’ or ‘tigers’ refer to the individuals that belong to the kind tiger
and predicates that they are striped. In (31)b, this form of reference is not possi-
ble: it is not the individuals that are extinct (they can only be dead), but the kind
itself, tigerness, say, that cannot be found around the globe. Now the kind-denoting
ability of generics has a lot of interesting features. To begin with, establishing the
relevant kind does not depend only on the encoded information of the noun (e.g.
‘tiger’) or the concept that emerges in the perceptual experience (e.g. TIGER). For
example, in the generic interpretation of an utterance of ‘Tigers are extinct’, the
speaker might not convey that all tigers are extinct, but that a sub-class of tigers, say,
Caspian tigers, are (these are taxonomic readings according to Krifka 1987, which
has strong similarities to the process of enrichment or narrowing in the post Gricean
pragmatics literature, see Sperber and Wilson 1996; Recanati 1993; Carston 1997,
2002). Moreover, the kind-denoting and individual-denoting generic statements
have different entailment patterns. For example (see Carlson and Pelletier 1995),
on individual denoting interpretations, if ‘Caspian Tigers are on the front lawn’ is
true, so is ‘Tigers are on the front lawn’ (e.g. a set to superset). However, kind-
denoting interpretations have the reverse entailment patterns, if ‘Tigers are extinct’
is true, so is ‘Caspian Tigers are extinct’ (e.g. set to subset). Thus, the following
property is motivated.
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Reference to Individuals or Kinds: Generic statements can refer to either individuals
or kinds, each of these having different entailment patterns.
Finally, generic statements seem to be associated with information conveyed
by tense. That is, the expressed generalisations seem to range over a significant
number of instances. If the utterance used describes a specific event (i.e. episodic
utterances), a generic statement cannot be made. Consider the contrast below (Carl-
son and Pelletier, 1995, 12):
(32) Episodic utterances: The/An Italian/Italians/Luigi is (are) drinking wine
with his dinner.
(33) Non-episodic utterances: The/An Italian/Italians/Luigi drink(s) wine with
his dinner.
Generic reading of the utterances in (32) are not possible, whereas generic read-
ings of the present tense utterances in (33) are. The following property seems to be
motivated.
Event Neutrality: Generic statements can only be made by utterances that do not
describe specific eventualities or situations.
The two sets of examples above also illustrate that generic statements are rel-
atively neutral with respect to the type of determiner used: plurals, definites, in-
definites and proper names can convey similar readings. This could be formulated
as a separate property known as Determiner Neutrality, but I would formulate this
here for a simple reason. Given the properties of generics reviewed in this section,
namely, Expressive Genericity, Reference to Individuals or Kinds and Event Neu-
trality, generic and descriptive interpretations seem to be quite different phenomena.
The descriptive interpretations in section 1.2, do not seem to express generalisations
that are immune to counter examples, denote kinds, nor are neutral with regards to
the eventualities described by their utterances. We will now move to an assessment
of the relationship between identification-based descriptive uses and metonymy.
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1.7 Descriptive pronouns and metonymy: preliminary
remarks
Given the indirect relationship between the individual salient in the context (e.g.
the footprint) and the interpretation (e.g. the footprint maker), identification-based
descriptive pronouns bear strong similarities to metonymy and hence we should
consider whether the former is an instance of the latter. Roughly, metonymy is ‘a
figure [of speech] in which one word is substituted for another on the basis of some
material, causal, or conceptual relation’ (Brogan et al. 1993, quoted in Papafragou
1996, 169; square brackets mine). Typical substitutions include event - cause, object
- possessor, artefact - creator, concrete entities - abstract properties they exemplify.
As an illustration, consider Nunberg’s famous metonymy example:
(34) In a restaurant, the waiter warns the cook: The ham sandwich is getting
restless. (Nunberg, 1978, 186)
Here the use of ‘the ham sandwich’ contributes the ham sandwich orderer to what
is communicated, where the culinary item and the person who ordered it would be
connected via some form of (contiguity or causal) relation. It is important to observe
that the same interpretation can be conveyed by a descriptive use of the pronoun in
the right context. Consider:
(35) In a restaurant, the waiter warns the cook: He [pointing to the ham sand-
wich] is getting restless.
Arguably, the identification of the ham sandwich provides the audience with a men-
tal representation about it (e.g. a HAM SANDWICH concept) that provides a gateway
to the interpretation the ham sandwich orderer. Note that in (34) the same thing
might occur, the only difference is that the relevant representation (e.g. the HAM
SANDWICH concept) emerges via the lexical properties of the words ‘ham sand-
wich’. Thus, identification-based descriptive pronouns could be regarded as a form
of identification-based (as opposed to lexical) metonymy.
Given the possibility of non-literal interpretations, one could ask which con-
stituents in an utterance are interpreted figuratively. As Recanati (2004, 34-36)
points out, the utterance below allows for two non-literal interpretations, in (a) and
(b), respectively.
(36) The city is asleep.
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a. The inhabitants of the city are asleep.
b. The city is quiet.
Prima facie, either argument or predicate (verb) could be, in principle, non-literal
interpretations. That is, ‘the city’ could be metonymically interpreted as referring
to its inhabitants, as in (36)a, or ‘is asleep’ could be non-literally interpreted as
denoting the property of being quiet, as in (36)b (to some, e.g. Robyn Carston,
p.c., the latter seems to be more like a case of metaphor than metonymy). If the
observation is correct, many of the descriptive uses mentioned so far could be de-
scribed as behaving like proper indexicals combined to predicates that have been
interpreted non-literally. This strategy is somewhat counter-intuitive for many, if
not all, descriptive uses of third person singular pronouns lack an obvious literal
interpretation (e.g. ‘He [pointing to a footprint in the ground] must be a giant’,
where the context lacks a suitable referent). Descriptive uses of plural pronouns
(e.g. Justice O’Connor saying ‘We might have been liberals’) are problematic, be-
cause even though a literal interpretation of the pronoun is possible (i.e. the actual
American Supreme Court Justices), the metonymic interpretation of the predicate is
unclear. For example, which figurative interpretation of ‘might have been liberals’
could have been intended by the speaker? Still, the assumption that the predicate
is interpreted in a non-standard way17 could work for some descriptive uses of the
first person singular pronoun, as argued by Nunberg (1995). His crucial example is
this:
(37) Driver holding a set of car keys: I’m parked out back (Nunberg, 1995,
111).
The interpretative options are the following: ‘I’ could be interpreted descriptively
as the car or ‘to be parked out back’ could be interpreted, metonymically, as denot-
ing the property of being a driver whose car is parked out back. Nunberg (1995)
proposes four tests aimed to show that the second option is the right one: (i) predi-
cate coordination, (ii) apposition insertion, (iii) agreement, and (iv) substitution by
descriptions or names. Let us take a look at these tests and assess whether they can
be used to support the claim that the descriptive feel of certain utterances containing
pronouns emerge from non-standard interpretations of the verb (based on Barrios
2011). Consider:
17I prefer to describe such cases as being non-standard rather than non-literal, because drawing
the literal/non-literal is a theoretical matter. Ways in which this distinction can be drawn will be
discussed properly in chapter 2. As I shall argue later, descriptive pronouns are not cases of non-
literal meaning, but they might be classified as ‘non-standard’ in an intuitive way.
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(38) Predicate Coordination (judgement in Nunberg 1995, 111):
a. I am parked out back and have been waiting for 15 minutes.
b. *I am parked out back and may not start.
Above, it seems that we can coordinate a structure which describes the referent of
‘I’, but if we try to co-ordinate a structure which involves the descriptive interpre-
tation of the pronoun, the resulting utterance is infelicitous. Nunberg (1995) argues
that this shows that it is the predicate that is not interpreted in its standard way.
Moreover, consider the insertion of appositions.
(39) Apposition Insertion (Barrios, 2011, sect. 6) A guest who has not been
exposed to the weather to a parking valet: I’m coated with ice.
a. I, the blue Chevrolet, am coated with ice (based on Mount 2008).
b. *I, the hostess’ husband, am coated with ice (where the intended read-
ing describes the guest’s car).
In this case, we cannot insert appositions that modifies the standard interpretation
of the pronoun. It is interesting to note that the apposition test appears to present
the opposite pattern to the co-ordination test above (although, see Nunberg 1993,
39-40, ex. 87-88). However, Nunberg could claim that the apposition is some-
how connected to the predicate. That is, (39)a would be interpreted as John is the
blue Chevrolet coated with ice, where John is the referent of the pronoun and the
predicate ‘to be’ is interpreted in a non standard manner (i.e. to be the owner of ).
Applying the same strategy to (39)b results in John is the hostess’s husband coated
with ice, which might be fine (although a bit weird) on its own and does not trigger a
non-standard interpretation. Therefore, this choice of words would not be very well
suited to convey the intended reading. Let us now turn to agreement phenomena.
(40) Agreement (based on the Italian equivalent of ‘I’m parked out back’).
a. Said by a male Italian speaker: Io sono parcheggiato[1st.person,sing.,masc.]
dietro.
b. Said by a male Italian speaker: *Io sono parcheggiata[1st.person,sing.,fem.]
dietro.
Based on the contrast above, Nunberg (1995) proposes the following argument.
If the pronoun were interpreted descriptively (similarly to the interpretation of ‘la
macchina’fem. (the car) in Italian), the predicate ‘to be parked’ would have to agree
with it. This is invisible in languages with a poor inflectional system, like English,
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but more visible in languages with a richer system, as in Italian. Since agreement
patterns with the gender of the referent of ‘I’, the pronoun seems to be interpreted
as an indexical, leaving the predicate to be interpreted in a non-standard manner
(e.g. to be the owner of a car parked out back). Finally, consider the test where the
pronoun is substituted by a description or name that determines the same object in
the context it would normally pick out.
(41) Substitutions by descriptions and names (examples and judgements in Nun-
berg 1995, 111-2).
a. *The key I’m holding is parked out back.
b. The man with the cigar (Mr. McDowell, etc.) is parked out back.
In this case, Nunberg argues that if the pronoun is interpreted in a non-standard
way, that is, via the identification of an individual in the context, which is then
connected to a related description, we could replace the pronoun by an expression
which determines a contextually salient object (the car keys) that is related to the
relevant interpretation (the car) without any problems. As (a) indicates, this is
not possible. The only possible substitution is by an expression that determines
the same referent as determined by ‘I’, as indicated by (b). This shows that the
referent of the pronoun remains constant, ruling out the possibility of a descriptive
pronominal interpretation.
At this point it is worth assessing the strategy presented so far. First, it is im-
portant to point out that is applies only to a small subset of the relevant expressions
(only instances of first person singular pronouns), so even if plausible the range of
the approach is quite limited. Second, the approach is motivated by a series of tests
intended to rule out descriptive interpretations of the pronoun. In this respect, the
tests face some methodological issues. If we consider more examples, we see that
the results they give are inconclusive. Let us begin by considering the following
example of co-ordination:
(42) Celebrity whose statue is at Madame Tussaud’s: I’m (located) in floor 2
and mad at the visitors/paparazzi (Barrios, 2011, sect. 6).
In this example, it could be argued that the pronoun is interpreted as the statue of
a certain celebrity in the first conjunct and as the specific celebrity who uttered the
sentence in the second, Madonna, say. The conjunction test is simply inconclusive.
This also seems to be the case for the apposition test. Consider:
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(43) Said by a guest to the parking valet: I, the/an excellent tipper, am coated
with ice (Barrios, 2011, sect. 6).
Here, the appositive clause seems to describe the guest who uttered the sentence
and is an excellent tipper, but ‘coated with ice’ cannot possibly be predicated of the
same individual, which triggers some sort of non standard interpretation.
For presentation purposes, the remaining two tests will be discussed in other
parts of the thesis. The reason for this is that they connect to broader issues in se-
mantics and pragmatics. The agreement phenomenon mentioned by Nunberg seems
to reflect certain perspectival elements of language use to be described in the next
section (on the extended properties of descriptive pronouns). As we shall see there,
the tests cannot be used in an argument in the way suggested by Nunberg. Finally,
the substitution patterns that Nunberg employs are an instance of a broadly Gricean
picture on the distinction between two levels of information: one governed by con-
ventional (encoded) information, another by norms on cooperative communicative
behaviour. As we shall see in the argument against the non-conversational status
of descriptive uses, chapter 2 section 2.2.2, the way Nunberg draws this distinc-
tion (following Grice 1967) faces certain problems and hence cannot be used in his
argument.
The tentative conclusions of this section is this. Descriptive pronouns seem to be
quite similar to instances of metonymy, where the concept that is related to the in-
tended interpretation is provided visually rather than linguistically. Moreover, there
is no knock down argument against the idea that first person singular pronouns can
convey descriptive interpretations. Note, however, that there is also no argument
against the idea that these expressions are interpreted indexically, whilst the pred-
icates they combine with are interpreted in some figurative way (Nunberg, 1995).
These positions, therefore, stand on equal ground until further interpretative prop-
erties are brought to light. Building on the review of the pronominal data and the
different ways to capture the descriptive interpretations mentioned so far, it is now
time to present the extended data of descriptive pronouns.
1.8 Descriptive pronouns: the extended properties
So far in this chapter, the core features of identification-based descriptive uses
of pronouns have been reviewed as well as a variety of other pronominal uses.
Roughly, descriptive uses seem to exploit the conceptual identification of an in-
dividual in the context in order to express descriptive information related to it. Such
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information does not appear to be regulated by any grammatically given structure
and rather depends on extra-linguistic processes. Bound and donkey uses of pro-
nouns, on the other hand, seem to depend on information that occurs in previous
discourse (antecedents), whose availability may be subject to an explanation that is
grammatical in nature (i.e. structural constraints on antecedent representations like
c-command and similar notions). In this section, we will take a look at the possible
interactions between information that emerges from extra-linguistic processes (vi-
sual identification) and linguistic structure. In doing so, a new set of properties of
identification-based descriptive uses will emerge.
To begin with, let us look at the relations between pronominal binding and de-
scriptive uses of pronouns. As mentioned in section 1.4, bound pronouns require
accessible antecedents in the same utterance that occur at a specific position in a
hierarchical structure (e.g. tree representation). Reflexives (‘self’) pronouns re-
quire antecedents that are ‘closer’ to the position of the pronoun when compared
to non-reflexive (bare) pronouns. Now, given that in identification-based descrip-
tive uses, content emerges extra-linguistically, we can ask two questions. First, can
descriptive uses be antecedents to bound uses? Second, can descriptive uses pro-
vide content for pronouns that are bound by other antecedents in the clause? With
regards to the first question, consider a modified version of the car scenario (10),
below.
(44) Ann and Matt pass by a sports car with the sentence ‘I’m the greatest’
written on its windshield:
a. Ann says to Matt: He [pointing to the car] adores himself.
b. Matt to Ann: Yeah, he [pointing to the car] believes he is better than
other people.
In this scenario, the first occurrence of the pronoun ‘he’ seems to be interpreted
in each utterance as the owner of the car, which binds the reflexive pronoun ‘him-
self’ in (44)a and the second occurrence of the pronoun ‘he’ in (44)b. In short,
identification-based descriptive uses can provide antecedents for bound pronouns
in the same way indexical uses can18. Regarding our second question things are
more complicated. Consider:
(45) Ann and Matt are in a wedding shop browsing through the items.
18It is important to observe that binding can target non standard interpretations, for example we
could imagine contexts where utterances of ‘Every flower4 adores herself4’ and ‘Every flower4
thinks she4 will win the contest’, where ‘every flower’ can be metonymically linked to girls with
flower t-shirts, say, or metaphorically interpreted as every pretty girl, for example.
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a. Matt to Ann: Every groom thinks his bride is worth dying for.
b. Matt to Ann: Every groom thinks *she/ ?his [pointing to a wedding
dress] is worth dying for.
In (45)a, the quantifier ‘Every groom’ binds the NP ‘his bride’. We could imagine
that a similar interpretation could arise via the gesture towards the wedding dress
in (45)b. If the pronoun of choice is in nominative form (e.g. ‘she’) the bound
interpretation conveyed by the descriptive use (i.e. his bride) does not seem to be
possible. I tried to come up with similar examples where this form of binding is
established, but did not succeed19. But if we change to the genitive form (from
‘she’ to ‘his’), the bound reading becomes much more salient. This might be due
to the fact the genitive can be re-analysed in terms of definite descriptions that need
contextual completion (Partee and Borschev, 1998), that is, ‘his’ can be re-analysed
in terms of the N R x, where N is a place holder for a nominal (e.g. book), R a place
holder for a relation between the unique satisfier of that nominal and the value of
the pronoun (e.g. authorship), and x is a place holder for a variable or an index that
can be bound or assigned to an individual. Given this structure, a bound reading
is possible (i.e. each groom4 thinks the bride of 4 is worth dying for). Still, some
native speakers suggest that (45)b (with ‘his’ instead of ‘she’), is only marginally
acceptable. As we shall see shortly, Jacobson (2000) has an example which shows
that simpler cases of descriptive uses may be bound by antecedents.
Given this inconclusive result, it is worth taking a look at the relationship be-
tween identification-based descriptive uses and other forms of dependency; more
specifically, donkey anaphora. According to section 1.5, unbound dependencies
(e.g. ‘Every farmer who owns a donkey feeds it’) seem to be more structurally re-
laxed than pronominal binding as they do not require an antecedent that occurs in
a particular configuration in the structure (such as one involving c-command, say).
As before, let us ask two questions. First, can descriptive uses be antecedents to
donkey interpretations? Second, can descriptive uses provide content for donkey
pronouns that co-vary with other antecedents? Apparently, they can. For the sake
of simplicity, let us consider an example which may provide an answer to the second
question.
(46) Dependent descriptive pronouns
19Thanks to Robyn Carston, Nicholas Allott, Dirk Bury and Matthew Reeve (personal commu-
nications) for feedback. For reasons of space, examples that confirm this trend will not be stated
here.
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Andy and Martha are talking about the killing of Osama Bin-Laden as they stroll
around Washington DC. They walk past the White House and hop on a departing
bus (relevant dependencies in bold-face).
a. Martha: So, do you think a country has the right to kill an unarmed man?
b. Andy: Well...Every time there is a war, he [pointing to the White House]
has tough choices to make.
Intuitively, ‘he’ in (46)b is interpreted as the American president, which depends on
‘Every time there is a war’ (an adverbial modifier). The utterance communicates
that for each time a war is being waged, the American president in that time has
tough choices to make. This shows that the identification of an individual in the
context can provide content, which establishes dependencies on other expressions
in the utterance. This phenomenon has been first noticed by Jacobson (2000, 89):
a speaker who utters ‘Do most faculty members deposit it [waving a paycheck] in
the credit union?’ conveys an interpretation where the paychecks co-vary according
to the faculty members. These cases (known as deep anaphora) differ from cases
such as (46) in one important aspect though. In the former, the concept used in
the identification of the individual (e.g. PAYCHECK) is the one that figures in the
interpretation, whereas in the latter, this relation is indirect: the concept used in the
identification (e.g. WHITE HOUSE) serves as a gateway to the concept that figures
in the interpretation (e.g. PRESIDENT), making these uses similar to metonymy.
Nevertheless, descriptive uses (and also donkey and deep anaphora) display Co-
variation, reprinted below:
Co-variation: the interpretation of the pronoun co-varies with another expression in
discourse.
If the intuitions are correct, what seems to be explaining the co-variation in
this case is some sort of time (or eventuality) variable: for every war time t, the
president in t has tough choices to make in t. Stanley and Szabo´ (2000) famously
argued that in order for such bindings to occur, the relevant variable (e.g. t) would
have to occur as part of the grammatical representation (or logical form, LF) of the
utterance or as a result of mandatory processes of the language faculty. Without
going into details, Stanley and Szabo´ seem to take grammatical representations
as the outputs of (i) a rule based system that (ii) is obligatory in nature. If this
strategy is pursued, pronouns would contribute at least two kinds of variables: an
individual variable (bound by quantification over individuals, e.g. ‘Every man’)
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and a time/event/situation variable (bound by quantification over times, locations,
eventualities, etc; e.g. ‘every war-time’). In chapter 5, I propose a grammar model
that can account for binding of the relevant event variables via optional rules (see
Martı´, 2006) that manipulate extra-linguistic content.
Going back to the first question, in addition to the fact that descriptive pro-
nouns can depend on other expressions in discourse, these uses can also provide
antecedents for donkey pronouns. Consider:
(47) Descriptive pronouns as antecedents (relevant dependencies in boldface)
a. Someone at a jazz festival: In many concerts, if she [pointing to a
saxophone] does not have enough power in her lungs, she ruins it.
b. As a reply to why in certain rural parts of the country people do not
drink alcohol: In most villages, if he [pointing to a church] says
something is a sin, then townspeople will avoid it (Klaus Abels, p.c.).
In (47)a, ‘she’ (in boldface) seems to be interpreted as the saxophone player. The
interpretation co-varies with the interpretation induced by another expression in
the utterance, namely ‘many concerts’, (i.e. the concerts would determine the sax
players in them) and also provides an interpretation for the pronoun ‘it’, namely,
the concert at which a specific sax player performs20. Similarly, in (47)b, ‘he’ is
interpreted as the priest, which co-varies with the adverbial ‘in most villages’ (each
village determining priests in them) and also figures in the interpretation of the
pronoun ‘it’, namely, the thing that the priest in a particular village said is sinful
(see the comments about the incremental nature of donkey pronoun interpretation
in section 1.5 due to Evans 1977).
These examples carry interesting consequences. Donkey pronouns seem to dis-
play Accessibility: certain expressions can provide antecedents for (donkey) pro-
nouns, while others cannot. If descriptive uses can be (accessible) antecedents for
donkey pronouns, then any principled explanation of what counts as an accessible
antecedent must include interpretations that are not provided linguistically. This in
fact runs against a trend in the literature since Postal (1969) (and followed by Evans
1977; Kamp 1981; Kadmon 1987; Heim 1990; Chierchia 1992; Elbourne 2001,
2005 among many others) that assumes that the antecedents of donkey pronouns
can only be available formally, that is, in terms of linguistic structure (to be further
20Similarly to what was stated in the previous footnote and in section 1.7, pronominal dependen-
cies can exploit non-literal interpretations of the antecedents. For example, we could replace the
first occurrence of ‘she’ and the associated demonstration by the description ‘the saxophone’, which
would be interpreted as the saxophone player (a case of metonymy) and provide the value of the
second occurrence of ‘it’ in the utterance.
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discussed in chapter 3). In section 1.5, this trend was motivated by the contrast in
examples, such as (26), reprinted here as:
(48) a. Every man who has a wife should bring her to the party.
b. #?Every married man should bring her to the party (intended reading: as
(a) above).
Postal explained this contrast in terms of a grammatical constraint: antecedents
must be (i) overt NPs (ii) that are not word-parts. However, the uses in (47) are not
the only counter-examples to this constraint. As argued by many since Anderson
(1971) (Cooper, 1979; Breheny, 1999; Jacobson, 2000; Patel et al., 2009), there are
cases that have the form of (48)b, but seem to be perfectly fine. Consider a few
examples (boldface indicate dependencies):
(49) a. When the baby threw-up, did you find any pencil eraser in it (Ander-
son, 1971)?
b. Every iphone owner uses it for browsing (Patel et al., 2009).
In (49)a, we have an antecedent that is not an NP, and in (49)b one that is part of
a word.In summary, donkey pronouns as well as descriptive pronouns may have
similar Accessibility properties. I also leave a full assessment of a possible unifica-
tion between such uses for chapters 3 and 5. For now, I believe we have data that
motivates the following interpretative property.
Accessibility (identification-based): Certain mental representations can provide the
right interpretations for (descriptive) pronouns, while others cannot.
The similarities between this formulation of Accessibility and Connection (an
explanation of how the mental representations used to identify the contextually
salient individual supply the right descriptive interpretation) are remarkable. This
may suggest that deriving the only component in the explanation of how the de-
scriptive interpretations emerge boils down to a description of how the ‘antecedent’
representation emerges though processes of visual identification (e.g. an IPHONE
concept making a MOBILE PHONE USER concept available, say). The suggestion
is misleading for the following reason. Constraints of a grammatical nature may
be involved in the right account of the Accessibility property of descriptive uses.
Consider the following examples, which as far as I know, have not been discussed
anywhere in the literature.
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(50) Anaphoric impossibilities of descriptive pronouns (boldface indicates po-
tential dependencies)
a. Said by someone: ‘A/The condemned prisoner is traditionally al-
lowed a last meal. He is also allowed to invite close friends for the
execution’.
b. Said by a condemned prisoner: ‘I am traditionally allowed a last meal.
* ‘He [said by same speaker]/ He [said by different speaker] is also
allowed to invite close friends for the execution’.
c. Said by someone: ‘If the Democrats had won the last few presidential
elections, the American Supreme Court Justices might have been
liberals. They would guard public interest better’.
d. Said by Supreme Court Justice O’Connor: ‘If the Democrats had won
the last few presidential elections, we might have been liberals. *They
[said by same speaker]/They [said by different speaker]/?We [said by
same speaker] would guard public interest better’.
In (50)a, the pronoun ‘he’ can refer back to ‘a/the condemned prisoner’, but in (50)b
where the speaker’s use of ‘I’ conveys the condemned prisoner, the speaker’s use of
‘he’ cannot refer back to the interpretation. Similarly, in (50)c, the pronoun ‘they’
can refer back to the description ‘the US Supreme Court Justices’, but if O’Connor’s
uses ‘we’ to convey the US Supreme Court Justices, she cannot use ‘they’ to refer
to that interpretation. She could, possibly, use ‘we’ to do so, at best, and convey
something similar to a conjunction of descriptive uses, as suggested by Andreas
Stokke (p.c.). This is surprising, given the fact that third-person pronouns ‘he’ and
‘they’ allegedly can depend on virtually any kind of information that is sufficiently
salient, as all the examples of descriptive uses and the ones in (49) illustrate so well.
The pressing issue now is to determine what explains this asymmetry.
There seems to be two factors at play here. First, as indicated by (50), if we
change the speaker of the dependent pronoun, the anaphoric relations are possible
(this was suggested to me by Nathan Klinedinst, p.c.). It seems then that the match-
ing of personal features in the example above captures some sort of perspective from
which the interpretation is determined. This kind of perspectival shift also seems to
be one of the hallmarks of multi-participant utterances. Consider (from Purver et al.
2010):
(51) Multi-party dialogue
a. Speaker A: Did you give me back...
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b. Speaker B: your penknife? It’s on the table.
c. Speaker C: I heard a shout. Did you...
d. Speaker D: Burn myself? No, luckily.
These data shows uses where ‘me’ in (51)a binds ‘your knife’ in (51)b and ‘you’ in
(51)c binds ‘myself’ in (51)d. The examples have peculiar features. First, it shows
that anaphoric dependencies can be established across speakers, which suggests that
operations of the grammar can target a common stock of representations available
in the context. It also creates certain difficulties for a string based view of gram-
matical operations (Chomsky, 1986), for, in one of cases above, the string would be
formed by the concatenations of (51)a and (51)b, resulting in ‘Did you give me back
your penknife?’. Now if grammar were to describe this string, the bound reading
intended by the speakers would be lost, indicating that the dependencies are estab-
lished at a richer representational level: one targeted by the entities determined by
the uses of the pronouns above, perhaps.
The multi-party dialogue above shows that certain anaphoric relations can hap-
pen across language users. In contrast, the anaphoric dependencies in the previous
example (50) must be established via multiple speakers. That is, even though the
descriptive use of ‘I’ and ‘we’ contributes information (the condemned prisoner,
the US Supreme Court Justices, respectively) it seems that the point of view ac-
cording to which these representations were determined blocks the possibility of
referring back to these interpretations via the same speaker’s use of third person
pronouns, which determines their contribution via a different perspective. In short,
although descriptive pronouns convey interpretations that are different from those
determined by indexical uses, they remain perspective-bound and this must factor
in any description of the Accessibility of mental representations that constitute the
communicated descriptive content21.
There are other ways to make anaphoric relations between O’Connors use of
‘we’ to communicate the US Supreme Court Justices and her subsequent use of
‘they’. We could either imagine a situation where there is a long silence (or unre-
lated conversation), before the use of the third person pronoun or a situation where
another conversational participant uses another NP to describe the justices before
O’Connor’s use of the pronoun to refer to them. Note that in both cases, the per-
21In this respect, descriptive uses share some similarities with logophoric pronouns (or uses) in
some African languages (Hage`ge, 1974; Clements, 1975), where the pronoun refers to a point of
view within the narrative that might be distinct from the perspective of the narrator herself. In de-
scriptive uses, however, the perspective is always determined relative to the identification of the
salient object (explanations of this perspectival character would then depend on an account of Iden-
tification Dependency), see Sells (1987) for the notion of pivot.
50
spective bound nature of the descriptive use is neutralised, as it were. No other
contextual change, at least to my mind, could make these anaphoric relations better
in any way.
In conclusion, identification-based descriptive uses do seem to have interesting
Co-variation and Accessibility properties. These will be considered here as the
extended properties of the data and explaining them should also be considered as
desiderata for accounts of such uses.
1.9 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have laid out the core as well as the extended interpretative
properties of identification-based uses of descriptive pronouns. This was partially
achieved by comparing such uses with other pronominal data as well as figurative
uses of language that bear some striking similarities with descriptive uses, such as
metonymy. We seem to have reached both negative and somewhat positive conclu-
sions.
On the one hand, identification-based descriptive pronouns cannot be reduced as
mere instances of: (i) indexicality, (ii) pronominal binding, or (iii) genericity. The
first case is ruled out, because deictic uses convey information about specific entities
in the context, and descriptive uses do not. The second is ruled out because binding
dependencies are established within local environments within structured represen-
tations, and the dependencies exploited by descriptive uses are non-linguistic in
nature. The association with the third type of phenomenon is ruled out, because de-
scriptive readings do not have the associated characteristics usually associated with
generic uses (e.g. interpretations that express generalisations that admit exceptions,
are kind-denoting, and presuppose salient well established properties).
Second, identification-based descriptive uses seem to bear strong similarities
with donkey anaphora (both convey co-varying interpretations and display unusual
accessibility patterns) and referential metonymy (both make an interpretation salient
via the saliency of another, related, object). It seems that pursuing treatments of
descriptive pronouns as a special instance of one of these two types of interpretation
seems promising. Accordingly, this sets up the following thesis plan.
In chapter 2, I examine how descriptive interpretations may result from some
form of figurative use of language, like metonymy. The exposition begins with
Grice’s treatment of non-literalness and moves towards alternative positions, such
as Relevance Theory. This chapter has the secondary aim of introducing general
(pragmatic) principles that may guide utterance interpretation, which will be used
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in many other parts of the thesis.
In chapter 3, I look at possible ways in which descriptive interpretations result
from interpretative processes similar to the ones underlying donkey anaphora. We
will assess whether visual experiences, say, of seeing a footprint, can make men-
tal representations that are indirectly related to the object seen (e.g. the footprint
maker) accessible for integration with linguistic content. This will be done from a
conceptual as well as an empirical perspective. Thus, as a secondary aim, this chap-
ter aims to give an empirically supported description of the kind of representations
that are visually accessible for integration with linguistically governed information.
In chapter 4, I assess explanations of identification-based descriptive uses of
pronouns in the literature and conclude that they cannot explain for all the properties
discussed in this chapter.
In chapter 5, I put forward my own account of the data. In many parts of this
chapter (sections 1.4, 1.5, and this page), the ultimate integrability of an account of
identification-based descriptive with an account of other pronominal uses has been
challenged. The main reason for this rests on a standard assumption about grammar
that sets linguistic processes aside other cognitive processes, such as the identifica-
tion of individuals in the environment or the attribution of intentions to the speaker
on the basis of her actions. The proposal made in chapter 5 rejects this standard
division of labour. I believe that the descriptive interpretations discussed in this
thesis provide good reasons for doing so, but other phenomena that raise similar
challenges will be mentioned as we go along. The grammar framework assumed
(i.e. Dynamic Syntax, Kempson et al 2001, Cann et al 2005) allows pragmatic
processes (described by the relevance-theoretic principles in chapters 2, Sperber
and Wilson 1995; Carston 2002, and the object-identification processes discussed
in chapter 3) to supply pronouns with values that can be singular or descriptive
(bound, anaphoric). Identification-based descriptive uses are cases in which the rel-
evant value of the pronoun is supplied rather indirectly in the context (i.e. a form
of anaphora with implicit antecedents), but can nevertheless be explained by the
same means. Although this account incorporates pragmatic reasoning in its core, it
employs a grammar that is able to capture the non-standard forms of dependencies
and the perspective-bound nature of pronominal person. This nicely captures the
extended properties of the data. Moreover, pronouns of different person features
give rise to different interpretations. Some of them might not allow identification-
based descriptive interpretations to arise at the level of an utterance’s assertoric
content (what-is-said, explicature). Thus, we end up with a heterogeneous account:
some descriptive interpretations arise from the full integration of salient representa-
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tions with the encoded meaning of the pronoun (explicature), while others depend
on a more basic representation that gets selected as the value of the pronoun (hence
counting as an utterance’s implicature). These elements come together in a proposal
that can account for the data without the shortcomings raised to other proposals in
chapter 4. Chapter 6 concludes.
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Chapter 2




In the previous chapter, it was argued that any account of descriptive uses must
explain the properties of Identification Dependency, Descriptiveness, Connection,
Co-variation, and Accessibility. However, it is unlikely that all these properties
would hold at the same level of linguistically expressed information. For example,
reconsider the following cases:
(1) a. Said by Justice O’Connor: ‘We might have been liberals’.
b. Near the White House in Washington, D.C.: ‘Every time there is a war,
he [pointing to the white house] has tough choices to make’ .
Identification Dependency states that an individual must be contextually identi-
fied in order for the relevant interpretations to be conveyed: O’Connor in (1)a and
the White House in (1)b. Descriptiveness tells us that the pronouns convey descrip-
tive information. In the cases above, they contribute the American Supreme Court
Justices and the American president to the truth-conditions of the utterances, respec-
tively. Connection tells us that the concept used to classify the identified individual
provides the building blocks of the descriptive interpretations. Note, however, that
this is done in an indirect way. The concepts about O’Connor and the White House
do not figure in what is communicated, but rather the concepts AMERICAN JUSTICE
and AMERICAN PRESIDENT. Therefore, there is not a single level of information
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that can sufficiently account for both Identification Dependency and Descriptive-
ness. In short, these interpretative properties appear to be explained by distinct
pieces of information.
The appeal to different, yet related, levels of information is the cornerstone of
an approach championed by Paul Grice (1967). He developed a theory (a ‘logic
of conversation’) that exploited different levels of communicated (or, in his terms,
speaker-meant) content in order to explain a variety of philosophical and linguistic
problems. In doing so, he became the founder of modern inferential pragmatics: the
field that explains the principles of human communication and the ways in which
linguistic and contextual information fully interact. Given that the representations
that constitute the descriptive pronominal uses are not linguistically given, appeal-
ing to pragmatics in order to explain the data is crucial.
Grice’s picture involves two sets of norms governing what is expressed by an ut-
terance: norms that emerge from the conventions associated with the words uttered
and norms that emerge from the presumption that communication is a cooperative
endeavour. This allows a description of the data where Identification Dependency
is governed by a set of norms that determine a level of interpretation known as
what-is-said by an utterance (or speaker), while another set of norms explain the
other interpretative properties, at a level of interpretation known as the utterance’s
(or speaker’s) conversational implicatures. For Grice, all non-literal uses of words
are not a matter of the conventions associated with them and hence are better cap-
tured as instances of conversational implicatures. Given the similarities between
descriptive pronouns and metonymy (see section 1.7), this picture suggests that De-
scriptiveness may be captured at the level of conversational implicatures.
Assessing a Gricean explanation of the data is important for many reasons.
First, it tests the plausibility of a very natural explanation of the phenomenon. Sec-
ond, it also tests the adequacy of the principles, postulated by Grice, according to
which linguistic and contextual information interact. If the principles are not well
grounded, alternative pragmatic frameworks should be sought. My attempt at such
an assessment runs as follows.
In section 2.2, I will introduce Grice’s pragmatic framework, sketch how an ex-
planation of descriptive pronouns in these terms would go, and relate it to other
instances of non-literal interpretations, such as metaphor and metonymy. Three ar-
guments against a Gricean inspired explanation of the phenomenon will be raised:
one concerning the general distinction between what-is-said and what-is-implicated
(the argument from pragmatic intrusion), the second concerning views on non-
literal meaning (the argument against Grice’s picture of non-literal meaning), and
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the third concerning descriptive pronouns, more specifically (the argument against
the conversational status of descriptive uses, Nunberg 1993).
As we shall see, although the last argument is not sound, the first two arguments
seem so, motivating alternative pragmatic frameworks. In section 2.3, Relevance
Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1995) will be introduced. Its presentation follows the
structure laid out in the previous section. The framework’s core machinery will be
presented and then we shall proceed to possible treatments of the descriptive pro-
nouns, occasionally comparing them with cases of non-literal use, such as metaphor
and metonymy. As it turns out, Relevance Theory does not inherit the problems
raised for Gricean pragmatics. It draws upon very general cognitive principles and,
as a result, is much more flexible when it comes to capturing the data.
2.2 Gricean pragmatics
2.2.1 Grice on utterance comprehension
Meaning, What-is-said, and Implicature
In the lectures entitled ‘Logic and Conversation’, Grice (1967, 1975) observes two
opposing ways of solving the problems that natural languages raise for philosoph-
ical analysis. One is pursued by philosophers of the formalist tradition; another is
proposed by philosophers from the informalist tradition. Broadly speaking, these
views are similar, respectively, to the non-intentionalist and intentionalist proposals
in my discussion of the descriptive data in chapter 1 (see section 1.2).
The formalist approach aimed to devise formal languages (a Begriffsschrift, or
a perspicuous way of writing concepts, according to Frege 1967) which captured
certain properties displayed by language or even thought itself1. In this project, the
notion of a natural language sentence (as opposed to an utterance) played an im-
portant role, for it highlights two interesting facts. Sentences tokens (relativised to
context a` la Kaplan 1977) are both generated from basic units (lexical types) via a
recursive mechanism and are the minimal units for bearing truth and carrying in-
ferences. Early formalists such as Frege and Russell aimed to set out a recursively
built formal language capable of capturing the entailment patterns present in a natu-
ral language fragment (in terms of truth transmission from premises to conclusion).
1Besides Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell (1905), this tradition has been voiced, perhaps most
prominently, by Carnap (1947) and the Vienna Circle (see Coffa, 1993), and recently reflourished
in the works of Montague (1970a,b, 1973) and his followers, who, differently from early formalists,
saw natural languages as being no different from formal languages.
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On the other hand, the informalists (or ordinary language philosophers, e.g.
Moore 1918; Wittgenstein 1953; Austin 1962) saw the formalist project as partial
at best. Capturing the notion of meaning at the sentence level is misleading, for
it misses a crucial aspect of natural languages: what people use them for. Austin
(1962), for example, stressed the similarities between language and action based on
the idea that the same sentence can be used by a speaker to perform various different
acts. For example, the question ‘Have you eaten today?’ may sometimes be used
as a genuine question, say, by a doctor wondering whether she should proceed in
taking a blood sample or as an offer, say, on an occasion in which one is invited for
dinner. The task of the informalist was to elucidate the meanings of natural language
utterances by identifying the conditions under which they can be used by speakers
for particular purposes, hence the famous Wittgensteinean slogan: meaning is use
(Wittgenstein, 1953). One of the most influential groups in the informalist tradition,
namely, the Speech Act theorists (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969), sought to distinguish
between the content of an utterance (locutionary content), which, when uttered with
a certain communicative force (e.g. an assertion, command, request, etc...), imparts
(illocutionary) content that elicits (and explains) certain acts. For example, when
issuing a command, the speaker performs a certain act by which she obliges the
hearer to perform another act. As we shall see, this idea of acts having certain
consequences for the audience had a major influence over Grice’s work.
However, as the formalist argues, the broadly conceived informalist project sac-
rifices systematicity. Conditions on use are so varied that they cannot be explained
via the specification of the meanings of basic units plus the way they are put to-
gether.
Grice aimed to strike a balance between the two positions. On the one hand,
he follows the ordinary language philosopher in assuming that utterances (not sen-
tences relativised to contexts) are the carriers of meaning. In his seminal ‘Meaning’,
Grice (1957) took that non-natural meaning or meaningNN is a product of inten-
tional action (contrasting non-intentional events that also carry information, such as
smoke meaning fire, i.e. cases of natural meaning). Thus, expressing information
by the use of a sentence (an utterance) is governed by:
M-Intentionality: By producing an utterance (or gesture) u, the speaker means that
p, if (and perhaps only if) by uttering u she intends: (i) to produce a certain response
(e.g. the belief that p) in the audience, (ii) such that the intention in (i) is recognised
by the audience, and (iii) that the recognition in (ii) acts as a reason for the response
(e.g. the belief that p) in (i) (in Grice 1957, 217-9, formulation due to Strawson
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1964).
Now the speaker’s utterance or gesture sets a specific task for the audience,
namely, that of retrieving what the speaker intended to impart on the basis of her ut-
terance and the communicative context. According to Grice, this process is largely
a matter of non-demonstrative inference: utterance and contextual information pro-
vide evidence used by the audience in the attempt to identify the communicative (or
m-) intentions of the speaker. The word ‘largely’ here is no accident. By using con-
ventional signs (words or any kind of code) the speaker facilitates immensely the
audience’s task of recognising the relevant intention, because the information they
carry almost coincides with the information she m-intends to impart (indexicals,
ambiguous words, and a few other cases create some turbulence for this picture). In
short, the use of linguistic conventions provide an almost direct route to the central
content m-intended by the speaker.
Therefore, Grice follows the formalist in assuming that the conventional mean-
ing associated with the word (i.e. types) immediately determines some of the infor-
mation the speaker m-intended. Grice called this level of information ‘what is said’
(what-is-said, henceforth) by an utterance, which can be roughly equated with the
content the speaker asserts. This allowed Grice to preserve the systematicity sought
by the informalist. What-is-said would be determined by the standing meaning
of the words used and the way they are put together (the syntax of the language),
which, in turn, explains the entailment patterns associated with (a use of ) a sen-
tence. In order to preserve some of the insights of the formalist position, Grice
assumed that what-is-said was governed by two principles:
Linguistic Constraint on What-is-Said: What-is-said is closely determined by the
conventional meaning of the words used and their mode of composition (i.e. the
syntactic structure in which they occur).
Truth-Evaluability of What-is-Said: What-is-said corresponds to the truth-conditions
of an utterance 2.
2Linguistic Constraint on What-is-Said, and Truth-Evaluability of What-is-Said are Gricean in-
carnations of Carston’s Linguistic Direction Principle and Minimal Truth-Evaluability Principle,
respectively. These principles aim at constraining pragmatic contributions to what-is-said to, and
only to, processes that are necessary either for supplying a value to a linguistically given variable or
for supplying constituents necessary in order to arrive at something minimally truth evaluable. Grice
did not recognise that considerations of conversational norms (i.e. pragmatics) were involved in
deriving what-is-said (though see Neale 1992). Thus, Carston’s principles would be held by people
who maintain a Gricean perspective but recognise the role of pragmatics only for these two cases.
This position is one variety of Semantic Minimalism. For discussion, see Carston (1988, 2002,
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The first of the two principles aims at making what-is-said a matter of retrieving
conventional information (pronouns, tenses, and ambiguous words require extra,
contextual, information). The second aims at connecting linguistically determined
information with truth, necessary for establishing the notion of entailment between
propositions whose contextual contribution is as minimal as possible. Such a min-
imising role is essential not only to preserve the gist of the formalist approach, but
also to articulate what-is-said so it can be used to impart other kinds of propositions:
a point that preserves the gist of the anti-formalist approach. This can be illustrated
by the following example, originally due to Grice (1981):
(2) a. He took off his boots and got into bed.
b. He got into bed and took off his boots.
c. He performed the actions in the order presented by (2)a.
d. He performed the actions in the order presented by (2)b.
This example presents the following tension. On the one hand, it is desirable to
follow the formalist philosopher in preserving a truth-functional account of the con-
tribution of ‘and’, that is, as a connective that takes two truth-values as input and
returns a single truth value as output, so logical rules like conjunction introduction
and elimination can be properly defined. But, on the other hand, there is the intu-
ition that the utterances in (2)a and (2)b convey that the event described by the first
conjunct happened before the event described by the second; something that falls
outside the truth-functional treatment just mentioned.
Grice dissolves this tension as follows: (2)a and (2)b express the same proposi-
tion (modulo an identical reference assignment to ‘he’) at the level of what-is-said
(given that p ∧ q and q ∧ p are truth-conditionally equivalent). However, this does
not mean that what-is-said exhausts what the speaker communicates. For example,
the speaker might have suggested different things by the different utterances. More
technically, by uttering (2)a the speaker might have implicated (2)c and by uttering
(2)b the speaker might have implicated (2)d. Grice describes the contents in (2)c
and (2)d as instances of generalised conversational implicatures. Conversational
implicatures emerge as a result of the expectation that communication is a rational
cooperative enterprise: an expectation that is captured by the Cooperative Principle
(CP, henceforth) ‘Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in
195-9).
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which you are engaged’ Grice (1975, 26). The term ‘generalised’ indicates that the
implicated content emerges in most contexts, where it is natural to expect that the
order of events is reflected in the order of saying. Generalised conversational impli-
catures contrast conventional implicatures, on the one hand, and particularised con-
versational implicatures, on the other. The former corresponds to contents that are
calculated on top of what-is-said in virtue of the conventional meaning of the word.
For example, an utterance of ‘P but Q’ and an utterance of ‘P and Q’ say (in Grice’s
technical sense) the same thing, but the use of ‘but’ also conveys as part of its con-
ventional meaning that P contrasts Q3. Particularised conversational implicatures
correspond to contents that arise from the same principles governing generalised
ones (like the CP and maxims), but hold in particular contexts (rather than most).
Grice (1975) considers the example of an utterance of ‘He is very punctual and has
good handwriting’ as a reply to whether a particular person is a good philosophy
student. The utterance conveys that the student is not very good, but this does not
seem to generalise across contexts. Some have argued that the distinction between
generalised conversational implicatures and particularised ones is not interesting,
as they draw from the very same set of principles (explained below) (see Sperber
and Wilson 1995, and Carston 1995, 2002, 111 for arguments). Given these three
candidates, identification-based descriptive interpretations seem to be best captured
as instances of particularised conversational implicatures (occasionally referred to
simply as implicatures, from now on).
Consonant with the CP, there are more specific conversational maxims whose
exploitation allows the speaker to convey information at an implicit level of mean-
ing. The specification of the maxims and the details of how they work was one of
the major accomplishments in Grice (1967, 1975, 26). I will summarise them under
the heading Communicative Cooperativity4, below:
Communicative Cooperativity: Make your contribution as informative (Quantity),
truthful (Quality), relevant (Relation), and perspicuous (Manner) as required by the
talk exchange in which the communicator is engaged in.
Above, the parenthesis indicate the category of each maxim associated with
the CP. Specific sub- or super-maxims will be mentioned when necessary. Going
back to the previous example, Communicative Cooperativity derives the temporal
3For details about the relation of conventional implicatures and the communication of higher
level speech acts, see Grice (1989b, 361-2).
4This does not mean that Communicative Cooperativity exhausts all the principles that regulate
conversation. One that is not tied to communication is the maxim ‘Be polite’.
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implicatures associated with ‘and’ in (2) in the following way. First, the audience
retrieves what-is-said by the utterances in (2)a and (2)b (e.g. Max took off his boots
∧ got into bed, Max got into bed ∧ took off his boots, respectively), observes
that the speaker is paying attention to the CP and associated maxims5, retrieves
necessary contextual information, and infers the intended implicatures (based on the
category of manner, more specifically, the maxim ‘Be orderly’). Such a reasoning
exploits the following facts: (i) the speaker says two conjoined propositions, (ii) she
has to utter them in a given order, (iii) the maxim of orderliness regulates possible
relations between the conjuncts. In the case of (2)a, these steps can be illustrated by
the following train of thoughts 6:
(3) Sketch of the Derivation of a Conversational Implicature
a. The speaker said that Max took off his boots ∧ got into bed.
b. The speaker is observing Communicative Cooperativity and knows that
I know this.
c. Events happen in a certain temporal order, so by observing the sub-
maxim ‘Be orderly’, the speaker communicates the order of events by
describing them in a certain order.
d. The event described by the first conjunct of (3)a happened before the
event described by the second one.
e. The speaker knows (and knows that I know) that I will assume this and
did not do anything to stop me from arriving at this conclusion.
f. Therefore the speaker implicated (2)c (e.g. that Max took off his boots
and then got into bed).
The abductive argument in (3) is an instance of the general working out schema for
the derivation of conversational implicatures. I would like to point out that there
5There is an interesting discussion on whether Grice thought that a substantial part of his maxims
would be involved in the determination of what-is-said. For discussion, see Grice (1957, 222), Neale
(1992, 530), and Carston (2002, 104-5).
6Here is how Grice himself describes the derivation of conversational implicatures:
A man who, by (in, when) saying (or making as if to say) that p has implicated that
q, may be said to have conversationally implicated that q, provided that [i] he is to
be presumed to be observing the conversational maxims, or at least the Cooperative
Principle; [ii] the supposition that he is aware that, or thinks that, q is required in
order to make his saying or making as if to say p (or doing so in those those terms)
consistent with this presumption; and [iii] the speaker thinks (and would expect the
hearer to think that the speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer
to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in [ii] is required.
(Grice 1975, 24 square brackets and emphasis mine)
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is some arbitrariness involved in fleshing out the exact premises in it7. I justify
my particular choice by the resemblance it bears to Grice’s own example of the
derivation of a conversational implicature (see Grice, 1975, 50).
The working out schema above provide a window into the properties of conver-
sational implicatures. For example, the schemas is an instance of a non-demonstrative
inference: the content of the implicature being the argument’s conclusion. From
this, an important property follows: conversational implicatures are calculable, that
is, the inferred conclusion depends on the inferential steps that lead to it8. From the
inferential nature of the derivation, another property follows. If utterances of dif-
ferent sentences say the same thing on different occasions and contextually salient
information is sufficiently similar, then the speaker would convey the same con-
versational implicatures. That is, for Grice, conversational implicatures are non-
detachable (with regards to what-is-said)9. Finally, given the non-demonstrative
character of the inference, the speaker could easily provide evidence capable of can-
celling the relevant implicature without contradicting herself. For example, in the
dialogue above, the speaker could cancel the conclusion of the argument, namely,
(3)f, by saying ‘...but I do not mean that these events happened in the order I just
said’ without any problems. The cancellability of conversational implicatures has
been used to distinguish them from entailments, which allegedly hold at the level of
what-is-said. For example, if the speaker says ‘John has a red car’ and continues by
saying ‘but I do not mean he has a car’, she would contradict herself.
7For example, if one allows for contextual information to be shaped freely by the theory, one
could flesh out premises in a way such that conversational implicatures come out as deduced con-
clusions.
8 There has been some discussion in the literature on whether articulating the working-out schema
must be exercised by the audience (a position taken by Neale 1992, 527 and Recanati 1993, 245) or
only by the pragmatic theorist who offers a ‘rational reconstruction’ of the audience’s behaviour (a
position taken by Grandy 1989, 519). For discussion, see Carston (2002, 108). Moreover, there is
the further issue of whether the audience must be capable of consciously articulating the inferential
steps to derive the relevant implicatures (see Recanati 1993, 2004) or just providing some post hoc
reconstruction of how the implicatures were arrived at: a position assumed by relevance theorists
(Sperber and Wilson, 1995; Carston, 2002).
9 Grice acknowledges that non-detachability is not a regular property of some implicatures based
on the maxim of manner, that is, even if two sentences say the same thing, the manner of saying may
convey different contents. Here is the crucial passage (noted by Korta 1997):
Insofar as the calculation that a particular conversational implicature is present re-
quires, besides contextual and background information, only a knowledge of what
has been said (or of the conventional commitment of the utterance), and insofar as the
manner of expression plays no role in the calculation, it will not be possible to find
another way of saying the same thing, which simply lacks the implicature in question,
except where some special feature of the substituted version is itself relevant to the
determination of an implicature (in virtue of one of the maxims of Manner) (Grice,
1975, 39) .
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In sum, Grice’s insights on meaning take the following form. M-Intentionality
characterises every instance of speaker meant information. Linguistic Constraint
on What-is-Said and Truth-Evaluability of What-is-Said further constrain speaker
meaning, determining the level of information represented by what-is-said. Finally,
Communicative Cooperativity provides a set of conversational norms that are used
together with what-is-said to derive the conversational implicatures meant by the
speaker. Grice’s theory of conversation employed different categories of implica-
tures: conventional, generalised conversational and particularised conversational.
Grice took calculability, non-detachability and cancellability as ‘tests’ for the pres-
ence of conversational as opposed to conventional implicatures.
At this point, we can evaluate the suggestion made at the beginning of this chap-
ter, namely, that of accounting for the properties of descriptive uses of pronouns at
different levels of information. For the sake of simplicity, I will focus here on only
the core data: Identification Dependency, Descriptiveness and Connection. As an
illustration, let us consider the case where the speaker points to a footprint on the
ground and says ‘He must be a giant’. The Gricean might say that the a propo-
sition is expressed at the level of what-is-said, which implicates the proposition
that the footprint maker must be a giant. In a nutshell, Identification Dependency
would be captured at the level of what-is-said, Descriptiveness at the level of what-
is-implicated, and the non-demonstrative inferential relation between the two levels
would account for Connection (which requires that the identification of the object
provides access to the building blocks of the descriptive proposition). The structure
of this explanation, as it turns out, is identical to Grice’s proposal for non-literal
word uses. In the next section, we shall take a look at Grice’s picture of non-
literal meaning, starting with metaphor (which Grice explicitly discussed), moving
to metonymy (which, as suggested in chapter 1 section 1.7, is closely associated to
the phenomenon we are interested in), and finishing with descriptive pronouns. In
the section on metaphor, an argument against Grice’s picture of non-literal meaning
will be raised. Moreover, after the presentation of a Grice inspired account of the
core data, other types of objections will be levelled: one specifically concerning the
status of descriptive uses as conversational implicatures, another, more fundamen-
tally, concerning the Gricean division between what-is-said and what-is-implicated.
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2.2.2 A Gricean inspired explanation of the core properties
The basic picture of non-literal meaning
According to Wilson and Sperber (2002, 587), a Gricean explanation of tropes and
figures of speech assumes the following explanatory pattern:
(4) a. Speaker meant information - whether presented literally or non-literally
- corresponds entirely to conceptually structured propositional content.
b. Non-literal meaning differs from literal meaning in the ways it is gen-
erated. Literal meaning is governed by linguistic rules, whereas non-
literal meaning is not.
c. Non-literal meaning is explained by systematic departures from literal
meaning.
The pattern in (4) can be traced back to classical rhetoricians and is present
even today in the analysis of many philosophers and linguists. The assumptions in
(4)a to (4)c are fairly standard, but, as Wilson and Sperber (2002) point out, there
is some flexibility when it comes to cashing out what such ‘systematic departures’
are. For Grice, they are explained within a two-stage picture. First, what-is-said is
determined by the conventional linguistic meaning of the sentence uttered and a few
features of the context. Secondly, Communicative Cooperativity and what-is-said
by the utterance offer the means by which non-literal information can be conveyed.
In short, although non-literal uses of words contribute contents they do not encode,
their conventional meaning is used by the speaker to violate norms of rational com-
municative behaviour, which then makes the audience search for an interpretation
which satisfies them. Thus, non-literal uses are instances of implicatures10. It is
worth pointing out that the systematicity in this explanation emerges entirely from
Communicative Cooperativity. Let us take a look now at how this specific picture
applies to the case of metaphor (which has been the subject of much attention in the
relevance theoretic literature, see Sperber and Wilson 1986; Carston 1997; Moreno
2007; Rubio Fernandez 2005; Wilson and Carston 2006; Sperber and Wilson 2008;
Carston 2010).
10Lewis (1983) also made sense of such ‘departures’ within a two-stage picture: first there is the
specification of the literal meaning of a sentence, in a language called ‘literal-£’, which is then linked
up to a distinct meaning of the sentence, in a language called ‘nonliteral-£’, via some sort of rule.
Wilson and Sperber (2002) point out that, unlike Grice, Lewis took non-literal meaning as a matter
of ambiguity resolution.
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Metaphor and the argument against Grice’s picture of non-literal meaning
According to the rhetoric tradition, metaphor is a figure of speech that invokes re-
semblance between things. For example, by uttering ‘Jane is a flower’ the speaker
invites the audience to focus on similarities between a person and a flower, thereby
conveying something in virtue of such similarity. On the basis of this utterance
together with the contextual assumption that flowers are beautiful and the resem-
blance relation between Jane and flowers, the utterance might convey that Jane is
beautiful, as well as some extra imagistic content, which, according to certain ro-
mantic poets and critics, explains much of the beauty of metaphorical uses. As
suggested previously, Grice’s insight was to capture non-literal discourse in virtue
of the mechanisms that regulate saying and implicating. In order to illustrate how
his account works, consider the following dialogue (Grice, 1975, 34):
(5) a. A: Are you fond of Jane?
b. B: Oh she’s the cream in my coffee.
(6) A’s reasoning might go as follows:
a. B has said that Jane is the cream in B’s coffee.[what-is-said ??? by
(5)b].
b. By saying (5)a, B would blatantly violate the maxim of truthfulness ‘Do
not say what you believe to be false’ [from (5)a and Communicative
Cooperativity].
c. B gives no overt reason for supposing that he does believe (5)a to be the
case, and I would be completely irrational to do so, so I must suppose
that B thinks something else other than (5)a [from (5)b and Commu-
nicative Cooperativity] .
d. B thinks (or at least wants me to think) that Jane is a delightful person.
e. B knows (and knows that I know) that I can work out these steps and
did not do anything to stop me from doing so [from (5)a to (5)d, Com-
municative Cooperativity].
f. Therefore, B implicates that Jane is a delightful person [from (5)a to
(5)e].
Obviously, the (particularised) conversational implicature in (5)f could be used by
the audience to derive further implicatures, such as an affirmative answer to A’s
question above. It is worth noting that this explanation involves what Grice calls a
‘blatant’ violation of conversational maxims (i.e. a flouting of a maxim). As (5)c
illustrates, in (5)a the speaker would flout the maxims ‘Do not say what you believe
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to be false’ (i.e. Quality’s maxim of truthfulness) and ‘Be relevant’ (Maxim of Re-
lation). Blatant violations differ from covert violations, such as lying or deliberate
omission, and the temporary opting out of the maxims, as in cases of fiction, in the
sense that both speaker and audience know (and know that they know) that a maxim
is being violated, most usually the maxim of truthfulness (see Grice, 1975, 32-34)11.
This triggers the search for an implicature that would preserve Communicative Co-
operativity by conveying truthful information (i.e. (5)f above). However, a problem
emerges for this account. Grice took both what-is-said and what-is-implicated as
instances of speaker meaning (what she m-intended), therefore (5)a cannot figure
as a premise in the schema because ‘Jane is the cream in B’s coffee’ is simply not
m-intended by B (this is the reason behind the question marks in (5)a, see Neale
1992, sec. 2 and Wilson and Sperber 2002, 590). Now, if (5)a is absent, the in-
ference simply does not go through. For this reason, Grice moved from saying to
the notion of making as if to say (henceforth, making-as-if-to-say), that is, in cases
of metaphor and irony ‘nothing may be said, though there is something that the
speaker makes as if to say’ (Grice, 1975, 41). Let us reconsider the same schema
but assuming this new notion, to be explained immediately below.
(7) A’s reasoning might go as follows
a. Jane is the cream in B’s coffee [what the speaker made-as-if-to-say by
(5)b].
b. By making as if to say that Jane is the cream in B’s coffee, B would
violate some maxim, such as ‘Be relevant’ (Relation) or standards of
informativeness (Quantity) [from (5)a and Communicative Cooperativ-
ity].
c. B gives no overt reason for supposing that he does believe (5)a to be
the case, so I must suppose that B thinks something else other than (5)a
[from (5)b and Communicative Cooperativity] .
d. B thinks (or at least wants me to think) that Jane is delightful.
e. B knows (and knows that I know) that I can work out these steps and
did not make anything to stop me from doing so [from (5)a to (5)d,
Communicative Cooperativity].
f. Therefore, B implicates that Jane is delightful [from (5)a to (5)e].
In order to get this explanation off the ground, Grice had to cast making-as-if-to-
say outside the domain of speaker meaning. To be more precise, the proposition
11Grice also considered cases where two or more maxims clash. In such scenarios, a maxim could
be violated in order to preserve another one.
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in (7)a is simply not m-intended by the speaker. To me, Grice’s use of the notion
suggests that making-as-if-to-say is closely related to pretence or entertaining a
thought without much commitment (see the discussion about irony in Grice 1978).
Although appealing to the notion of making-as-if-to-say avoids the problem
raised by non-literal sayings and the maxim of truthfulness, the move carries its
own consequences. As Wilson and Sperber (2002, 590) argue, (7)b cannot count
as a blatant violation of the maxim of truthfulness, since the speaker is not say-
ing anything. For the derivation of the implicature in (7)f to go through, a maxim
must be violated blatantly, which requires overt recognition by both speaker and
audience. This form of violation seems to require something to be asserted, rather
than merely considered, entertained, or made-as-if-to-be-said. For example, if A
makes-as-if-to-say that he wants to murder B, B would not act as if his life were at
risk. In short, apart from revealing an awkward sense of humour, A’s words would
not carry many psychological consequences for B12. On these grounds, (7)a cannot
violate any maxim blatantly. As a consequence, (7)b cannot figure as a premise in
the schema above. Again, the inference does not go through13.
In conclusion, Wilson and Sperber (2002) show that no matter which notion
is employed - saying or making-as-if-to-say - Grice’s working out schema fails to
deliver the conversational implicatures necessary to capture the speaker’s intended
meaning: the conclusion of what may be presented as the argument against Grice’s
picture of non-literal meaning. In the next subsections I will show how metonymy
and descriptive uses can be regarded as an instance of the pattern described in this
section and that they, therefore, also fall under this argument.
Metonymy
As mentioned in chapter 1 section 1.7, metonymy is a figure of speech in which a
word (e.g. ‘Plato’) contributes with something which is related to its literal denota-
tion (e.g. Thaetetus, the book by Plato) rather than the literal denotation itself (e.g.
Plato, the philosopher). Such ‘substitutions’ are mediated by a variety of relations
12This might not be entirely right. Timothy Chan (personal communication) suggested that at
some level the audience may act a bit suspicious. Still, in this situation we would not count such
psychological effects as communicated by the speaker, because she did not intend to convey them.
13Nicholas Allott (personal communication) suggested to me that a Gricean could hold that propo-
sitions could be non-literally conveyed without a blatant violation, just mere violations of maxims
pertaining to the categories of manner and relation. I acknowledge the point, but the move carries
problematic consequences. First, we lose a way to distinguish non-literal meaning from lying and
other forms of maxim violation. Secondly, we still would have to admit that an absurd proposition,
e.g. that Jane is actually the cream in one’s coffee is meant by the speaker. These are consequences
that most Griceans would not be willing to accept.
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- contiguity, causal, or part-whole (synecdoche)14 - between entities, such as event
- cause, object - possessor, artefact - creator, concrete entities - abstract properties
they exemplify. Reconsider Nunberg’s ‘ham sandwich’ case, reprinted from chapter
1 section 1.7):
(8) In a restaurant, the waiter warns the cook:
a. Waiter: ‘The ham sandwich is getting restless.’ (Nunberg, 1978, 186)
b. proposition communicated: The ham sandwich orderer is getting rest-
less.
Above, ‘ham sandwich’ contributes ham sandwich orderer, rather than ham sand-
wich to what is communicated by the utterance, where the substitution between
these two thought constituents is licensed by some form of contiguity or causal
relation holding between the entities they denote. Although Grice did not treat
metonymy explicitly, his assumptions about metaphor apply easily here. In a nut-
shell, the proposal is this: by saying (8)a, the speaker would blatantly violate a con-
versational maxim, triggering an inferential process that results in the implicature
in (8)b, which preserves the CP and maxims under Communicative Cooperativity.
Could this account be along the right tracks?
The argument against Grice’s picture of non-literal meaning (Wilson and Sper-
ber, 2002) suggests that it cannot be. In (8)a, the speaker does not mean that a ham
sandwich, the culinary item, is losing patience. If the speaker does not intend to
convey this proposition, she cannot mean it, and hence it cannot be said. A crucial
premise in the schema that delivers the implicatures is missing, and the inference
cannot go through.
This motivates the move to making-as-if-to-say. Thus, instead of saying the
statement in (8)a, the speaker makes-as-if-to-say it. However, this notion does not
carry enough commitment to blatantly violate a conversational norm. In this case,
there is no trigger for the search for an implicature capable of satisfying Commu-
nicative Cooperativity. Another premise necessary for the derivation of the impli-
cature corresponding to (8)b is missing. Again, the inference cannot go through.
In conclusion, the same pattern that emerged from metaphor applies to cases of
metonymy. However, to be fair with Grice, the formulation of his maxims were a
first approximation to describe complex pragmatic phenomena. If he had not for-
mulated the maxim of truthfullness using the technical notion of saying or if the
notion of making-as-if-to-say had been better connected to the notions of assertion
14This would unify metonymy and synecdoche, which I assume for the purposes of this thesis.
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and maxim violation, the problems described here could have been avoided. The
problem is that what begins as just a reformulation to avoid a technical problem ends
in a quest for the true principles that govern pragmatic reasoning. As we shall see
in due time, such principles might lie outside a Gricean framework. Before present-
ing this, I move to an assessment of a Gricean explanation for cases of descriptive
pronouns, which in some respects, resemble metonymy.
Identification-based descriptive pronouns and the argument from circularity
Under the rhetorician’s understanding of figures of speech, descriptive pronouns can
be approximated to metonymy. In (8), above, the interpretation the ham sandwich,
which would be decoded from the words ‘the ham sandwich’, is replaced by the
interpretation the ham sandwich orderer, via a contiguity or causal relation. Given
the similarities between metonymy and descriptive pronouns pointed out in chapter
1 section 1.7, we could imagine a context quite similar to the one in (8), but in
which the speaker uses a pronoun rather than the words ‘the ham sandwich’ in
order to establish the relevant reading. Consider:
(9) In a restaurant, the waiter warns the cook:
a. Waiter: ‘He [pointing to a ham sandwich on the counter with an order
number under it] is getting restless’.
b. Proposition communicated: The ham sandwich orderer is getting rest-
less.
Here, the alleged ‘substitution’ between the interpretations the ham sandwich and
the ham sandwich orderer takes place as before, but the former (the vehicle in the
rhetoric tradition) is induced on the basis of perceptual information and the encoded
meaning of the pronoun, rather than the concepts associated to ‘ham sandwich’. On
this basis, there are two Gricean options for accounting for descriptive uses of third
person singular pronouns.
The first proposal is structurally identical to the metonymy case discussed pre-
viously. By uttering (9)a, the speaker would say that the/this ham sandwich (the
culinary item itself) is getting restless. This (singular) proposition would count as
a blatant violation of the CP and trigger the search for an implicature capable of
complying with it. The audience would reach, as a result of an inference to the
best explanation, the (descriptive) proposition in (9)b. It is important to note that
this explanation accounts for the core features of the data. The requirement that an
individual must be identified by the audience as belonging to a certain kind (Identifi-
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cation Dependency) is captured by the proposition at the level of what-is-said. The
intuition that the information communicated by such pronominal uses is descrip-
tive (Descriptiveness) is captured by the implicated proposition in (9)b. Finally, the
fact that the kind used in the identification somehow provides the building blocks of
the descriptive proposition (Connection) is captured by the (inferential) dependency
between what-is-said and its associated implicature.
Despite its apparent success, the proposal faces shortcomings. First, in the same
way as the Gricean explanation for metaphor and metonymy, it cannot avoid the ar-
gument against Grice’s picture of non-literal meaning (Wilson and Sperber, 2002).
By uttering (9)a, the speaker does not intend to convey that the/this ham sand-
wich (the culinary item itself) is getting restless. Therefore, this proposition cannot
possibly be said. A crucial premise in the schema that delivers the implicature in
(9)b is missing and the inference cannot go through. Moving the relevant singular
proposition from the level of what-is-said to that of making-as-if-say faces the usual
problem. This notion does not carry enough commitment for a blatant violation of
conversational norms. Without such violations, the search for an appropriate impli-
cature that complies with Communicative Cooperativity is not triggered. Another
ingredient necessary for the derivation of the proposition in (9)b is missing, and the
inference cannot go through.
The Gricean, however, could make a second move. As stated earlier, the level
of saying is closely determined by the conventional (lexical) meaning of the words
uttered (Linguistic Constraint on What-is-Said). Pronouns raise a problem for this
picture, because they rely on contextual information in order to make their truth-
conditional contribution. Still, no matter how such contextual elements factor in
utterance comprehension, the ham sandwich itself cannot be the value assigned to
the pronoun ‘he’, given the clash between lexical features of the expression (e.g.
masculine, animate) and features of the object itself (i.e genderless, inanimate). In
short, if the Linguistic Constraint on What-is-Said is indeed assumed, no object in
the context of (9) counts as a referent for ‘he’ in (9)a and, as a result, nothing is
said. Thus, something like By uttering ‘He [pointing to the ham sandwich] is get-
ting restless’ the speaker m-intended to say nothing would figure as a premise in the
working-out schema. The fact that nothing is said, in turn, blatantly violates conver-
sational maxims that contain the notion of saying in their definitions (e.g. ‘Do not
say what you believe to be false’, ‘Do not believe that for which you lack adequate
evidence’, Quality), which triggers the search for an implicature, in this case, that
the ham sandwich orderer is getting restless (i.e. (8)b), that observes Communica-
tive Cooperativity. Note that this possibility is not standardly available for the cases
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of lexical metaphor or metonymy, because their conventional (encoded) meaning
fully determines what-is-said (no contextual completion is necessary).
Although this move is possible, it still faces a problem known as the argu-
ment from circularity (first presented by Hugly and Sayward 1979). Whenever the
speaker does not say something truthful, she must at least imply something true,
so the talk exchange conforms to Communicative Cooperativity (supermaxim of
quality: ‘Try to make your contribution one that is true’). However, determining
whether the speaker is cooperative, and not merely opting out of norms on ratio-
nal communicative behaviour, requires knowledge of the specific implicature that
makes a truthful contribution. Since implicatures are calculable on the basis of the
what-is-said and the assumptions under Communicative Cooperativity, the audience
must know that the speaker is cooperative in order to derive the relevant implica-
tures. Hugly and Sayward (1979) point out an argumentative circle: knowledge of
the specific truthful (or informative) implicature is required for determining that the
speaker is cooperative and speaker cooperativeness is required for the derivation of
the relevant implicature. This move ought to be rejected on pains of circularity.
Finally, let us consider another option. Suppose that ‘he’ contributes the male
(Cooper, 1979; Elbourne, 2005), so what-is-said by the utterance is paraphrased as
the male is getting restless. Although this proposition would not violate any maxim
and therefore lacks the associated problems, it fails to capture the core properties
of the data. Identifying the sandwich would be irrelevant for conveying the propo-
sitions which we take to be intuitively communicated in the context. As a result,
Identification Dependency and Connection cannot be accounted for. Moreover, as
we shall in the discussion on how to distinguish the two levels of meaning put for-
ward by Grice, there are reasons for assuming that the description the ham sandwich
customer, instead of the male, is the one that belongs to the proposition expressed
by the utterance.
In summary, it seems that a Gricean kind of explanation does not work out neatly
for the cases of metaphor, metonymy and descriptive uses of third person pronouns.
But does this point generalise to other pronominal forms? Apparently not. Let us
consider the cases of first person pronouns (singular and plural) with the relevant
singular propositions at the level of what-is-said and the associated communicated
descriptive propositions at the level of what-is-implicated.
(10) Bill Clinton saying: ‘The founders invested me with the sole responsibility
for appointing Supreme Court Justices’ (Nunberg, 1993, 20).
a. What-is-said by (10): The founders invested Clinton with the sole
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responsibility for appointing Supreme Court Justices.
b. What-is-implicated by (10): The founders invested the President of
the USA with the sole responsibility for appointing Supreme Court
Justices.
(11) Said by US Supreme Court Justice O’ Connor: ‘We might have been liber-
als’ (Nunberg, 1993, 14-15).
a. What-is-said by (11): The actual group of Justices that include O’Connor
might have been liberals.
b. The/A group of US Justices (not necessarily including O’Connor) might
have been liberals.
Differently from the third person cases, the propositions that appears at the level
of what-is-said in (10)a and (11)a make sense, could be meant by the speaker and
do not violate standards of truthfulness. It might be true that Clinton, in virtue of
being president, was invested with some powers by the writers of the American
constitution and that there is a possible way in which the world might have turned
out to be such that O’Connor and the other Justices around the early 90s are liberals.
However, a familiar problem emerges for some of these cases, more specifically
(11). The singular proposition in (11)a is not m-intended by O’Connor in a context
where she describes a group of people that does not necessarily includes her, and
hence cannot be used to blatantly violate a maxim in order to trigger a search for the
relevant implicature. Moving to making-as-if-to-say would be of no help, because
the notion does not carry enough speaker commitment to blatantly violate a maxim
and thus no implicatures can be derived. On the other hand, the singular proposition
in (10)a may be intended by Clinton, which renders the implicature based account of
first person singular descriptive pronouns relatively acceptable. This may be extra
evidence for the heterogeneity of the phenomenon of descriptive interpretations,
mentioned towards the end of chapter 1.
Although a Gricean implicature-based explanation of descriptive uses might be
viable for some cases of descriptive uses of pronouns (e.g. first person singular),
it does not explain the other cases. This, by itself, motivates looking at alternative
proposals. Before doing so, it is worthy taking a look at two other arguments against
the Gricean account: one specifically targeting an implicature account of descrip-
tive uses; another threatening the general Gricean distinction between what-is-said
and what-is-implicated. The analysis of these arguments will bring extra motiva-
tion for the introduction of alternative pragmatic frameworks, which will be done
immediately after.
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The argument against the conversational status of descriptive pronouns
Nunberg (1993, 20-24,30) pointed out that descriptive interpretations do not seem
to have the usual properties associated with conversational implicatures. His main
argument concentrates on non-detachability, but it would also be worth considering
the hypothesis of whether descriptive uses of pronouns are cancellable and/or cal-
culable. Let us reconsider the Clinton case in (10), but suppose Clinton or another
speaker used the proper name ‘Clinton’ instead of the pronoun ‘me’.
(12) Bill Clinton or another speaker saying: ‘The founders invested Clinton
with the sole responsibility for appointing Supreme Court Justices’.
a. What-is-said by (12): The founders invested Clinton with the sole respon-
sibility for appointing Supreme Court Justices.
b. What-is-implicated by (12): The founders invested the President of the
USA with the sole responsibility for appointing Supreme Court Justices.
Non-detachability, as a test for the presence of conversational implicatures, states
that if two sentences can be used in similar contexts to determine the same informa-
tion at the level of what-is-said, then the same conversational implicatures would
arise. The implicatures depend on what-is-said (not the linguistic form used) and
hence are non-detachable from it. Against non-detachability, Nunberg argues that,
in this case, the level of information at (12)a does not implicate (12)b. Since con-
versational implicatures are non-detachable, descriptive interpretations of pronouns
cannot be implicatures.
Calculability, as a test, states that what-is-implicated must be calculable on the
basis of what-is-said. Against calculability, one could argue, based on the discus-
sion in the previous subsection, that in some cases it is hard to know what the level
of what-is-said would look like according to Grice’s account. Consider again the
example in (9), where the speaker points to the ham sandwich while uttering ‘He
is getting restless’. To say that the pronoun refers to the actual sandwich is at least
problematic because of the feature clash between the gender and animacy features
encoded by the word and the genderless inanimate nature of the referent. On the
other hand, if we maintain that nothing is said, it is difficult to see on what basis
the dependent implicatures would be derived. Without what-is-said, implicatures
cannot be calculated. Therefore, descriptive uses do not seem to be instances of
conversational implicatures (see the argument against Grice’s picture of non-literal
meaning and argument from circularity in the previous subsection).
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Related to this point, cancellability, as a test, states that implicatures can be can-
celled explicitly by the speaker without resulting in contradictions 15. In the ham
sandwich scenario just considered, imagine the speaker continuing (9)a by saying
‘... but I don’t mean that the ham sandwich orderer, whoever he is, is getting rest-
less’. In this situation it is hard to see what would be communicated by ‘He [point-
ing to the ham sandwich] is getting restless’. Since implicatures are cancellable
and this descriptive reading cannot be, otherwise nothing would be communicated,
descriptive pronouns are not implicatures.
The conclusion of this partially hypothetical argument, initiated by Nunberg
(1993), is the following. Since descriptive interpretations fail the non-detachability,
calculability, and cancellability ‘tests’, they are not implicatures. Nunberg, based
solely on the failure of non-detachability, actually goes further than that. Since im-
plicatures are the model by which all pragmatic phenomena must be understood, de-
scriptive interpretations must be treated ‘semantically’ and by this Nunberg means
that the phenomenon must be accounted for by some sort of linguistic control. But,
is this conclusion warranted?
There are two main reasons for a negative answer. First, Grice’s ‘tests’ are
neither sufficient nor necessary for detecting the presence of a conversational im-
plicature. Secondly, they were also misused by Nunberg. Let us begin with the first
point.
The status of non-detachability is unclear even for Grice, since for him the man-
ner of saying can carry different implicatures (see footnote 9 page 62). For example,
the utterances ‘He took his boots off and got into bed’ and ‘He got into bed and took
his boots off’ (Grice, 1981), say the same thing, but imply different temporal orders
of the events in the conjuncts. Thus, the maxim of manner is one principle which
would guide interpretations that obviously violate the non-detachability test (the
ordering in this case, in fact, might not be an implicature, as the argument from
pragmatic intrusion suggests). In short, to expect that for every two different ut-
terances that determine the same level of what-is-said in their respective contexts
convey exactly the same implicatures is unrealistic. Arguably, non-detachability
seems to work for some cases. But the fact that it does not work for others makes
this test, by itself, an unreliable method for detecting the presence of an implicature.
As for cancellability, the observations are simply not true. If we consider the
ham sandwich example again, it seems that the descriptive interpretation can be
15Relevance theorists argue that every pragmatic aspect of utterance interpretation can be can-
cellable. Some argue that there is a distinction between cancelling something so something else can
be expressed and cancelling something so that nothing is meant. However, it is hard to draw this
distinction in a theoretically unbiased was and therefore I will not discuss it here.
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cancelled in favour of another interpretation, that is, the speaker of ‘he [pointing to
the ham sandwich] is getting restless’ could continue her utterance, without contra-
diction, by saying ‘I don’t mean that the ham sandwich orderer is getting restless, I
mean that the waiter, who needs the fries that accompany the sandwich, is getting
restless’ (see Stokke 2010, ch. 3 for more cases of cancellation). Thus, it seems that
in some cases, descriptive uses can be cancelled. Given that cancellability is inter-
twined with calculability, it would be natural to expect that descriptive uses would
also be calculable. In order to show this, I must make a small digression.
Descriptive interpretations are cancellable and calculable because they might be
conveyed by (non-demonstrative) inferential processes. Thus the ‘tests’ not only
determine the presence of conversational implicatures but all inferential aspects of
utterance interpretation which might contribute to what-is-said. Consider reference
fixing, which Grice took to contribute to the level of what-is-said, but did not talk
much about. Now suppose a scenario in which Matt and Ann, office co-workers,
talk about a party last week at the office. Ann says to Matt ‘Bill got too drunk’,
to which Matt replies ‘I thought your husband was away last week’. Now, it is
perfectly fine for Ann to reply: ‘Ohh I don’t mean that Bill, my husband, was too
drunk at last week’s party, I meant that Bill, from the 4th floor, was’.This dialogue
seems totally natural. Therefore, contra Grice, there might be processes that con-
tribute to the level of what he took to be what-is-said but are distinct from the mere
retrieval of the conventional meaning of words (as the argument from pragmatic in-
trusion, spelled out in the next subsection, suggests). Contra Nunberg, descriptive
interpretations can be calculable16. But that does not mean that they are implica-
tures, because calculability and cancellability could underlie pragmatic processes
involved in the delivery of what-is-said.
In conclusion, the argument from the non-conversational status of descriptive
pronouns fails for the following reason. Some of the alleged tests for implica-
tures simply do not hold and the others that do hold not only characterise implica-
ture derivation but also (pragmatic) processes that might contribute to what-is-said.
Therefore, the tests cannot be used to support that a given phenomenon should (or
should not) be treated as an instance of conversational implicatures. This conclusion
paves the way to a more general objection against Gricean pragmatics: a challenge
to the very way in which he distinguished saying from implicating. This is the topic
of the next subsection.
16For an initial reaction to Nunberg’s argument see Recanati (1993, ch. 16), for exposition and
criticism of Nunberg’s position from Relevance Theory, see Grimberg (1994); Powell (1998, 2003);
Galery (2008).
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2.2.3 The argument from pragmatic intrusion
For Grice, with the exception of reference fixing and ambiguity resolution, what-is-
said is by an utterance is essentially determined by its conventional meaning, that
is, what-is-said is not a matter of non-demonstrative inferences to speaker mean-
ing. This claim, however, faces some problems. There seem to be cases where
the proposition intuitively taken as said by the speaker contains elements that are
not controlled by any linguistic item in the sentence that conveys it, thus violating
the Linguistic Constraint on What-is-Said. To use a term from Perry (1986), such
constituents would be ‘unarticulated’, because they cannot be traced back to any as-
pect of linguistic meanings and yet are present in the interpretation (thoughts) they
induce. Consider:
(13) a. Said by someone in Oslo: It’s snowing [in Oslo].
b. Said by a car salesperson: [That car has] Only 10,000 km!
c. Said by Sam, a high school teacher: Every student [in Sam’s class ]
passed the exam.
d. Said by Jane, after mentioning how hard she has studied for an exam:
I’m ready [to take the exam].
In these examples, the constituents in square brackets are part of the proposition the
speaker intended to get across, yet these do not seem to be controlled by any overt
linguistic expression in the utterance. An explanation of these cases in terms of
particularised conversational implicatures seems unlikely. Take (13)b, for example;
we cannot say that what-is-said by the speaker is Only 10,000 km, which implicates
in the context Car x has only 10,000 km, because many other things have 10,000 km
(i.e. the approximate distance between the equator and the north pole), rendering
what-is-said communicatively inert, that is, what-is-said would systematically fail
to capture what is specifically intended by the speaker. Some propose the existence
of covert linguistic structure for some of the cases above (Stanley, 2000; Stanley
and Szabo´, 2000). This approach usually invokes pronominal-like variables of the
appropriate type. I will not go into the details, as I believe that much of this debate
depends on case by case analysis (see Carston, 2004; Martı´, 2011). Rather, I would
like to point out that this approach certainly would not be able to generalise to every
instance. To illustrate, consider Cohen’s (1971) classical examples:
(14) a. The old king has died of a heart attack and a republic has been de-
clared.
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b. A republic has been declared and the old king has died of a heart
attack.
According to the Gricean explanation, the two utterances above have the same truth-
conditions (they express the same what-is-said), and any information suggesting
that the second conjunct is a consequence of the first emerges as a conversational
implicature based on the maxim of ‘orderliness’ (whether it is a generalised or a
particularised one does not matter here). However, if these sentences are embedded
in conditionals, things look rather different. Consider other examples by Cohen
(1971):
(15) a. If the old king has died of a heart attack and a republic has been de-
clared, then Tom will be happy.
b. If a republic has been declared and the old king has died of a heart
attack, then Tom will be happy.
As Cohen (1971) pointed out (see Carston, 2002, 109), these two utterances simply
do not have the same intuitive truth-conditions (i.e. what-is-said). Grice (1989a)
recognised this in his retrospective epilogue, but he did not recognise its implica-
tions for his way of distinguishing what-is-said (i.e. semantic content) from impli-
catures (i.e. pragmatic content). In addition to the intrusion of temporal ordering,
utterances containing ‘and’ can be used to convey a cause-consequence relation.
Consider:
(16) She shot him in the head and he died instantly (Carston, 2002, 223).
In this example, the death would be understood as not only happening before the
shooting, but as being a consequence of it. The word ‘and’ would not be interpreted
as ‘...and then...’, but as ‘...and, as a result...’. These examples are instances of prag-
matic intrusion into what-is-said (a term due to Levinson 200017). They represent
a problem for the Gricean distinction between semantics and pragmatics because
constituents that usually become available through appeal to conversational norms
seem to enter the truth-conditions expressed by an utterance. There are two main
ways to react to the problem: (i) reject it by postulating richer linguistic structure or
17The word ‘intrusion’ is sometimes used with a negative connotation, as if life would be better
if such intrusions did not happen. A different approach, such as the one advocated in Relevance
Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1995; Carston, 2002) and by other truth-conditional pragmaticists (Re-
canati, 1993), have a different take on this. Pragmatic contributions to the proposition expressed are
theoretically desirable because they capture the communicative intentions of the speaker in the right
way.
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lexical semantics, or (ii) reject it by insisting that the phenomenon is pragmatic but
does not intrude into truth-conditional content proper. As an example of the first
approach, Cohen (1971) associated temporal and causal features to the linguistic
meaning of ‘and’ that would regulate the contents that enter the scope of the condi-
tional. However, it is not difficult to come up with cases that cannot be accounted
for by such features. For example, a use of ‘Jane married and got pregnant’ conveys
a particular temporal ordering of the events, but ‘Jane got pregnant and married’
might convey some form of explanatory reading: the pregnancy was a reason for
the marriage. Cohen’s proposal does not account for this reading. Postulating extra
linguistic features associated with conjunction (or the relevant expression) seriously
risks overgeneration, as one could come up with examples that might not be prop-
erly explained by them.
Alternatively, one could argue that the alleged ‘intrusive’ constructions do not
intrude the level of what-is-said but rather are a matter of implicature retrieval.
Carston (2002, ch. 3) makes a series of objections against such possibility. First, as
Cohen (1971) pointed out, it remains obscure how the alleged implicatures (defined
as non-truth-conditional components of utterance meaning) can fall in the scope
of logical operators such as conditionals and negation18. In fact, Cohen’s use of
conditionals and other operators became one of the most reliable tests for deciding
whether a given constituent belongs to the truth-conditional content of an utterance
(section 2.3.2 discusses this topic thoroughly). In conclusion, the association of
what-is-said with a level of information entirely governed by linguistic rules does
not seem to be empirically adequate. Conversational norms do seem to provide con-
stituents that enter truth-conditions. As a result, the very notion of saying, as defined
by the Linguistic Constraint on What is Said and the Minimal Truth-Evaluability of
What-is-Said, must be revisited (see section 2.3.2).
2.2.4 Tentative conclusions
It is helpful to briefly list what has been achieved in this section. First, Grice’s prag-
matic framework was presented. It was initially motivated by a series of philosophi-
cal problems raised by the clash between the formalist and the informalist positions.
This conflict was solved by a division between two levels of content associated with
an utterance: what-is-said and what is-communicated. The former was defined by
18For an exhaustive argumentation against a Gricean explanation for the different readings associ-
ated with ‘and’ and in favour of pragmatic contributions to truth-conditional content more generally,
see Sperber and Wilson (1995); Carston (1988, 2002); Recanati (1989, 1993); Green (1998), among
many many others.
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three constraints, namely, M-Intentionality, Linguistic Constraint on What-is-Said,
and Minimal Truth-Evaluability of What is Said and the latter by norms of coop-
erative communicative behaviour under Communicative Cooperativity (the CP and
maxims).
The main aim of outlining Grice’s framework was to assess how it might ex-
plain the data raised by descriptive pronouns. Given the close similarities between
these cases and metonymy (a non-literal or figurative use), the Gricean picture of
non-literal meaning was introduced. Under a certain understanding of the Gricean
position on descriptive pronouns, these can be seen as almost identical to metonymy,
and thus the analysis is subject to the argument against Grice’s picture of non-literal
meaning (Wilson and Sperber, 2002). Under another understanding of the Gricean
position, descriptive uses would say nothing and imply certain descriptive propo-
sitions in virtue of that. This possibility, however, is subject to the argument from
circularity (Hugly and Sayward, 1979). Both objections apply to uses of third per-
son pronouns. Some descriptive uses of first person pronouns, on the other hand,
do not seem to involve the same difficulties. In addition to the two arguments just
mentioned, we took a look at Nunberg’s argument against the non-conversational
status of descriptive pronouns. It simply stated that if implicatures are defined by
Grice’s ‘tests’ - non-detachability, calculability and cancelability - and descriptive
pronouns fail them, then such uses cannot be a matter of implicature derivation. The
argument, however, is not sound, which means that some descriptive uses of first
person pronouns might be instances of implicatures.
From a more general perspective, we then took a look at Grice’s distinction be-
tween what-is-said and what-is-implicated. As it was originally drawn, the distinc-
tion simply cannot accommodate interpretations that emerge from norms on rational
communicative behaviour, but are part and parcel of the truth-conditional content
of the utterance: the so-called ‘intrusive constructions’. This motivates a serious
revision of the way we carve the distinction between the truth-conditional content
of an utterance and its implicit content. In the next section, we will present an al-
ternative to the Gricean (or Gricean-inspired) proposal made here. The framework
of choice is known as Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson, 1995) and with it we
can re-assess the pragmatic possibilities concerning descriptive uses of pronouns.
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2.3 Relevance Theoretic pragmatics
2.3.1 Relevance Theory and ostensive-inferential communication
In this section, I will present a theory that improves on Grice’s by providing a
model of utterance comprehension that draws on fewer but general and cognitively
grounded principles and that satisfactorily account for non-literal uses, namely, Rel-
evance Theory (RT) (Sperber and Wilson, 1995). Schematically, it departs from
Grice’s framework along the following lines: the notions of saying and making-
as-if-to-say and the correlated Linguistic Constraint on What-is-Said and Truth-
Evaluability of What-is-Said are utterly rejected, and Communicative Cooperativity
is replaced by Communicative Relevance.
This brief presentation makes clear that RT preserves one of the central aspects
of the picture of meaning sketched in Grice (1957): meaning that p can be described
as making manifest an intention to convey that p. That is, like Grice, Relevance
Theory assumes that much, if not all, of communication comes down to figuring
out what the communicative intentions of the speaker are. Now, the challenge is
to define the relation between the intentions of the speaker and the utterance by
which they are revealed. RT assumes that this relation is explained by the following
definitions:
(17) Ostensive - Inferential Communication:
Communicating something (i.e. a proposition p) involves the speaker’s production
of a stimulus u with the intention:
a. to inform an audience of something (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 29), or
more technically speaking, (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 58) to make mani-
fest a set of assumptions I (which includes that p) (Informative Intention).
b. to inform an audience of one’s informative intention (Sperber and Wilson,
1995, 29), or, more technically speaking, to make one’s informative in-
tention mutually manifest (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 61) (Communicative
Intention)19.
19The technical definitions of manifest and mutually manifest information can be unpacked into
the definition of the Ostensive-Inferential model, resulting in:
Ostensive-inferential communication: the communicator produces a stimulus which
makes it mutually manifest to communicator and audience that the communicator intends,
by means of this stimulus, to make manifest or more manifest to the audience a set of
assumptions I (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 63).
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The distinction between communicative and informative intentions permits desir-
able moves in pragmatic theory. The speaker’s communicative intention is fulfilled
when her informative intention is recognised by the audience. The speaker’s in-
formative intention is fulfilled when the proposition she intends to convey (i.e. her
informative intention) is not only recognised but also believed by the audience. Al-
though the fulfilment of one’s communicative intention normally acts as a reason
for the fulfilment of one’s informative intention, there is no necessary connection
between the two. The fulfilment of the intentions is more or less independent from
each other.
This double dissociation can be illustrated easily. When someone utters on the
street ‘Jesus is our saviour’, one could get the message that is being put across,
but one does not necessarily need to accept or believe what was just said. We
recognise something is intended to be communicated, we just do not believe in it,
that is, information is not transmitted. Conversely, the informative intention can
be fulfilled without the fulfilment of the corresponding communicative intention.
Suppose Kasha leaves the newspaper on the kitchen table, so John can be properly
informed about the repercussions of the latest financial crisis, but by the time John
sees the newspaper, Kasha had already left the house. He is indeed informed, but
does not realise Kasha intended that. This situation is not a communicative one,
because Kasha did not make her intentions overt, even though the information she
intended to convey was transmitted.
The formulation of intentions according to the ostensive-inferential model in
(17) brings another advantage over the Gricean: communication and overt informa-
tion are connected in the right way, that is, communication is making information
overt in a mutually recognisable way. This is achieved by using the notion of mutu-
ally manifest information in the formulation of the communicative intention 20.
Sperber and Wilson (1995, 39-46) define manifest information as assumptions
that an individual (i) is able to represent at a given time and (ii) takes as true or
probably true. A set of manifest assumptions constitutes an individual’s cognitive
environment (CE). Now, among the information represented in an individual’s cog-
nitive environment, there is information concerning who might have access to it.
Sperber and Wilson (1995, 41) exemplify as follows. Suppose an individual gained
20Strawson (1964, 445-7) and Schiffer (1972) have pointed out cases in which the three clauses
- (i) to (iii) - of Grice’s M-Intentionality are satisfied and yet no information is intuitively commu-
nicated, because not all of the intentions of the speaker were overt to the audience (i.e. cases of
‘sneaky’ intentions, see also Neale 1992). These cases are properly ruled out by the way RT defines
the informative and communicative intentions as well as the notions of manifestness and mutual
manifestness.
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knowledge that p by becoming a Freemason. By coming to know p, the individual
also came to know that all Freemasons have access to p. This property permits
the characterisation of mutually manifest information. First, the intersection of two
(or more) cognitive environments constitutes a shared cognitive environment, as in
a situation where two people, unaware of each other, look at a water fountain in a
park. Second, shared cognitive environments containing information about who has
access to it constitute mutual cognitive environments, as in a situation similar to the
one just mentioned, but where two people become aware of each other by sitting on
the same bench, say 21.
These notions nicely characterise communicative situations and the transmis-
sion of information that accompanies it along the following lines. The production
of ostensive stimuli makes the information it carries manifest. Such information
provides evidence of what the speaker wishes to convey, feeding a two-stage recog-
nition model. The speaker’s communicative intention is fulfilled, if the audience
recognises the embedded informative intention. In this case, there is communica-
tion, but that does not necessarily mean that the speaker’s informative intention is
fulfilled. For this to happen, the audience not only needs to recognise the speaker’s
intention, but also to believe in it. In this case, information is transmitted through
communication22.
According to this model, the stimulus produced by the speaker has an evidential
status: it provides a set of clues of what the speaker’s intentions might be. Thus, the
recognition of the relevant intentions depends on a process of non-demonstrative
inference. Since this is also one of the fundamental tenets of Gricean pragmatics,
it is worth noting potential differences between Grice’s model and RT. According
to him, the use of a linguistic code more or less determines the content of one of
the propositions falling under the speaker’s m-intention. Grasping what-is-said, in
many cases, does not require inference. However, the argument from intrusion,
the argument against the Gricean picture of non-literal meaning, and the argument
21The notion of mutual manifestedness emerged as an alternative to that of common or mutual
knowledge (Lewis, 1969; Schiffer, 1972). By devising the notion of mutual manifestedness, Sperber
and Wilson (1995) intended to capture communicative overtness in a way such that (i) it comes in
degrees, and (ii) it does not carry any commitment to the fact that a given piece of information is
mutually known for sure. When it comes to the latter point, the proponent of the mutual knowledge
hypothesis might object by saying that much of the epistemology after Wittgenstein (1969) aimed to
free the notion of knowledge from that of certainty.
22Epistemic vigilance is a cognitive ability aimed at selecting good information sources. Thus,
although conditions on the fulfilment of the speaker’s communicative intention are quite relaxed,
conditions on the fulfilment of the informative intention highly depend on the information source
or what is at stake. Since humans massively depend on communication to acquire information,
they would be open to the risk of being often misinformed. Sperber et al. (2010) argue that hearers
develop such ability to counter-balance this drawback.
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from circularity raise serious objections to this picture. For RT, no such difficulties
arise, as the notion of saying and the specific way in which it provides a basis
for implicating do not exist in the theory. As a consequence, non-demonstrative
inferences can contribute constituents at the level which Grice took to be what-is-
said as well as to that of implicatures. But if this is the case, what then would guide
these inferences, if not the CP and the maxims under Communicative Cooperativity?
The answer is a particular notion of communicative relevance.
According to Sperber and Wilson (1995), relevance is a property of cognitive
inputs (both external and internal stimuli). It is usually conceived in a comparative
way: the greater the input’s positive effects on an individual’s cognitive system the
greater its relevance; the lower the input’s cognitive costs the greater its relevance.
In short, the relevance of a stimulus increases with an increase in the effects/efforts
ratio that it brings to the state the cognitive system is in. With this definition in
mind, the following principle seems to hold:
(18) Cognitive Principle of Relevance: Human cognition is geared towards the
maximisation of Relevance, that is, to the achievement of as many positive
contextual (cognitive) effects for as little processing effort as possible (see
Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 260-266).
Note that the Cognitive Principle of Relevance is overarching in nature. Every
aspect of cognitive life would be regulated by it. Sperber and Wilson also assume
another principle; one that is more specifically tied to communication:
(19) Communicative Principle of Relevance: Every ostensive act communicates
(i.e. makes mutually manifest) the presumption of its own optimal rele-
vance (see Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 260).
A stimulus is optimally relevant if it is (i) relevant enough to warrant the audience’s
processing effort and (ii) the most relevant one compatible with the communicator’s
abilities and preferences (see Sperber and Wilson 1995, 269, Carston 2002, 379).
The Communicative Principle of Relevance warrants what has come to be known
as the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure, stated as:
(20) Relevance Theoretic Comprehension Procedure: Test interpretative hy-
potheses based on their order of accessibility, that is, follow a path of least
effort, until an interpretation that satisfies the expectation of relevance is
found.
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An audience’s expectation of Relevance comprises (i) a presumption of optimal
Relevance modulo (ii) a specific set of mutually manifest assumptions. Thus, in
many communicative situations, the turn taking amongst communicators creates
more specific expectations about the relevance of incoming stimuli. For example, if
Ann asks Matt a question, she will presume that Matt will not only utter something
that is worth paying attention to (i.e. expectation of optimal relevance), but also that
it provides the means to an answer (or conveys more positive cognitive effects than
an answer would). This specific instance of the comprehension procedure makes
two things mutually manifest: explicitly, the information the question linguistically
communicates and, implicitly, the move from the presumption of optimal relevance
to the current and more specific expectations about the relevance of the current os-
tensive stimulus23. In short, the difference between Gricean pragmatics and RT
can be schematically represented by differences in the principles that govern inter-
pretation. For Grice, Communicative Cooperativity guided only the derivation of
conversational implicatures, whereas for RT every inferential aspect of utterance
comprehension boils down to following the relevance theoretic comprehension pro-
cedure above.
By placing the relevant theoretic comprehension procedure in the lieu of con-
textualised appeals to the CP and the maxims under Communicative Cooperativity,
Sperber and Wilson (1995) offer a way to reduce disconnected norms on rational
communicative behaviour to a very compact and incredibly general set of principles.
The procedure is uniquely involved in the many processes, such as reference assign-
ment, disambiguation, and the supply of unarticulated constituents, that determine
the proposition expressed by an utterance in addition to the associated implicatures.
This raises an important issue: if the theory allows for pragmatic contributions to
both levels of meaning, how can the proposition expressed be distinguished from
its associated implicatures?
2.3.2 The Explicit-Implicit distinction
By rejecting the notion of what-is-said (and the associated Linguistic Constraint
on What-is-Said and Truth-Evaluability of What-is-Said) while also accepting a
Gricean-inspired intentional characterisation of speaker meaning, RT assumes a
broadly underdeterministic picture of encoded information. This assumption, known
in the literature, as the Underdeterminacy Thesis (Carston, 2002, 19), can be for-
23Note that the talk about expectations here plays a similar role to Grice’s talk about the audience’s
expectation that the speaker obeys the CP and the conversational maxims.
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mulated in its most general form as:
Underdeterminacy Thesis: The linguistic meaning of an utterance underdetermines
every level of speaker meant information, even the proposition expressed (i.e. what-
is-said in Gricean terms).
RT assumes that the proposition expressed corresponds to the explicature of an
utterance (what the speaker explicates by uttering something) and, crucially, this is
a communicated (speaker-meant) proposition. This level of utterance meaning is
defined as follows (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 182):
Explicitness: An assumption communicated by an utterance U is explicit if and only
if it is a development of a logical form encoded by U.
Propositions that are speaker meant but not explicit belong to the implicit level:
the utterance’s implicatures. This allows the implementation of a machinery some-
what similar to Grice’s: the derivation of implicatures would be driven by the ex-
pectation that the stimulus made by the speaker is (at least, optimally) relevant and
hence subject to the relevance theoretic comprehension procedure. Expectations of
relevance would be essentially dynamic: information made mutually manifest by
previous ostensive stimuli can make room for more finely calibrated presumptions,
rather than the general expectation of optimal relevance. However, the problem with
Explicitness is to understand what ‘development of a logical form’ means24.
It is important to observe that RT assumes that human minds represent informa-
tion in a language like medium or language of thought (LOT), as proposed by Fodor
(1975). The syntax of this language must have the means to represent quantification
and variable binding, as well as predicates and constants. Its basic building blocks
are atomic concepts: concepts that are individuated by their reference relation to
properties or individuals in the world and by formal attributes (i.e. a neural pattern
that the concept supervenes on) necessary for distinguishing states constituted by
co-referring terms, like ‘horse’ and ‘steed’. Concept acquisition would be a matter
of an individual mind ‘locking on’ to the relevant property. Although concepts are
structureless, they relate to other pieces of information in the mind. RT assumes
that there are three main entries that a given concept is associated to: the lexical
entry, the encyclopaedic entry, and the logical entry. The first associates the con-
cept, at a minimum, with a word form (spoken or written) used to express it and
24Sperber and Wilson (1995, 294) themselves consider some difficulties for the definition.
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a syntactic form (e.g. a noun phrase or the lexical actions described in chapter 5).
The second associates the concept with knowledge about the entities that it refers to
(e.g. The concept DOG might activate one’s knowledge that dogs are playful, good
pets, affectionate, etc...). The third relates the concept to certain deductive rules, for
example from the concept BACHELOR one may infer the concepts UNMARRIED and
MALE 25. Thus, the theory assumes that developing the logical form encoded by an
utterance would result in a representation stated in something like Fodorian LOT.
In the next subsection, I will take a look at the criteria proposed in the literature
for distinguishing explicit and implicit content. This would provide tools for deter-
mining whether that data raised by descriptive pronouns should be accommodated
at one level or another. First, ways of distinguishing the explicit from the implicit
that draw from conceptual analysis, hence referred to as ‘off-line tests’ for explicit
content, will be discussed. Second, tests that are more empirically based will be
considered. Since much of the next sections deals with arguments used to support
some revamped notion of what-is-said, I will assume the more neutral terminol-
ogy of ‘proposition expressed’ (which pragmatists take as speaker-meant). Once
we have this distinction in place, we will be able to look at different proposals for
non-literal cases and descriptive pronouns within RT.
Off-line Tests
Four proposals for delineating the distinction between explicit and implicit content
will be discussed here: Functional Independence, Availability, Embedding (Scope)
and Agreement-based tests. Following Carston (2002, ch.2), I assume that the intu-
ition that these should not be interpreted as principles that guide interpretation like
the principles of relevance, rather they are theoretical tools that might suggest one
kind of semantic-pragmatic analysis over another. Let us begin with the first:
Functional Independence: ‘The proposition expressed by an utterance should have
a role to play, distinct from and independent of its implicatures, in the hearer’s
inferential processing, specifically, it should function independently as a premise in
arguments’ (Carston, 2002, 190).
The Functional Independence test is motivated by the thought that, on economy
of effort grounds, the proposition expressed, construed as a communicated assump-
25 There is some debate on whether all these entries need to be assumed by the theory. Kjøll (2010)
is sceptical about the existence of logical entries, as the inference from BACHELOR to UNMARRIED
may be licensed by encyclopaedic entries of special status.
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tion, should have a role to play in the audience’s cognitive life. The principle is
deeply rooted on the cognitive principle of relevance. If an implicature contextually
entails a proposition that allegedly corresponds to the explicature, processing the
latter independently would bring processing costs without extra positive effects. In-
dependence here means that the proposition expressed cannot be (i) entailed by any
implicature of the utterance and (ii) should be used together with other contextual
assumptions, some of which are implicated premises, to generate further implica-
tures. Implicated premises are contextual assumptions that are used in the derivation
of further implicatures 26, for example (Sperber and Wilson, 1995, 34):
(21) Implicated premises and conclusions
a. Peter: Do you want some coffee?
b. Mary: Coffee would keep me awake.
c. implicated premise: Mary does not want to be awake.
d. implicated conclusion: Mary does not want coffee.
According to this characterisation, Functional Independence would be wrong if one
could find an implicated premise that entails the proposition expressed. Something
that Carston (2002, 191) claims to have never encountered27. Although the test pre-
serves the intuition that the proposition expressed is the basis on which implicatures
are derived, something which is also present in Grice’s working-out schema, it does
not give a rock-solid tool for distinguishing the proposition expressed from impli-
catures, for the following reason. Suppose we wonder whether p corresponds to
the proposition expressed or an implicature. One could go either way: p could be
the proposition expressed, provided that independent implicatures are derived, or p
could be actually implicated by another independent proposition, provided that this
proposition plays some role in the agent’s cognitive life. For example, consider an
utterance of ‘Tigers are striped’ in a context where two people are travelling through
the Siberian south-west during winter time. The proposition that Caspian tigers are
striped could be regarded as the utterance’s explicature provided that independent
implicatures are generated (e.g. Caspian tigers are easy to spot in such a white
landscape) or it could be regarded as the independent implicature of the more basic
26 Implicated premises and conclusions may shape the audience’s hypotheses about the speaker’s
explicatures. The development of the speaker’s explicature as the utterance is processed on-line may,
in turn, be used to revise the assumed implicated premises. This is known as the mutual adjustment
of explicatures and implicatures, see the first table in Wilson and Sperber (2002) for details.
27The formulation here is different from the one given by Recanati (1989, 316) and avoids a
counter example he raised to his own formulation of Functional Independence, see Carston (2002,
190-1) for discussion.
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proposition Tigers are stripped (which does not entail that every sub-type of tiger
is)28. Now, let us move to the Availability Test.
Availability Test: In deciding whether a pragmatically determined aspect of utter-
ance meaning is part of [the proposition expressed], that is, in making a decision
concerning [the proposition expressed], we should always try to preserve our pre-
theoretic intuitions on the matter (Recanati 1989, 310; Recanati 1993, 245; my
square brackets replace ‘what is said’ in the original).
According to Recanati, availability to communicator’s consciousness is a prop-
erty that regulates a two-fold distinction: ‘we have distinct conscious representa-
tions for [the proposition expressed] and for what is implicated by a given utterance:
both are consciously accessible, and are consciously accessible as distinct’ (Reca-
nati 1993, 245). Thus, although the availability test appeals to intuitions about what
has been communicated (i.e. an off-line test), it seems to make claims about human
cognitive life: a property that is also found in Carston’s Functional Independence.
Recanati (2004, sect. 1.5) elucidates his position by saying that conscious accessi-
bility to the proposition expressed might be underpinned by communicators’ ability
to pair utterances with the situation in which they are true. According to him, this
ability is more basic than the ability to say or describe the conditions under which
an utterance is true or false. Now, can this test do the job of distinguishing the
proposition expressed by an utterance from its implicatures?
There does not seem to be a knock down argument against the availability test.
In fact, as Carston (2002, 166-170) pointed out, intuitions about information com-
municated at the level of the proposition expressed or at the implicit level have
always been present in theory building in linguistics and philosophy. The intuitions
of communicators do offer a rough guide to theorising, but it is hard to see how
they would provide a decisive method for classifying p as a proposition expressed
or as an implicature. Experimental results have shown that scalar implicatures, e.g.
‘some’ implying ‘not all’, enter speaker judgements about the truth or falsity of
the propositions expressed quite frequently, but not decisively (see Noveck 2004;
Noveck and Sperber 200729; Carston 2002, 166-170 and Carston and Hall 2011).
28This generic statement does not involve the usual entailments that hold in most contexts, and
therefore, it could be argued that it is a bit artificial. I confess that finding an example suitable to
my purpose was difficult, which suggests that the functional independence test may be aiming at an
intuitive, or psychologically real, way to carve the explicit/implicit distinction.
29Noveck (2004) used scalar utterances like ‘Some of the turtles are in the box’ that should be
evaluated against a range of scenarios: one in which some turtles were inside and some others out-
side, another in which all the turtles were inside the box. Subjects were asked to judge the utterances
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This means that the proposition expressed and implicatures are not present to the
subject as categorically distinct entities. Indeed, one should try to preserve one’s
pre-theoretical intuitions, but that is just good theory building. It seems then that
the availability test does not provide a clear-cut method for distinguishing implica-
tures from the proposition expressed. Let us move to the next test: the Embedding
(Scope) test.
Embedding (Scope) Test: A pragmatically derived aspect of meaning is part of the
[proposition expressed] (and therefore, not a conversational implicature) if - and,
perhaps, only if - it falls within the scope of logical operators such as negation
and conditionals (Recanati 1989, my square brackets replace ‘what is said’ in the
original).
The examples in Cohen (1971), used to motivate the argument from pragmatic
intrusion, constitute an important precursor of the embedding test. As discussed
in section on this argument, pragmatically derived aspects of meaning might con-
tribute to the explicature of utterance’s containing natural language logical connec-
tives, such as ‘and’, or ‘if..., then...’. The test also shares similarities with Kripke’s
1972 rigidity test, which inquires into the type of content induced by an expression
by embedding it under modal operators (e.g. ‘if..., then...’, ‘necessarily’, ‘must’,
see chapter 1 section 1.3). Both Krikpe’s and the embedding tests assume that the
content which operators operate on corresponds to the proposition expressed. So
far, I have not seen any decisive argument against the scope test in the literature
(see Carston 2002, 191-7 for discussion) and it has been guiding many theoreti-
cal decisions regarding whether a contribution should be traced to the proposition
expressed or to an implicature of the utterance. The scope test seems a promising
method for testing the behaviour of descriptive pronouns. With this remark in mind,
let us move on to other possibilities.
The final method for carving the explicit/implicit distinction out is the Agreement-
based test. It has been more recently voiced by Hawthorne (2006). He proposed that
the semantics of certain clauses, in this case, ‘agrees that’, can be used to specify
the content of the utterances they embed: a form of content specifying operator30.
true or false. In the scenario in which all the turtles were in the box, ‘Some of the turtles are in the
box’ was judged true by 53% of the participants, indicating that for them, ‘some’ contributed its lex-
ical meaning only, and false by 47% of the participants, indicating that, for these people, the scalar
inference from ‘some’ to ‘not all’ entered the proposition expressed. For experimental precursors
that aimed at testing the empirical plausibility of the availability test, see Gibbs and Moise (1997);
Nicolle and Clark (1999).
30The indirect quotation test (Bach, 1994, 1999, 2001), the Inter-Contextual Indirect report test
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Consider the predicate ‘ready’. If Bill utters ‘Magda is ready’ thinking that she is
ready to leave and John utters ‘Magda is ready’ thinking that she is ready to get
married, one could easily imagine different contexts in which John and Bill could
report (or say) that Magda is ready, but it seems difficult, if not impossible, for Bill
and John to be in agreement.
I suppose Hawthorne takes his test to be a semantic one, that is, it inquires
into the lexically determined content that is the objects of agreement. In this case,
the predicate ‘ready’ comes out as context dependent (or relative to some other
circumstance or parameter). However, one could consider the test as a possible
tool for drawing the distinction between the implicatures and the proposition (ex-
plicature) expressed by an utterance, which would certainly admit pragmatically
provided constituents that are not linguistically supplied. Roughly, this takes the
following form:
Agreement Based Test: If two communicators A and B utter two sentences and one
can report that, by the use of these sentences, A and B agree that p, then p captures
the content expressed by the utterances of A and B31.
Although agreement based tests seem to presuppose commonality of content,
it remains dubious which level of content this is. As von Fintel and Gillies (2008)
point out, agreement or disagreement can target a variety of levels, such as, presup-
positions and maybe even implicatures conveyed by an utterance. For example, the
following dialogue, adapted from Grice, seems quite natural to me:
(22) Implicature disagreement
a. Professor Wilson: Mr. Green is applying for a position in the depart-
ment. Professor Smith, you supervised him, right? Is he good?
b. Professor Smith: Hum... All I can say is that he has good handwriting
and is very punctual.
(Cappelen and Lepore, 2005, 88) and the Collective Descriptions test (Cappelen and Lepore, 2005,
99) would employ either ‘says that’ (e.g. John said that Bill is ready) or any verb predicated of a
collective subject (e.g. Both John and Bill are ready) to specify the relevant content (in italics here).
Although these tests can be extended to cover cases of pragmatic intrusion in addition to context
sensitivity of the indexical form, they are subject to the same criticism levelled against agreement-
based tests. For these reasons, they will not be discussed separately here.
31Agreement/disagreement is one of the topics that sparked a recent debate on the nature of asser-
tion, truth and structure of content, in addition to the notion of proposition expressed, there might be
thinner notions of content, mere properties, for example, that play a role in understanding agreement
related phenomena. For discussion, see MacFarlane (2003, 2005, 2007, 2009); Lasersohn (2005);
Recanati (2007); Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009) .
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c. Professor Jones: I disagree, Professor Smith. He is very hard-working
and has great intellectual potential.
It is difficult to see how the object of disagreement, namely, the proposition that Mr.
Green is not very good at philosophy, would constitute the proposition expressed
by the utterance(s) in (22)b. Like the Availability test, the Agreement-based test
seems to be at the mercy of speaker intuitions. To the extent speaker intuitions vary,
no decisive method for distinguishing implicatures from the proposition expressed
is provided. To the extent that they converge, speaker intuitions seem to be very
permissive with regards to what can be targeted. Therefore, this test, at least as
formulated above, should not be relied upon.
In this subsection, I have looked at various tests for distinguishing explicit from
implicit content, including: (i) Functional-Independence, (ii) Embedding (Scope),
(iii) Availability, and (iv) Agreement-based tests. Intuitions seem to converge more
evenly under the Embedding test and for this reason I consider it to be the best
methodological off-line tool for drawing the distinction we are after. Now, I will
take a look at some possibilities for looking at the explicit/implicit distinction from
a more experimental perspective.
Empirically-oriented Tests
When it comes to the relations between experimental predictions and pragmatics,
Grice’s framework is a good starting point. According to it, the literal/non-literal
distinction is explained in terms of the explicit (what-is-said)/implicit distinction,
hence any predictions entailed by the latter automatically carry over to the former.
Since one of the distinctive traits of implicatures is their dependence on the explicit
level (what-is-said), it follows that they would be accessed only after the proposition
expressed is articulated and so would be more costly to process. This prediction can
be tested, but is it shared by other pragmatic frameworks, more specifically RT?
Not really. As mentioned in the previous section, ostensive stimuli might make
implicit premises available before any hypotheses about the proposition expressed
are made. Moreover, implicit premises can shape the on-line development of hy-
potheses about the proposition expressed (i.e. as part of the process of mutual ad-
justment see example (21), footnote 26). Consider the following dialogue (Wilson
and Sperber, 2006):
(23) Mutual adjustment of implicatures and explicatures
a. Peter: Did John pay back the money he owed you?
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b. Mary: No. He forgot to go to the bank.
Peter’s question in (23)a indicates his expectations: Mary must provide means
to an answer. The partial decoding of Mary’s utterance gives rise to the expectation
that it will be relevant if it explains why John has not repaid her. As a consequence,
that forgetting to go to the bank, the financial institution, is a good reason for not
repaying someone is conveyed as an implicated premise. This assumption, in turn,
is used to disambiguate the word ‘bank’ deriving an unambiguous proposition as
explicature. This illustrates how implicated premises can be accessed before the
proposition expressed. But what about implicated conclusions?
Imagine that Peter continues the conversation by asking if he could borrow some
money from Mary. She answers with some stuttering ‘Well... the thing... is...’, at
which point Peter could retrieve a negative answer to his question as an implicated
conclusion, before hypotheses about the proposition expressed are fully formed.
In sum, Gricean pragmatics predicts more effort in processing implicatures than
the proposition expressed (what-is-said), while RT does not (for some empirical
evidence for the relevance-theoretic alternative, see Matsui 1998, 2000 and Wilson
and Matsui 2000).
In conclusion, RT cannot distinguish between these two levels in terms of dif-
ferences in processing effort, at least not without bringing extra assumptions or de-
tailed information about the specific communicative situation into closer scrutiny.
2.3.3 Relevance Theory, literal vs non-literal meaning, and de-
scriptive pronouns
Literal and non-literal Meaning: an Overview
As suggested by Wilson and Sperber (2002, 587), Grice followed three aspects of
the rhetorician’s description of non-literal meaning (see (4)): (a) like literal mean-
ing, non-literal meaning corresponds to conceptually structure propositional con-
tent, (b) non-literal meaning differs from literal meaning in the ways it is generated,
and (c) non-literal meaning is explained by systematic departures from literal mean-
ing. Grice fleshed out these assumptions in a very specific way. An utterance’s lit-
eral meaning coincides with what-is-said, whereas what-is-said by non-literal uses
blatantly violates conversational norms, thus triggering the search for implicatures
that capture the intended interpretation and are capable of preserving such norms.
In RT, options (b) and (c) (and more recently (a) as well, see Carston 2010) are
rejected.
92
Before analysing how RT deals with non-literal used, I would like to mention
yet another two ways in which they have been overlooked by Gricean pragmatics.
The first of them concerns the fact that every non-literal interpretation results from
a blatant violation of a maxim (truthfulness). If this is the case, utterances like the
ones below seem hard to explain (see Sperber and Wilson, 1986):
(24) After a moderately tiring Friday, Bill says:
a. I’m pretty tired. I deserve a beer (approximation).
b. I’m exhausted. I deserve a beer (hyperbole).
c. I’m a walking corpse. I deserve a beer (metaphor).
Strictly speaking, Bill’s utterance in (24)a is not true, but it also does not seem
to intuitively count as a blatant violation of the maxim of truthfulness (‘Do not say
what you believe to be false’). Without a blatant violation, the Gricean explanation
cannot get off the ground. Moreover, such deviations from literalness seem to occur
in degrees (see Wilson and Carston 2006, 2007, for a recent statement). The hyper-
bole in (24)b count as a greater deviation in comparison to (24)a and the metaphor in
(24)c an even greater one in comparison to (24)b. Since Sperber and Wilson (1986),
it has been pointed out that there does not seem to be a clear cut off point between
approximations and hyperboles, and hyperboles and metaphors. This raises an im-
portant question. How would the maxim-flouting account deal with cases that only
slightly deviate from what is literally expressed and the continuum formed among
uses that deviate from literalness in different degrees? It seems that Grice simply
cannot account for these facts32.
Moreover, Grice’s analysis faces one last shortcoming. When it comes to more
poetic uses, such as an utterance of ‘Joanna is a flower’ that figuratively conveys that
JOANNA IS BEAUTIFUL, the maxim-flouting account characterises the speaker’s
choice of words as a very clumsy and uneconomical way of conveying the rele-
vant proposition. But if that is the case, something very important about non-literal
uses is lost. Most tropes and figures of speech are used for a purpose. Many of
them evoke powerful images and emotions, and are also useful tools for persua-
sion. According to the romantic critique of the classical rhetoric tradition, if the
figurative interpretation (e.g. Joanna is beautiful) exhausts what is communicated,
the ornamental or stylistic effects created by that specific choice of words are left
32One possibility is to deny that slight deviations such as approximations and hyperboles are cases
of non-literalness. The loose use of language here would be a form of relaxation of the maxim of
truthfulness: the speaker aims to say something true but does not set her standards of accuracy very
high.
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unexplained. In this spirit, Coleridge argues that a property of great style in speech
or writing is:
its untranslatableness in words of the same language without injury to
the meaning. Be it observed, however, that I include in the meaning of
a word not only its correspondent object but likewise all the associations
which it recalls. (Coleridge 2007, XXII, cited in Sperber and Wilson
1986, 155)
We will now take a look at the pragmatic options to deal with non-literal uses
within RT in the hope they will provide the grounding for possible understanding of
descriptive uses of pronouns. So far, accounts of non-literal uses must: (i) capture
their intuitive truth-conditions, (ii) explain the cognitive effects (images, empathy,
etc.) that they give rise to, and (iii) explain the continuum of departures from lit-
eralness. As in the section on Grice, my comments on non-literal uses begin with
metaphor, which paves the way to a treatment of metonymy and descriptive pro-
nouns. It is important to note that accounts that try to accommodate non-literal
contributions at the explicit level face the challenge of allocating inferential aspects
of communication within the range of possible developments of the logical form
encoded by the utterance (i.e. Explicitness).
Metaphor
RT rejects an important aspect of the Gricean tradition. Both decoding and infer-
ring play a role in determining even the literal interpretation of an utterance. Thus,
non-literal interpretations would not be generated by any different mechanism. On
the assumption that the principles that guide such inferences are not violable (con-
tra Grice’s maxim-flouting account) and pragmatic constituents can figure at any
level of meaning, RT could explain the cognitive effects imparted by metaphorical
utterances at the explicit or implicit levels of meaning (or both). But, does anything
motivate one explanation over the other? In subsection 2.3.2, we reached the con-
clusion that the embedding (scope) principle is the best diagnostic tool for making
this decision. Let us then embed a metaphorical word use under a conditional and
see how it behaves. I shall use Grice’s example of ‘cream in one’s coffee’ uttered in
a context to convey that a person is delightful. Consider:
(25) If Jane is the cream in your coffee, she deserves a nice birthday present.
Intuitively, the utterance above expresses that Jane deserves a nice birthday present,
only if she is delightful or nice (as opposed to being actual cream). The embed-
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ding test suggests that some metaphors contribute to the explicature of the utter-
ance. Other metaphors that are conveyed by the lengthy development of a series
of thoughts and images are not so easily testable33 and hence will not be discussed
here. This move, however, faces a problem. How can we conciliate the fact that a
metaphorical interpretation (i.e. ‘cream in one’s coffee’ conveying that a person is
delightful) contributes to the explicit content and, at the same time, counts as a de-
velopment of a logical form of an utterance (see Explicitness)? RT’s current answer
rests on the notion of ad hoc concepts.
The RT account of ad hoc concepts was inspired on Barsalou’s (1983; 1987;
1993) work on categorisation. At the time, Barsalou reacted against the Prototype
theory of concepts. This view was motivated by experiments suggesting that human
categorisation skills, for example, deciding whether an individual (say, Fido) falls
under a given category (say, of dogs), are subject to prototypicality effects. Smith
and Medin (1981), for instance, argue that people do not treat all the individuals
falling under the same concept equally. A robin would be classified as a bird faster
and at a higher ranking in a classificatory scale than a duck would, even though
both fall under the concept BIRD: a clear prototypicality effect. Contra Fodor,
the prototype view assumes that concepts have internal structure, namely, a set of
typical properties of the members that fall under them.
Barsalou’s studies suggest that prototypicality effects clearly exist, but they can-
not be explained by the prototype view, because categorising is a context-dependent
activity and hence cannot be accounted for by a set of stable features. He found that
prototypes vary according to different: (i) individuals, (ii) contexts (e.g. in a discus-
sion about milking, cows and goats would be judged more prototypical mammals,
whereas in a discussion about farming, horses and donkeys would), (iii) perspec-
tives (i.e. swans would be judged prototypical birds from a Chinese stand point,
but eagles would be judged prototypical birds from an American stand point), and,
quite surprisingly, (iv) prototypes can be constructed on the fly (e.g. a wig, as an
exemplar of things that could warm your head in a functional way). Barsalou ar-
gued that these (reviewed) prototypicality effects are best explained by an occasion
specific mental representation: an ad hoc category.
Borrowing from Barsalou, RT devised the notion of ad hoc concepts (repre-
sented by an asterisk attached to conceptual representations) that are built along the
following lines: words (e.g. ‘coffee in cream’) activate atomic (Fodorian) concepts
(COFFEE CREAM), which are strongly associated with information stored in ency-
33Here is an example: ‘The fog comes on little cat feet. It sits looking over harbour and city on
silent haunches and then moves on’ (Fog in Sandburg 1950 recently quoted in Carston 2010) .
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clopaedic entries (e.g. CREAM IS CONSIDERED A NICE TREAT IN ONE’S COFFEE;
HAVING COFFEE WITH CREAM IS A DELIGHTFUL EXPERIENCE), which are used
in inferential processes that create an occasion specific sense for this word use: COF-
FEE CREAM*. Thus, a metaphorical use of ‘cream in one’s coffee’ communicates,
in a situation similar to Grice’s example, the ad hoc concept COFFEE IN CREAM*;
roughly meaning DELIGHTFUL IN A WAY THAT ONLY COFFEE WITH CREAM IS:
WARM AND INVIGORATING, and so on. Such an explanation assumes a pattern like
this (activation spreading from the word flows from left to right)34:
Table 2.1: Ad Hoc Concept Construction
Word Lexical Concept Assumptions Ad Hoc Concept
‘cream in coffee’ COFFEE CREAM X BEING DELIGHTFUL IS A
GOOD REASON FOR BEING
FOND OF X;
COFFEE CREAM*
CREAM IS CONSIDERED A
NICE TREAT IN ONE’S COF-
FEE;
HAVING COFFEE WITH
CREAM IS A DELIGHTFUL
EXPERIENCE;
etc...
Note that this is not a sequentialist view. Given the evidential status of stimuli
and the (relevance-driven) inferential nature of the comprehension process, many
of the assumptions above would be made available by the addressee’s current ex-
pectation of relevance in the specific context: one expects reasons for Jane deserv-
ing a present in the context of (25). This kind of effect-oriented top-down flow
of activation is crucial to RT, setting it apart from purely associationistic (Lakoff
34 In early RT, metaphors and other loose uses were analysed as relevance-driven implicatures. In
the case of a metaphorical utterance of ‘Jane is a bulldozer’ that communicates that JANE IS TOUGH,
the proposal assumed that a nonsensical proposition (i.e. that JANE IS (actually) A BULLDOZER) was
expressed but not communicated. The expressed proposition, besides conveying the metaphorical
interpretation as an implicature, would also control a range of implicatures, such as JANE IS ABLE
TO ENDURE ANY SORT OF HARDSHIP or JANE IS RESILIENT AND NON-SENTIMENTAL at a low
degree of manifestness and account for many of the extra cognitive effects conveyed by metaphors
(e.g. imagistic content) as weak implicatures; see Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1987, 1995); Wilson
and Sperber (1988) for details. Despite the fact that all the desiderata of non-literal uses was met, a
strong asymmetry between two processes - narrowing (that contributes to the proposition expressed)
and loosening - was predicted. This was not theoretically motivated: a point made by Carston (1997)
and more recently by Wilson and Carston (2007). Moreover, the proposal has a strong resemblance
to Grice’s. In particular, the idea of expressing a proposition without communicating it could be
regarded as a form of making-as-if-to-explicate, which could be subject to criticism similar to that
against the notion of making-as-if-to-say.
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and Johnson, 1980; Lakoff and Turner, 1989) and mixed inferential-associationistic
frameworks (Recanati, 1993, 1995, 2004)35. Accordingly, the derivation of the in-
terpretation of (25) has the following form (following Wilson and Sperber 2002).
(26) A’s reasoning: metaphors as ad hoc concepts
a. B has said to A, ‘Jane is the cream in your coffee’ [embedding of the
decoded (incomplete) logical form of B’s utterance into a description
of B’s ostensive behaviour].
b. B’s utterance will be optimally relevant to A. [expectation raised by
recognition of A’s ostensive behaviour and acceptance of the presump-
tion of relevance it conveys].
c. CREAM IS CONSIDERED A NICE TREAT IN ONE’S COFFEE; HAVING
COFFEE WITH CREAM IS A DELIGHTFUL EXPERIENCE; HANGING
OUT WITH JANE IS A DELIGHFUL EXPERIENCE, etc... [assumptions
made salient by the decoding of the logical form in (26)a and the
(specific) expectations of relevance in (26)b ].
d. JANE IS THE CREAM* IN A’S COFFEE [since being delightful is a
good reason for deserving a gift, inferred from (26)b and (26)c, and
accepted as an explicature of B’s utterance]36.
Schematically, the use of ‘cream in one’s coffee’ activates the conceptual clus-
ter COFFEE CREAM, which, in turn, makes assumptions stored in the associated
35Since the availability of representations is mediated by considerations of relevance, assumptions
that are not contained in the entries associated with a concept are usually available for the construc-
tion of the relevant ad hoc concept. This amounts to a good explanation of the emergent property
problem for metaphors, that is, the fact that, in many cases, the intended metaphorical interpretation
(e.g. INSENSITIVE) is not represented in the encyclopaedic entry activated by the figurative use of
the word ‘cold’ or ‘bulldozer’. I will not discuss emergence issues here. For recent discussion, see
Wilson and Carston (2007); Sperber and Wilson (2008).
36 Another possibility is simply to say that the explicature simply is JANE IS DELIGHTFUL. I
call this the substitution approach. It faces two problems. First, how would this proposition be
a development of the logical form of ‘Jane is the cream in my coffee’. Second, how would the
ornamental value of non-literal uses be accounted for, given that the sentence uttered is a clumsy way
of saying something quite simple. As proposals for metonymy will illustrate shortly, the first point
may not turn out to be that problematic. With regards to the second point, the proponent of the simple
account could argue that the ornamental value of non-literal uses are conveyed at a nonconceptual
level of content. For example, by uttering the sentence above the speaker intends to cause feelings
or images that usually accompany the event of drinking coffee with cream on the audience, as an
illustration of Jane’s delightfulness (as recently suggested by Carston 2010). This move requires a
serious revision on assumption (a) of the basic scheme in (4), namely, that communicated content
is exhausted by conceptually structured propositional content. Of course, much more would have
to be said in order for the assumption that the conveyed imagistic content should be captured at the
level of non conceptual content to do any serious theoretical work. Note that this could be regarded
as a treatment of metaphor qua metonymy: one concept would simply be replaced by another.
97
encyclopaedic entries available for inferring the speaker’s meaning. The overall
accessibility of the assumptions in (26)c derives from the lexical meaning of the
words as well as the demand for an interpretation that satisfies the expectations of
relevance held in the particular context. They provide the means for the construction
of an ad hoc concept - CREAM IN ONE’S COFFEE*. Now, since this process depends
partially on the lexical concept activated by the word, ad hoc interpretations can be
regarded as developments of the logical form of utterance (see Explicitness).
Although there might be other proposals for metaphor within RT (see footnotes
34 and 36) the ad hoc concept construction approach has good explanatory proper-
ties. For starters, it is in consonance with the results given by the embedding test and
explains how explicatures containing ad hoc concepts can convey further relevant
information based on the assumptions used to shape the content of the relevant con-
cept (e.g. Jane should get a present because she is delightful). Moreover, the fact
that the ad hoc concepts usually denote a very complex property (e.g. cozy delight-
fulness) explains why non-literal uses have ornamental value (e.g. imagistic content
that may be considered as extra cognitive effects). Some would say that, as a result,
ad hoc concepts are ineffable (see Carston, 2002, ch. 5): the properties they denote
are hardly specifiable (i.e. not paraphraseable). Finally, a similar explanation can be
devised for narrowing (or strengthening) and loosening (or broadening). Narrowing
would be considered as the building up of an ad hoc concept whose denotation is
a subset of the set denoted by the lexical concept. For example, suppose that Mary
expresses her desire to get married by uttering ‘I want to meet some bachelors’ and
by it she means that she wants to meet not only unmarried males, but also men with
additional characteristics, such as being emotionally stable, heterosexual, trustwor-
thy, and committed. Understanding Mary’s utterance can be described as a process
by which the concept BACHELOR is used as a starting point for the construction of
an ad hoc concept BACHELOR* that denotes entities that have just these properties.
Entities that fall under BACHELOR* automatically fall under BACHELOR37 . Broad-
ening is the converse operation. An approximation like ‘France is hexagonal’ can be
taken as conveying an interpretation containing the concept HEXAGONAL*, which
denotes entities that are not only strictly hexagonal but also sufficiently approximate
to this shape. Entities that fall under HEXAGONAL automatically fall under HEXAG-
ONAL*. Metaphors are just an extreme version of broadening (CREAM IN COFFEE*
denotes cream and also individuals that are delightful in a very specific way) or a
combination of broadening and narrowing (the concept is broadened to cover both
37This form of narrowing slightly differs from cases of lexical narrowing characterised by the
addition of extra conceptual material, say, a use of ‘P and Q’ that conveys P and as a result Q.
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kinds of entities and then narrowed to denote only delightful people, see Wilson
and Carston 2006, 2007, for details). In this way, the ad hoc concepts approach also
explains the continuum amongst different kinds of departures from literal meaning.
In conclusion, the relevance-theoretic proposal based on ad hoc concepts is not
subject to the same problems raised by Grice’s account and preserves all the intu-
itive properties associated with non-literal interpretations. In what follows, I will
assess whether its nice explanatory properties carry over to cases of metonymy and
descriptive pronouns. Like my discussion on metaphor, I will mention possible
moves within RT for such cases.
Metonymy and Descriptive pronouns
Let us take a look at metonymy and identification-based descriptive pronouns in the
same way as we did with metaphors. First, we will assess the diagnostics given
by the embedding test and then move to ways of accounting the data within RT.
Consider:
(27) Two waiters closing up the restaurant after work: If the ham sandwich/he
[pointing to a ham sandwich] left without paying, we won’t get as much
money as we thought.
Above, a use of ‘the ham sandwhich’ or ‘he’ while pointing to a ham sandwich
falls within the scope of the conditional. The waiters will not get as much money
as they thought, if the ham sandwich orderer leaves without paying. The embed-
ding test motivates treating uses of third person singular pronouns (and possibly
2nd person singular and all the plural pronouns) as contributing to the explicit con-
tent of the utterance. This approach is also motivated conceptually. The absurd and
non-sensical proposition THE HAM SANDWICH (the culinary item) LEFT WITHOUT
PAYING does not seem to play any role besides conveying the relevant figurative
interpretation. This point, originally due to Sag (1981), is captured in RT under the
idea that the nonsensical proposition simply cannot meet the audience’s presump-
tion of relevance in this context and hence, on grounds of economy, it should not be
even considered as speaker-meant (e.g. it does not play an independent cognitive
role in the sense of Carston’s Functional Independence test). Following this lead,
Papafragou (1996) and Falkum (2010) argue that metonymy exploits minimisation
of effort, whereas metaphor imparts more cognitive effects38. If such uses contribute
38 It is possible to object to this point. Consider the utterance ‘You should avoid marrying a sheep
at all costs’ (Gerrig, 1989), where ‘sheep’ refers to someone born in the year of the sheep. It could
be argued that the utterance imparts both humour (via the literal interpretation of the words) and
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to the explicit level of content, how then could the ham sandwich orderer count as
a development of the logical form of a use of ‘the ham sandwich’ or ‘he’, above?
Given the unificatory basis of lexical adjustments laid out in Wilson and Carston
(2007), one could try to treat metonymy and identification-based descriptive pro-
nouns in terms of ad hoc concept construction, like the proposal for metaphors in
the section above. Understanding the utterance above would proceed as follows: the
words ‘ham sandwich’ or the gesture towards the ham sandwich activate the com-
plex concept HAM SANDWICH, which, in turn, makes certain assumptions contextu-
ally salient, including: PEOPLE ORDER HAM SANDWICHES FOR LUNCH; ORDER-
ING A HAM SANDWICH COSTS MONEY, etc. The availability of such assumptions
also stems from the addressee’s expectations of relevance in the particular context
(suppose the utterance above is an answer to the question ‘Did we get many tips
today?’). Both the high activation status of these assumptions together with the fact
that the HAM SANDWICH concept cannot combine coherently with the predicate ‘to
leave without paying’ are as cues for the construction of an ad hoc concept. Follow-
ing the proposal for metaphor, the metonymic use of ‘ham sandwich’ would convey
the ad hoc concept HAM SANDWICH*. Its construction would involve an initial
broadening of the concept so it denotes both certain culinary items and the people
who ordered them, and then narrowed to denote only the latter.
This proposal, however, is subject to a number of objections. First, ad hoc con-
cepts are created by cognitive operations that broaden or narrow the set denoted
by the (original) lexical concept. This is what allowed the placement of metaphor
within the continuum of departures from literalness mentioned earlier. As Falkum
(2010, ch.6), following Wilson and Carston (2006, 2007), points out, the modu-
lation of lexical meaning (broadening or narrowing) is warranted by implications
that may feed a process of backwards inference that shapes the content of the occa-
sion specific concept (as in the mutual adjustment of implicatures and explicatures).
With regards to this specific case, broadening the ad hoc concept HAM SANDWICH*
so it denotes both culinary items and individuals who ordered them does not seem
to be licensed by any cognitive effects captured in terms of implicated premises
or conclusions. Conversely, in the metaphor case, the modulation of FLOWER in
‘Joanna is a flower’ to convey that Joanna is beautiful, is underpinned by a simi-
larity relation: both flowers and Joanna are beautiful things and thus both would
be denoted under the initial modulation of the concept (which gets narrowed af-
terwards). The similarity relation explains a range of implications. Joanna may
have a delicate beauty (as opposed to a feral kind of beauty), because flowers are
information about a person (via the metonymical interpretation).
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beautiful in that way. In metonymy, there are no such cognitive effects and the con-
tiguity relation does not play the pragmatic role played by the resemblance relation
in metaphor comprehension. As a result, broadening the initial metonymically used
word is not pragmatically licensed (huge effort involved and without any apparent
gain in effects, although see footnote 38). Since the broadening is necessary for a
further narrowing of the HAM SANDWICH* so it denotes only certain customers,
the system is unable to create an occasion specific sense that captures the intuitive
contribution of the words ‘ham sandwich’ in the utterance above.
There is yet another difficulty for the approach. The interpretations conveyed by
metaphor and many other instances of broadening or narrowing have an ineffable
nature, which is nicely captured by these occasion specific senses. The properties
they denote are hard to specify (e.g. beautiful in a flower-like delicate kind of way).
This does not seem to be the case for metonymies. The concept HAM SANDWICH*
is exhausted by the description the ham sandwich orderer.
As for descriptive uses of pronouns, an explanation in terms of ad hoc con-
cepts seems to be even more difficult. The reason being the fact that pronouns are
not lexical words. Their contributions are determined in an essentially context de-
pendent way. Still, one could argue that, in the utterance above, ‘he’ contributes
an ad hoc concept MALE* (in virtue of the lexical material of the pronoun) or HAM
SANDWICH* (in virtue of the gesture) to the proposition expressed by the utterance.
Regardless of the form taken, the occasion-specific concept is roughly equivalent to
the description the ham sandwich orderer.
This proposal in fact inherits the same shortcomings as in cases of metonymy.
The conceptual representation would have to be first broadened to denote both culi-
nary items and their customer and then just the latter, but since the first operation
cannot kick off the ground (no cognitive effects are conveyed modulo huge process-
ing effort), the concept cannot be shaped so it corresponds to the intuitive contribu-
tion the pronoun makes to the proposition expressed. In short, the ad hoc concept
account does not seem to be a good way to explain how interpretations resulting
from metonymical uses of words nor descriptive uses of pronouns. Alternative pro-
posals must be sought39.
39In the case of metonymy, Papafragou (1996) pioneered explicature based treatments based on
metarepresentations. Borrowing from Kaplan (1989, 558ff), she explored the idea that metonymy
involves a specific form of naming, that is, the explicature of an utterance of ‘The ham sandwich left
without paying’ would be paraphrased as THE INDIVIDUAL APPROPRIATELY CALLED/CONCEIVED
‘THE HAM SANDWICH’ LEFT WITHOUT PAYING. The main problem I see with this account is that it
builds into the explanation what it should explain. We want to know the circumstances under which
such namings are appropriate. Falkum (2010, ch. 6) builds on this proposal in a way such that it
does not inherit this shortcoming (as well as other difficulties). As Falkum’s proposal does not carry
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At this point it is worth considering substitution-based accounts. The idea is
simple. In the right contextual setting, the lexical material of the word would be
entirely replaced by a contextually salient mental representation. This proposal
follows much of the spirit, if not the letter, of Nunberg’s (1993) talk of transfer
(after Fauconnier 1985, see also Recanati 1993, 2004) and the idea of certain mental
representations serving as triggers for other target representations.
In the case of lexical metonymy, the substitution-based account would proceed
as follows. The use of ‘ham sandwich’ activates the concept HAM SANDWICH,
which in turn makes a range of assumptions contextually salient; including PEOPLE
ORDER HAM SANDWICHES FOR LUNCH; ORDERING A HAM SANDWICH COSTS
MONEY, etc. The availability of such assumptions also stems from the addressee’s
expectations of relevance in the particular context: the means for an answer to ‘Did
we get many tips today?’ must be provided. By replacing the lexical concept HAM
SANDWICH with the (phrasal) concept HAM SANDWICH ORDERED the audience is
able to arrive at the explicature the ham sandwich orderer left without paying.
Note that the proposal does not inherit the problems raised by the ad hoc concept
account, but it does have some problems of its own. The main issue is this. How
can a substitution between conceptual material count as a development of the logical
form of an utterance? If they indeed can count as so, the way encoded information
constrains inferences to the explicature(s) meant by the speaker is trivialised. The
main challenge is one of overgeneration. We explain the intuitive truth conditions
of the metonymical use of ‘ham sandwich’ above, but fail to explain why the use of
‘Jane’ is a bad name for the dish she prepared in the example below:
(28) a. Bill: Who is London’s best cook?
b. John: ?Mary won the cooking contest, although Jane was very tasty
as well (judgement in Papafragou 1996, 143).
Let us abstract away from this difficulty for cases of lexical metonymy for the
moment and consider the substitution-based proposal for identification-based de-
scriptive uses of pronouns. Suppose that the use of ‘he’ introduces a variable-like
entity x40 whose value is supplied contextually and that the gesture towards the ham
sandwich makes a range of assumptions, including, PEOPLE ORDER HAM SAND-
WICHES FOR LUNCH; THE PERSON WHO ORDERED THE HAM SANDWICH IS NOT
AT HER TABLE, etc., contextually salient. Replacing x by the concept HAM SAND-
WICH does not provide an overall intelligible interpretation that is compatible with
over to descriptive uses of pronouns straightforwardly, I cannot assess it fully here.
40My use of ‘variable-like’ here contrasts proper variables that are bound by quantifiers.
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the audience’s current expectations of relevance and that can satisfy the predicate
‘leaves without paying’. Therefore, such substitution is not pragmatically licensed.
However, these assumptions provide other concepts that can replace x in a way
such that the resulting interpretation satisfies the current expectations of relevance.
More specifically, the pronominal variable can be replaced by the value THE PER-
SON WHO ORDERED THE HAM SANDWICH (as an implicit antecedent, as it were),
capturing the descriptive truth-conditions of the utterance in terms of the propo-
sition the person who ordered the ham sandwich left without paying. In (some)
descriptive uses of pronouns, the substitution operation is not as problematic as in
the metonymy case, since pronouns may require this type of operation in virtue of
their logical form. Indexical cases illustrate this well. The only difference is that
‘substitution’ in this case targets a singular (as opposed to a descriptive) mental
representation.
Although the substitution-based proposal is much more plausible in the case of
descriptive uses of (third person singular) pronouns than cases of metonymy, it still
faces two challenges. The first concerns the precise specification of the lexical infor-
mation encoded by pronouns. Above, we assumed that they encode a variable-like
entity and, crucially, that it could be replaced by the description the ham sandwich
orderer, which some (Montague, 1973; Barwise and Cooper, 1981) take to be a
quantified term. The challenge then is to come up with a lexical entry for such ex-
pressions that allows for ‘substitutions’ that target both general and singular terms
(as in indexical cases) and that accounts for the binding and the cross sentential
dependencies. In short we need a grammar for these expressions so we can have
a better idea of how the ‘developments’ of the logical form encoded by pronouns
(see Explicitness) can derive all the types of pronominal interpretation reviewed in
chapter 1, but nothing more. This will be crucial for an explanation of the extended
properties of descriptive uses.
The second point concerns some accessibility puzzles that metonymy and also
identification-based descriptive pronouns face. If in both cases, the alleged sub-
stitution would target an indirectly or non-immediately available concept (e.g. the
interpretation the ham sandwich orderer is accessed through or mediated by the
HAM SANDWICH concept), then it is mysterious why some cases, where the rel-
evant interpretations are also indirectly available, cannot be interpreted properly.
Re-consider the instance of donkey anaphora below:
(29) Accessibility patterns of indirectly available concepts
a. Every man who has a wife should bring her to the party.
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b. #?Every married man should bring her to the party. (intended reading:
as (a) above)
Here the word ‘married’ would activate the concept MARRIED, which in turn would
make the assumption A HUSBAND IS MARRIED TO A WIFE salient enough so it
could provide a value for the pronoun ‘her’. However, this does not seem to be
possible. Note also that there are identification-based descriptive uses that display
a similar accessibility pattern. Consider:
(30) Every groom thinks *she/ ?his [pointing to a wedding dress] is worth dying
for.
Here the gesture towards the wedding dress does not make the bride salient
enough to become the selected value of the pronominal expression.
Finally, it is worth noting that the assumptions made here are also compatible
with an heterogeneous treatment of the data. For example, as in the section on
the Gricean-inspired treatment of descriptive uses, some cases may be instances of
implicatures. Consider the embedding of a use of the first person singular pronoun
under a conditional.
(31) Melvin, a condemned prisoner says: If the incarceration system in this
country changes, I will be traditionally allowed to order whatever I like for
my last meal. (based on Nunberg 1993, 20)
According to Nunberg, when the proposition in the consequent is unembedded, ‘I’
contributes the condemned prisoner. However, we do not get this reading here. The
utterance conveys that if the system changes, there would be a tradition according
to which Melvin himself is able to chose whatever he wants for his last meal. There
might be many factors at play here. For example, even in cases where a descriptive
interpretation of ‘I’ gets under the scope of a conditional, it is impossible to rule
out a reading where the pronoun is interpreted indexically (i.e. referring rigidly
to Melvin) but the predicate receives a non-standard interpretation (see the discus-
sion in chapter 1 section 1.7). Moreover, as in the section on Grice, some of the
descriptive interpretations of the first person singular pronoun may be captured as
implicatures. For example, Clinton’s utterance of ‘The founders invested me with
the sole responsibility for appointing Supreme Court Justices’, may convey that The
founders invested Clinton with the sole responsibility for appointing Supreme Court
Justices at the explicit level and implicate that The founders invested the American
President with the sole responsibility for appointing Supreme Court Justices. These
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propositions could be generated without any problem in RT.
The strategy that seems to have emerged is this. According to the Embedding
(scope) test, some descriptive uses of pronouns contribute to the utterance’s expli-
cature. These are best explained under the substitution-based account mentioned
above. Some other uses (e.g. first person singular) are diagnosed as contributing to
the utterance’s implicatures. RT (as well as a Gricean inspired account) account for
these cases without any problems. Such proposal mixed both implicit and explicit
contributions depending on the particular use and will be fully developed in chapter
5.
2.4 Conclusion
At this point, let us take stock and look at what we have accomplished in this
chapter. Its aim was to introduce pragmatic frameworks that describe how extra-
linguistic information interacts with encoded information in utterance comprehen-
sion. Given that descriptive interpretations are not provided by a linguistic an-
tecedent or coincide with a immediate entity in the environment (like cases of
deixis), appeal to pragmatics in order to explain the data is essential.
We begun by assessing Grice’s framework, which laid out the general founda-
tions for pragmatics. A Gricean-inspired account of descriptive uses of pronouns
explains the core properties of descriptive uses of pronouns in two levels of commu-
nicated information, one determined by the linguistic meaning of words (what-is-
said), the other by norms of rational communicative behaviour (what-is-implicated).
Thus, the individual identified in the context, e.g. a footprint in the ground, con-
tributes a certain propositional constituent at the level of what-is-said, i.e. FOOT-
PRINT. Since what-is-said by descriptive uses of pronouns violate conversational
norms (the footprint cannot be a gigantic person), the search for an implicature that
preserves them (i.e. the footprint-maker is a giant) is triggered. This explains why
the identification of certain individuals in the context (Identification Dependency)
is necessary for conveying (Connection) the descriptive truth-conditions that are
intuitively communicated (Descriptiveness).
Various problems were raised to this approach. To begin with, Grice took what-
is-said to be closely determined by the linguist meaning of words. Under this as-
sumption, it is difficult to see how the personal pronoun ‘he’ could contribute THE
FOOTPRINT to the level of what-is-said. Moreover, what-is-said is also determined
by the communicative intentions of the speaker. Thus, the absurd proposition that
the footprint is a gigantic person cannot be possibly meant, as it is hardly intended.
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Without what-is-said, the relevant implicatures cannot be conveyed. Moving to
the notion of making-as-if-to-say is not helpful, because it does not carry enough
speaker commitment to blatantly violate a maxim. Again, the relevant implicatures
cannot be generated. These and other shortcomings motivated the examination of
alternative frameworks.
We then moved to a presentation of Relevance Theory. As one of its many de-
partures from Grice, it assumes that inferential (pragmatic) processes can contribute
the explicit or implicit levels of meaning. Such contributions are regulated not by
norms of (idealised) rational communicative behaviour, but by overarching princi-
ples that regulate the processing of information and communicative overtness. In
this framework, descriptive pronouns can induce readings that fall at the explicit or
the implicit levels of meaning. The use of the scope test as a diagnostics for de-
ciding the level to which descriptive pronouns contribute gave mixed results. The
descriptive readings of some first person singular pronominal uses may be captured
as implicatures, while other types of descriptive uses appear to contribute to the
utterance’s explicatures. The first approach (even in Gricean terms) explains the
core data straightforwardly and does not carry any problems. With regards to the
explanation of the data in terms of relevance-driven explicatures, two sub-types of
proposals were analysed: an account based in ad hoc concept construction (borrow-
ing from RT’s recent treatment of metaphor) and the substitution-based account.
The first faced serious conceptual problems. The second appears very promissory,
but it faces two main challenges.
First, the account presupposes that a variable-like entity, allegedly encoded by
the pronoun, can be replaced by descriptive information (a quantificational con-
stituent) available in the context. The challenge then is to specify the linguistic
meaning of pronouns in a way such that not only the identification-based descriptive
interpretations are predicted, but also the other pronominal interpretations reviewed
in chapter 1. That is, this is the challenge of describing what counts as a legitimate
development of the pronoun’s logical form (see Explicitness).
Secondly, the substitution-based account faces the challenge of explaining how
visual processing establishes certain ‘antecedent’ representations that can provide
the pronouns with the relevant value. The description of such processes should also
aim to account for some accessibility puzzles regarding the unavailability of some
interpretations. As the parallels between metonymy and descriptive uses make clear,
the concept that is immediately available in the context (e.g. FOOTPRINT, upon
seeing a footprint in the ground) is not the one that is selected as the semantic value
of the expression, but rather provides a gateway to the relevant interpretation (e.g.
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the footprint-maker). However, there are other cases where the relevant conceptual
representations are also indirectly available, but the relevant readings cannot be
established. As for example, certain cases of cross sentential anaphora (see chapter
1 section 1.5). For example ‘Every married man should bring her to the party’
does not make the concept WIFE salient enough to be selected as the pronoun’s
interpretation, even though it is closely associated with the MARRIAGE concept.
A similar form of unavailability can also emerge for some descriptive cases. This
is particularly puzzling. On the one hand, the fact that some identification-based
descriptive interpretations are possible suggest that they can be generated as positive
cognitive effects in some contexts. On the other, the fact that interpretations that
rely on indirectly available concepts are sometimes unavailable suggest that such
positive cognitive effects cannot be generated in some other contexts. How then is
this duality possible, given that the principles underlying both types of interpretative
attempts are the same and the encoded meaning of the pronoun remains stable across
contexts?
The first of these challenges will be dealt in chapter 5, where a grammar for-
malism that plays a key role in explaining not only the core but also the extended
data will be laid out. In the next chapter, I will take care of the second one. In order
to overcome it, we need to supplement our pragmatic account with a description of
specific visual processes by which certain mental representations can integrate with
encoded information. Note that this makes sense only within pragmatic frameworks
that are grounded on cognitive principles41 as opposed to pragmatic frameworks
that were motivated as solutions to certain philosophical problems (e.g. Grice’s
programme).
41This strategy may presuppose something akin to a competence/performance distinction within
pragmatics. The cognitive principle of relevance (similarly to competence) is an overarching prin-
ciple for information-flow regulation. Specific representational abilities (similarly to performance)
recruit such a principle in the delivery of certain representational states.
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Chapter 3
Descriptive pronouns and the
representation of individuals
3.1 The Representation of individuals and linguistic
understanding
At the end of the previous chapter, I motivated the idea that explaining utterance
comprehension not only involves an account of overarching pragmatic principles,
but also a description of the specific cognitive mechanisms employed by humans in
comprehension. In this chapter, I engage with a debate about how certain views on
the nature of visual representations bear on linguistic theorising, more specifically
accounts of descriptive pronouns. According to chapter 1, these as well as other
pronominal uses depend on the identification of a specific individual in the envi-
ronment as belonging to a certain kind (Identification Dependency). Below, there
are examples that illustrate that the reliance on the identification of an individual
in context is not restricted to these expressions and consists in a more widespread
phenomenon.
(1) Linguistic and conceptual inter-dependencies
a. A new faculty member picks up her first pay check from the mailbox.
Waving it, she asks a colleague: Do most faculty members deposit it
[their paycheck] in the Credit Union? (deep anaphora, Jacobson 2000,
89).
b. A visitor is leapt on by his host’s dog and utters: Mine [my dog] does
the same (noun phrase ellipsis, Hankamer and Sag 1976).
c. Chris utters to Mandy, who is looking for a box of cereal around the
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kitchen: [The cereal box is] On the top shelf! (subsententials, Carston
2002, 17)
d. Johnny talking about a friend who just finished his PhD and making
a circular motion to the side of his head: He worked so hard he went
(gesture) [crazy] (cases of ‘showing’, Wharton 2003).
e. Pointing to the White House in Washington DC: Every time there is
a war, he [the president] has tough choices to make (identification-
dependent descriptive pronouns).
The bracketed expressions in strikethrough are not uttered, but seem to be extracted
from the context and become the constituents of the interpretations of the utterances
above. They indicate conceptual representations that emerge from the identification
of certain individuals as falling under a kind: the paycheck in (1)a, the dog in (1)b,
the box of cereal in (1)c, the gesture in (1)d, and the White House in (1)e. In the
face of such variety of linguistic phenomena, descriptive pronouns are just another
case in which words require a suitable conceptual constituent, extra-linguistically
provided, for communicating some information.
In order to illuminate the relevant analogies and dissimilarities between the use
in (1)e and the other examples above, let us compare it to the deep anaphora case
in (1)a. It is clear that both display some form of Identification Dependency in the
sense of chapter 1, that is, in order for the relevant propositions to be communi-
cated, the contextually salient individuals must be identified as belonging to a kind.
In (1)a this is achieved under the concept PAYCHECK. In the case of in (1)e, this is
achieved by the concept WHITE HOUSE. However, there is an important difference
between the two. In the deep anaphora case, the concept that is employed in object
identification is the one that is selected as a constituent of the proposition expressed.
In the case of descriptive pronouns, the concept that is employed in object identi-
fication serves as a gateway for another concept, namely, AMERICAN PRESIDENT,
that is selected as the value of the pronominal expression. This is what makes de-
scriptive pronouns similar to metonymy (see chapter 1 section 1.7 and chapter 2
section 2.3.3).
Let us elaborate on the intuitive vocabulary used towards the end of previous
chapters and assume that any concept that is not involved in the identification of the
contextually salient object is an indirectly salient or available concept. Following
this assumption, the concept AMERICAN PRESIDENT is not directly available, be-
cause it is not involved in the identification of the White House in (1)e, whereas the
concept PAYCHECK is directly available in the context of (1)a, because it is involved
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in the identification of the object waved by the speaker. This form of direct involve-
ment can be conceived as concept tokens that emerge as a result of the detection of
instances of certain properties in the environment. This terminology allows us to
formulate a hypothesis about how non-linguistically available information and en-
coded information interact. More specifically, it allows the formulation of the Cross
Modal Integration (CMI) question, below, which this chapter aims to answer1:
(CMI Question): Can indirectly salient concepts contribute to the proposition ex-
pressed by an utterance (i.e. count as a development of the logical form of an
utterance)?
On the basis of the intuitive truth-conditions of (1)e, it seems that the CMI
question deserves a positive answer. However, there are cases that raise difficulties
for it, as, for example, the examples that motivated formal treatments of cross-
sentential anaphora in chapter 1 section 1.5 and exemplify the accessibility puzzles
mentioned in the subsection on descriptive pronouns in chapter 2 section 2.3.3.
Consider again:
(2) Accessibility patterns of indirectly available concepts
a. Every man who has a wife should bring her to the party.
b. *Every married man should bring her to the party. (intended reading:
as (a) above)
Above, the utterance in (2)b contains a linguistic expression (e.g. ‘married’) that
would be able to indirectly single out an individual to establish the intended inter-
pretation of the pronoun (e.g. the wife). However, it is only with an antecedent that
directly singles out the relevant discourse entities, as in (2)a, that the anaphoric link
can be established. Note that in these cases, identification would be achieved via a
linguistic expression, rather than via visual processes (the ways in which linguistic
and visual identification can be unified will be taken up in chapter 5). Taking this
point for granted for the moment, one could argue, based on the examples in (2), that
indirectly available concepts cannot contribute to the proposition expressed. Let us
develop this suggestion more clearly, relating it to some background discussion on
anaphora.
1Elugardo and Stainton (2003), for example, are among the few in the philosophical and linguistic
communities who detail how actual mechanisms of visual representation deliver the content that
integrates with encoded information in substentential utterances.
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In chapter 1 section 1.5, we looked at the first proposal in the literature for ac-
counting for the asymmetry in (2): a condition on anaphoric dependencies known
as the anaphoric island constraint (Postal, 1969). It states that only (i) overt NPs
that (ii) are not part of words can serve as antecedents for anaphoric pronouns.
The constraint would rule out cases like (2)b and many others (e.g. cases where
‘McCarthyites’ cannot serve as an antecedent for interpreting ‘his’ as McCarthy’s).
This shaped what Kadmon (1987) later called the ‘formal link condition’: the im-
perative according to which the relationship between pronoun and antecedent must
be described formally, that is, in terms of the architecture of grammar. The move,
then, can be summarised as follows. On the basis of certain intuitions held by
communicators, a condition on human cognitive architecture was postulated: cer-
tain dependencies cannot be represented because they go beyond what the grammar
faculty is able to establish.
There are two inter-related problems with the trend initiated by Postal. First,
something like the anaphoric island constraint would rule out the deep anaphora
cases in (1)a. This simply would get the data wrong and go counter speaker intu-
itions (which motivated the constraint in the first place). Second, the status of the
anaphoric island constraint as a condition imposed by grammar is a bit mysterious.
For example, Chomsky (1986) famously argued for the idea that grammar is a set
of rules (comprising an I-language) induced from the stimuli in a specific natural
language modulo a universal set of constraints (a Universal Grammar). Under this
conception, the rules of an I-language basically amount to certain conditions on
well formedness of strings (competence). Since donkey anaphora exploits relations
across strings (see chapter 1 section 1.5), Postal’s anaphoric island constraint cannot
be stated at the level of grammar, according to this narrow view. That is, his con-
straint seems to capture conditions on dependencies between discourse ‘referents’,
a level of representation much richer than the string-bound forms of dependency
that a narrow conception of grammar is concerned with2. However, if we depart
from such narrow view, as Postal’s constraint seems to do, it is mysterious why
the saliency of the paycheck in (1)a and the dog in (1)b cannot provide discourse
antecedents.
In order to overcome these difficulties, Elbourne (2001, 2005), a recent exponent
of the tradition initiated by Postal, refines the early conditions on donkey anaphora.
In order to capture the deep anaphora data in (1)a in the right way, he postulates that
2The narrow view is not the only conception of grammar. Discourse Representational Theory
(Kamp, 1981), Buring’s Discourse Trees (Bu¨ring, 2001) and Dynamic Syntax (Kempson et al., 2001;
Cann et al., 2005) assume that grammar can describe structure that is not string bound.
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donkey cases involve NP ellipsis, that is, it involves the deletion of a constituent of
a noun phrase at the level of phonological form (PF, i.e. the pronounced elements
of a sentence) which nevertheless contributes to the sentence’s logical form (LF, i.e.
the structured representations that corresponds to truth-conditional content). For
Elbourne, such an operation is defined as follows:
Elbourne’s condition on NP ellipsis: NP deletion at PF requires (i) an overt NP
as an antecedent (ii) that is not part of a word or (iii) a sufficiently salient and
pragmatically accessible representation that serves this role.
Conditions (i) and (ii) are basically the same as Postal’s and effectively ex-
plain the antecedent accessibility pattern in (2). Condition (iii) explains the deep
anaphora cases where PAYCHECK in (1)a is recovered at the level of LF and the
elided noun DOG in (1)b is recovered in the same way. With regards to such licens-
ing via pragmatic saliency, Elbourne (2005, 45) observes that:
NP deletion in the absence of a linguistic antecedent would rely on some
extralinguistic reconstruction by the hearer of what must be meant by the
speaker; this explains the fact that it seems limited to cases where there is
some immediate cue in the physical environment, which is indicated by
some physical gesture for the greatest felicity to result. Any harder task,
presumably, would produce the feeling of mental stretching that one has
on hearing [e.g. (b) in (2)] (italics and square brackets mine).
It seems that an immediate salient cue corresponds to a feature in the environ-
ment that makes a concept directly available for integration with encoded informa-
tion, in the intuitive sense used earlier3. Based on these claims, condition (iii) of
the constraint would rule out cases where the cue does not make the ‘discourse en-
tity’ immediately salient, as in (2)b (‘Every married man should bring her to the
party’, where ‘her’ is interpreted as a particular man’s wife). That is, concepts
that are only indirectly available in the context cannot license the ellipsis opera-
tion (e.g. the reconstruction of the elided noun by the audience) and hence cannot
3Elbourne mentions that retrieving the LF of the sentence uttered corresponds to ‘a reconstruc-
tion’ of speaker’s meaning, but he does not specify by which mechanisms such reconstruction takes
place. As discussed in chapter 2, Grice did not describe how contextually available information
figures in what-is-said and allegedly precluded conversational maxims from shaping this level of
content. It seems that Grice’s position cannot cast light on Elbourne’s appeal to pragmatic saliency.
Adopting a pragmatic framework like RT could make sense of this process, but with it a whole
lot of processes that shape truth-conditional content would be allowed, threatening the strictness of
conditions (i) and (ii) of the NP ellipsis constraint. See further discussion in this section.
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contribute to the propositions expressed. This carries some interesting explanatory
consequences. For example, some cases of descriptive pronouns, presented in chap-
ter 2 and reprinted below, would be ruled out. Consider:
(3) Unavailability of descriptive interpretations
a. Ann and Matt are in a wedding shop browsing through the items, Matt
to Ann: Every groom thinks his bride is worth dying for.
b. In the same context as (a), Matt utters to Ann: Every groom thinks
*she/ ?his [pointing to a wedding dress] is worth dying for.
Above, the gesture towards the wedding dress does not count as a immediate cue for
the emergence of a BRIDE concept, hence accounting for the infelicity or ungram-
maticality of the use in (3)b. However, by the same token, the speaker’s gesture
towards the White House in (1)e would not count as an immediate cue for interpret-
ing ‘He has tough choices to make’ as the American President has tough choices to
make. Condition (iii) of Elbourne’s constraint rules out all identification-based de-
scriptive pronouns, thus providing a negative answer to the CMI question: indirectly
available concepts cannot integrate with encoded information in order to express a
proposition (count as an development of the utterance’s logical form). This is un-
desirable, for these interpretations seem available for most language users and, in
some cases even fall within the scope of logical operators (in (1)e, the interpretation
of the pronoun covaries with the (quantificational) adverbial ‘Every time there is a
war’). Moreover, as mentioned in chapter 1 section 1.8, Elbourne’s constraint on
NP deletion would rule out cases of donkey anaphora where neither an overt an-
tecedent that is not a word-part (conditions (i) and (ii)) nor an immediate cue for the
intended interpretation (condition (iii)) are present in the context. However, uses in
these circumstances can be felicitous, like the following and previously mentioned
examples.
(4) a. When the baby threw-up, did you find any pencil eraser in it (Ander-
son, 1971)?
b. Every iphone owner uses it for browsing (Patel et al., 2009).
Here, the VP ‘threw-up’ allows the pronoun to be interpreted as the vomit in
(4)a and the complex ‘iphone owner’ in (4)b provides ‘it’ with the interpretation
his iphone. If such dependencies as well as identification-based pronouns are to
be explained, they should be explained by a mechanism different from that of NP
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ellipsis licensing 4, but it is not clear how this alternative mechanism would be able
to allocate the relevant content at a level of meaning distinct from the proposition
expressed, on the assumption that constraints such as Postal’s or Elbourne’s exist.
Before raising the dilemma central to this section, I would like to make some
comments on the transition from Postal’s constraint to the one proposed by El-
bourne. As previously mentioned, the definition given by Elbourne is able to ac-
count for cases of ‘deep anaphora’: an advantage over Postal’s proposal. However,
if the status of Postal’s constraint vis-a`-vis the architecture of grammar (narrowly
conceived) is unclear, the status of Elbourne’s is even more so. If condition (iii),
which incorporates issues concerning the saliency of mental representations, is part
of a constraint on NP-ellipsis, then either the operation is not licensed by grammar
(in the narrow sense) or the operation is grammatically licensed, but grammar here
may draw on other representational resources (e.g. the ability to visually single out
individuals as pertaining to a kind; i.e. conceptual system, more generally). The fact
that the two positions seem virtually indistinguishable from each other presses an
interesting point. Elbourne’s disjunctive condition does not explain what immediate
saliency amounts to. But, if we try capture this notion in a theoretically interesting
way, we could reduce Elbourne’s disjunctive constraint into a single one that covers
both linguistic and extra-linguistic licensors for the relevant felicitous dependencies
(in (1), say) and, at the same time, rules out the relevant infelicitous cases (in (2)b
and (3)b, say). This could achieved by the following:
The Individuative-Representational constraint: A dependent use of a linguistic ex-
pression must draw its interpretation from an individuative representation available
from the context.
The use of ‘dependent’ above unifies dependencies that are linguistic in nature,
like the standard cases of donkey anaphora, and cases that rely on the visual identi-
fication of objects in the environment, like the uses in (1)5. The notion of an indi-
viduative representation might be characterised by three roles: (i) it emerges cross-
modally (perception and decoding could give rise to the same representations), (ii)
it singles out individuals or discourse ‘referents’ in thought, and (iii) it captures a
4As an alternative, Elbourne (2008) writes a different semantics for identification dependent
descriptive pronouns.
5The notion of identification I am interested in potentially covers other cases, like singling out an
individual in memory and in testimony or communication (see Evans, 1982, ch. 5). Since this chapter
aims to answer the CMI question based on empirical evidence, the literature review is restricted to
identification in vision only.
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level of representation without which such singling out would not be possible.
In the linguistic case, these roles would be played by the concept that is encoded
by the antecedent. For example, in ‘Every man who has a wife should bring her to
the party’ (i.e. (2)a), the concept WIFE emerges via the decoding of ‘wife’ and sin-
gles out certain discourse entities that can be picked out by the pronoun ‘she’. In
‘Every married man should bring her to the party’ (i.e. (2)b), however, the concept
MARRIED, which emerges via the decoding of ‘married’, does not discriminate be-
tween husbands and wives and hence does to play an individuative role, that is, it
does not single out discourse entities that can be picked up by the pronoun. As a
result, utterances of this type are ruled out by the Individuative-Representational
constraint.
In the perceptual case, the roles (i) to (iii) above would be played by concepts
that emerge visually. For example, in ‘Do most faculty members deposit it [waving
a paycheck] in the Credit Union ?’ (i.e. (1)a), the concept PAYCHECK emerges via
the visual identification of the object waved by the speaker and singles out discourse
referents in a way such that they can be picked out by the pronoun ‘it’. In ‘Every
groom thinks *she/?his [pointing to a wedding dress] is worth dying for’ (i.e. (3)b),
the concept WEDDING DRESS emerges through the visual experience, but it does not
partition the world into discourse entities, in this case, brides, that can be picked out
by the pronoun. This explains the infelicity of the pronominal use.
In terms of predictions, it is very difficult to see how Elbourne’s NP deletion
proposal and the Individuative-Representational constraint, sketched above, differ.
Moving from the former to the latter highlights an important shift, however. The no-
tion of an immediately salient concept, present in the NP deletion account, has been
formulated in terms of concepts that, among other things, single out individuals in
thought and capture a level of representation without which such singling out would
not be possible. Although it is easy to see how that can be met by concepts that are
encoded by certain lexical items, it is more difficult to see how that would come
about in the perceptual case. Why would my seeing of an object waved by some-
one, require the concept PAYCHECK, or any concept at all? Thus, in order to play
the role required by the Individuative-Representational constraint, we would need
to find the counterpart, in vision, of concepts that emerge through decoding. Per-
haps the best candidate for establishing the relation between the visual identification
of a salient individual, on the one hand, and the availability of certain conceptual
representations, on the other, is the notion of a sortal.
In the philosophical and psychological literature (Strawson 1959; Quine 1960;
Wiggins 1967, 1980, 2001; Macnamara 1972, 1982, 1986; Spelke 1990, to name
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just a few), it has been proposed that perceiving particulars, that is, individuals that
move as a whole, have a bound contour and so on, requires a specific kind of con-
ceptual representation, otherwise such entities would not be presented to us as the
individuals they are. This representation is known as a sortal concept. Intuitively,
sortals are the kinds of concepts that answer ‘What is it?’, where ‘it’ designates a
given object, and complete the question ‘How many ... are there?’. For example, in
a situation where one sees a dog and is asked ‘What is it?, the answer would be me-
diated by a DOG concept. If the question ‘How many are there?’ is further asked, the
same concept (e.g. DOG) would determine the answer, namely, one (and not four, or
five). In short, sortals seem to outline certain conditions on identity and individua-
tion of particulars (I will be more explicit about these notions shortly), and hence are
good candidates for playing the role required by the Individuative-Representational
constraint. In short, sortals would be the most accessible conceptual representations
in a given perceptual experience (i.e. seeing a ball moving), because they are re-
quired in order to characterise the experience as such (i.e. as the experience of a
ball moving). More specifically, Sortalism is captured by two claims:
Sortal Individuation: Sortal concepts are necessary for singling out individuals in
thought.
Sortal Identity: Sortal concepts are necessary for capturing the identity conditions
of objects, that is, the conditions under which they remain the same through time
and space and the set of transformations they can undergo while remaining the same
objects 6.
It is important to notice that sortals are necessary but not sufficient for charac-
terising a visual experience of solid, bound, three-dimensional material objects as
such. A causal relation between the object and the visual system is also needed.
I will introduce, motivate, and properly discuss the notion of a sortal in the next
section. Now, if such representations do exist, then it seems that the Individuative-
Representational constraint and the notion of directly available concepts, used by
Elbourne’s NP ellipsis constraint, can be sensibly formulated. The appeal to any
6This definition may lump together two notions of identity: one related to spatio-temporal conti-
nuity and other related to the changes an object can undergo. These two notions come apart in many
cases. For example, when a person dies, she is spatio-temporally continuous with her body, but the
individual that once existed ceases to be at the moment of death. In my assessment of the sortal
theses these two notions of identity will be distinguished, even though they are represented here in a
unified manner.
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of such constraints explains some of the accessibility patterns present in donkey
anaphora as well as cases of deep anaphora, but it would inevitably cast identification-
based descriptive pronouns aside. As these exploit concepts that are indirectly avail-
able (like metonymy), the relevant representations would not be able to integrate
with the linguistic meaning of pronouns (the CMI question would be answered neg-
atively). How then would descriptive uses of pronouns be explained? It is not clear,
but one possibility is this. Advocates of such constraints could appeal to other levels
of information, such as implicatures (although chapter 2 discusses the limits of such
appeal), or presupposition (i.e. imagine a scenario where the immediately salient
concept WHITE HOUSE is presupposed to be a shorthand for talking about the pres-
idents whose office is based in it). In short, alternative means to explain the data
surrounding descriptive pronouns would have to be sought.
On the other hand, if sortals do not exist, then the Individuative-Representational
constraint and the notion of ‘directly’ available concepts, used by Elbourne’s NP el-
lipsis constraint, cannot be sensibly formulated. As a result, there would be no
significant distinction between descriptive uses of pronouns and deep anaphora.
Concepts that are ‘indirectly’ available can integrate with the linguistic meaning
of pronouns in the same way as ‘directly’ available concepts would (the CMI ques-
tion would be answered positively). As a result, the accessibility pattern present in
donkey anaphora, some descriptive cases (and even metonymy) would have to be
explained by mechanisms other than the constraints reviewed above. This clears the
way for the development of a substitution-based account for some descriptive uses
in the sense of chapter 2 (section 2.3.3). This will be fully developed in chapter 5.
In this chapter, we will assess the existence of sortal concepts as individuative
representations that can make sense of the direct availability of certain interpreta-
tions, from both a conceptual and an empirical standpoint. The latter aspect has
been motivated by comments made towards the end of chapter 2. If the pragmatic
principles that guide interpretation are the same, it is mysterious why certain ‘indi-
rectly’ available representations can be selected as constituents for the proposition
expressed in some contexts but not in others. The next section, 3.2, provides moti-
vations and evidence in support of Sortalism (captured under the Individuation and
Identification theses mentioned above). Section 3.3 provides evidence against it. In
section 3.4, I suggest that the empirical evidence reviewed raises a dilemma and I
aim to resolve it by assuming an incremental notion of processing that is based on
the cognitive principle outlined in chapter 2. In section 3.5, I suggest how the no-
tion of incremental processing developed in the previous section helps us to answer
the CMI question and understand some of the issues outlined here. More specifi-
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cally, I argue against Sortalism and for the idea that the so called indirectly avail-
able concepts can be integrated with linguistic meaning. The accessibility patterns
mentioned in this introduction and in previous parts of the thesis can be partially
explained by the incremental notion of processing put forward in this chapter.
3.2 Sortalism and direct availability
3.2.1 Sortalism introduced
Previously, I mentioned that sortals are motivated to capture conditions on individ-
uation and identity of particulars. The first type of condition is a quantitative or
numeric notion (Sortal Individuation). The second is a qualitative one (Sortal Iden-
tity). In the literature, arguments for these two roles have been provided by different
sources. In what follows, I will present some of them.
The idea that sortals are somehow necessary (but not sufficient: a causal relation
between object and thinker is another necessary component) to individuate an object
(or to capture its identity in the numeric or quantitative sense) is nicely illustrated
by Frege’s counting argument (Frege, 1950) and Quine’s argument from divided
reference.
The counting argument supposes a scenario where someone is looking at a deck
of cards. Now, the same perceptual experience could be taken as eliciting either a
representation about a single object – the deck – or a mental representation about
fifty-two numerically distinct objects – the cards. So, how is it that a single percep-
tual episode can elicit two different thoughts? Frege’s answer relies on the idea that
concepts are necessary in order to count (i.e. to numerically individuate) objects. In
one case, object individuation would proceed via the DECK concept; in the other, it
would proceed via the CARD concept.
The argument from divided reference (Quine, 1960) seems to be a radical ver-
sion of the counting argument. Consider a person looking at the waters of a river and
thinking that the water looks refreshing. It seems natural to ask the following ques-
tion: is there a specific entity this person’s thought is about? It is certainly about
something, but there does not seem to be a particular entity that is ‘singled out’
in thinking. In the words of Quine (1960, 61), sortals7 are necessary for ‘dividing
7Instead of postulating mental representations like concepts, whose existence is obscure, Quine
actually held that the role played by sortals would be captured by linguistic entities: predicates.
The idea here is that individuation reflects ontological commitments held by a community, as, for
example, the social commitments involved in fixing the reference of the term ‘couple’. For the sake
of simplicity, I will unify the discussion of this chapter under concepts.
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reference’, that is, carving the environment into sets of discrete entities, something
which mass concepts do not do. This idea exploits, among other things, situations
in which objects may have dimensions that go beyond the visual field. Even though
one does not see the object’s boundaries when visualising mountains, lakes, rivers,
etc., one can still think about one particular object (e.g. this river) as opposed to
other objects. According to Quine, the possibility of having such thoughts (or refer-
ring to such entities) requires sortals. The underlying idea can also be read off the
example used in his thesis of the inscrutability of reference (Quine, 1960, ch. 2).
Consider a linguist in fieldwork trying to master an entirely alien language and a na-
tive speaker who says ‘Gavagai!’ while pointing to a white rabbit that just emerged
in the scene. Apparently, there are various hypotheses that are consistent with the
evidence available to the linguist: ‘gavagai’ could be taken as synonymous with
‘fur’, ‘whiteness’, or ‘undetached rabbit-part’, and so forth. Similarly, the percep-
tual experience of seeing the rabbit can be construed as being about a certain rabbit,
but it also could be about the rabbit’s colour, shape, parts and so forth. In order to
rule out relevant alternatives, Quine argues that sortal concepts must be applied to
the stimuli. What makes an experience one about rabbits is the fact that it has been
organised under the concept RABBIT or ANIMAL8.
In addition to their role in capturing the conditions of individuation on objects,
sortals arguably have the role of capturing (some of) an object’s identity conditions
(the qualitative notion mentioned previously). In order to support this claim (it can
also be found in some of Quine’s remarks), Strawson (1959) argues that humans
represent objects by some form of conceptual structure (scheme) that captures their
persistence conditions (in a minimal sense: spatiotemporal continuity). If objects
were ever changing in nature: multiplying, disintegrating and re-assembling them-
selves as seconds go by, we could not make sense of an agent’s thinking about a
specific entity in the environment. We simply would not be able to identify objects
and re-identify them (i.e. identify something as the previously identified entity) in
space-time. For example, I can identify the chair that I am now sitting on as the
same chair I sat on yesterday and also identify a rolling ball as the same ball in
adjacent spatial positions at successive times. Note that the sensory stimuli could
be different: the chair might have acquired a coffee stain in between and the ball
could reflect light differently as a cloud passes by.
The ability to (re-)identify requires that material objects are perceived as endur-
8Sortal concepts were of great interest to psychologists working on language acquisition, for
they would offer a restriction on the entities that a given linguistic category (nouns) may refer to.
For ground-breaking work, see Macnamara (1972, 1982, 1986).
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ing, at least briefly, in space-time. Since the sensory stimulations are ever changing
in nature (the retinal image of the object can change dramatically), information that
hits the retina would not be able to capture the conditions under which the object
remains the same (e.g. if a chair liquefies, there would also be a dramatic change
in retinal image, but in this case, we would say that the chair that once existed does
not exist any more). If the identity of an object cannot be traced back to the original
stimulus, it must be captured by a basic conceptual structure, under which three-
dimensional, bound, persistent objects fall. This roughly corresponds to the sortal
MATERIAL OBJECT or BODY (see Strawson 1959, 31-40, 168)9. I will call this, the
argument from re-identification. Schematically, it moves from the premises (i) that
the ability to identify and re-identify objects in space-time underpins object repre-
sentations, and (ii) that the ability to identify and re-identify objects requires the
sortal concept MATERIAL OBJECT, to the conclusion (iii) that object representation
involves the sortal concept MATERIAL OBJECT. Note that this concept is the most
basic one in our conceptual scheme and more specific conditions of identity can be
captured by more specific concepts, such as ARTEFACT or PERSON.
Finally, although I have reviewed here some arguments that motivate the idea
that the necessary role played by sortals in characterising visual experience can be
recruited as an explanation of the direct availability of some conceptual represen-
tations, it is rather unclear which concepts are the necessary ones. For example,
for Quine, representing an object’s individuation and identity conditions would be
achieved by very specific concepts, such as DOG or BALL. Strawson, on the other
hand, believed that such roles can be played by the less specific concept MATERIAL
OBJECT (plus the concept PERSON to make the distinction between representations
about the self and those about the objective world). Therefore, Sortalism, the posi-
tion according to which sortal concepts are necessary for capturing the identity and
individuation of objects, can assume different degrees of strength. A strong ver-
sion of Sortalism requires more specific concepts to specify the individuation and
identity conditions (Quine, 1960; Wiggins, 1967, 1980, 2001) of particular objects,
a weak version states that something like MATERIAL OBJECT would do (Strawson
1959; Spelke 1990, among many others).
9In effect, this argument fits in with Strawson’s search for the conditions of objectivity of ex-
perience, which for him require entities that are distinct from the self, hence the importance of
MATERIAL OBJECT. Much of vision science (see Palmer (1999) for a textbook) had similar goals:
how can a rich representation about the distal stimulus be constructed from an informationally poorer
2D proximal stimulation? The difference is that Strawson postulates that only concepts could make
sense of human’s re-identification of objects, whereas for many constructivist psychologist this could
be explained by a system of constrained information processing units. Burge (2010) takes concepts
to be not necessary for re-identification nor for rendering experience objective.
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This has particular consequences for this chapter. A weak version of sortalism
would not be able to account for the data reviewed in the introduction, as the inter-
pretations meant the speaker contain more specific concepts, such as, PAYCHECK,
DOG, etc. Thus, it seems that only strong versions of Sortalism, i.e. more specific
concepts are necessary for individuating objects and capturing their persistence con-
ditions, would do interesting theoretical work. However, since I have opted to assess
sortalism from an empirical standpoint and much of the evidence discussed in this
chapter concerns the role played by MATERIAL OBJECT (specially in the first year
of human life), I will confine the initial discussion to this much more basic level
of representation before moving towards evidence for the idea that more specific
conceptual representations may be used for individuating and identifying objects in
the environment. I urge the reader to bear with me through the next two sections.
3.2.2 Evidence for sortalism
A series of experiments conducted in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s brought evidence
that was taken as supporting the sortalist position. These experiments used the
method of violation of expectancy in infants from 2.5 months to 36 months old.
The idea behind this methodology is the following. Children were presented with
events which had two possible outcomes: an expected one and an unexpected one
(according to adults’ understanding of the world). If children look more at the un-
expected outcome, it implies that their expectations about the way the world works
are adult-like. The theoretical task then would be to speculate about what kind of
cognitive mechanism generates such expectations (for ground-breaking work, see
Baillargeon 1987; Spelke 1990).
Spelke et al. (1995) conducted the following study. First, two spatially separated
screens were introduced. An object (rubber duck) was removed from behind screen
one and shown to the infant. After that, the object was put back in its original place.
The same process happened with screen two: another occluded object (rubber duck)
was removed and shown to the infant and then replaced behind the screen. Finally,
both screens were removed revealing either one of two possible outcomes: the ex-
pected outcome displaying two rubber ducks or the unexpected outcome displaying
one rubber duck (see the dynamics in the left of figure 3.1). The authors found that
the looking times of 4.5 month-olds was significantly longer when the outcome was
unexpected, suggesting that they used the spatial gaps between screens to deter-
mine how many rubber ducks were occluded. In order to control for the possibility
of children’s sensitivity to the matter that constitute the objects, Huntley-Fenner
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et al. (2002) devised a similar experiment with two conditions: one in which sand
was poured behind two (separated) screens and another in which two objects made
of sand were placed behind the screens. In the sand condition, infants could be pre-
sented with either one (unexpected) or two (expected) sand piles. In the sand object
condition, infants could be presented with either one (unexpected) sand object or
two (expected). Infants were at random in the sand condition, but looked longer
when the outcome was one sand object, suggesting that they expected that two sand
objects (one per screen) were occluded and thus reduplicating the results of Spelke
et al. (1995). These findings were used to motivate what Spelke calls ‘principle of
cohesion’, which states that an object is a bounded chunk of matter that preserves
its connectedness and boundaries as it moves through space 10.
Figure 3.1: Diagram of the split-screen spatio-temporal continuity paradigm in Spelke et al.
(1995). Permission to reproduce this image has been granted by Prof. E. Spelke
Going beyond perceptual processes explainable by a principle of cohesion, Bail-
largeon et al. (1985) investigated children’s expectations regarding the behaviour of
objects in motion. Four-month-olds saw an object being placed behind a drawbridge-
like screen. As the screen rotates backwards, two outcomes are possible. The screen
could either stop roughly at the position where the object is (expected outcome), or
it could come all the way down to the ground, as if the object were ethereal (un-
expected outcome, see figure 3.2). Like before, four-month-olds looked more at
10In addition to spatial gaps, Needham and Baillargeon (1998) show that 8 month-olds start to
use Gestalt principles (e.g. similarity, good continuation, figure-ground segregation) to individuate
objects. For example, although a horseman and his horse seem to move as a whole, differences in
their shapes and colours may be used to distinguish one from the other.
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the unexpected outcome. The finding supports two principles concerning infants’
conception of physical objects. First, infants do not expect objects to disappear at
one point and reappear at another (principle of continuity). Second, infants expect
objects to constitute physical barriers to the movement of other objects (principle of
solidity).
Figure 3.2: Diagram of the rotating screen paradigm in Baillargeon et al. (1985). Permission to
reproduce this image has been granted by Prof. E. Spelke
In order to test whether children’s expectations were based only on visual stim-
uli, Spelke (1990, 44-5) blocked the infants’ visual field with a screen while letting
them play with two rings that moved together, as if connected by a bar. After ex-
periencing the rings as if they were parts of the same object, the screen would be
removed and two outcomes were possible: either the rings were connected by a bar
(expected) or they were disconnected (unexpected). Spelke found that children were
surprised by the unexpected result, suggesting that infants’ expectations applies to
stimulation in multiple modalities (visual and haptic, at least). The conjunction of
these principles (cohesion, continuity, solidity) is taken by psychologists to deter-
mine the concept SPELKE-OBJECT. Since it is essentially the same as Strawson’s
MATERIAL OBJECT, I will follow Strawson’s terminology but take it to be also
motivated by the empirical evidence discussed here. It is worth noting that, in ad-
dition to these principles, Spelke and collaborators postulate a principle of contact,
necessary to capture children’s expectations that only animate objects can move
themselves (and which determines an ANIMAL or ANIMATE OBJECT concept).
The Spelke-concepts and their underlying principles11 account for the evidence
11There seems to be a difference between the way Spelke and Kinzler (2007) and Carey (2009) see
the status of conceptual representations that explain children’s behaviour. Spelke takes the relevant
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as follows. As the objects are shown to the infant, the MATERIAL OBJECT concept
provides a criterion for individuation: each entity that falls under the concept would
be numerically distinct from the others. Suppose there are two material objects at
locations l1 and l2 in the subject’s visual field. Given that the stimuli are such that
the two corresponding entities fall under the MATERIAL OBJECT concept and that
these instances of MATERIAL OBJECT occur at different spatial locations, the system
of representation would give rise to two numerically distinct object representations.
The system also captures the object’s identity conditions. According to the set up in
Spelke et al. (1995), the fact that first rubber duck falls under MATERIAL OBJECT
enables the child to have certain expectations about the conditions under which
these objects persist in time-space. As the duck is put behind the screen, the infant
is required to maintain that specific object representation in working memory. As
there are no other events happening, the MATERIAL OBJECT enables the child to
assume that the object remains behind the screen, for material objects preserve their
spatial properties if there is no interaction with other material objects (e.g. crushing
by another heavier object). The same process would apply for the second duck.
Metaphorically, one could describe this operation as performing a primitive form
of adding 1 to 1, which creates an expectation of 2 objects behind the screen. If
only one duck is seen after the screens are removed, then at least one of the Spelke
principles, in this case, continuity or cohesion, was violated, which explains the
longer looking times. Similar explanations apply to the other experiments, (solidity
and cohesion for Baillargeon et al. 1985).
According to this type of explanation, children’s expectations would emerge
from a system of representation concerning the behaviour of medium-sized ob-
jects in the world (proto-physics). This system - alongside systems for representing
purpose-oriented self-propelled objects and causality (via the principle of contact),
basic numeric operations, and spatial geometry - constitute core systems of repre-
sentations that are taken to be innate in humans and some other animals (see Kinzler
and Spelke 2007; Spelke and Kinzler 2007; Baillargeon 2008 on how these systems
are inter-related).
Note that the concept MATERIAL OBJECT does not capture the intended readings
of many of the identification dependent uses reviewed previously. The more specific
concepts to be intrinsic to a system of core knowledge: the child looks more at the unexpected
outcome because she knows it should not have happened. Carey tones it down. The relevant concepts
are the outputs of systems of core cognition and do not necessarily correspond to propositional
knowledge stored in the mind of infants. Children look more at the unexpected outcomes, because
they go against what they are cognitively geared towards. Unfortunately, a proper assessment of
these differences transcends the purposes of this thesis.
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conceptual representations that are part of such readings have not been mastered by
the children who participated in the studies reviewed here. Most of them were under
the first year of life. Still, the argument for the necessity of MATERIAL OBJECT
can be implemented for more specific concepts (representations that do bear on the
availability of the readings mentioned at the beginning of the chapter). This will be
done in the next section.
3.2.3 Object representation and conceptuality
It is intuitive to say that humans represent objects as bound chunks of matter that
move as whole through time-space, but one may wonder whether the robust findings
by Spelke, Baillargeon, Carey and colleagues really necessitate the postulation of
conceptual representations it order to explain the empirical findings supporting this
intuition. Carey and Xu (2001) propose three arguments for the idea that the systems
for representing medium-sized object representations are conceptual in nature.
The first of them basically consists in evidence for Strawson’s argument from
re-identification. The fact that infants are surprised when they see one object (in the
unexpected outcome condition) instead of two suggests that they were expecting
the missing object to be behind the screen. Carey and Xu (2001) argue that such
expectations require children to distinguish an object’s occlusion from the cessation
of its existence. If material objects were non-persisting, infants could assume that
the missing object somehow got destroyed behind the screen and find the outcome
containing a single object to be normal. Similarly to Strawson, they argue that
only sortal concepts capture the conditions under which a given object persists (and
hence can be re-identified by the subject). Therefore, concepts (e.g. MATERIAL
OBJECT) become necessary to explain the behavioural data.
The second argument emerges from the integrative nature of the representations
governing infants’ behaviour, a terminology from Carey and Xu (2001, 208). The
basic idea is that information that governs object representation seems to be avail-
able for other cognitive tasks, suggesting that the underlying representations have a
common format. Under this assumption, it would not be far off to claim that con-
cepts, the representations manipulated by central systems, play such a unifying role
(see Fodor, 1983). In order to back up this claim, the argument invokes the follow-
ing empirical evidence. Spelke (1990, 44-5) found that infants’ expectations hold
across modalities (visual and haptic, see also Gordon and Irwin 1996, 2000, for a
similar finding regarding visual and ‘linguistic’ modalities). A similar point could
be made about the infants’ attitude towards content that emerges perceptually. The
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output representations guide human volitional action, thus exploiting interactions
between beliefs and desires. Given that these two mental states target the same con-
tent, one could assume that the relevant representations are structured by concepts
(i.e representations in a common format). Also, Carey (2009) shows at length that
the expectations of children concerning the behaviour of material objects and self
moving agents are quite complex and sensitive to multiple cues. The basic idea is
that the behaviour governed by the infant’s representation of objects in the environ-
ment enters complex inferential relations. This has been shown previously: on the
basis of certain stimuli children infer that two objects, rather than one, lie behind
the screens. As more complex forms of inductive inferences will be discussed in
the third argument, below, I will postpone a more substantial discussion about this
point until then.
The third argument is based on evidence relating a harder object-permanence
task to the availability of more specific sortal concepts (e.g. BALL, DOG, etc.). Xu
and Carey (1996) tested the ability of 10- and 12-month-olds to use information
concerning an object’s identity-conditions as a criterion of individuation. They in-
troduced a slight modification to the designs discussed previously. Subjects were
presented with a single screen, instead of two separate ones. Initially, a ball was
removed from behind the screen, shown to the participant, and placed back where
it came from. Then, a duck was removed from behind the screen, shown to the
child and then placed in its original position. As usual, the screen was removed and
participants would be facing either the expected outcome of a display containing
a ball and a duck, or the unexpected display containing just a ball (or just a duck,
see figure 3.3). Now, there is one important difference between this experiment and
previous ones. Since only one screen was introduced (no spatial gap between the
locations the objects are placed at), the child not only has to represent the objects un-
der occlusion, but also consider possible interactions between them while occluded.
For example, if a chest and a ball were occluded and only the chest emerged as
outcome, the child may infer that the ball is inside the chest, and hence infer that
only one object will be displayed. The task requires no simple effort.
Xu and Carey (1996) found that 12-month-olds looked more at the unexpected
display. 10-month-olds, on the other hand, looked at both displays for the same
amount of time. Given the evidence that the MATERIAL OBJECT concept is available
since 4.5 months of age, it seems that this concept is not enough for children to make
the 1 [MATERIAL OBJECT] + 1 [MATERIAL OBJECT] = 2 inference. 12-month-olds’
longer exposure to the occluded objects suggest that their success in the task is
related to the availability of more specific sortal concepts, such as, DUCK or BALL.
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The task is schematically represented below:
Figure 3.3: Diagram of the single screen paradigm in Xu and Carey (1996). Permission to repro-
duce this image has been granted by Elsevier.
As a follow-up to Xu and Carey (1996), Xu (1999, 2002, 2005) and Dewar and
Xu (2007) tested 9-month-olds using the same design with the exception that, as
objects were shown to the baby, linguistic cues were also given. At the time that the
baby looked at the duck, someone would say ‘Look [baby’s name], a duck’. The
same thing was performed for the ball. In this set up, 9-month-olds looked for a
longer period of time at the unexpected outcome, similarly to the 12-month-olds in
the Xu and Carey (1996) study. Moreover, Xu introduced a condition where both
the displayed objects were followed by ‘Look [baby’s name] a toy’. The looking
times were not affected by these linguistic stimuli. In order to control for other
variables influencing the correlation between the saliency of distinct kinds, on the
one hand, and the different objects that instantiate such kinds, on the other, Xu
and colleagues included conditions where the objects were introduced while dif-
ferent non-linguistic sounds (‘blink’ vs. ‘blonk’) and even communicative sounds
(approval ‘yay’ vs rejection ‘yuck’) were played to the child. None, with the excep-
tion of words similar to nouns in children’s first language, improved performance.
The only other factor that helped the individuation task was when the two objects
moved, during the habituation phase, in a way such that it became clear to the child
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that they belonged to different kinds. For example, Surian et al. (2004) introduced a
condition where a toy train would move in and out from behind the screen making
train-like mechanical noises and whistling, whereas the other object, an agent-like
creature, would walk in and out from behind the screen accompanied by footstep
sounds. In this condition, 10-month-olds behaved like 12-month-olds.
The explanation of this finding by Xu, Surian and colleagues runs along the
following lines. There are important boot-strapping relations between concepts and
the word categories (e.g. common nouns) they might be related to (Bonatti et al.,
2002). It is likely that children around 8-12 months of age are learning the mappings
between certain words, predominantly common nouns, and concepts. In the case
of 9-month-olds, the mapping is not well established. The experimenter’s use of
different common nouns could make more salient to the child that there are two
kinds classifying the objects behind the screen, and hence they could infer that 2
objects (falling under the respective kinds) are occluded. In the Surian et al. (2004)
study, a similar effect was achieved by using stimuli that made clear that 10-month-
olds were dealing with two different kinds of objects. The extra experience of 12-
month-olds allows the relevant kinds (and the concepts that capture them) more
easily accessible, hence the adult-like performance12.
In conclusion, the studies reviewed in this section suggest that (i) there is a
robust set of data concerning very young infants which needs to be accounted for
and (ii) the interpretations given here display support for certain incrementality in
the system of object representation. Children seem to be equipped with a MATERIAL
OBJECT concept, whose availability matures in the first 6 months of life. With
the acquisition of more concepts, more specific sortals can perhaps be used for
object individuation and the representation of an object’s identity conditions. Such
concepts, such as PAYCHECK, DOG, would then be the ones that become directly
available in visual experiences of (mature) language users and can be recruited by
the constraints reviewed in this chapter’s introduction in an explanation of some
linguistic data.
12Carey (2009, ch.4) discusses whether these findings suggest that when children acquire more
specific concepts, like TOY TRUCK, DOG, TABLE, they acquire new and improved mechanisms for
individuating objects and representing their identity conditions. This possibility would involve a
certain reconceptualisation of the world by the child (that is, a representational system’s induction
of another, more powerful, representational system, see the discussion of Quinian bootstrapping in
Carey 2009). Carey assumes contra Fodor that this operation exists and underlies certain transitions
in human ontogeny. If this is the case, then it seems to me that concepts lose much of their ex-
planatory power as a common representational format, since there are interesting cognitive relations
between systems whose representations may be stated in different formats. Since the data relevant
for the discussion in this chapter could be explained simple by infants’ acquisition of concepts along
Fodorian lines, I will abstract away from the issue.
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3.2.4 Interim conclusions: sortal concepts and linguistic inte-
gration
In the first section of this chapter we raised a question about cross-modal integra-
tion as well as the need for empirically supported answers to it. This (CMI) question
inquires into whether indirectly available concepts can be constituents of the propo-
sition expressed by an utterance. Among other things, this question was motivated
by certain accessibility puzzles raised by the availability of identification-based de-
scriptive uses of pronoun, on the one hand, and the necessity to explain the im-
possibility of certain cases of donkey anaphora (i.e. the asymmetry between the
felicitous ‘every man who has a wife should bring her to the party’ and the infelic-
itous ‘every married man should bring her to the party’). In order to explain such
conditions, many constraints on the availability of such antecedents have been pro-
posed. We looked earlier at Postal’s anaphoric island constraint, which states that
antecedents must be overt NPs that are not word-parts. However, this constraint
rules out cases of deep anaphora (e.g. ‘Do most faculty members deposit it [waving
a paycheck] in the credit union?’), where perceptual information provides the right
donkey interpretation. We then moved to a constraint that accounts for such cases,
namely, Elbourne’s. It assumes that antecedents for donkey dependencies are avail-
able either via Postal’s condition or by an immediate cue in the environment that
provides the relevant concept. Given Elbourne’s appeal to extra-linguistic represen-
tations, his proposal does not differ much from the Individuative-Representational
constraint, suggested immediately afterwards, which proposes that a directly avail-
able (individuative) concept is required by any form of dependency (linguistic or
perceptual).
This section provided an empirically grounded understanding of the terms ‘im-
mediate cue’ and ‘directly available’ concept, used in such constraints. An imme-
diate cue comprises stimuli that require the presence of certain (sortal) concepts,
otherwise the experience would not be the experience that it is. Similarly, directly
available concepts are the ones necessary in order to characterise the nature of a
particular mental episode. According to the studies reviewed, the sortal concepts
MATERIAL OBJECT and PERSON (via the principle of contact) are available to hu-
mans from the age of 4 months and enables them to individuate certain objects in
the environment and also capture objects’ persistence conditions. By the comple-
tion of the first year of life, more specific sortal concepts, like DOG, BALL or TOY
become available to the agent and seem to be involved in these cognitive tasks.
In short, the notion of a sortal concept appears to be empirically well-grounded and
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could be recruited in order to make sense of Elbourne’s constraint on NP deletion or
the Individuative-Representational constraint. A negative answer the CMI question
would be motivated and, thus, identification-based descriptive pronouns cannot con-
tribute to the proposition expressed and should be explained by alternative means.
This may be a counter intuitive result, but is a consequence that follows from more
empirically supported claims.
The next section presents evidence against the the idea that sortal concepts play
a role in the individuation and the representation of an object’s identity conditions,
challenging the fundamental status of such representations in our cognitive architec-
ture. If this is the case, the grounding for understanding the level of representation
appealed to by constraints such as Elbourne’s of the Individuative-Representational
constraint is gone. This will pave the way to a rejection of these conditions on em-
pirical grounds: ‘indirectly’ available concepts emerge for the agent in the same
way as ‘directly’ available ones do.
3.3 Anti-Sortalism: representing bare individuals
3.3.1 Bare object representation introduced
In this section, I review some experimental data against the idea that the individ-
uation and the identity (in a minimal sense: spatiotemporal continuity) of objects
requires a sortal concept. The review is divided into two subsections. One deals
with object individuation: the quantitative notion exploited by the counting argu-
ment (Frege) and the argument from divided reference (Quine). The crucial data
in this section stems from the difference between estimating the quantity of a small
number of objects (known as subitizing) and larger quantities. The second body of
work reviewed deals with the processes involved in tracking simple 2-dimensional
objects through visual displays (known as multiple object tracking, or MOT).
3.3.2 The subitizing data
When subjects are presented with a small number of items in a visual display and
asked how many objects there are, they give fast, precise and confident judgements.
Alternatively, when the number of items is not so small, the speed, accuracy and
confidence of the judgements decrease to a much greater degree than is propor-
tional to the increase in items. Given the sharp contrast in performance, psychol-
ogists coined the term ‘subitizing’ to describe the former type of behaviour, re-
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serving ‘enumerating’ or ‘counting’ as descriptions of the latter. This distinction is
supported by the following findings.
If the individuation of the objects displayed is achieved by attending to each
one in turn, the difference in confidence, accuracy and speed in judgements would
be correlated linearly with the number of displayed items. However, Trick and
Pylyshyn (1994a,b) falsify this hypothesis. If the items exceeds a certain number
(4 or 5), accuracy and confidence decrease dramatically. Additionally, response
times receive the huge increase of 250ms – 350ms per item in the display after the
fourth, when compared to the 10ms-40ms per item in the ‘subitizing’ range (up to
4 items). This finding suggests that individuating up to 4 or 5 items is achieved by
a mechanism different from the one involved in enumerating or estimating a larger
number of objects.
In order to gain insight into the kind of mechanism that might be at play in
the fast, reliable and accurate individuation of a small number of items, Trick and
Pylyshyn (1994a,b) attempted to delineate the conditions under which subitizing
is possible and the conditions under which it is not. The experimental paradigm
they used had three conditions: (i) same size condition, (ii) different size condition,
and (iii) concentric condition. In the same size condition, subjects were presented
with a display containing rectangles delineated by four edges in a bound contour.
All of them had the same size, which could be small, medium or large, and they
were located in different locations in the display. In the different size condition, the
setting was almost the same, the only difference being that rectangles could be of
different sizes. In the concentric condition, all the rectangles had different sizes but
they had the same centre. In each case, subjects had to simply say how many items
were displayed.
Note that visual features - in this case shape, but also colour hue, saturation,
luminance, position - need not be represented by concepts. Consider the human
ability to distinguish different hues of the same colour, for example. We can distin-
guish red127 from red231, but that might not surface at the conceptual level (e.g. as
RED127 and RED231 concepts), due to a series of factors: (i) we may share the ability
to distinguish between similar hues with other, evolutionary distant, creatures, (ii)
these hue representations do not figure in thought productivity in the same way as
RED and BLUE do, and (iii) the ability to distinguish very fine-grained hues may not
be sufficient to ‘lock’ a cognitive system onto the right property, in the Fodorian
sense of concept acquisition, among other factors.
In this study, Trick and Pylyshyn found that subitizing is possible in (i) the same
size condition and in (ii) the different size condition, but not in (iii) the concentric
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condition. Moreover, items that are too near one another or that are individuated
by an instruction like ‘Identify items on the same curve!’ cannot be subitized (see
Pylyshyn 2007, sect. 1.4.3). This seems puzzling, for the items presented in the
concentric condition or in the curve condition were within the subitizing range.
Trick and Pylyshyn have suggested that the visual system individuates objects by
using coarse-grained information about their location in the display. This would
engage a mechanism that determines which regions of the display are richer sources
of information in an entirely bottom-up, data driven way, that is, before the stage
at which we can describe the subject as having any kind of experience at all (see
Olshausen and Koch 1995; Itti and Koch 2000 for arguments and a saliency based
model of pre-attentive allocation of resources). Roughly, if the items are located
in the same informationally salient region, then a mechanism of attention would
have to focus on the concentrically positioned bound contours in order to determine
which object is which; in other words, shifts of attention would have to spread
serially. If these remarks are on the right track, subitizing engages mechanisms that
distribute attention in parallel (see Pylyshyn 2007, 28, and Dehaene 1997).
Trick and Pylyshyn’s suggestion seems to be further supported by neuroanatom-
ical evidence from patients with Balint’s syndrome. This condition is characterized
by a general deficit in focal attention, generated by lesions in the post parietal cor-
tex. Symptoms include the inability to see all the objects in the visual field simul-
taneously, difficulty in coordinating hand and eye movements, and the inability to
shift attention towards another object. Dehaene (1997) reports that a patient with
this condition failed to enumerate objects outside the subitizing range (more than
4 items) either by ignoring certain objects in the visual display or by counting the
same objects multiple times. Nevertheless, the condition did not impair the ability
to subitize.
In order to account for the data, Trick and Pylyshyn propose that subitizing is
done by a mechanism of parallel object individuation that assigns visual indices to
objects in the visual display. Pylyshyn calls such indices ‘FINgers of INSTancia-
tion’, or ‘FINSTS’ for short, to remind us that they function as pointers. There are
two fundamental characteristics of FINST assignment. First, they are assigned es-
sentially in a causal, data-driven way, that is, information-flow is strictly bottom-up,
coming directly from the objects perceived. Thus, saying that the visual system as-
signs indices could be a little bit misleading. Rather, the external objects themselves
‘grab’ certain indices given the way human cognitive architecture has evolved. Ac-
cording to Trick and Pylyshyn (1994a,b), there are two conditions that must be met
for this ‘grabbing’ to occur: objects must have bound contours and they must be
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located relatively away from each other. There is an important way in which such
conditions differ from sortal concepts: they are stringent constraints on the infor-
mation that serves as input to visual processing - if they are not met, visual indices
are not assigned, whereas if an object does not fall under a concept it may fall under
another concept. Pylyshyn claims that the representation conditions of the index
assignment mechanism works as a natural constraint, in the sense of Marr (1982):
if requirements imposed by the architecture of the cognitive system (e.g. module,
network) are not met, the system cannot deliver its output. This constraint can be
depicted by an if - else statement in computer languages:
(5) Paraphrase of the FINST assignment mechanism
IF bound, move-as-a-whole, less or equal 4
THEN represent under the first index in the sequence: i,j,k,l,m
ELSE abort
Note that natural constraints are architectural, that is, the conditions in the IF
statement belong to the hardware of the system of representation, so they would
be implicit representations in the sense of Carey (2009). The condition in the
ELSE statement illustrates an important difference between conceptual represen-
tations and the outputs of a natural constraint: if the latter misrepresents, no visual
index emerges, whereas if an entity does not fall under a ANIMAL concept, it could
fall under many other conceptual representations, such as PLANT, LIQUID, STUFF,
and so on. I will now turn to experiments that suggest that this (alternative) mech-
anism of individuation can also capture the identity conditions of objects (in a very
minimal sense).
3.3.3 The MOT data
In the subitizing experiments just reviewed, the task was to represent static objects,
but how do humans deal with many moving objects in the display? Do they track
these objects by their visual features, such as shape, colour, and size, by updates
in their locations, or by something else? In order to answer these questions, Zenon
Pylyshyn devised an experimental technique known as multiple object tracking. The
idea is simple: subjects are presented with a display containing moving objects,
some factors are manipulated, and, as a result, performance may improve or not.
Sensitivity to the manipulated factors should shed light into the structure of the
system of representation.
A typical MOT experiment runs as follows. Subjects are presented with a dis-
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play containing two sets of objects: (i) target objects, which are supposed to be
tracked during the trial, and (ii) non-target or distractor objects (t=1). Unsurpris-
ingly, the number of target objects does not exceed four (respecting the subitizing
range). After the display is introduced, targets usually blink on and off a few times
so they can be distinguished from non-target objects (t=2). After that, targets move
around the visually identical non-targets for 10 seconds (t=3). At the end of the
trial, a given object is pointed at – the probe – and subjects are then asked whether
or not the probe was in the target set (t=4). According to Pylyshyn (2007, 35), the
task was extremely easy (around 90% accuracy) when up to 4 targets and a further
number of non-targets were moving randomly, even passing in front of each other,
at a reasonable speed (4-6 seconds to cross the computer screen on average, but that
varied in different trials). By what means do subjects track these objects?
Figure 3.4: Diagram of the MOT paradigm in Pylyshyn (2001). Permission to reproduce this
image has been granted by Elsevier.
As mentioned in the argument from re-identification, tracking or attending to an
object as it moves in the display would seem to inevitably involve sortal concepts
so that the object can be represented as the same object visualized at the beginning
of the trial. Since the persistence conditions on material objects are captured by
spatiotemporal continuity at successive times, one could cash out a sortalist model
of object tracking, under the MATERIAL OBJECT concept, by claiming that subjects
track multiple targets by storing their initial locations in memory and updating these
continuously, as attention shifts to each successive position of the targets in turn.
According to Pylyshyn and Storm (1988), this proposal has two related difficul-
ties. First, if objects move faster than the time that serial shifts of attention normally
take, a huge decrease in performance would be expected. Second, if a target object
is not at the stored location any longer, but a non-target is nearby, then updating the
object’s location could lead to greater probability of target/non-target confusion (see
Pylyshyn 2007, 37). A tracking model which incorporates both factors - using the
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average speed for human-like shifts of attention - yields a prediction of 30% track-
ing performance. However, Pylyshyn and Storm found that subjects performed at an
accuracy level of 87%. Therefore, it appears that the parallel mechanism of object
individuation could also be involved in representing objects’ persistence conditions
in the minimal sense of spatio-temporal continuity.
There is another way in which tracking might be done. By detecting the pres-
ence of certain shapes (e.g. squareness) and colours (e.g. redness) in the display,
the visual system could track the object by tracking the features that co-occur in
a given location (squareness ∧ redness at l2). Although the hypothesis does not
support Sortalism, since features, such as redness, might not provide any criteria
for individuation, it seems to support a form of descriptivism about object repre-
sentation in the following sense: to experience an object amounts to experiencing
the properties that uniquely describe it (see Treisman and Gelade, 1980; Campbell,
2002; Clark, 2004). Such a descriptivist strategy would predict that (a) if objects
have distinctive features, (e.g. three objects consisting of one triangle, one cir-
cle, and one square) tracking them would be easier; and (b) if the objects’ features
remain stable during the trial, tracking would be easier as it does not require up-
dating of features in memory. Dennis and Pylyshyn (2002) tested this and showed
that having a uniquely discriminating shape does not improve tracking performance
in MOT. Conversely, performance is no worse when objects’ colours and shapes
change randomly during the trial. Scholl et al. (1999) and Bahrami (2003) report
that sometimes subjects were not even conscious of the object’s changes. This fur-
ther suggests that the objects were taken to be the same regardless of changes in
their properties; that is, object tracking is not the same thing as tracking different
bundles of perceptual features.
The results above strongly suggest that sortal concepts are not necessary for
re-identifying the same object as it changes its position through time (the weaker
notion of qualitative identity I have been assessing here). The MOT paradigm indi-
cates that once the target objects blink, the early visual system assigns an index to
the relevant objects in the display and the identity of the object is preserved under
the identity of the index. Change in features would not change index assignment.
Again, it must be noted that there are certain conditions not only for assigning vi-
sual indices, but also for preserving them. For example, Scholl et al. (2001) showed
that objects’ parts cannot be selected and tracked by visual indices; also, if ob-
jects liquefy and ‘pour’ from one place to another or if they move in a wormlike
stretch and slink way, tracking is not possible (see VanMarle and Scholl, 2003).
However, if target objects briefly disappear as if they were passing behind a ‘trans-
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parent’ occlusion that renders them invisible, tracking is still possible (Scholl and
Pylyshyn, 1999). Moreover, tracking is successful even if objects change the direc-
tion of their movement up to 60 degrees while occluded (Franconeri et al., 2006).
Thus, in addition to the conditions of objecthood (i.e. bound contour, sufficient spa-
tial segregation) unearthed by the subitizing studies, the MOT experiments suggest
that visual indices can capture the weak notion of identity through space-time by a
condition on object movement (i.e. spatiotemporal continuity). Interestingly, such
object representations even survive momentary occlusions of the causal source.
In line with my previous remarks, the visual index mechanism relies heavily
on spatio-temporal information: objecthood seems to be equated with instances of
bound contours at a location and a time in the visual field. In order to test the role
of location in object individuation, Blaser et al. (2000) asked a simple question: can
humans track objects that are in the same location? In order to reach an answer, they
devised a trial that consisted in tracking objects in feature-space, instead of physical
space (within which they were static). The objects employed were two coloured,
round, striped figures, called ‘Gabor patches’, one of which was superimposed on
the other. As the Gabors had transparent backgrounds, the set of features pertaining
to each object could be correctly identified. Now, subjects had to track movement
in feature space, that is, track changes in the set of features of each object, which
could be independently modified in the following way. Gabors could change colour,
stripe width, or stripe orientation (moving clockwise or anti-clockwise). It would
be possible for objects to occupy the same position in feature space with regards to
one or two features (they could have the same colour and number of stripes, say),
but at least one feature should remain distinctive.
Figure 3.5: Diagram of the feature-space tracking paradigm Blaser et al. (2000). Permission to
reproduce this image has been granted by Prof. E. Blaser.
Initially, subjects were designated a target Gabor as both of them ‘moved’ through
feature space. After the trial, subjects picked out the right object with an accuracy
rate of 90%, which strongly suggests that tracking targets did not engage an in-
dividuation mechanism based on spatial location. However, the question whether
individuation is achieved by feature-based or by object-based mechanism theories
of selection remains.
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Let us suppose that the two gabor patches are individuated by their respective
set of features, that is, objecthood equals a bundle of visual features (Treisman and
Gelade, 1980; Campbell, 2002; Clark, 2004). Simplistically, this can be represented
by a pair of colour - stripe orientation features, such as i[blue, anti-clockwise] and
j[red, clockwise]. Here ‘i’ and ‘j’ supposedly represent the identity of the bundle,
but it is important to stress that the difference between the two indices is explained
by the difference in the feature sets. On the assumption that the subject distinguishes
the gabors as soon as they start moving, it seems that the feature-based explanation
of object individuation predicts that performance would be the same, whether the
changing features belonged to the same object or different ones. To test this, Blaser
et al. (2000) introduced pairs of small ‘jumps’ in the feature ‘trajectories’ of the
objects in the display (i.e. sudden changes in orientation or colour, say). Such
jumps were totally unpredicted, which has the advantage of working as data-driven
stimulation. The pairs of sudden feature changes could either belong to the same
object or to different objects. The task was simply to detect any ‘jump’. In this
experiment, subjects made faster judgements when the sudden changes belonged to
the same object than when they belonged to different objects, (see Pylyshyn, 2007,
41). The selection of features seems, then, to be object-based and not feature-based.
3.3.4 More interim conclusions
I take my brief review of some experimental work on subitizing and the MOT
paradigm to support the following claims.
First, it seems that the type of behaviour elicited by the subitizing tasks is gov-
erned by representations that do not quite fit the level of conceptual representations.
The representations that guide behaviour in these tasks seem to be extremely encap-
sulated: the fact that an object has a uniquely discriminating shape, colour or label
does not improve performance, suggesting that a conceptual token of, say, SQUARE,
does not drive shifts of this type of attention. Plus, subitizing via conceptual repre-
sentations, in response to the question ‘How many objects lie in the same curve?’
makes performance dramatically worse. Here, the concept CURVE seems to block a
mechanism that was earlier engaged in individuation (Trick and Pylyshyn, 1994a,b).
These results have been more or less duplicated in multiple object tracking (includ-
ing feature-space) tasks. Additionally, subjects sometimes are not conscious of the
changes the objects undergo13 (Scholl et al., 1999; Bahrami, 2003), while concepts,
13There are many other systems for representing the identity of features of the world even though
their respective stimuli changes. For example, humans are pretty good at preserving sameness of
colour, size and shape even given radical changes in the distal stimulus impinging on the retina.
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on the other hand, seem to underlie many of our conscious states. Finally, subjects
are able to track co-located objects; as differences in location would be essential to
distinguishing two instances of a concept or a set of features, it seems that repre-
sentations that single individuals out descriptively are not operative in the feature
space MOT task (Blaser et al., 2000).
The point of tracking (physically co-located) objects in feature space needs a bit
of extra development. Blaser et al. (2000) suggest that spatial location is not that
crucial for early object representation. As long as they have bound contours and
movement is in a ‘continuous’ trajectory in feature-space, a bare representation of
the object is established. If this is right, this study also suggests that individuat-
ing and preserving an object’s identity in space-time (in this abstract sense) cannot
be segregated, otherwise tracking in feature-space would be impossible. This also
suggests that capturing spatio-temporal continuity happens at a more abstract level
than just the occupying of adjacent positions in three dimensional space at succes-
sive times. If this is the case, the sortalist could claim that there is no real difference
between tracking in feature space and tracking into three-dimensional space, and
that both require some form of conceptual representation.
Let us now take stock and relate this body of evidence to the preceding discus-
sion. In the first section of this chapter, we asked whether indirectly available con-
cepts could integrate with the encoded meaning of expressions in order to express
a proposition (i.e. the CMI question). The question was raised by certain accessi-
bility puzzles displayed by a variety of linguistic phenomena (i.e. the asymmetry
between the felicitous ‘every man who has a wife should bring her to the party’ and
the infelicitous ‘every married man should bring her to the party’), which motivated
a series of constraints in linguistic theory, as, for example, Elbourne’s conditions
on NP ellipsis. Since such constraints are also designed to capture cases of ‘deep
anaphora’ (e.g. ‘Do most faculty members deposit it [waving a paycheck] in the
credit union?’), they would have to appeal to a representational level that is not re-
stricted to linguistic representations, but includes concepts that emerge from certain
immediate cues in the environment. This type of constraint, however, results in a
negative answer to the CMI question, and, counter-intuitively, identification-based
descriptive pronouns cannot contribute to the proposition expressed. But if we want
such pronominal uses to contribute to the proposition expressed, how can the acces-
sibility pattern of donkey uses above can be explained? We are at an impasse.
Burge (2010) calls these identity preserving mechanisms ‘natural constancies’, which Pylyshyn’s
visual index system would be an example of. Thus, there are colour, shape and many more constan-
cies in human representational systems in addition to the one involved in early object individuation.
138
In the last section, we looked at the necessity to ground, empirically, the no-
tion of a directly available concept or an immediate cue for an interpretation. The
philosophical idea that some form of representation is necessary to partition the
world into discrete particulars, namely, sortals, has received empirical support from
a variety of experimental paradigms. There is evidence suggesting that infants use
concepts like MATERIAL OBJECT for a variety of cognitive tasks related to individu-
ating and capturing persistence conditions on objects from a very early age. As more
concepts become available, e.g. DOG, BALL, TOY, the agent can employ more spe-
cific information in cognitive tasks involving the objects that fall under them, such
as individuation and the representation of an object’s persistence conditions. Thus,
these studies provide empirical support for the idea that certain conceptual repre-
sentations are basic in the cognitive architecture of agents, for they are required
for characterising the way humans experience objects. This basic status, in turn,
can explain the direct availability of certain concepts for integration with linguistic
information, as stated in the constraints just mentioned.
The studies reviewed in this section, however, go against this conclusion. There
is evidence that the type of representation that governs object individuation and
captures an object’s spatio-temporal continuity is non-conceptual. The conditions
on representing material objects (i.e. bound, move as a whole, etc.) can be captured
in terms of hardwired natural constraints that spit out a bare object representation
as output: a visual index. If this is the case, then the argument that establishes the
direct availability of sortal concepts in virtue of their necessary status in partitioning
the world into discrete individuals is threatened. As a consequence, we must seek an
alternative explanation of how concepts (even non-sortal ones) emerge in cognition.
As we shall see, this will pave the way for allowing indirectly available concepts to
integrate with the encoded meaning of expressions.
Apparently, we have moved from a dilemma concerning communicators’ intu-
itions to a dilemma involving divergent evidence. In the next section, I will present
an interpretation of the empirical data that offers a way out of our second dilemma
and paves the way to the solution of the first one as well. This will also provide an
answer to the CMI question presented initially.
3.4 Levels of representation revisited
The preceding sections have raised interesting questions. Do these two sets of data
provide evidence for a single system of object representation or two distinct ones?
If they are the same, would output representations be conceptual or non-conceptual
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in nature. If distinct, how would the different output representations be related. In
order to assess possible answers, I shall first take a look at analogies between the
two sets of experimental results and then proceed to their disanalogies.
3.4.1 Analogies between MATERIAL OBJECT and visual indices
Carey (2009), building on Carey and Xu (2001), points out three analogies between
the two bodies of experimental data reviewed: (i) primacy of spatio temporal in-
formation in object individuation, (ii) a representational limit of four entities in
working memory, and (iii) the ability to represent the distinction between existence
through occlusion and cessation of existence. I will take each of these in turn.
Primacy of spatio temporal information means that human cognitive architec-
ture privileges bound contours and spatio-temporal continuity in motion to individ-
uate objects and preserve their identity through time and space. In the MOT ex-
perimental design, participants were quite good at tracking multiple objects as they
moved around, regardless of whether or not they had uniquely identifying shapes,
colours, or labels. Moreover, robust changes in the type of object motion (liquefy-
ing and pouring from place to place, disintegrating and reassembling (see VanMarle
and Scholl 2003), severely impairs tracking skills. Similarly, Spelke, Carey, Bail-
largeon, Xu and colleagues tested children’s expectations concerning the behaviour
of objects in the world in terms of their spatio-temporal properties. In Spelke et al.
(1995), children seem to use the gap between two screens as a way to determine how
many objects are occluded by them. Replicating these studies using piles of sand
instead of bound objects shows that children are unable to numerically individuate
one object from the other (Huntley-Fenner et al., 2002). Also, Xu and Carey (1996)
show that 8-month-olds cannot succeed at the object-permanence task if two ob-
jects are occluded behind a single screen. Carey (2009) rightly concludes that both
bodies of experimental research support the claim that spatio-temporal information
plays a crucial role in object representation.
A limit of up to four (or five) object representations has also been unearthed by
both literatures. The first piece of evidence for this stems from the subitizing phe-
nomenon: up to 4 objects can be easily enumerated, but performance drops dramat-
ically if the set size is slightly increased. In the MOT paradigm, this limit becomes
manifest quite clearly: up to four of five objects can be tracked simultaneously, but
not more. Various studies in the infant literature converge on the same conclusion.
Here I will confine myself to two. First, Rose et al. (2001) and Ross-sheehy et al.
(2003) presented infants with an array consisting of a certain number of objects.
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The array disappeared and then it emerged again either without any changes or with
one of its objects (chosen at random) having its colour changed. The arrays could
contain 1, 2, 3, 4 or 6 objects. If infants were able to create models for the objects
in the first display, they would be more interested in the display with the change
as opposed to the constant display. This hypothesis turned out to be true for one
object, in the case of 4 and 6 month-old infants, and up to 4 objects in the case of
10-month-olds. Since the subitizing range is lower than 6, both groups of infants
performed poorly in the 6 objects condition. This suggests a period of maturation
of the subitizing range. Moreover, Feigenson et al. (2002) and Feigenson and Carey
(2005) used a manual search paradigm to shed light on children’s memory capac-
ities. They placed a number of graham crackers into one bucket showing one at
a time to 10 or 12 month-olds and then another number of crackers, in the same
manner, into another bucket. Children would then crawl to a bucket and search
for crackers. If infants were able to represent the number of crackers, they would
choose the bucket that contains the most. Children performed as predicted when
the choice was 1 vs 2, 1 vs 3, and 2 vs 3, but behaved randomly when one of the
buckets contained 4 crackers (even in a 1 vs 4 condition). Thus there seems to be
converging evidence for the idea that representing up to 4 objects has a privileged
status in cognition.
Finally, the ability to represent the distinction between the occlusion of an object
and the cessation of an object’s existence is attested in both bodies of literature. In
the MOT paradigm, Scholl and Pylyshyn (1999) showed that if objects pass behind
a fixed zone in the display that renders them momentarily invisible and objects’
movement patterns remain the same, tracking performance is unaltered. Also Fran-
coneri et al. (2006) showed that if objects change their directions up to 60 degrees
while ‘occluded’ in this way, they still can be tracked. If visual indices were re-
assigned during these critical moments of occlusion, a drop in performance would
be predicted. This is not the case. Similarly, in the infant literature, representing
objects as persisting throughout occlusion is crucial. If the 1 + 1 task involving two
objects hidden behind screens could be explained in terms of infants representing
the destruction of a given object and the emergence of a new one, then there would
be no surprise when only one of the objects appears as an outcome: the other simply
got destroyed. This is not empirically borne out. Note, however, that this does not
preclude this distinction from being captured in different ways: it is perfectly pos-
sible that, at the level of early representations of objects (visual indices), survival
through occlusion is captured by sameness of index and cessation of existence by
index re-assignment (reflecting reduction in performance). This would be achieved
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by features of the hardware itself, not by the fact that a MATERIAL OBJECT concept
is necessary for stating under which conditions a material object is occluded and
under which it ceases to be.
Carey and Xu (2001) and Carey (2009, ch. 4), based on this common set of three
‘signatures’, argue for a single system of object representation. One that is concep-
tual in nature, given their arguments for the conceptuality of such representations,
namely, the integrative role of such representations and their interface with linguis-
tic systems (see section 3.2). Before assessing the soundness of the argument, it is
worth taking a look at the disanalogies between the two bodies of evidence.
3.4.2 Disanalogies between MATERIAL OBJECT and visual indices
The similarity between the two systems of representation seems to break down in
the ways they interface with either a given kind of stimuli or with the conceptual
system. I will take up these two ways in which the point can be illustrated in turn.
These basically amount to tensions between the interim conclusions of the two pre-
ceding sections.
First, it seems that visual indices can apply to pre-3D stimuli. In some of the
MOT experiments (all presented using 2D displays), objects could pass through
each other without any loss in performance, clearly violating Spelke’s principle of
cohesion (Baillargeon, 1987). Moreover, objects that do not stereotypically fall
under MATERIAL OBJECT could, in principle, be visually indexed, such as shadows
and holes (see Casati, 2004). More impressively, ‘objects’ can even be tracked
in feature space. None of these forms of representation can be achieved under
MATERIAL OBJECT. Stimuli represented under this concept, on the other hand, give
rise to complex expectations concerning the possible interactions amongst different
kinds of physical and animate entities in real space.
Second, based on the findings revealed by the MOT experimental paradigm,
Pylyshyn argues that visual indices are unlikely to be conceptual because of their
degree of encapsulation. Tracking multiple objects that have a uniquely identify-
ing shape, colour, or size does not improve performance (this suggests that visual
indices may be encapsulated even from (possibly) other non-conceptual represen-
tations). Crucially, giving a uniquely discriminating label for each object does not
improve performance. These data contrast with the findings of Xu (1999, 2002,
2005); Surian et al. (2004); Dewar and Xu (2007). The success of 9-month-olds on
the object permanence task involving two objects behind a single screen, usually
achieved at 12 months of age, depends on cues that make information about object
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kind salient to the child. Thus, providing a common noun for each object greatly
improves performance. This does not seem to be attested in the MOT studies: any
object, as long as they are bound and move continuously, can be indexed.
3.4.3 Accounting for the dilemma
The following dilemma emerges at this point. How can we explain the partial over-
lap between the MOT based experimental findings (Pylyshyn and colleagues) and
those discovered by the child expectancy-violation paradigm (Spelke, Baillargeon,
Carey, Xu and colleagues), as well as their disanalogies? On the one hand, assuming
that object representations are the output of a single, non-conceptual, encapsulated
and data driven system allegedly faces the difficulty of accounting for the robust
set of expectations and complex inferences that seem to be regulating children’s be-
haviour. On the other hand, assuming that object representations are concepts faces
the challenge of accounting for the uniformity of the tracking performance across
conditions that would allegedly make the task easier, such as an object’s having a
uniquely discriminating colour, shape, and, crucially, label.
I believe that the way out of this dilemma involves making room for the idea
that visual indices and concepts play different, yet related, cognitive roles and pos-
tulating a notion of incremental object representation.
The disanalogies reviewed above rest on the many interesting properties to the
mechanism of visual index assignment. More specifically, the data reviewed in
section 3.3 suggest the following claims: (i) visual indices play a role in the in-
dividuation of objects based on pre-3D images as well as capturing their identity
in the minimal sense of sameness construed as continuity through space-time, and
(ii), given the need for mechanisms that determines that a set of features belong
to (causally derive from) the same object (Treisman and Gelade, 1980), visual in-
dices may provide a reference point to visual information processing units sensitive
to other types of information, such as colour and shape. If information about the
object’s shape (say, [square]) and colour (say, [yellow]) are processed by different
streams of activation in the brain, then adding information (say, [square ∧ yellow])
necessitates a common reference point, provided by the visual index (say, i[square
∧ yellow]). Effectively, something like visual indices would play a fundamental role
in the integration of information in the visual system. If this is right, concepts are the
not the only representations that are content integrating (contra Carey’s argument
in section 3.2.3).
There is another angle from which this integrative role of visual indices can
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be viewed. In the previous paragraph, I alluded to the addition of featural (non-
conceptual) information in a rather static way. The process mirrors an inference,
but at a possibly non-conceptual level: from [square] and [yellow] one can move to
i[square ∧ yellow]. However, there is also a more dynamic perspective on object
representations. In the MOT experiments, there were trials in which the object’s
properties changed constantly, yet were not reflected in performance. In order for
changes of an object’s properties to be perceived, the link between the object and a
cognitive system must be preserved through time. This is captured by sameness of
visual index. Thus, these nonconceptual representations not only allow for informa-
tion to be added, but also to be updated through time by preserving an information
channel between object and cognitive system (an important aspect of cognitive dy-
namics). This can regarded as yet another beneficial cognitive effect brought by
such early-level object representations.
In conclusion, the review in section 3.3 argues for three inter-related claims,
namely, (i) that there are representations that may fall below the conceptual level,
(ii) that such a kind of representations plays a role in the individuation of objects
as well as representing the conditions under which they remain the same in time-
space, and (iii) that by playing the latter role, visual indices also maintain a link to
the object, which allows information to be added or updated.
These claims seem to presuppose a notion of incremental object representation:
our representation of an object evolves through time (via the preserved information-
link achieved by something like a visual index). This temporal parameter introduces
another important aspect: the richness of the object representation may be relative
to certain cognitive tasks faced by the system. Some of the studies reviewed in
previous sections raised interesting limiting cases for our ability to represent ob-
jects. Treisman and Gelade (1980) showed that failures in the ‘binding’ of visual
features can occur, that is, when subjects are presented with a display containing
a red triangle to the right and a yellow rectangle to the left for a very short time,
they cross-linked shape and colour information, representing a red rectangle and
a yellow triangle. This suggests that the system did not have sufficient cognitive
resources to produce the richer information state in the right way due to cognitive
load. Similarly, Scholl et al. (1999) and Bahrami (2003) showed that when subjects
really concentrate on tracking multiple objects whose properties are changing con-
stantly during the trial, the changes went unnoticed by the subjects. This suggests
that some of the information derived from the object did not surface at the concep-
tual level, indicating that visual indices were enough to carry on with the task at
hand.
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The relativity to processing time, task achieved, and cognitive resources em-
ployed in doing so highlights one final aspect of the notion of incremental repre-
sentation that I am putting forward: a prior representational state about an object is
necessary for and informationally poorer than further representational states about
the same object. Latter states engage more cognitive resources but allow for more
information to be aggregated. Conversely, earlier states rely on shallower input
analysers, but might provide a good enough representation of the object if current
cognitive demands or environmental constraints necessitate a certain course of ac-
tion - e.g. ducking an unrecognised object that moves towards one’s head - before
the system is in a position to process more fine-grained information about the object,
such as which kind it belongs to.
If the foregoing remarks are on the right track, object representation seems to be
an effect driven activity that takes place against the background of certain environ-
mental constraints (both external and internal to the system). This characterisation
of object representation displays clear parallels to the relevance theoretic cognitive
principle outlined in the previous chapter. Sperber and Wilson (1995, 260-266)
claim that cognition is geared ‘towards the achievement of as many positive cogni-
tive effects for as little processing effort as possible’ (Cognitive Principle of Rele-
vance). The cognitive regulations imposed by this principle, in effect, could enrich
an object representation modulo the task at hand and the resources available. This
provides an interesting tool for understanding how the gap between conceptual and
non-conceptual representations can be bridged. Conceptuality can be considered a
cognitive effect14.
In a similar way that a visual feature bundle can be regarded as an enrichment
of a bare object representation, early forms of non-conceptual representation and
concepts can be related via an incremental notion of processing. The cognitive
effects purchased by conceptual representations are obvious. Conceptual informa-
tion can be stored as what psychologists call ‘semantic memory’ - the individual’s
database of knowledge and belief - and interact with other conceptually structured
information inferentially (deductively or inductively) in the derivation of further in-
formation. Thus, as information is processed through the visual pathways, a series
of mental states is established, with the goal of cognitive benefit. Object represen-
tations begin at the visual index level (i) and proceed to i[round ∧ blue345], the level
of feature bundle (Campbell 2002) or object-file (Kahneman et al. 1992), and then
14Ness (2011) argues that concepts are necessary in order to provide the thematic unity of the
phenomenal content of a given experience. Perhaps thematic unity could be regarded as another
positive effect achieved at the conceptual level.
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go to a conceptual level of information (i(round ∧ blue345)[BALL]), at which proposi-
tional information associated with that concept (DOGS LIKE TO CATCH BALLS) is
available for further cognitive tasks, such as inference and memory retrieval and
storage.
This picture of object representation solves the dilemma at the beginning of
this subsection in the following way. The analogies unearthed by the two bodies
of experimental data are explained by the incremental nature of processing: given
the dependency of a higher level state on a lower level one, it is natural to expect
that features that constrain the latter (limit of 4 indexed objects) also constrain the
former. However, the conceptual nature of the higher level states enables certain
cognitive tasks, e.g. the possibility of interaction with semantic memory and infer-
ence - that are precluded of non-conceptual representations. This explains the dis-
analogies between the two bodies of experimental work. The encapsulated nature of
representations involved in MOT, on the one hand, seems to be governed by early
level representations, as the cognitive effects in question boil down simply to the
preservation of the identity of objects moving in a display. The object-permanence
studies, on the other hand, comprise more cognitively loaded tasks. Infants have to
consider the transformations and interactions which objects might have undergone
while occluded, which draws on more stable (less occasional) information.
The fact that words can improve children’s performance suggest that they ac-
tivate specific pieces of information (concepts) that are associated with knowledge
relevant to the task at hand, as in the studies by Xu (1999, 2002, 2005) and Dewar
and Xu (2007). The findings in these studies are also explained by the fact that in-
cremental processing is geared towards achieving beneficial cognitive effects. Many
of the expectations manifested in the two separate screens object permanence task
of Spelke (1990) and Spelke et al. (1995) (among many others) seem to be under-
pinned by MATERIAL OBJECT, whereas the success in the object permanence task
in the single screen studies of Xu and Dewar depends on the availability of two
distinct conceptual representations (e.g. DUCK, BALL)15 that allow for an inference
of the following sort: if two kinds are present, then there must be two entities that
instantiate them behind the screen. Children fail when they have not acquired the
distinct concepts, because only one kind-level representation - i.e. MATERIAL OB-
JECT or TOY - is involved in the task, which would not naturally give rise to the
expectation of two entities instantiating that kind being occluded behind the screen.
15The proposal made here is neutral with regards to whether these more specific concepts involve
a re-conceptualisation of the world by the child and to whether certain object permanence tasks (Xu,
1999, 2002, 2005; Dewar and Xu, 2007) are explicable by beliefs associated with concepts acquired
by the child (see Carey, 2009, 279-85).
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This suggests that the notion of effect oriented incrementality also holds at the con-
ceptual level (and throughout cognition, more generally): when children are able to
use more specific conceptual representations, more effects can be generated.
Now, if we assume that there are non-conceptual representations (necessary for
some early forms of object individuation and identity preservation) and that the in-
cremental notion of processing mentioned above makes representations surface at
the conceptual level at some point in the evolution of mental states, then it seems
that sortal are not necessary for individuating objects and capturing their spatio-
temporal continuity. Still, concepts play an important role in capturing an object’s
identity conditions in a broad sense: realising the totality of transformations an ob-
ject can undergo whilst remaining the same object (Wiggins, 1967, 1980, 2001) is
subject to the thinker’s knowledge about the particular kind the object belongs to,
which inevitability requires a concept that denotes that kind. Other roles include
categorising and stating generalisations about entities that fall under the relevant
kinds. Consider plants, for example: they are not self-propelled, so they do not
fall under our innate concept for agents, but they also do not fall under MATERIAL
OBJECT either. Thus, evaluating whether a seedling is the same as a large oak some
time later requires not only a PLANT concept, but certain beliefs and knowledge
about the transformations these objects can undergo. This indeed is a conceptually
loaded cognitive task, but quite different from individuating and tracking simple
objects moving in the visual field. In the next section, I will sketch how the notion
of incremental processing can be extended from early mechanisms of object rep-
resentation to (directly or indirectly available) conceptual representations that are
suitable for linguistic integration.
3.5 Incremental object representation, the CMI ques-
tion, and descriptive pronouns.
At this point, we must take a look at how the notion of incrementality of object
representation gives us an answer to the question raised at the beginning of this
chapter, namely:
(CMI Question): Can indirectly salient concepts be constituents of the proposition
expressed by an utterance (i.e. count as a development of the logical form of an
utterance)?
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The initial negative answer to this question was motivated by a hypothesis that
linked the notion of a sortal to that of concepts which would be directly available to
the audience because they are necessary in the characterisation a particular visual
experience as the experience it really is (i.e. as experiences of a discrete, bound
objects that move as a whole, see the theses Sortal Individuation and Sortal Identity
in this chapter’s introduction). That is, the justification for sortal concepts consti-
tuting such a privileged level of representation relied on their necessary role for
individuating objects as well as capturing their persistence conditions. The hypoth-
esis offered a way to sensibly capture the notion of a immediately available concept
used in linguistic constraints, such as Elbourne’s condition on NP ellipsis or the
Individuative-Representational constraint, which were motivated to explain some
accessibility patterns in anaphora (and possibly descriptive uses), illustrated below:
(6) a. Every man who has a wife should bring her to the party.
b. *Every married man should bring her to the party. (intended reading:
as (a) above)
c. Every groom thinks his bride is worth dying for.
d. Every groom thinks *she/?his [pointing to a wedding dress] is worth
dying for.
Above the concept MARRIED makes the concept WIFE indirectly available and the
gesture towards the wedding dress makes the concept BRIDE indirectly available as
well. Therefore, such representations cannot be selected as the values of the respec-
tive pronouns. Moreover, justifying the immediate availability of certain concepts
because they are required by a given perceptual experience enables us to deal with
cases where certain dependencies are established perceptually, as in deep anaphora,
below:
(7) Do most faculty members deposit it [waving a paycheck] in the credit union
(Jacobson, 2000)?
Singling out the object waved by the speaker would require a token of the PAY-
CHECK concept, which would then be integrated with the linguistic meaning of ‘it’.
However, as a result all cases of identification-based descriptive uses of pronouns
(as well as some cases of donkey anaphora) cannot contribute to the proposition
expressed and an alternative way to explain this linguistic data would be motivated.
This tentative hypothesis has serious predictions and was assessed empirically.
In section 3.2, I reviewed data in support of the idea that this basic level of repre-
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sentation necessitates sortal concepts. In section 3.3, I reviewed data that argues
against the very same idea. Thus, a new dilemma emerged in section 3.4: how to
make sense of both sets of evidence. This section aimed to coherently explain both
the analogies and disanalogies between the findings unearthed by the two bodies
of experimental work reviewed previously. The answer involved a notion of in-
cremental object representation, which falls out from the combination of general
mechanisms that regulate the flow of information (e.g. the Cognitive Principle of
Relevance) and an empirically based picture of how human visual processing mech-
anisms actually work, that is, a description of human visual abilities.
The adoption of this picture undermines the link between sortals and their role
in individuating objects and capturing their persistence conditions in the spatiotem-
poral sense. As a consequence, the justification for sortals constituting a privileged
level of representation in virtue of their role is lost. Still, incremental processing
explains much of the data that was recruited in support of sortalism as well as data
against it.
Representation begins by early (visual) processing mechanisms that individuate,
capture the identity conditions of material objects, and aggregates (possibly non-
conceptual) information about many of their properties, such as colour, shape, size,
edge and so on. This accounts for the data against sortalism reviewed in section 3.3.
We can think of these as visual counterparts of early auditory mechanisms involved
in detecting many of the properties of speech, such as, tone and pitch, as well as
identifying phonemes and determining word boundaries. Given the incremental na-
ture of processing, these representations eventually surface at the conceptual level.
Conceptuality could be regarded as a cognitive achievement which brings many
beneficial effects to the thinker. This level of representation accounts for the data
reviewed in section 3.2. However, the concepts that emerge do not do so because
they are necessary to play an individuating role. That has already being achieved
by early mechanisms. Still, we may preserve the idea that some concepts emerge
naturally in the processing history of a visual episode, as, for example, when the
seeing of a dog gives rise to a DOG concept, not because the concept is required
for the individuation of the object, but because it is the representation that naturally
emerges at the conceptual level and allows for cognitive effects that are semantic
in nature (i.e. semantic memory retrieval and storage). A similar story holds for
the processing of words: a DOG concept emerges in virtue of early level processing
mechanisms that identify the word (e.g. ‘dog’) associated with it.
Note that this proposal makes room for an important unification. The emergence
of non-sortal concepts is explained in the same way. Consider someone looking at
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a large body of smoke. Early processing mechanisms (distinct from visual index-
ing) would be able to represent certain properties of the entity in the environment
(smoky stuff) in a way such that a concept (e.g. SMOKE) surfaces at some point
due to the incremental nature of processing. This concept could then be available
to feed the interpretation of various expressions in natural languages, even though
it would not be a sortal. For example, it could be the referent of the ‘it’ or ‘that’ and
it could be also used for the processing of certain identification-based descriptive
uses of pronouns (e.g. one of two people engulfed in a smoke cloud at a demon-
stration saying ‘They are bringing reinforcements’, where ‘they’ is interpreted as
the police). In other words, even though the mechanisms responsible for the early
processing of different kinds of aspects of the environment (smoke vs chairs, say)
are underpinned by quite different output representations, they would eventually
give rise to representations in a common format (e.g. SMOKE, CHAIRS concepts).
Representations that emerge from standard material objects and those that do not
figure in the same way as part of the context for interpreting overt stimuli.
Moreover, the picture sketched here answers the CMI question in the follow-
ing way. The allegedly ‘indirectly’ available concepts can integrate with linguistic
meaning in order to express a proposition, because the same notion of incremen-
tality that would make concepts emerge after certain low-level processes fulfil their
role would also make related concepts available. For example, seeing the White
House involves processing information in a way such that the WHITE HOUSE or
PUBLIC BUILDING concept eventually emerges in a person’s mind, making White
House-related information - such as the concept AMERICAN PRESIDENT and the
propositions THE AMERICAN PRESIDENT WORKS AT THE WHITE HOUSE, THE
WHITE HOUSE IS AN IMPORTANT BUILDING, and so on - salient or accessible for
whichever cognitive task the system currently faces. In the case of interpreting (1)e,
reprinted below, incrementality in object representation would render AMERICAN
PRESIDENT accessible enough to satisfy the interpretative demands.
(8) Pointing to the White House in Washington DC: Every time there is a war,
he [the American president] has tough choices to make.
On the other hand, the gesture towards the wedding dress in the context of (6)d
does not reach a threshold of activation that enables the integration between linguis-
tic information and salient conceptual information (maybe due to the availability of
linguistic forms that would establish the relevant interpretation at lower cognitive
costs, or the availability of competing representations at a low cost). Thus, the
incremental notion of processing allows a more empirically grounded solution to
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not only the empirical dilemma concerning divergent data, but also the intuitive
dilemma concerning whether a positive or negative answer to the CMI question
should be given. Note that this type of explanation also carries over to some cases
of anaphora where the antecedent is not stated explicitly but the dependency is suc-
cessfully established, such as:
(9) Every iphone-owner uses it for browsing.
Now, the role the incremental picture of processing (underpinned by the Cogni-
tive Principle of Relevance) plays in the case above and in the White House scenario
in (8) and the assumption that Covariation (e.g. between US presidents and war-
times, or iphone-owners and their mobiles) should be explained by some form of
grammatical process has important consequences for our conception of grammar.
That is, this chapter argues for an explanation that allows pragmatically available
constituents (available through some form of incremental processing) to figure in
the mechanism that explains the relevant co-varying readings. Conversely, the nar-
row string-based view of grammar sketched at the beginning of this chapter does
not seem to get the data right (e.g. (8) and (9)), nor is compatible with the in-
cremental picture presented here. In chapter 5, I will sketch a grammar (Dynamic
Syntax, Kempson et al. 2001; Cann et al. 2005) that builds instrumentality in its
very heart and does not suffer from such shortcomings. Its adoption can account for
the Co-variation property of identification-based descriptive pronouns and cases of
anaphora straightforwardly, thus offering an unified explanation for the variety of
pronominal uses discussed in chapter 1.
Finally, the asymmetry between the felicitous ‘Every man who has a wife should
bring her to the party’ and the infelicitous ‘Every married man should bring her
to the party’ and the infelicity of certain identification-based descriptive pronouns
should not be accounted for by the postulation of grammatical and/or representa-
tional constraints, but only by serious work in psychology aimed to establish the
threshold of activation that certain representations need to reach in order for them
to be recruited for integration with linguistic expressions in utterance comprehen-
sion. This would be in total consonance with the incremental view of processing
put forward here. Certain cognitive effects, in this case, establishing certain inter-
pretations, would be influenced by frequency and recency (as well as many other)
variables. This would explain an interesting fact about the infelicitous cases men-
tioned above. As one repeats them to oneself, their acceptability rises. I believe this
would be very much in the spirit of recent approaches to metonymy (see Falkum,
2010, ch. 6) and the same point could be made for bad cases of donkey anaphora
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that motivated the formal link condition and the constraints stated at the beginning
of the chapter.
In conclusion, the processing of descriptive pronouns can result from the inte-
gration of linguistic content and content delivered visually, in a way similar to in-
tegration underpinning deep anaphora. This paves the way to the full development
of a substitution-based account of some descriptive cases, as suggested towards the
end of chapter 2. Before doing so, we must assess some of the literature that at-
tempt to explain the data presented in chapter 1 and that may appeal to some of the






This chapter marks the start of a second stage in the thesis: one in which we begin
to assess different theories of identification-based descriptive uses. Thus, it is worth
reminding ourselves of what has been achieved so far and how the conclusions
reached in previous chapters shape possible accounts of the data.
In chapter 1, the properties of identification-based descriptive pronouns were
thoroughly described. Comparing them to a variety of other pronominal uses and
to one kind of non-literal interpretation (metonymy) brought both the core and
extended properties of descriptive pronouns to light (i.e. Identification Depen-
dency, Descriptiveness, Connection, and Accessibility). More specifically, such uses
seemed to be most similar to donkey anaphora and metonymy.
In chapter 2, we have dug deeper into the latter similarity. Explaining descrip-
tive uses of pronouns as non-literal interpretations seems impossible from a Gricean
perspective and although this is more sensible in alternative theories, such as RT,
there are important dissimilarities between descriptive pronouns and metonymies:
since the former do not encode lexical concepts, postulating a ‘substitution’ be-
tween linguistically-driven conceptual representation and speaker-meant concept
misses the point. Still, this chapter laid out some important cornerstones. Some de-
scriptive uses seem to contribute to an utterance’s explicature and some others to an
utterance’s implicatures. The best criterion for deciding which analysis is preferred
seems to be provided by the scope test. While we have an account of implicature
derivation (by global inference), contributions to the explicit level of meaning still
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need to be explained by some mechanism. As we shall see in this chapter, this can
rely more heavily on either grammatical structure or pragmatic principles.
In chapter 3, we have assessed whether identification-based descriptive inter-
pretations result from processes that are radically different from donkey anaphora.
In the literature on the latter type of dependency, many have proposed that con-
cepts that are ‘indirectly’ available in the context cannot provide antecedents for
pronouns, hence predicting that the two cases are essentially different phenomena.
This hypothesis has been assessed thoroughly from both conceptual and empiri-
cal standpoints and it seems to be unwarranted. In the course of carrying out this
task, we have reviewed many assumptions about the processes of individuating and
identifying a material object in the environment which may be invoked by different
types of proposals. In conclusion, treating identification-based descriptive pronouns
as a special form of anaphora (dependent on an indirectly and extra-linguistically
available antecedent, as it were) seems to be a viable option. This will be pur-
sued in chapter 5. Note that this strategy is not exhaustive. As discussed towards
the end of chapter 2, some identification-based descriptive uses are better captured
as implicatures. The grammar to be described in chapter 5 together with the rel-
evance theoretic pragmatic machinery introduced in chapter 2 can accommodate
such pronominal uses at either level of meaning, which turns out to be a great ad-
vantage over competing accounts. Before laying out the proposal, however, we
must look at alternative explanations.
In this chapter, I aim to review some of the accounts of the data proposed in the
literature. I will begin with a reminder of the desiderata that a theory of descriptive
uses of pronouns must meet (section 4.2). Broadly speaking, there are two families
of theories that have attempted to account for these uses . In section 4.3, I will assess
proposals that do so by postulating a more complicated grammatical (i.e. syntactic
or semantic) machinery, that is, the so-called ‘heavy-handed semantics’ positions,
in Neale’s (2007) terminology. In section 4.4, I turn to theories that have tried to
explain the phenomenon in pragmatic terms, that is, ‘heavy-handed pragmatic’ ac-
counts, according to Neale (2007). The specific instances reviewed, unfortunately,
do not exhaust every single position in the market. I have opted to focus on the
more influential ones. The presentation of each within these two groups is followed
by an assessment of its shortcomings. Section 4.5 concludes and paves the way
to my own account of the data that assimilates the insights from other chapters, as




As a quick review of the interpretative properties discussed in chapter 1, descriptive
uses, such as:
(1) a. Someone pointing at a huge footprint in the sand says: ‘He must be a
giant’ (from Schiffer 1981, 49) .
b. US Supreme Court Justice O’Connor says: ‘We might have been liber-
als’ (Nunberg, 1993, 14-15).
c. Bill Clinton saying: ‘The founders invested me with the sole responsi-
bility for appointing Supreme Court Justices’ (Nunberg, 1993, 20).
d. John, expecting a call from his mother, answers a phone call from his
colleague and says: ‘Oh, I thought you were my mother’ (Nunberg,
1990).
seem to have the following interpretative properties:
Descriptiveness: The information conveyed by the pronominal use is descriptive or
general.
Identification Dependency: The pronominal uses depend on the identification of a
particular entity as belonging to a certain kind.
Connection: An adequate account of the pronominal uses must explain the relation
between Descriptiveness and Identification Dependency - that is, how the concepts
used to represent objects as falling under a certain kind make the descriptive inter-
pretation available in a principled way.
In chapter 1, these were referred to as the core interpretative properties of de-
scriptive pronouns. Note that I am not saying that any use of these utterances must
convey descriptive information at the explicit level, I am just saying they can or
might. The sentences in examples (b) and (c) could easily be used to express sin-
gular propositions about Clinton and a group containing O’Connor, respectively
(which could be used to implicate, or otherwise be used in the communication of,
descriptive content). Then, in addition, uses like the one in (2) and the contrasts
between (a) and (b) and that between (c) and (d) in (3) seem to motivate the extra
desiderata below:
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(2) Andy: Well...Every time there is a war, he [pointing to the White House]
has tough choices to make.
(3) Antecedent impossibilities of descriptive pronouns (boldface indicate poten-
tial dependencies)
a. Said by someone: A/The condemned prisoner is traditionally allowed
a last meal. He is also allowed to invite close friends for the execution.
b. Said by a condemned prisoner: I am traditionally allowed a last meal.
*He [said by same speaker]/ He [said by different speaker] is also al-
lowed to invite close friends for the execution.
c. Said by someone: If the Democrats had won the last few presidential
elections, the American Supreme Court Justices might have been
liberals. They would’ve guarded public interest better.
d. Said by Supreme Court Justice O’Connor: If the Democrats had won
the last few presidential elections, we might have been liberals. *They
[said by same speaker]/They [said by different speaker]/?We [said by
same speaker] would guard public interest better.
Co-variation: The pronominal interpretations can co-vary with another expression
in discourse.
Accessibility (descriptive): Certain mental representations can provide the right in-
terpretations for (descriptive) pronouns, while others cannot.
In short, we want a theory that is able to account for the core properties of the
data, namely, Descriptiveness, Identification Dependency and Connection as well as
the extended properties of the data, namely, Co-variation and Accessibility. More-
over, we would like a theory that explains the interpretative properties of other uses
of pronouns, reviewed in chapter 1, in a unified manner. In the next two sections,
we will take a look at how different families of theories try to achieve this goal. An-
ticipating things a bit, it seems that all of them face some problems, when it comes
to explaining the extended properties of the data. We turn now to accounts that do
so by postulating an intricate grammatical or semantic machinery.
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4.3 Heavy-handed semantic accounts
In this section, I focus on theories that deal with the data at hand by postulating a
complex formal semantic apparatus. I will concentrate on Nunberg’s (1993) original
insight.
4.3.1 Nunberg’s three-component account
Nunberg’s proposal
In order to account for the interpretative properties above, Nunberg (1993) assumes
that personal and demonstrative pronouns encode three components: (i) a deictic
component, which can be understood as descriptive information that works as ‘a
function from occurrences or utterances of an expression to elements of the context
of utterance’ (Nunberg, 1993, 8), for example, the speaker is the deictic component
of ‘I’ and determines a particular entity in a context , (ii) a classificatory component,
responsible for guiding the overall interpretation process and consisting of features
such as gender and/or animacy, and (iii) a relational component, which constrains
the relation between the object the deictic component determines, that is, the index,
and the intended interpretation. In the case of first- and second person pronouns
(‘participant terms’, according to Nunberg 1993), the relational component imposes
that the ‘index must be included in, or more generally, must instantiate the inter-
pretation’ (Nunberg, 1993, 9). Nunberg’s notion of interpretation here is just the
pronoun’s truth-conditional contribution, which might be the deictic, or anaphoric,
in addition to the identification-based descriptive interpretations discussed here.
This machinery explains the data as follows. Clinton’s utterance in (1)c con-
tains an occurrence of ‘me’. Since first-person pronouns encode something like
‘the speaker’ as deictic component, it determines Bill Clinton as index. Now, the
index is related to the final (and intended) interpretation via the classificatory com-
ponent: the pronoun’s animacy feature must be preserved by the final interpretation,
which also must include or be instantiated by the index. In (1)c, the alleged intended
interpretation is the American President, which is related to the index, Bill Clinton,
in a way such that the information encoded by the classificatory and relational com-
ponents are preserved (presidents are animate entities). The interpretation is also
instantiated by the index (Clinton was a President). The three components equally
account for the ‘literal’ deictic cases, with the exception that the intended interpre-
tation and the index would coincide: instead of relating to a property like being the
American President, the index (Clinton) would exhaust the intended interpretation
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of the pronoun.
As suggested in chapter 2 section 2.2.2, Nunberg’s argument against the conver-
sational status of descriptive interpretations can be seen as one of the main motiva-
tions for the ‘formal’ account just mentioned. Thus, the treatment can be regarded
as a function that takes a function from the deictic component and context to index
as input and outputs the intended interpretation. But this formal approach does not
answer a key question. What would determine whether the intended interpretation
is deictic or descriptive? In earlier writings, Nunberg (1979, 160) borrows the psy-
chologist’s use of ‘cue validity’ to describe what determines the relevant reading. In
some cases, the range of possible interpretations indicated by an index is exhausted
by itself (e.g. a ‘direct’ cue, in the sense of chapter 3). These are the deictic uses.
In some other cases, the index can be cue to an interpretation that is related to it
(e.g. an ‘indirect’ cue, in the sense of chapter 3). These are the ‘descriptive’ uses.
However, it is unclear whether cue validity should be understood in terms of the
spread of activation amongst competing mental representations (Recanati 1993, to
be reviewed shortly) or in terms of cues to specific intentions of the speaker (Sper-
ber and Wilson 1995, reviewed in chapter 2). Nunberg (1993) mentions that speaker
intentions would be necessary for fixing the relevant values of index and intended
interpretation, which suggests that he has in mind something closer to the latter
understanding. Thus, the take home message seems to be this: although Nunberg
argued against implicature accounts, it seems that the appeal to the intentions of the
speaker is essential for the explanation of deictic and descriptive readings.
The account generalises to other cases of pronouns as follows. The first person
plural works pretty much along the same lines as the first person singular above, the
only difference being that the classificatory component includes a plural feature that
makes the intended interpretation to be about a group of entities. In the case of (1)b,
O’Connor’s use of ‘we’ determines her as the index. The intended interpretation is
the American Supreme Court Justices, which is instantiated by the index, hence
preserving the constraints imposed by the classificatory and relational components.
Differently from first person pronouns, the deictic component of second person
pronouns corresponds to something like the addressee, which determines the spe-
cific person or group addressed as the index. The difference between singular and
plural ‘you’ works along the same lines as the one between ‘I’ and ‘we’ above. In
the case of (1)d, John’s use of ‘you’ makes his friend the index. The intended inter-
pretation is the person calling, which is instantiated by him (John’s friend is making
the call) and preserves the requirements imposed by the relational and classificatory
components (the resulting interpretation is animate and is instantiated by the index).
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Third person (singular and plural) pronouns - non-participant terms, accord-
ing to Nunberg (1993) - fall a bit out of the picture sketched so far. Their deictic
component does not encode enough information to direct the audience to any set
of potential indices. Some uses of these expressions would require a demonstra-
tion to do the job (called ‘deictics’, Nunberg 1993, 23,36). Other uses can dispense
with demonstrations, because an object is salient in the context in such a way that
communicators take it as the pronoun’s index (called ‘contextuals’, Nunberg 1993,
23,36). It is unclear here whether deictics and contextuals encode different deictic
components, or whether they could be unified by encoding the same requirement of
‘object salience’ (demonstrations play the role of making a particular object salient,
perhaps along the lines sketched in chapter 3) 1. In the case of (1)a, the gesture
determines the footprint as index, which is suitably related to the intended inter-
pretation the person who made the print. Non-participant terms do not impose that
the interpretation must include or be instantiated by the index. The classificatory
component - male and animacy features - is preserved in the interpretation.
The desiderata in section 4.2 can be explained as follows. The deictic com-
ponent encoded by the pronoun and the speaker intention determines the index:
Clinton for (1)c. This is the stage at which Identification Dependency would be
met, but it is unclear whether the account predicts that Clinton should be identified
under a concept, like POLITICIAN, or as a bare individual, along the lines described
in chapter 3 section 3.3. Since the latter would preclude the account from meet-
ing Identification Dependency, I assume that the contextually salient object must
somehow be identified under a concept and take this interpretative property to be
properly accounted for at this stage in the interpretation. The relational component
encoded by the pronoun and some form of pragmatic process, then, select an appro-
priate interpretation which is constrained by the classificatory component (e.g. the
pronoun’s animacy features) and, in the case of participant terms (first and second
person pronouns), by the relational component’s requirement that the index must
be included in or instantiate the intended interpretation. The ‘cues’ in (1)c together
with such linguistic constraints select the American President as the intended in-
terpretation. This meets Descriptiveness. In this proposal, the relation between the
identified object (index) and descriptive interpretation is a linguistically-mandated-
intention-sensitive process. This accounts for Connection on partially inferential
grounds (speaker intentions are necessary to arrive at the descriptive interpretation)
1Following Powell (1998), I take it that the distinction between two types of demonstrative pro-
nouns would introduce an ambiguity for non-participant terms, which we hardly see evidence for.
Therefore, I just assume that Nunberg assumes that both kinds of use require some form of object
saliency.
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and partially by encoded information: the requirements imposed by each compo-
nent. The latter aspect makes descriptive pronouns much more similar to indexi-
cality (to properties, in this case) than implicature derivation2. But what about the
extended properties of the data?
Based on the proposal’s ability to predict that identification-based pronouns can
receive descriptive interpretations fact and the ability of descriptions to co-vary with
other expressions in discourse, we could assume that the interpretation of the pro-
noun in ‘Every time there is a war, he [pointing to the White House] has tough
choices to make’ contributes the description the American President, which co-
varies according to different war times. However, this is a hand-waving explanation
and one would really need a mechanism that can account for the co-varying read-
ings. Elbourne (2008) provides an implementation of Nunberg’s proposal, based on
three cornerstones: (i) pronouns are definite descriptions, (ii) descriptions presup-
pose the uniqueness of their satisfiers, (iii) predicates describe minimal situations:
world parts that contain only one individual, who instantiates only that property.
Elbourne’s implementation gets the Co-variation property right, thus I assume that
this desideratum can also met3 (Breheny 1999 has a proposal that is also able to
account for co-variation, but unlike Elbourne’s is deeply pragmatic in nature).
As for the Accessibility property, things are more complicated. Since Nunberg
does not account for how dependencies across sentence boundaries are established,
it is hard to see how he would explain the data below. The same difficulty can be
raised for Elbourne’s (2008) implementation.
(4) a. Said by someone: If the Democrats had won the last few presidential
elections, the American Supreme Court Justices might have been
liberals. They would guard public interest better.
b. Said by Supreme Court Justice O’Connor: If the Democrats had won
the last few presidential elections, we might have been liberals. *They
[said by same speaker]/They [said by different speaker]/?We [said by
same speaker] would guard public interest better.
2Note, however, that the argument that Nunberg gives against implicature accounts of descrip-
tive pronouns is a non-sequitur (see the argument against the conversational status of descriptive
interpretations in chapter 2 section 2.2.2), but there are other reasons for not treating (some) descrip-
tive pronouns as implicatures (as suggested by the arguments against Grice’s picture of non-literal
meaning, from circularity and from intrusion, discussed in the same section).
3I omit a full assessment of the mechanisms by which Elbourne (2008) accounts for Co-variation
because the proposal is subject to the same criticism that may be raised to Nunberg (1993). There-
fore, I have opted to take the explanation of this desideratum for granted and present a common
criticism to both proposals.
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Problems for the proposal
I will present three potential problems for Nunberg’s proposal: (i) one concerning
its explanatory insufficiency, (ii) another to the effect that the components seem to
be too restrictive in some cases, and, finally, (iii) issues related to the desiderata
that the account must explain. Arguments based on (i) and (iii) seem to be along the
right tracks, but the status of arguments based on (ii) seem to be less clear.
First, Nunberg’s proposal faces the problem of being an insufficient explana-
tion. He rightfully takes the data discussed throughout this thesis as a motivation
for postulating richer linguistic structure; in his case one that involves deictic, clas-
sificatory and relational components. However, these components do not explain,
by themselves, how the descriptive readings are delivered. Nunberg (1993) appeals
to ‘speaker intentions’ (or ‘cue validity’ in Nunberg 1979) to first fix the index and
then to provide the intended interpretation that satisfies such linguistic components.
However, we saw in chapter 2 that there are different ways in which a theory of
human communication can incorporate sensitivity to speaker intentions. For exam-
ple, Gricean pragmatics and Relevance Theory both appeal to speaker intentions in
their explanations, but ultimately make quite different predictions. Moreover, as we
shall see soon (section 4.4), the notion of ‘cue validity’ can capture extra-linguistic
information in a speaker-intention free manner (Recanati, 1993). This adds more
possibilities when it comes to the question of how extra-linguistic information is
recruited to augment or modify linguistic meaning; but without the specific details
of how pragmatic options elaborate on the three encoded components, the proposal
cannot be properly assessed.
The second objection against Nunberg’s proposal can be traced to Powell (1998)
and runs along the following lines. In many cases, the account seems to be too re-
strictive in at least two ways: one related to processing order, the other related to the
satisfaction of constraints imposed by the components themselves. First, consider
the case of third-person non-participant terms. They do not encode a deictic com-
ponent to fix the interpretation and rather require some form of ‘object saliency’
to fix their indices. For example, an utterance of ‘They haven’t signed the permis-
sion form yet’, whilst a school teacher points to a little girl (Nunberg, 1993), has
the index, namely, the little girl, fixed by the demonstration and then some form of
mental process takes us to the interpretation: the parents. However, there are no
arguments for this sequential view of processing. Since third person pronouns lack
a deictic component, it could be the case that the index does not play a semantic
role (i.e. a linguistically mandated stage) in finding the final interpretation. It could
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be the case that third person pronouns just need some salient interpretation and in
the case above pointing to a girl is a good enough way of making her parents the
right interpretation of ‘they’ (as argued for in chapter 3). Nunberg simply does not
rule out this possibility. I believe that this objection is well supported.
The second respect in which Nunberg’s proposal might be too restrictive con-
cerns the interplay among the different components in the theory. Many relatively
similar arguments based on this point have been raised in the literature. I will try
my best to address each claim individually, in order to avoid drawing misleading
conclusions.
To begin with, it could be argued that the constraints imposed by a given compo-
nent do not hold for certain interpretations (Grimberg, 1996; Powell, 1998; Galery,
2008). Consider the gender feature of the pronoun, which constitutes the classifi-
catory component. In many cases, it can be overridden. For example, when I point
to an old good male friend of mine and say ‘She is going to be late’, I convey, in
addition to the proposition that person is going to be late, information associated
with a certain (usually but not necessarily negative) female stereotype. On the as-
sumption that expressing the relevant proposition requires certain gender features of
the pronoun to be ignored by the audience, how can we be certain that such feature
deletions do not occur in descriptive uses of pronouns? If nothing can guarantee
this, then it could be argued that Nunberg’s components would not play the role
they are supposed to and hence could be dispensed with. In Galery (2008), I raised
this objection, but now I think it misses the mark. The mismatch between features
in the case of ‘she’ above plays quite a different role from the one involved in de-
scriptive pronouns. In the former case, the feature-deletion occurs so information
(e.g. regarding a negative female stereotype) collateral to the expression of a sin-
gular proposition is expressed. In the descriptive case, the feature mismatch (e.g.
between the animacy of ‘he’ and the demonstrated footprint) is one of the triggers
for the search for a descriptive interpretation. The fact that pronominal features are
somehow preserved in these case can also be attested by the anaphoric data that mo-
tivates Accessibility; re-stated in section 4.2 above, i.e. descriptive pronouns usually
convey descriptions, but these cannot serve as antecedents to other pronouns unless
the person feature of the pronoun is of the right kind.
A similar complaint has been raised against the relational component. Grimberg
(1996), quoted by Powell (1998), suggests that certain examples, like the one below,
show that ‘we’ does not impose the restriction that the index must be ‘included’ in
the interpretation:
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(5) ...a group of conservative middle aged businessmen [is] sitting around
a boardroom table as one of them says: ‘in a couple of years we’ll
probably all be women.’ (Nunberg, 1993, 14, fn. 20)
Nunberg himself agrees that the speaker does not include himself in the interpreta-
tion, for that is a women-only group. Similar remarks apply for O’Connor’s use of
‘we’ in (1)b, as she intended to induce a group-denoting interpretation that does not
include her. The example in the quote above could be treated along various lines.
The first of them consists in dismissing any constraints imposed by the relational
component of ‘we’, if any such thing exists (Grimberg, 1996). The second is to
actually say that ‘we’ above refers to the actual group of board members, but the
predicate ‘probably all be women’ receives a metonymic interpretation, (Nunberg
1993, 14, fn. 20 and Nunberg 1995), such as, to behave in a feminine way.
However, as Powell (1998) suggests, none of these hard-liners need to be taken.
Nunberg postulates a disjunctive definition for the constraint of the relational com-
ponent of ‘we’: the index (speaker) must be included by or instantiate the inter-
pretation. In this case, the intended interpretation is the boardroom members, in
Donnellan’s (1966) attributive sense. It is true that the speaker does instantiate the
property picked out by the description in the actual world, but the utterance is eval-
uated against a circumstance in which it is impossible for the speaker to instantiate
such property (as all the boardroom members are women). Still, nothing forces us
to assume that instantiation here must hold also at the circumstance of evaluation.
The fact that the index instantiates the property in the context of utterance (situation
or actual world) ensures that the right descriptive interpretation is ‘loaded up’ into
the proposition expressed. The criticism simply does not hold.
Another complaint against Nunberg’s components has been voiced by Recanati
(1993, 311) and this time the culprit is the index. In order to make his point, Reca-
nati urges us to consider the following example.
(6) John utters: We are in red brick.
According to him, the truth-conditions of the utterance above is the house we live
in is in red brick. He then argues that determining the index (John) is not sufficient
to convey the intended interpretation. To him, what does the job is identifying the
group of people who live in that specific house, which he treats as a trigger (in the
terminology of Fauconnier 1985) and raises the saliency of the house itself (the tar-
get, according to Fauconnier). If the relevant group of people is not identified, there
is no descriptive interpretation. Recanati’s remarks are indirectly associated with a
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previous problem: the interpretation - the house - does not satisfy the requirements
imposed by the relational component: it neither includes nor is instantiated by the
index. However, these are separate claims: something that has not been recognised
as such in the literature.
Nunberg (1993) argues his way out of this example in the same way he dodged
previous criticism, namely, by assuming that the predicate in this case (to be in red
brick) is mapped to another predicate (say, to be living in red brick, see discussion in
chapter 1 section 1.7). Whether this process is predicate metonymy or coercion4 is
unimportant at this point, but note that Nunberg’s way out is more appealing in this
case than the previous one. The proposition that some people, including the speaker,
are living in red brick seems to capture what is intuitively conveyed by the utterance.
Moreover, as Recanati (2004) later points out, there is no principled explanation
for assuming that such forms of (pragmatic) alterations to truth-conditional content
target the subject as opposed to the predicate. Both are equally viable options (see
chapter 1 section 1.7). In conclusion, the objection by Recanati (1993) seems to
miss the mark. So, the second family of objections against Nunberg’s account does
not offer any knock down argument.
The third and final type of argument against Nunberg’s account concerns its
explanatory adequacy with regards to the desiderata mentioned in chapter 1 and
reprinted here in section 4.2. The objection is quite simple. Nunberg’s account
does not predict the fact that certain uses of descriptive pronouns cannot serve as
antecedents to other pronouns in discourse unless personal features of descriptive
antecedent and anaphoric pronoun are of the right kind. To be fair, Nunberg did not
consider this phenomenon in his original writings, but if he wants to account for this
fact, substantial extensions to the theory must be made. The implementation offered
by Elbourne (2008) seems to suffer from the same vulnerability. If pronouns are
descriptions and utterances describe minimal situations, it is unclear why further
pronominal uses cannot describe the situations (i.e. ‘extend’ the minimal situation,
in his terminology) previously described by identification-based descriptive uses in
some contexts but not can do so in others.
In conclusion, I have raised two problems for Nunberg’s account (and Elbourne’s
2008 implementation of it): first, in order to predict the readings that it allegedly
predicts, it must spell out in detail how perceptually available content can integrate
with linguistically encoded content. Second, it does not account for all the interpre-
tative properties of the data, more specifically Accessibility.
4Consider, for example, ‘John began the book,’ where the semantics of the verb ‘coerces’ a richer
reading due to the fact that it requires eventualities as complements: John began reading the book.
164
4.4 Heavy-Handed pragmatics accounts
This family of theories aims to account for the data by extra-linguistic means. In this
section, I will deal with Borg’s (2002; 2004) semantic minimalism account, Reca-
nati’s (1993) synecdoche account, and the relevance-theoretic accounts of Bezuiden-
hout (1997) and Powell (2003). Like the previous section, I will present these posi-
tions and their respective challenges in turn.
4.4.1 Semantic Minimalism
The proposal
Before addressing how Emma Borg deals with the particular details of the descrip-
tive uses of pronouns I have in mind, I must outline her general view on linguistic
understanding and the grammar/pragmatics interface.
Echoing Fodor (1975), Borg (2004) puts forward a position according to which
language understanding is a formal, systematic and algorithmic process. The po-
sition assumes a level of linguistic comprehension, the semantic level, which is
recoverable entirely from the lexical type encoded by the words used. This stage
in linguistic comprehension can be described by a syntactically driven semantic
machine: semantic representations are computed solely on the basis of the formal
features of the linguistic expressions and formally tractable aspects of context (i.e.
‘narrow’ context, in the sense of Bach 1994).
This computational view of language understanding is underpinned by the re-
quirement that a semantic theory should only account for the (pragmatics-free) out-
puts of the language faculty. The position is quite similar to the one held by rele-
vance theorists (Sperber and Wilson, 1995; Carston, 2002) in the sense that semantic
content is equated with encoded information. However, differently from relevance
theorists, Borg further assumes that the outputs of the decoding phase in compre-
hension are always fully propositional (truth-conditionally evaluable) 5.
In addition to RT, it is useful to compare this position with that of Grice (chapter
2 section 2.2). To begin with, Borg seems to be making claims about representa-
tions that are psychologically realised. This picture is very different from one aimed
at solving certain philosophical problems, like Grice’s. Moreover, the semantic ob-
jects that are the output of the linguistic faculty are more minimal than the Gricean
5Bemis and Pylkka¨nen (2011) recently published some evidence against such a strong modularist
claim: the composition of simple phrases containing just a noun (e.g. ‘boat’) and an adjective (e.g.
‘red’), which results in a semantic object below the level of truth-conditions, requires the use of brain
areas usually associated with general reasoning.
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what-is-said, for they do not need to correspond to the level of information that the
speaker intended to convey. In short, M-Intentionality does not constrain semantic
representations for Borg. Still, there are two Grice inspired principles that inform
her view: a minimalist principle according to which the minimal outputs of the
decoding phase correspond to truth-evaluable objects (akin to Truth-Evaluability
of What-is-Said) and a linguistic determination principle, which states that such
objects are free from pragmatically derived constituents (akin to Linguistic Con-
straint on What-is-Said). From this last principle, an interesting consequence fol-
lows. Given this strong modularist position, the (E)pistemic condition on singular
thinking, mentioned in chapter 1 section 1.2, does not characterise semantic (i.e.
linguistically determined) contents. That is, the idea that the audience must know
which object a word-use designates in order to grasp the singular thought expressed
by the relevant sentence does not constrain semantic content. Therefore, either there
is no singular content at the semantic level or singular semantic content is deter-
mined solely in virtue of the lexical types uttered. Borg assumes that the latter
is the case and thus postulates a strong isomorphism between referential linguistic
expressions and singular concepts introduced by them.
As stated, the position faces obvious difficulties when it comes to words whose
lexical entries engage contextually available information in order to express singu-
lar thoughts about specific aspects of the context in which they were uttered, such
as, ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘here’ and ‘now’. How then could context dependency be captured
in a purely syntactic manner? Following Kaplan (1977, 1989) and Bach’s (1994)
notion of ‘narrow’ context, Borg models contexts as containing parameters for each
aspect of reality that is necessary for the existence of an information-carrying sen-
tence use. For example, each sentence is used by someone to address someone
else somewhere at a time. Thus, if I say ‘I’m Brazilian’, it is necessary that Thiago
Galery is the speaker of that token, otherwise it would not be the token that it is (and
similarly for the other essential features of context). Along Kaplanian lines, a (nar-
row) context c contains parameters for speaker, addressee, time, place and whatever
other metaphysically necessary aspects for sentence evaluation are necessary. The
resulting picture is this, a purely semantic treatment of context-dependent linguistic
meaning amounts to a formal description of sentences relative to context: the ob-
jects described by our semantic theory. As a use of ‘I’, say, requires that someone
produced it, the essential connection between producer and token allows the word
to load the right referent into the semantic content expressed by the relevant sen-
tence (see Borg, 2004, 158-63,166-7). The contribution of the first person pronoun
roughly corresponds to a singular concept (i.e. α; a constant in LOT format) that
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designates the speaker of that token (see Kaplan, 1978; Perry, 2001), regardless of
whether or not the speaker is able to identify (in a extra-linguistic sense) the relevant
individual in the context.
This picture faces a problem when one considers what would happen if the es-
sential properties of the utterance event fail to hold. For example, if there is no
speaker, there is no utterance, so no proposition is expressed. If there is no audi-
ence, linguistic material could still be produced by the speaker, but it would not be
understood by anyone and no information would be conveyed. Now, consider a sit-
uation in which both speaker and audience are present and the speaker utters ‘that
is red’ whilst pointing to an empty space. The absence of a demonstrated object
does not bear on the existence of something (a proposition) that is conveyed to the
audience based on the token uttered by the speaker. According to Kaplan (1989),
third person demonstrative and personal pronouns cannot be traced to any formal
model of the context. In short, a demonstrated object is not a necessary metaphys-
ical feature of every communicative situation. How then could the content of such
expressions be derived solely in virtue of the token of a certain lexical type?
Borg’s treatment of third person personal and demonstrative pronouns borrows
heavily from Higginbotham’s notion of conditionalised truth-conditions (hence-
forth, CTCs), which can be summarized as follows:
If the speaker of ‘this is red’ refers with the utterance of ‘this’ therein to
x and to nothing else, then that utterance is true if and only if x is red.
(Higginbotham, 1994, 92-3)
It seems that knowledge of the truth-conditions of utterances containing demon-
stratives involves the knowledge of an antecedent condition securing that in order
for a demonstrative pronoun to have the content that it has, the speaker must have
referred to a specific object. In loose terms, because utterances containing third
person personal and demonstrative pronouns convey conditional truth-conditions
in virtue of their linguistic type, they contribute singular concepts (e.g. α) to the
semantic content expressed by the utterances they occur in. Similarly to other pro-
nouns and indexicals, the singular concepts introduced by third person pronouns
behave rigidly, that is, their content remains constant even if the utterance is eval-
uated against different possible worlds or situations. Still, their content is quite
independent from the communicative intentions of the speaker or the audience’s
ability to identify the object in question (see Borg, 2004, 165).
The position can be made clearer by the following scenario. Suppose someone,
looking at another person through the window utters ‘She is running’. The hearer
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sits far away from the window, and thus cannot integrate the linguistic information
of the pronoun with the perceptual content that the speaker has access to. Still, Borg
argues, the hearer is able to retrieve a singular content, which refers to the woman
the speaker sees, solely based on the conditional rule invoked by Higginbotham
above6. At this point let us grant Borg’s claim that a certain class of linguistic
expressions can introduce singular (i.e. rigid) concepts via their syntactic form
alone and ask: what are the consequences of this position for the interpretation of
descriptive pronouns?
According to the core data of descriptive uses, the communication of descrip-
tive truth-conditions (Descriptiveness) depends on the identification of a specific
entity in the environment as belonging to a kind (Identification Dependency) which
provides the conceptual building blocks for the communicated proposition (Con-
nection). Since extra-linguistic identification processes cannot provide constituents
for semantic content, descriptive uses of pronouns cannot contribute descriptive in-
formation at this level of information.
Borg’s picture is rather intuitive at least for some cases. Reconsider the scenario
above, where the hearer does not have a perceptual link to the woman the speaker
looks at from the window, but is still able to recover the concept that denotes the
woman based on the linguistic form of the pronoun. Similarly, it could be argued
that in the situation in (1)a, where the speaker points to a footprint whilst uttering
‘He must be a giant’, the concept introduced by the pronoun refers to the footprint-
maker, even though the hearer does not know who that is. The similarity between
the two cases can be highlighted by the separation Borg (2002) draws between the
ostensive act (the physical gesture) and the demonstration itself. In the first case,
the ostensive act and the demonstration coincide: the woman pointed at is the ob-
ject the pronoun’s referent. In the footprint case, these notions do not coincide,
that is, the speaker ostensively points to the footprint, but in fact demonstrates the
footprint-maker, which the encoded meaning of the pronoun is sensitive to (in virtue
of the coditionalised T-schema). If one concentrates on the more interesting notion
of demonstration, the descriptive readings of many pronominal uses are illusory at
Borg’s semantic level. Thus, the alleged core properties of the data are a mischarac-
terisation of what goes on in these cases (i.e. instances where the pronoun behaves
rigidly).
However, Borg acknowledges that, in some other cases, descriptive interpreta-
6Note that one could object to Higginbotham’s use of conditionalised T- schemas by demanding
an elucidation of the meaning of ‘refers to’ in the quote above. Does it mean ‘succeeds to refer to’?
If so, can success in reference be separated from any appeal to intentions? This is a natural and
powerful objection.
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tions may arise from some form of pragmatic reasoning. The example she has in
mind is this.
(7) Pointing to the American Presidential podium: Every intern wants to have
an affair with him.
Borg (2002, 500) argues that the speaker could continue her utterance by saying
‘Even if he is deceitful, like Nixon, or boring, like Carter...’, suggesting that ‘him’
above contributes the American President. Given the tenets of the proposal, the de-
scriptive interpretation would not be part of the semantic content of the utterance,
but rather fall under its implicatures. The idea is this: (7) expresses a proposition
about the actual American President, Barack Obama, without any form of epistemic
identification of the referent (the concept α introduced by the pronoun refers to him
rigidly via the Higginbotham style T-schema) and then general reasoning processes
use the semantic content in the generation of a descriptive interpretation at the level
of speaker-meant implicatures. Borg (2002, 502-3) mentions that, in this inference,
‘though we would view the speaker as having made some kind of mistake in his
choice of sentence, we can still follow what he is trying to say’. Schematically, the
core properties of the data would be explained along Gricean lines (see chapter 2
2.2), Identification Dependency would be captured by the singular proposition at the
semantic level (or at a post semantic level at which visual information would be inte-
grated with semantic content), Descriptiveness would be captured by the implicated
descriptive proposition, and the inferential relation between the two propositions
would explain how the building blocks of the descriptive proposition are generated
from a more basic level of interpretation, thus accounting for Connection.
Before assessing this position, it is also important to consider two arguments
against the idea that pronouns convey descriptive information at the level of se-
mantic content (a position Borg 2002 calls ‘Descriptivism’), which motivate the
proposal sketched here.
The first argument, which I call the ‘instability of content argument’ (i.e. ‘the
variety of descriptions argument’, in Galery 2008, 171), uses, as a premise, the
claim that various descriptions can be associated with a given pronominal use. Borg
(2002, 494) considers the following example:
(8) Someone points to a chair which a person sat on recently: ‘She is gone’.
Borg points out that there are various descriptions that the audience could associate
with what the pronominal use communicates in this context, such as: the previous
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occupant of that chair, the person sitting there five minutes ago or the female owner
of this piece of furniture, for example. Since there are multiple semantically non-
equivalent descriptions that are likely candidates of the pronoun’s truth-conditional
contribution, none of them could capture a stable level of meaning that is expressed
by a token of the sentence above. Moreover, none of these descriptions needs to
be intended by the speaker in order for the pronoun to express the content that
it does. Here, Borg (2002) might be arguing for any of three positions, the first
concerning content shareability; the second concerning semantic compositionality,
the third concerning the status of such descriptive uses vis-a-vis a semantic rule that
determines content.
On the first interpretation of the argument, if the speaker associates the G with
the pronominal use and the hearer associates the H with the same word token, the
truth-conditional content entertained by each may differ and it cannot be shared be-
tween communicators (see Borg, 2002, 494-5). There are several lines of response
available to this. First, this may not be an undesirable feature of the system at all.
Cases of miscommunication that emerge because a very basic level of information is
not shared are common and a theory must capture the conditions under which they
happen. Secondly, even though the descriptive readings are a significant departure
from what pronouns literally encode, they are not ‘free’ from pragmatic factors.
Thus, pragmatic principles may guide communicators in zooming into a common
identification-based descriptive content. Borg’s worries seem to be unwarranted in
this case.
On the second interpretation of the argument, Borg could press on and aban-
don descriptivism on the grounds of compositionality. Since a token of ‘he’ can
contribute different descriptions in different contexts, there is no possible expla-
nation of how an utterance’s truth-conditions are composed of the meaning of its
parts. As a response, one might argue that compositionality does not need to hold
at any pragmatics-free level such as Borg would like to. Rather, one might devise a
compositional explanation which encompasses the relation between encoded con-
tent and the pragmatic processes that shape extra-linguistic information into truth-
conditional contributions. In this sense, the very process of semantic composition
requires adjustments on the lexical meaning of words uttered. Such adjustments
may involve top-down pragmatic processes triggered by the bottom-up composi-
tion and/or highly salient information in the conversational setting (for recent argu-
ments in this direction, see Recanati 2009; for the idea that a compositional explana-
tion may hold at the level of encoded information, see Powell 2001; Carston 2002,
70-74). Dynamic Syntax (Kempson et al., 2001; Cann et al., 2005) is an example
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of a fully compositional grammar model that incorporates pragmatically available
contents into the computed representations. My own proposal for the descriptive
pronominal data, sketched in the next chapter, draws on this framework. Thus, this
instance of the argument also does not seem to be sound.
On the third interpretation of the argument, Borg (2002, 508-9) expresses some
worries about perceptually-based descriptive information being treated as semantic
information which begin by observing a distinction between cases of perceptually-
based singular referring pronouns and perceptually-based descriptive pronouns. For
example, in some cases, pointing to a person’s shadow or the door she just slammed
shut while uttering a pronoun may count as instances of singular reference to that
person7. In some other cases, uttering the same pronominal expressions (accom-
panied by a similar ostensive act) could result in descriptive interpretations (e.g.
the person who just slammed the door shut, assuming the audience does not know
who did the door-slamming). The argument then introduced the following premise:
if the semantic content of such uses is descriptive, there must be a clear division
between cases where a pronoun is interpreted referentially and cases where it is
interpreted descriptively (on the assumption that semantic content in order to be
shareable, must be uniquely available for communicators).
One would have to assume then that referentiality and descriptiveness in in-
terpretation emerge as a result of different linguistic rules, which in turn classify
different types of situation which the pronoun can describe. This would carry di-
rect consequences for learnability: if one has the means to produce and understand
singular and descriptive uses of pronouns, then one would have mastered a method
for distinguishing all the situations where a pronoun receives a referential interpre-
tation versus those where it receives a descriptive one. However, this does not seem
to be the case, there is a plurality of factors that may be involved in the availability
of referential or descriptive interpretations, as for example, the lack of knowledge
about the person who was just sitting on the chair pointed at by the speaker. Without
a clear cut distinction between the circumstances under which a pronoun is inter-
preted descriptively and the conditions under which it is interpreted referentially,
descriptive interpretations cannot emerge at the semantic level.
Although I quite agree with Borg’s position that the descriptive interpretations
cannot be traced back entirely to semantics, understood as encoded information,
there are problems with the conditional statement used as a premise in this third
interpretation of the argument (in italics above). First, referential and descriptive in-
7This in fact is one of the reasons why Descriptiveness is one of the essential properties of the
core data.
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terpretations of the pronoun are assumed to be explicable only in terms of different
linguistic rules. Besides positing unwarranted ambiguity, this misses the possibility
of a single underdetermined level of linguistic meaning (to be spelled out in chapter
5) giving rise to both types of interpretation. This possibility breaks the connection
between antecedent and consequent: one could be able to understand and produce
both types of pronominal use, without having a clear cut method for distinguishing
all situations appropriately described by referential pronouns from those described
by descriptive pronouns. After all, whether an identification-based pronominal use
is referential or descriptive depends on a variety of factors (see chapter 1 section
1.2). Therefore, although Borg’s conclusion, namely, that descriptivism is a seman-
tic thesis (i.e. a thesis about what words encode) seems right, the argument does
not show why pronouns cannot have descriptive interpretations at a level of content
that is minimally truth-evaluable but pragmatically rich.
In summary, all the possible takes on instability of content argument can be
resisted.
Borg’s second argument, which I call ‘the modal and scope argument’, builds on
the analysis of the pronoun’s modal and scope behaviour. The idea is that if descrip-
tivism is right, the descriptive readings conveyed by identification-based pronouns
would give rise to scope ambiguities, when interacting with other operators (nega-
tion, quantifiers, propositional attitude verbs, etc...). As an illustration, consider the
sentence below:
(9) Someone points to a parked car with a ticket on its windscreen and says:
‘He is not going to be sorry’.
On the assumption that the pronoun’s truth-conditional contribution is a definite de-
scription, and given a Russellian (Russell, 1905) treatment of descriptions as com-
plex quantifiers (‘The F is G’ is equivalent to ∃x (F (x) ∧ ∀y (F (y) → x =
y) ∧ G(x))), the sentence above would have two scope readings: (i) ‘there is a
unique person who owns the car and that person is not going to be sorry’, and (ii)
‘there is not a person who owns the car and is going to be sorry’. However, no
ambiguities arise when we interpret the negated sentence: only the first reading is
available. A similar point can be based on the modal behaviour of the pronoun. Con-
sider a non negated version of the sentence above embedded as the antecedent of a
conditional statement, producing ‘Even if parking tickets were cheap, he [pointing
to the car] would be sorry’. Borg argues that the interpretation of ‘he’ is tied to the
actual world or situation, that is, it refers to the actual owner of the demonstrated car.
We do not have a potentially different car owner for each of the worlds/situations
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against which the utterance is evaluated. In other words, the pronoun - even in ‘de-
scriptive’ uses, behaves rigidly (see the test by Kripke 1972 in chapter 1 section 1.3).
Borg (2002, 497) concludes that since scope interactions target the level of truth-
conditional content and the predicted ambiguities are not borne out, the descriptive
readings should not be captured by a semantic theory.
With regards to the modal behaviour of the pronoun, Borg seems to make an un-
warranted move. As we have seen in chapter 1 section 1.3, Kripke’s (1972) rigidity
tests crucially relies on communicators’ intuitions about the type of worlds/situations
that are considered for the purposes of evaluating an utterance containing a modal
operator. Intuitions about the truth-conditions cannot be used as evidence for as-
cribing an interpretative property - in this case, rigidity - to an expression type - in
this case, pronouns - because they target an already pragmatically rich level of con-
tent (i.e. Gricean what-is-said, RT’s explicature). The type of semantics/pragmatics
interface assumed by Borg undermines the very evidence for assuming that referen-
tial expressions (pronouns, names, etc.) introduce singular concepts. Alternatively,
Kripke’s test could be rejected as a tool for determining whether certain expressions
are rigid and pronouns could be classified as rigid designators. This move, however,
throws out the baby with the bath water. There is no evidence for the alleged ref-
erentiality of pronouns as linguistic types and, given the plethora of descriptive
interpretations, as, for example, bound, donkey and descriptive, stipulating an iso-
morphism between pronouns and singular concepts is unjustified. Note that if we
let communicators’ intuitions play a role in theory building, then we find cases, like
O’Connor’s utterance of ‘We might have been liberals’, where the pronoun selects
different people in different worlds, i.e. a non-rigid designator.
In conclusion, both of Borg’s arguments against descriptivism do not rule out
the possibility of descriptive uses of pronouns contributing to a level of content
that is pragmatic in nature but minimally truth-evaluable. I will now turn to some
problems that the theory might face.
Problems for Borg’s views on descriptive pronouns
Borg’s theory aims at the right direction. Building psychologically realistic theo-
ries about linguistic and extra-linguistic content is a virtue. Recognising the crucial
role of pragmatics in fixing the intuitive truth-conditions of utterances containing
pronouns is another. However, there are two contentious aspects of the proposal
just presented. The first concerns the status of the semantic representations as com-
pletely truth-evaluable objects that are entirely linguistic determined. The debate
around this issue has been a hot topic for the past two decades. I will refrain from
173
entering into the details of it and focus only on aspects that concern the topic of
this thesis. The second problem concerns how would a pragmatic explanation of
the desiderata (section 4.2) would go given the isomorphism between referential
linguistic expressions and singular concepts.
As detailed above, Borg has different proposals for descriptive pronouns. For
some cases, such as when the speaker points to a footprint and says ‘He must be a gi-
ant’, the alleged descriptive reading is illusory. The idea is that although the speaker
points at the footprint, the pronoun rigidly refers to the footprint-maker (the demon-
stratum) via Higginbotham’s conditionalised T-schema. For some other cases, like
the scenario where the speaker points to the American Presidential podium and says
‘Every intern wants to have an affair with him’, the pronoun contributes the Ameri-
can President to the utterance’s implicatures. Let us assess each of these strategies
in turn.
The first strategy faces a serious difficulty, namely, the conflict between the idea
that semantic content is determined entirely by linguistic means and that the idea
that the context-dependent contribution of third person pronouns and demonstra-
tives (i.e. the demonstrated referent as opposed to the object ostensively pointed
at) is determined by Higginbotham’s conditionalised T-schema. The schema gen-
erates a certain truth-conditional contribution, if a condition holds, namely, that
the speaker succeeds in referring to an object by the pronoun. Given that the rel-
evant truth-conditional contribution (e.g. the demonstratum) is indirectly available
(in the sense of chapter 3) in identification-dependent descriptive uses, it seems
that whether or not the right truth-conditional contribution is loaded into the se-
mantic content expressed by the sentence is not something that can be determined
entirely by the lexical information of the words used (relative to formal aspects of
the context). After all, as mentioned in chapter 3, there are descriptive uses that are
infelicitous. As the antecedent of Higginbotham’s schema makes clear, the success
in establishing the right truth-conditional contribution seems to be speaker success.
Alternatively, if we want to make the determination of linguistically conveyed con-
tent relative to certain conditions, these ought to be conditions on the existence of
the utterance token itself (i.e. the formal aspects of context), or conditions imposed
by the language faculty for the decoding of the linguistic material. Therefore, if this
strategy is to be pursued, one of two things must give in: either we abandon the idea
that semantic content is determined by linguistic form alone and keep the idea that
one can refer to an object by ostensively pointing at another one, or we keep the
linguistic determination principle, but sacrifice a sensible way to distinguish the os-
tensive pointing of an object from the referent actually demonstrated. Any of these
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options would threaten Borg’s strategy for dismissing the descriptive data.
The second strategy, namely, accounting for cases that do impart descriptive
readings as instances of implicatures, also faces serious difficulties. According to
chapter 2 section 2.3.3, that may be so for some cases, specially, uses of the first
person pronoun, but ultimately an implicature-based account for all instances of
descriptive uses seems to fail because the proposition that is necessary to violate
a conversational maxim (e.g. the footprint must be a gigantic person) cannot be
neither meant by the speaker nor determined solely by the meaning of the word
alone, and hence the search for a descriptive proposition that preserves such maxims
at the implicature level cannot be triggered. Alternative notions, such as making-
as-if-to-say, do not carry enough speaker commitment to violate a maxim and thus
the relevant implicatures cannot be generated. As a final possibility, Borg could try
to marry her semantic minimalism with relevance theoretic pragmatics, so that the
semantic content expressed by an utterance of ‘He must be a giant’ whilst pointing
to the footprint, expresses the salient male in this context must be a giant at the
semantic level and implicates the footprint maker must be a giant at the implicature
level. This possibility, however, fails to account for the extended properties of the
data. Consider again the co-variation and the asymmetries present in the examples
below:
(10) Andy: Well...Every time there is a war, he [pointing to the White House]
has tough choices to make.
(11) a. Said by someone: If the Democrats had won the last few presidential
elections, the American Supreme Court Justices might have been
liberals. They would guard public interest better.
b. Said by Supreme Court O’Connor: If the Democrats had won the last
few presidential elections, we might have been liberals. *They [said
by same speaker]/They [said by different speaker]/?We [said by same
speaker] would guard public interest better.
It seems that the co-variation between the description the American President and
the adverbial ‘every time there is a war’ cannot be explained by implicature-based
account. The descriptive reading falls within the scope of the adverb of quantifica-
tion (over times), which motivates an explicature based treatment for some uses of
the third person pronoun. In short, the isomorphism between referential expression
types and singular concepts they introduce precludes any explanation of the Co-
variation property, which are also present in bound and donkey uses (reviewed in
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chapter 1). Moreover, the Accessibility pattern of antecedents in (11) above cannot
be explained by variations in context other than shifts of perspective, suggesting that
a simple pragmatic explanation may be insufficient. However, the division of labour
sketched by Borg makes semantics a matter of string decoding, which precludes any
explanation of this interpretative property that is not entirely pragmatic in nature. In
sum, Borg’s account is partial at best, for it does not explain the extended proper-
ties of the descriptive data and also cannot explain pronominal binding or anaphora,
which raises serious difficulties for a unified treatment of pronominal expressions.
The foregoing observations suggest that there is no evidence for supposing that
the outputs of decoding are minimally truth-evaluable objects, nor for supposing
that the alleged referential expressions, if there are any, introduce singular con-
cepts via linguistic form alone 8. The decoupling of semantic content from the
intuitive-truth-conditions expressed by an utterance undermines two of the under-
lying tenets of the proposal, namely, the claim that semantic representations are
truth-evaluable objects, given that considerations about truth-evaluability and/or as-
sertability impinge on the level at which intuitive content emerges, and also the
claim that pronouns are rigid designators, given that the rigidity evidence for deic-
tic uses (see chapter 1 section 1.3) depends on intuitions about the modal profile of
the contents induced. In conclusion, each of the possible explanatory routes of the
semantics/pragmatics interface proposed by Borg (2002, 2004) faces shortcomings.
I shall now move to other heavy-handed pragmatic possibilities.
4.4.2 Truth-Conditional Pragmatics
Truth-Conditional Pragmatics comprises a family of theories that diverge from Grice’s
notion of what-is-said as an attempt to resolve tensions amongst the theses he held.
In chapter 2, we saw that Grice held that (i) what-is-said corresponds to the lin-
guistic meaning of the words uttered (Linguistic Constraint on What-is-Said), (ii)
constitutes the minimal truth-evaluable object expressed by an utterance (Minimal
Truth-Evaluability of What-is-Said), and (iii) captures the proposition the speaker
intends to assert by a certain utterance (M-Intentionality). While some versions
of semantic minimalism (e.g. Borg 2004, above) resolve the tension here by re-
jecting (iii) and slightly modifying the other tenets, TCP departs from this picture
8It could be suggested that a Perry (2001) style reflexive proposition or some form of existential
closure over the linguistic form of the pronoun could capture a minimally truth-evaluable level of
content (e.g. the/a male is hungry for an utterance of ’he is hungry’). Although this move is possible,
it could characterise the meaning of pronouns as descriptive, hence threatening the isomorphism
between referential expressions and singular concepts sought by Borg.
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by reviewing the idea that the same level of information is solely linguistically de-
termined and minimally truth-evaluable (claims (i) and (ii) above). It allows for
pragmatic constituents to enter at least two levels of speaker meaning: the level of
the intuitive proposition(s) expressed by an utterance (the explicature in Sperber
and Wilson 1995, or the proposition generated by primary pragmatic processes, in
Recanati 1993), and the level of the utterance’s implicatures.
In the remainder of this subsection, I will concentrate on two TCP approaches
that differ from each other with regards to the mechanisms that select pragmatic
elements as constituents of the proposition expressed by an utterance. Such mech-
anisms can be association-based (Recanati, 1993, 2004) or fully inferential as in
relevant theoretic accounts (Bezuidenhout, 1997; Powell, 1998, 2003).
Mixed association-based TCP (Recanati, 1993)
In the early 90s, Recanati (1993) attempted to solve a variety of issues in the phi-
losophy of mind, language and pragmatics in a unified and empirically oriented
framework. The main challenge was to provide a thought/language interface able to
explain (i) Fregean insights about the cognitive value of certain natural language ex-
pressions or thought constituents, (ii) Kripke’s insights about the scope and modal
behaviour of a class of expressions, and (iii) the variety of meaning adjustments
brought to light by people working in pragmatics (Grice, 1957, 1975) and speech
act theory (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969) (illustrated by the non-literal uses in chapter
2).
In order to account for (i), Recanati assumes a naturalistic version of Frege’s
notion of sense, that is, objects are not the kinds of things that are constituents
of propositions; mental representations (of a certain sort) are. As we shall see
shortly, these mental representations can be complex in nature and can be regarded
as dossiers of information (Grice, 1969) or mental files. In order to account for
(ii), he assumes that referential expressions, as linguistic types, encode a REF fea-
ture, which constrains the semantic value of the expression to be singular in na-
ture, hence distinguishing this class of linguistic types from that of quantificational
expressions (including definite descriptions). In order to account for (iii), he as-
sumes that processes other than the bottom up decoding of linguistic information
can participate in the building of the proposition expressed by an utterance as well
as the derivation of the associated implicatures. However, the former, known as
primary pragmatic processes, result from the spread of activation among certain
mental representations by an association-based mechanism, while the latter, known
as secondary pragmatic processes, involve general reasoning mechanisms that can
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infer speaker-meant implicatures from the proposition expressed as a result from
the contribution of primary processes. It is important to note that this duality of
mechanisms does not exist in Relevance Theory.
Recanati (1993) accounts for the interpretative properties of descriptive pro-
nouns by treating them as a special case of deictic uses of pronouns that undergo
some sort of non-literal interpretation. Thus, some remarks about his views on
deixis or indexicality are needed. The explanation of these cases begins by observ-
ing that deictic expressions or thoughts crucially involve a non-descriptive form of
contextual dependency or token-reflexitivity (Reichenbach, 1947). Consider the lin-
guistic case. In a situation where John utters ‘I’m hungry’, ‘I’ refers to John in virtue
of the fact that John is the utterer of that word token. In other words, the meaning
of ‘I’ cannot be equated with the non-indexical description the speaker, because the
connection between the specific speaker and the specific word spoken is lost. The
description the speaker of that token successfully captures this connection, but note
that a deictic element is re-introduced, namely, that token.
Recanati captures the non-descriptive nature of deictic or indexical context de-
pendency at two levels. At the level of thought, the speaker or agent exploits certain
epistemic relations that she has to aspects of the environment just by occupying it.
...by watching an object or by holding it in my hand, I gain (visual or
tactile) information about that object; by standing in a certain place, I
gain information about what is going on at that place; by being a certain
person, with a certain body, I gain information about that person and that
body (Recanati, 1993, 122)
.
Thus, what makes the thought I’m hungry be about John is the fact that John is
the person entertaining it (similar remarks hold about the time and place the thought
is about for example). This is subsumed by a thought mechanism - a psychological
mode of presentation in the terminology of Recanati (1993), following Bach (1987)
- capable of exploiting the special epistemic relation that one has to oneself, that is,
information about oneself is gained from the ‘inside’ as it were (an egocentric rela-
tion). Another kind of epistemic relation is that between a thinker and a perceived
object which possibly engages mechanisms described in chapter 3 (a demonstrative
relation). These various types of epistemic relations have something in common: an
instantiation of a particular type of relation in a context determines a body of infor-
mation about the object the subject is related to9. The referent of John’s I’m hungry
9Recanati mentions that the perceptual (demonstrative) relation may start at the non-conceptual
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thought would be a mental file on John himself (in virtue of the ‘inner’ relation that
John has to himself; files can also be less occasional in nature, like the encyclopedic
entry on dogs that was established in virtue of many perceptual episodes regarding
dogs). The specific token of the file (or information bundle) is individuated by the
object it is about, but it is also associated with a body of information pertaining to
the object, such as: John has not eaten for 8 hours, John likes fish, John was born
on the 8th of July, etc.
At the level of language, Recanati holds that context-dependent expressions,
such as pronouns, encode instructions that exploit these epistemic relations. This is
done by two pieces of encoded information: one that tells which contextual param-
eter the expression depends on, in the case of ‘I’ this corresponds to ‘the speaker’
(i.e. the linguist mode of presentation; something like Kaplanian character or Nun-
berg’s deictic component); another that tells the hearer to find out a mental represen-
tation about a specific entity. Recanati calls this last piece of encoded information
the ‘REF’ (referential) feature. Suppose Jane is addressed by John’s utterance of
‘I’m hungry’. She is related to a variety of objects in the environment: herself (in-
evitably), John, the table he works on, and a book on that table, say. Allegedly, the
epistemic relations between Jane and these objects would make mental files about
them available in her mind. Furthermore, when John starts speaking, the piece of
information ... is speaking gets added to Jane’s file on him. The fact that this piece
of information matches the information encoded by ‘I’ spreads activation from the
decoded word to the mental file on John. Furthermore, the REF feature makes the
file itself (its label or address in the terminology of Sperber and Wilson 1995), not
information associated with it, the likely candidate for the semantic value of the
word. This is an instance of the primary pragmatic process of saturation.
It is worth mentioning the similarities between the theoretical assumptions of
Borg (2004) and Recanati (1993). Like Borg, Recanati aims to capture Kripke’s
(1972) intuitions about the modal and scope behaviour of expressions at the level
of expression types, but while she assumes a strong lexical-type concept type iso-
morphism (as discussed in the previous subsection), he assumes a lexical feature
that interacts with the spread of activation amongst semantic representations. This
marks an important difference between the two positions. While the former is a
syntactic based notion of singular thought, the latter bases the notion of singular
thinking on extra-linguistic relations between communicators and environment that
level, possibly along the lines of Pylyshyn (2007), but surfaces at a level where certain combinatoric
properties characteristic of conceptual representations (Evans, 1982) hold. See chapter 3. This
model can also be extended to other types of epistemic relations.
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can be exploited by special linguistic devices (the ones encoding REF). Recanati,
echoing Bach (1987), assumes that the reference of deictic expressions in language
and thought are determined relationally, as opposed to the satisfactional manner in
which descriptions and other quantifiers make their truth-conditional contribution.
After this brief introduction to Recanati’s basic framework, we can proceed to
an assessment of his account of the interpretative properties of descriptive pronouns.
Let us reconsider the famous footprint example in (1)a, reprinted here as:
(12) Someone pointing at a huge footprint in the sand says: ‘He must be a giant’
(from Schiffer 1981, 49).
The proposal aims to explain descriptive pronouns by an additional primary prag-
matic process. In the situation above, the perceptual experience of seeing the foot-
print creates a file on it that enables information about the object to be stored. The
file is individuated entirely by the relation between the person who sees the object
and the object itself. No conceptual representation or categorisation is involved
(this relation can be regarded along the lines of bare object representation in chap-
ter 3 section 3.3). Further cognitive processes add the information ... is a footprint
into the file. At this point Identification Dependency is met. Now, the REF fea-
ture spreads activation to the file as a whole and selects it as the likely candidate
for interpretation, but that cannot be the semantic value of the pronoun, because
it would make the overall interpretation of the utterance nonsensical: a footprint
cannot be a gigantic person. In addition to the whole file, other kinds of mental
representation compete for being the semantic value of the pronoun, including ...
someone made this print, which is written under the file on the footprint. At this
point, the mechanisms of activation-spread select this bit of descriptive information
for integration, the REF feature is suppressed, and the pragmatic process of synec-
dochic (part-whole) transfer kicks in. In summary, a description written in the file
replaces the file itself for semantic purposes and the truth-conditions of the utter-
ance above unpack as the person whose foot made the print must be a giant. At
this point Descriptiveness is met. Finally, Connection is captured in terms of the
association-based mechanisms that spreads activation from the file to information
contained within it.
What about the other interpretative properties of the data? Since Recanati’s ac-
count predicts that full-fledged descriptions can be the semantic values of pronouns
despite the fact that they encode REF, Co-variation could be explained, because
utterances containing pronouns can be truth-conditionally equivalent to utterances
containing the corresponding definite descriptions, and the latter can covary with
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other expressions in discourse. Although we would ultimately want a description of
how co-varying interpretations are established, let us take for granted that they can
be predicted by the proposal. The problem is that, under this assumption, the very
same mechanism that captures Co-variation makes the contrast between (a) and (b),
below, impossible to account for:
(13) a. Said by someone: If the Democrats had won the last few presidential
elections, the American Supreme Court Justices might have been
liberals. They would guard public interest better.
b. Said by Supreme Court Justice O’Connor: If the Democrats had won
the last few presidential elections, we might have been liberals. *They
[said by same speaker]/They [said by different speaker]/?We [said by
same speaker] would guard public interest better.
It seems that the proposal does not account for Accessibility, that is, for why the
descriptive interpretation of ‘we’ in (b) which proceeds through a singular mental
file on O’Connor to the descriptive information ‘... is a member of the American
Supreme Court’ and selects this piece of information as the semantic value of the
pronoun on the basis of the suppression of its REF feature cannot be the antecedent
of a subsequent use of a third person pronoun.
Problems for mixed association-based TCP (Recanati 1993)
In this section, I shall point out four issues that arise for Recanati’s proposal.
First, the account is incomplete. As my last comments in the previous section
indicate, Recanati’s proposal cannot explain, at least prima facie, the Accessibility
property of descriptive pronouns, and hence cannot account for all the desiderata.
Second, the account does not easily extends to other pronominal uses. As re-
viewed in chapter 1, pronouns induce other forms of descriptive readings, more
specifically bound and donkey interpretations. For example, how, in utterances like
‘Every farmer thinks he is a genius’ and ‘Every farmer who owns a donkey beats
it’, could the relevant dependencies (in boldface) be established give the presence
of REF? It seems that they cannot. To be fair, Recanati (1993) warns the reader that
his book focuses on singular reference; hence excluding bound and plural cases, but
the conclusion seems to be that a unified explanation of the variety of pronominal
uses seems precluded or at least left wanting.
At this point one could try to cash the co-varying readings above in terms of
mental files and/or by the optional suppression of the REF feature, but I would
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rather not. The reason is simple: REF is neither sufficient nor necessary to explain
the data raised by deictic and descriptive uses of pronouns (see Galery, 2008, 180-
3). This point can be developed along the following lines.
First, the mere existence of identification-based descriptive interpretations of
pronouns suggests that REF is not sufficient to secure a singular interpretation of
the pronoun. Such sufficiency was met in Borg (2004) by the stipulated isomor-
phism between referential expression types and singular concepts. Since Recanati
allows pragmatic processes to modulate encoded information, referentially marked
expression types can receive descriptive interpretations depending on the context
they are uttered in.
Second, that REF is not necessary for establishing singular interpretations can
be easily illustrated by Recanati’s explanation of referential uses of definite descrip-
tions. Let us suppose now that John and I are watching the trial of Smith’s murderer.
Both of us perceive the defendant from where we sit, and hence each of us has a per-
ceptually based mental file on him. As the judge sentences the defendant as guilty,
the description ‘Smith’s murderer’ is added to our dossiers on the man, which al-
ready contained plenty of other descriptions, such as .... is nervous, ...hired a bad
lawyer, etc. After the Court section, John says ‘Smith’s murderer is insane’ to me.
Recanati (1993, ch. 15) explains the fact that I could identify the specific man in
the courtroom by the synecdochic relation between the description in the utterance
and information that was just added to the mental file on the man (i.e. ... murdered
Smith). The direction of activation flow is the converse from that of descriptive
pronouns. In these pronominal uses, activation spreads from the singular file itself
to a description in it. In the case of definite descriptions, activation flows from de-
scriptive information in the file, which matches the descriptive information encoded
by the words, to the file itself. Thus, the description ‘Smith’s murderer’ does not
figure in the proposition expressed by this referential use of the description and a
singular thought about the demonstratively identified individual is communicated.
This process does not involve appeal to REF features: the singular interpretation
is determined via the matching of descriptive information and flow of activation to
the file as a whole. So why suppose REF is encoded by pronouns in the first place,
specially given that it makes a unified explanation of the variety of pronominal uses
more difficult10?
10Much of Recanati’s (1993) project aims to connect the linguistic meaning of pronouns to the
context of utterance in a special and direct way. If the observations here and in Galery (2008, 181-2)
are along the right lines, the same (mental) mechanism of synecdoche is available for definite de-
scriptions and the linguistic meaning of pronouns would not connect to the context in a special way
any more. In order to circumvent this consequence, Recanati (1993, 288-292) further characterises
the linguistic meaning of pronouns: (i) as contributing to conditions on the context of utterance (as
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Third, the mixed association-based account cannot explain cases where pronom-
inal reference crucially depends on the intentions of the speaker. Carston (2007)
raised the following difficulty for the solely association-driven nature of Recanati’s
primary pragmatic processes. She urges us to consider a scenario where she talks
to one of her students, Sarah, who utters the sentence below:
(14) Neil has broken his leg.
In this hypothetical scenario, Carston knows only two people named ‘Neil’: her
young son and her colleague at the UCL linguistics department. Furthermore, sup-
pose she is deeply worried about her son (represented by a NEIL1 concept) but not
about her colleague (represented by a NEIL2 concept). Given that the process of
delivering the proposition expressed by an utterance does not involve considerations
about speaker intentions, the account predicts that the resulting interpretation would
be something like NEIL1 HAS BROKEN HIS LEG, which is overall coherent and car-
ries many psychological consequences (i.e. cognitive effects) for the addressee.
Carston (2007, 28) concludes:
Nevertheless, this is not the interpretation I give to the utterance - for the
simple reason that I know that the speaker (one of my students) does not
know anything about my family life, while she does know that I have a
colleague, Neil, who teaches her syntax. So, even if initially my highly
activated NEIL1 concept is the first one accessed, it is soon replaced by
NEIL2. This interpretation is also coherent and sufficiently relevant.
Now, Recanati (1993, 1995, 2004) assumes that top-down shifts of activation,
i.e. from the NEIL1 to the NEIL2 concept, are indeed possible, but they can only
be explained in terms of cognitive schemas or scripts. These roughly correspond to
abstract scenario types that are evoked by salient features of the situation in which
the sentence was uttered. According to Carston (2007, 28), Recanati might assume
opposed to contributing to truth-conditions proper and (ii) as devices that exploit contextual infor-
mation in such a way that it gives rise to thoughts that are immune to error through misidentification.
In Galery (2008), I suggested that given these two properties, REF is completely dispensable be-
cause they are enough to mark referentiality at the lexical level: the level at which Recanati assumes
Kripke’s intuitions about the modal and scope behaviour of pronouns should be met. However, I do
not think any of these properties hold. Regarding (i), consider a scenario where someone sees ‘I am
the greatest’ written on the wall. There is no speaker present, but the hearer can retrieve a Perry-type
reflexive proposition of the form ‘the speaker of that token is the greatest’. Regarding (ii), we could
imagine someone walking in front of a group of people which includes a person who utters ‘I am
the greatest’. The hearer knowns that someone uttered it, but could be mistaken about who did: he
may assume Peter did it where in fact John did. It might be the case that the necessity of capturing a
notion of referentiality at the type level is a theory-internal demand.
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that a university schema provides top-down activation to the representations about
particular lecturers, hence explaining the shift to the NEIL2 concept. However,
Carston (2007, 28) still presses on:
...even supposing this account goes through for the example as described
so far, we can change the speech situation so that it does not make salient
university departments, lecturers or subjects like syntax. Suppose I run
into Sarah at the local supermarket, and after some chat about the merits
of organic vegetables, she says to me, ‘I hear that Neil’s broken his leg’.
Given the high activation of my NEIL1 concept and the absence of any
frame to effect an accessibility shift, the prediction of the automatic, non-
reflective associative account seems to be that (contrary to intuitions) I
will take her to have said that NEIL1 has broken his leg.
Her point is quite simple. One can evoke as many cognitive schemas and scripts
as one likes, but for an account in terms of activation-spread, this move faces the
following shortcomings: (i) it seems to capture the data (in this case our offline in-
tuitions) in a rather ad hoc way, and (ii) in some cases the cognitive schema does
not seem to deliver the necessary kind of top-down influence that the audience’s
expectations about the speaker’s intention exercise on the selection of mental repre-
sentations.
Now the point I would like to make is this. Given that the activation-based ex-
planation faces problems for the simple linguistically mandated primary pragmatic
process of saturation and that the optional pragmatic process of synecdochic trans-
fer depends on the interpretative level determined by saturation, the explanation of
descriptive pronouns inherits the difficulties raised by Carston. Moreover, in some
of the descriptive cases at hand, say, the footprint case, the use of the pronoun seems
to rely on information that is occasionally available. It is hard to see what a footprint
schema, necessary for the relevant accessibility shift, looks like.
The fourth and final problem rests on the cognitive architecture required by the
complex relations between mental file and information associated with it. We saw
that the descriptive uses of pronouns (as well as referential uses of descriptions) are
explained by a process of synecdochic transfer involving information written in the
file ‘standing in’ for the file itself in some cases, and vice-versa for some others.
But then how are the old metonymy cases (see chapter 1 section 1.7 and chapter 2),
like the one below, explained?
(15) a. In a restaurant, the waiter says to the chef: ‘The ham sandwich is
getting restless’ (Nunberg, 1978, 1979).
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b. Proposition expressed by (a): The ham sandwich orderer is getting
restless.
For Recanati (1993, 263), the delivery of the truth-conditions, in (15)b, of the ut-
terance in (15)a involves the primary pragmatic process of metonymic transfer. I
take it to be an optional pragmatic process that takes a mental representation about
sandwiches as input and delivers a representation about their orderers as output, but
how should it be understood given Recanati’s mental file approach?
On the one hand, we could understand metonymic transfer along the lines of
synecdochic transfer. Understanding (15)a calls up a HAM SANDWICH file or ency-
clopedic entry which has information associated with (written in) it. One piece of
such kind information is .... has been ordered by someone. Thus, like the synec-
doche case, activations flows from the file as a whole to a specific piece of informa-
tion written in it.
If the proposal runs along these lines, it is unclear why the specific notion
of metonymic (as opposed to synecdochic) was reserved to describe this process.
Moreover, one of the motivations for the mental file approach seems to be chal-
lenged. One of the roles that could be attributed to files is to organise information
in the mind. Suppose one raises the following question. If top-down processes are
indeed involved in linguistic understanding, what would block my knowledge that
dinosaurs cannot play chess from playing a role in the interpretation of (15)a (see
the frame problem in Fodor 1983)? Two aspects of Recanati’s proposal may pro-
vide an answer. It seems that the association-based mechanism would not make this
proposition accessible enough for understanding the utterance. I take this point to be
well grounded. Alternatively, one could claim that the proposition about dinosaurs
does not play a role in the interpretation of the utterance about ham sandwiches
because it does not figure in a ham-sandwich file. But if the synecdoche model
can be extended from descriptive pronouns and referential descriptions to cases of
metonymy, metaphor and possibly every other non-literal interpretation, we run the
risk of ending up with one gigantic file, because in the right context any piece of
information can be related to a single mental file, say, ham sandwich.
There are two conclusions that might be drawn from this. First, if the argu-
ment is sound, then the theoretical notion of mental file is not playing any role
and we are no better off by adopting it rather than just having a pre-theoretical (or
metaphorical) understanding that information about sandwiches (and people who
order them) is somehow organised around my HAM SANDWICH concept (as far as
I know, this point was first raised by Woodfield 1991 and has not been discussed
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properly by mental file theorists). Second, if mental files are indeed psychologically
real and do theoretically interesting work, we would need to describe mechanisms
by which information in files is organised (e.g. stored, hierarchically related to other
information, and retrieved), otherwise understanding an utterance would invoke an
impressively large information database, whose access would have to be reduced in
order for it to play an interesting role in utterance comprehension. This role could
be played by the activation-spread mechanism adopted by Recanati (or the cognitive
principle of relevance, under RT), but appealing to it would make the information-
constraining job allegedly done by files redundant: one would only need a mech-
anism of activation spread or something like the principle of relevance11. In con-
clusion, appealing to files, without specifying the principles by which they are indi-
viduated, is helpless; however, specifying such principles renders the appeal to files
theoretically inert.
On the other hand, metonymic transfer might be understood as an operation
between files. For example, when I understand (15)a, my file on ham sandwiches
serves as input to a process that delivers another file, namely, one about restaurant
customers. This sheds light on Recanati’s use of a specific name (e.g. ‘metonymic’
as opposed to ‘synecdochic’) for this type of transfer process. However, one could
raise the question of how many files does the individual mind have? Does my
knowledge that cats chase mice enter my cat file or my mice file? In short, what mo-
tivates the use of two distinct files to explain the understanding of metonymies, on
the assumption that information that could potentially be stored in one file (say, on
ham sandwiches) could also be stored in another file (say, on restaurant customers).
This strategy may run the risk of assuming that information that constitutes the file
(like clay that constitutes a vase) acts as an individuator of the file (like saying that
a vase which was repaired by the addition of new clay is numerically different from
the vase that it was before the repair). Thus, my file on ham sandwiches (containing
...is a nice food in it) is different from my file on ham sandwich orderers (contain-
ing ...spend money needlessly) because the information written under the files is
different.
This assumption has severe consequences for the metaphysics of mental repre-
sentations and runs counter to the idea that files are individuated by their referential
relations to the entities they are about. If this conclusion is to be avoided, then
it seems that the mental file theorist who explains cases of (metonymic or synec-
11One could say that files themselves are the result of activation patterns among different kinds
of information that have been crystallised. Although this sheds light on how information can be
organised as files, it concedes to the point I am trying to make: the activation spread mechanism is
doing the heavy work, not files themselves.
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dochic) transfer in terms of two distinct files must explain the principles (other than
the constitution of information) by which data is organised. Without these princi-
ples, the theoretical (as opposed to the metaphorical) notion of a mental file does
not give us better understanding of what goes on in understanding non-literal utter-
ances and other phenomena. Again, this point has been made by Woodfield (1991)
but unfortunately it has not been given proper attention in the debate about mental
representations as files.
In conclusion, Recanati’s account explains part of the data. In some cases, it is
dubious how the mechanism of spreading of activation delivers the interpretations
that seem to be intuitively available. Finally, it seems to postulate mental entities
and processes that face some problems.
Variations on Recanati’s TCP
In this section, I want to highlight a point that might have already occurred to some
readers, but which I think is worth making more explicit. Recanati’s account as-
sumes the following: (i) type-referentiality, via the postulation of REF, (ii) a mixed
associationist/inferential view on pragmatic processes and (iii) an approach to men-
tal representations based on mental files. Now, it is important to notice that these
are not part of a package deal. The rejection of any of these assumptions does not
entail the rejection of any of the others. For example, Powell (1998), replaces Reca-
nati’s mixed picture in (ii) for a fully inferential mechanism based on the principles
of relevance, while preserving some form of type referentiality, as in (i), through
the idea that pronouns encode procedures (Wilson and Sperber, 1993) which trigger
the search for a specific mental representation. Although variations on Recanati’s
proposal may bring insights on how the data can be explained from different (per-
haps better) conceptual standpoints, they would eventually face the same difficulty:
Accessibility cannot be properly explained. Thus, for reasons of space, I cannot do
full justice to an assessment of positions that result from denying each of the as-
sumptions in (i) to (iii). In what follows, I will examine a more radical alternative
to Recanati’s TCP.
The underdetermination view - Bezuidenhout (1997); Powell (2003)
The underdetermination view begins with the rejection of the idea that referentiality
should be marked at the level of linguistic types. For Bezuidenhout (1997) and
Powell (2003) referentiality is only a property of linguistic tokens, that is, only the
thoughts these expressions induce can be singular or general. This move raises
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two questions. First, if referentiality is not marked at the level of linguistic types,
what does the linguistic meaning of pronouns look like? Is the meaning of ‘he’,
for example, a description along the lines of ‘the male’? Second, what are the
mechanisms in virtue of which the same lexical meaning can be developed into
either a singular or general mental state?
The first question warns of a potential danger that many working within the tra-
dition initiated by Reichenbach (1947), including Recanati, were so keen to avoid:
if the meaning of pronouns is captured entirely descriptively, the connection be-
tween the word token (e.g. ‘I’) and the specific aspect of the context it depends on
(e.g. the speaker) might be severed. For this reason, token-reflexivists, like Perry
(2001), make the linguistic meaning of the word reflect its token. Thus, ‘I’ means
‘the speaker of u’, where ‘u’ is a specific word token 12. As an alternative to the
idea that pronouns necessarily have an indexical element in their encoded meaning,
Anne Bezuidenhout (1997) proposed that certain linguistic types encode underde-
terminate information with respect to the type of proposition (singular vs general)
they determine. Powell (2003) develops this insight in more detail and tries to ap-
ply it to a variety of phenomena, including referential descriptions and descriptive
pronouns. For this reason, I shall concentrate more on Powell’s account.
The gist of the proposal rests on the claim that pronouns ‘are not semantically
constrained, i.e. constrained by their linguistic meaning, either to express de re [sin-
gular] concepts or to express descriptive concepts: they can do either’ (Powell 2003,
31, square brackets mine). In his terminology, expressions that can be used to pick
out a unique individual, such as ‘John’, ‘he’, or ‘the man’, introduce what he calls
‘individual concepts’ in the mind of the audience. It must be noted that individ-
ual concepts should not here be understood as functions from worlds or situations
to individuals, as commonly held in formal semantic frameworks (see Elbourne,
2005). For Powell, such conceptual representations can be used to express singular
or general truth-conditions. The pronoun, ‘provide[s] only pragmatic guidance to
the interpretation’ (Powell, 2003, 133).
It is unclear what exactly Powell’s characterisation of the meaning of pronouns
amounts to, but I take it to be a variable-like bundle of information that includes
grammatical features, such as gender, case, number, animacy and, at least in the
case of singular pronouns, the presupposition that the entity referred to is unique.
This requirement is neutral about the way in which it is satisfied. If the individual
concept describes the satisfier of a cluster of properties, the thought is general or
12A similar move has been made by Elbourne (2001, 2005, 2008). He postulates that pronouns
have a structure containing indices, which can be assigned to specific individuals.
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descriptive. Else, the individual concept denotes a specific individual on the basis
of certain epistemic relations between the communicator and referent, that is, a
singular thought is communicated. Furthermore, not all the encoded information
needs to be satisfied in the process of interpretation, if its suppression leads to an
overall more relevant interpretation. For example, Powell (2003, 133) mentions an
example where someone refers to a building by the pronoun ‘she’. In this case, some
of the pronoun’s features were ‘deleted’, so the hearer could grasp the proposition
expressed.
With regards to the second question, namely, which mechanisms allow individ-
ual concepts to be developed into either singular or general thoughts, both Bezuiden-
hout (1997) and Powell (2003) adopt a full-fledged inferential view based on the
relevance theoretic framework laid out in chapter 2. In a nutshell, RT assumes that
cognition is geared towards the maximisation of relevance (Cognitive Principle of
Relevance) and that ostensive stimuli (intentionally overt uses of words or gestures)
are particularly important because they create the expectation that they are relevant
enough (i.e. optimally relevant) for it to be worthwhile for the audience to process
them (Communicative Principle of Relevance). Thus, by processing such stimuli,
the audience forms certain hypotheses about what the speaker meant by her utter-
ance or gesture. The most relevant hypothesis that counts as a development of the
logical form of the utterance is attributed as speaker explicature(s), which is also
used in the (mutual) shaping of the utterance’s implicatures. Note that the audi-
ence’s particular expectation of relevance may be shaped by specific information
in the context (something richer than the presumption that the stimuli is worth the
audience’s processing effort). For example, a question usually enriches the expec-
tations of relevance in the context: its reply must not only be worth being processed
by the hearer, but also provide the means to an answer. Let us put these notions to
work (borrowing from the relevance theoretic schemas used in chapter 2 section 2.3
and using ‘?’ to mark the individual concept introduced by the pronoun). Consider
the adaptation of our first example in (1), given below and my attempt to reconstruct
a derivation based on Powell’s ideas, as he unfortunately does not explicitly provide
us with one:
(16) Someone pointing at a huge footprint in the sand says: ‘He is gigantic!’
(adapted from Schiffer 1981, 49)
a. ? IS GIGANTIC [partial decoding of the utterance’s linguistic meaning
(via the communicative principle of relevance and the presumption of
relevance it conveys)].
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b. THERE IS A BIG FOOTPRINT ON THE GROUND; SOMEONE MADE
THAT PRINT; [assumptions made salient by the ostensive gesture to-
wards the footprint (via the communicative principle of relevance and
the presumption of relevance it conveys)] .
c. BEING GIGANTIC EXPLAINS WHY ONE WOULD LEAVE A BIG PRINT
[implication (cognitive effect) derived from the encoded meaning of
the words and the perceptual experience (supplementation of the ex-
pectation of optimal relevance by specific presumptions warranted in
the context, given that no-one in the context is an immediate referent
of the pronoun)].
d. THE PERSON WHOSE FOOT MADE THE PRINT IS GIGANTIC [unpack-
ing of the individual concept into an explicature derived from (b) and
(c)].
Now, Powell’s theory is extremely flexible. In cases where the scope test suggests
that the relevant descriptive interpretation should be captured at the level of the
utterance’s implicatures, one could add a couple of extra steps in the schema in (a) to
(d) above, and the desired implicatures would come out. Moreover, this framework
is flexible in the sense that its basic tenets apply generally to all pronominal forms
(e.g. plurals; 2nd person, etc.). But how does it fare with the desiderata that needs
to be explained?
The basic three core interpretative properties fall out straightforwardly. Identi-
fication Dependency is met by (16)b, if the object were not identified as a footprint,
those mental representations would not be available. Descriptiveness is met by the
descriptive explicature in (16)e. The relevance-driven inferential relation between
the available assumptions and the explicature meets Connection. Moreover, since
the individual concepts can be developed into either descriptive or singular content
and given that the contend induced by descriptions can co-vary with other expres-
sions in discourse, the framework might have the resources to explain Co-variation,
exemplified below.
(17) Andy: Well...Every time there is a war, he [pointing to the White House]
has tough choices to make.
That is, the pronoun ‘he’ would unpack as the description the American Pres-
ident, which can depend on other quantifiers in discourse, possibly ensuing a co-
varying reading for the utterance. Like Recanati’s proposal, Powell’s does not lay
out the mechanism by which these readings are derived (necessary for a full expla-
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nation of Co-variation). Still, I take it that this property of the data can be success-
fully accounted for by the proposal. However, the similarities with Recanati’s do
not stop short from the problems raised previously. The underdetermination view
seems to overgenerate in cases where descriptive pronouns serve as antecedents of
other anaphoric pronouns. The contrast between the utterances below is, once again,
impossible to explain.
(18) a. Said by someone: If the Democrats had won the last few presidential
elections, the American Supreme Court Justices might have been
liberals. They would guard public interest better.
b. Said by Supreme Court Justice O’Connor: If the Democrats had won
the last few presidential elections, we might have been liberals. *They
[said by same speaker]/They [said by different speaker]/?We [said by
same speaker] would guard public interest better.
The underdetermination view can offer a solely pragmatic explanation for the Ac-
cessibility property, but this would not do justice to the role played by grammatical
person in the asymmetry above. In short, the proposal characterises linguistic mean-
ing as underdeterminate, but it does not say what linguistic meaning is. Describing
it seems crucial for a proper account of the data.
Problems for the underdetermination view
In this subsection, I present three problems for the relevance theoretic underdeter-
mination view.
First, like all the approaches discussed in this chapter, the proposal fails to ac-
count for all the properties raised by the pronominal uses discussed in the thesis.
Secondly, the fact that the underdetermination view rejects any account of refer-
entiality at the level of lexical types may be allegedly counter-intuitive (many would
claim this would be the case). One could say that pronouns are used indexically
most of the times, whereas descriptions are used to convey general propositions
most of the time. Arguably, these intuitions should be captured. Powell (2003, 168-
9) responds to this worry by claiming that ‘we are cognitively designed primarily to
track physical objects rather then properties’. I believe that given that pronouns do
not encode concepts that enter truth-conditional content and rather make dependent
contributions, they would be less costly to process than full-blown descriptions.
Plus, pronouns are usually shorter. This explains the preference for pronouns over
descriptions to convey deictic readings rather nicely, as descriptions would involve
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unnecessary processing effort. Moreover, one could just reject the intuitions that
pronouns are deictic by linguistic nature. Bound and donkey cases are genuine de-
scriptive pronominal uses. In other words, once we factor these pronominal uses in,
the intuition that these expressions favour singular interpretations loses its grounds.
It seems that the second objection against Powell does not offer any knock down
argument against the underdetermination view.
The third and final complaint rests on the nature of individual concepts and
for this reason applies only to Powell’s approach (not Bezuidenhout’s). One could
argue that saying that a mental representation is underdeterminate is misleading:
words can encode underdeterminate information which can integrate with different
types of mental representation, resulting in singular or general mental representa-
tions, but to say that such mental representations themselves are underdeterminate
seems obscure. How can concepts be underdeterminate? I do not know how Powell
might respond to this, but I also do not know whether the objection has any punch;
for individual concepts themselves might be intermediaries to well delineated con-
ceptual representations, rendering the objection terminological. Thus, I do not think
that it challenges Powell’s proposal significantly, unlike the first objection.
4.5 Conclusion
I have presented a variety of accounts of descriptive pronouns and discussed a vari-
ety of arguments against them. Since for each position there is at least one argument
that seems to be sound, we have the motivation to look for an alternative explana-
tion of the data. Moreover, many of them suffer from incompleteness in the sense
that they do not account for the extended properties of descriptive pronouns (Co-
variation and Accessibility). In the next chapter, I will outline a proposal that does
not suffer from this shortcoming.
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Chapter 5
Descriptive pronouns: a reanalysis
5.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to come up with an account of the core and the ex-
tended properties of identification-based descriptive pronouns (reviewed in chapter
1). Consider again the following examples:
(1) a. Said by someone: If the Democrats had won the last few presidential
elections, the US Supreme Court justices might have been liberals.
They would guard public interest better.
b. Said by Supreme Court Justice O’Connor: If the Democrats had won
the last few presidential elections, we might have been liberals. *They
[said by same speaker]/They [said by different speaker]/??We [said by
same speaker] would guard public interest better.
In summary, in (1)b, ‘we’ contributes the US Supreme Court Justices to the truth-
conditions of the utterance (Descriptiveness). In order for these truth-conditions to
be communicated, the audience must identify the speaker (O’Connor) as belong-
ing to the kind Justice (Identification Dependency). This shows that some form of
categorisation by the audience provides the building blocks of the relevant com-
municated propositions (Connection). Moreover, the descriptive interpretation can
co-vary with other constituents provided by other expressions in discourse. In (1)b,
the Justices co-vary with possible worlds/situation introduced by the modal ‘might’
(Co-variation). Finally, certain descriptive interpretations can be antecedents for
other dependent uses of pronouns, while others cannot (Accessibility). This is illus-
trated by the contrast between (1)a and (1)b.
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In chapter 4, many proposals in the literature were reviewed. Although they
were quite varied in terms of how they explained the data, they shared two draw-
backs. First, the mechanism by which descriptive interpretations co-vary with other
expressions in discourse was not properly explained (with the exception of Elbourne
2008). Second, and more importantly, the contrast between (1)a and (1)b (e.g. Ac-
cessibility) was not predicted. On the one hand, the more semantic-based accounts
of the phenomenon (section 4.3) did not use a model of grammar that could re-
cruit pragmatically available constituents that could be seen as ‘antecedents’ for
pronominal interpretation. On the other hand, the more pragmatically oriented ac-
counts (section 4.4) assumed that the phenomenon is entirely pragmatic and free
from any grammatical constraints, failing to predict the asymmetry as well.
The proposal in this chapter overcomes this explanatory deficit. In order to do
so, we need to outline a grammar that has the following properties: (i) it is not
restricted to describing only relations within strings and effectively relates the rep-
resentation of the proposition expressed to contextual information, (ii) it describes
the encoded meaning of pronouns in such a way that they can receive singular or
descriptive interpretations, (iii) it introduces a way to keep track of multiple per-
spectives in a dialogue, so that certain anaphoric impossibilities are explained, and
(iv) it is a unified mechanism that explains not only the descriptive uses of pronouns,
but also all their other types of interpretations (reviewed in chapter 1) straightfor-
wardly.
These theoretical needs are met by coupling the relevance theoretic pragmatic
framework (described in chapter 2) and the incremental view of object representa-
tion (described in chapter 3) to a grammar framework known as Dynamic Syntax
(DS, for short, see Kempson et al. 2001; Cann et al. 2005, inter alia), which will be
introduced in the next section. In section 5.3, I use the recently introduced grammar
together with the other elements of the account to explain the data. Identification-
based descriptive interpretations are handled in a heterogeneous way: some of them
contribute to the utterance’s implicatures, while others contribute to the utterance’s
explicatures. Determining to which level the use contributes to depends on contex-
tual factors and also on the choice of the pronominal form (more specifically, the
grammatical person and number encoded). In a nutshell, the proposal made here is a
form of the substitution-based account, sketched towards the end of chapter 2. The
rough idea is this. Pronouns contribute to variable-like constituents that can be re-
placed by indirectly available conceptual representations (along the lines described
in chapter 3), in some cases, or by singular (object-dependent) representations that
determine propositions that can contextually implicate or entail the relevant descrip-
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tive interpretations, in some other cases. This makes the proposal quite similar to
Powell’s relevance-theoretic proposal in chapter 4 but describes, in DS-terms, what
the meaning of pronouns is ina way such that Co-variation and Accessibility are
properly explained. In section 5.4, I state concluding remarks.
5.2 Dynamic Syntax: a crash course
Dynamic Syntax (DS) (Kempson et al., 2001; Cann et al., 2005) is a grammar frame-
work that aims to answer two challenges. On the one hand it seeks ‘to state the in-
teraction between order of words within the sentence’ (see Cann et al., 2005, 2) and
the structural constraints that it imposes. On the other, it is designed to incorporate
contextual contributions to the interpretation, so various semantic and pragmatic
phenomena are properly accounted for.
It is interesting to note the differences between DS and other grammar frame-
works. The second theoretical aim mentioned above sets it against the orthodox
view that only strings or sentences bear syntactic significance (i.e., the ‘narrow’
view of grammar briefly mentioned in chapters 1 and 3, see Chomsky 1957, 1965,
1981). As DS stresses, the relations between the constraints imposed by linguistic
structure are constraints imposed by (pragmatically available) contextual informa-
tion play a crucial role in linguistic theory. The data displayed by identification-
based pronouns illustrates this nicely: we need a partially grammatical and a par-
tially pragmatic account. Accordingly, DS aims to capture these relations in a uni-
fied way, so that the interplay between language and context output a single level of
representation (structured propositional content in a Language of Thought, Fodor
1975). This sets DS against frameworks that achieve this goal by assuming two
(or more levels of representation), such as postulating a Chomskyan-style grammar
at the level of syntactic representation and, for example, (certain versions of) Dis-
course Representation Theory (DRT, Kamp 1981) at the semantic/pragmatic level.
As we shall, these unification is achieved by assuming that lexical items encode a lot
of information (including sets of procedures that allow the expansion of syntactic
structure, i.e. the output representation is induced from lexical material in a bottom-
up fashion) and that the means to represent encoded information can also be used to
represent contextual information. Both the bottom-up aspect of the theory and the
complexity of information it is able to represent approximate DS to Head-Driven
Phrase Structure grammars (HPSG, Pollard and Sag 1994). The resulting gram-
mar/pragmatics interface is unorthodox: the parse of the sentence is coupled with
pragmatic aspects of utterance interpretation, yet there is a way to distinguish com-
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petence from performance. As we shall see soon, the former can be regarded as the
set of moves (computational operations) allowed by the system, whereas the latter
can be regarded as a particular choice of operation (including pragmatic operations)
at a given stage in interpretation.
The formal treatment of these theoretical tenets requires some basic ingredi-
ents. First, the fact that linguistic representations are hierarchically structured (see
the discussion on binding in chapter 1 section 1.4) is captured in terms of binary
LINKed trees, described by the Logic of Finite Trees (LOFT) of Blackburn and
Meyer-Viol (1994): a modal vocabulary that describes the relations amongst the
various nodes in a tree (points in logical space) via an accessibility relation (repre-
sented by symbols such as <↑>,<↓>). Second, information that holds at a node,
such as truth-conditional contribution or syntactic features, for example, is captured
by declarative units (DU) that ‘annotate’ or ‘decorate’ a given node. This com-
prises the declarative part of the framework. Third, linguistic underdetermination
is modelled as mappings from sub-trees to further developed trees. Such mappings
are regulated by three factors: (i) requirements, i.e. the fact that certain information
must hold at a node, promoting tree-building (represented by a ‘?’ preceding the re-
quired information), (ii) underspecified information (a node having unfixed position
or underdeterminate content), and (iii) grammatical rules that allow for transitions
between (partial) trees (such as rules that remove a requirement once it is met). This
comprises the procedural part of the language.
The incorporation of the Labelled Deductive Systems of Gabbay (1996) into the
framework allows for these various ingredients to be recruited, in a unified way, as
descriptors of a (partial) tree, that is, a set of tree nodes. Each node is described by
a triple of the following format: [requirements, < labels >, formula value]. The
components of node descriptions as well as how the framework models linguistic
understanding is the topic of the next subsection.
5.2.1 The language DU
Declarative Structure: A sketch of the Language DU
In DS, binary trees are rather simple. In addition to the root node, tree-nodes can
be either arguments, always represented by the daughter node at the left hand side,
or functors, always represented by the daughter at the right hand side. Thus, the
scaffolding of the basic representations in the formal system is this:
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(2) Tree structure root node
terminal argument node non-terminal functor node
terminal argument node terminal functor node
As mentioned in passing, the language DU - the formal system that captures
the grammar - employs decorations or annotations to describe the nodes in a tree
as well as the relations amongst them. In the bare bone structure above, I have
informally shown this by annotating ‘root node’ or ‘argument node’ at certain places
in the tree. What we are going to do now is replace this intuitive vocabulary by a
formal description. Note that a (partial) tree is a set of tree node descriptions, for
example, { {node description 1},{node description 2}, {node description 3} ... },
each being described by a [requirements, < labels >, formula value] tuple. The
unique component of the formula value field is the predicate Fo. Additionally, the
predicates Ty (logical type), Tn (node position), <↑> or <↓> (relations amongst
nodes) inhabit the labels field. Let us begin with the first of these predicates.
The Predicate Fo
The first decoration to be introduced corresponds to the truth-conditional contribu-
tion of a given tree node. In DS, this kind of information is captured by the predicate
Fo (formula value). For example, the utterance in (a) can convey the structure in
(b) with certain formula values at each node. This structure in turn, is abstractly
(i.e. less graphically) described by (c).1




c. {{..., Fo(Smoke′(John′))... },{...Fo(John′)...}, {...Fo(λx.Smoke′(x))...}}
The Predicate Ty
1For the sake of simplicity, I will abstract from tense and treat names as logical constants.
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The second decoration that we shall look at is the predicate Ty. It features in the field
label and represents information concerning the logical type of a certain node. This
imports the combinatorial properties of the lambda calculus into the DU language:
for example, given the type information e and e → t, we could deduce the type
information t by modus ponens and the corresponding formula values via function
application. The language DU assumes as basic types, e (entities), t (truth-values),
cn (common nouns). A small variety of functional categories is defined in the spe-








b. {{Ty(t), ..., Fo(Smoke
′(John′))},
{Ty(e), ..., Fo(John′)}, {Ty(e→ t), ..., Fo(λx.Smoke′(x))}}
The Predicate Tn
The third type of tree node description that enters in the field label of the triple above
is the predicate Tn. It represents the position of the tree node vis-a-vis other nodes
in the tree. The Tn predicate employs a recursive tagging mechanism to describe
node positions. By definition, the position of the root node is described by Tn(0).
The position of the argument daughter node(s) is recursively defined by appending
an extra ‘0’ to the number of the node of the mother. Thus, the argument daughter
node from the root is described by Tn(00). The position of the functor node is
formed by appending a ‘1’ to the end of the mother’s Tn value. Thus, the functor
daughter node from the root is described by Tn(01). As we shall see shortly, the
position of a tree node is used for a variety of purposes, such as keeping track of the
point of the parse, supporting the descriptions of relations that hold between nodes,
and describing the unfixed position of a node (which captures movement-like effects
postulated by Chomskyan grammars). A richer description of the structure in (4) is:
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(5) a.
Tn(0), T y(t), Fo(Smoke′(John))′
Tn(00), T y(e)
Fo(John′)
Tn(01), T y(e→ t)
Fo(λx.Smoke′(x))
b. {{Tn(0), T y(t), ..., Fo(Smoke
′(John)′)},
{Tn(00), T y(e), ..., Fo(John′)}, {Tn(01), T y(e→ t, ..., Fo(λx.Smoke′(x))}}
LOFT and relations amongst nodes
Given the necessity to describe relations among tree nodes, the language DU incor-
porates the vocabulary of the Logic of Finite Trees (LOFT, Blackburn and Meyer-
Viol 1994). It amounts to a modal logic that treats nodes as points in logical space
(in the same way that possible worlds are). Nodes then are related by two forms of
accessibility relation: an existential one, symbolised by <> and intuitively read as
‘there is a node such that...’, and a universal one, symbolised by [ ] and intuitively
read as ‘for all nodes...’. In order to be able to express relations about mothers,
grandmothers, sisters, daughter, etc... LOFT employs operators symbolised as up
and down arrows. Thus, from a given node, <↑> means ‘at the mother node’,
and [↓] means ‘for all the daughter nodes’. Furthermore, these modal operators
can receive affixes describing relations that hold at argument nodes, functor nodes
or underdetermined nodes (by the Kleene * operator). For example, <↑1> XYZ
means that ‘the description XYZ holds at the functor node above the current one’,
<↓0> XYZ means that ‘the description XYZ holds at the argument daughter’, and
<↓∗> XYZ means that ‘ the description XYZ holds for some node (argument, func-
tor, mother, grandmother, ...) below the current one’. Operators (also described as
modal relations) can be iterated, so <↑1><↓0> XYZ means ‘the description XYZ’
holds at the argument daughter of the functor node above the current one’. Here is
a simplified example of the use of such vocabulary:
(6) Tn(0), <↓1><↓0> XYZ
Tn(00) Tn(01)
Tn(010) XYZ Tn(011)
DU incorporates two more symbols from the LOFT formalism: the verum, ⊤, and
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the falsum, ⊥ (bottom restriction). The first interacts with LOFT’s modal language
by expressing that a given node description is ‘true’ for (some/every) tree node
related to the current one (in a similar way a proposition is true at (some/all) acces-
sible possible worlds),while the latter expresses the converse. For example, [↓]⊥
expresses that no node description holds at any node below the current one. This
indicates that the tree cannot be further developed below that point.
Procedural Structure: Partiality and Incrementality
Given the tools that describe the information that annotates a tree-node (the declar-
ative structure), we are in a position now to state how the system accommodates the
development of partial propositional forms into full blown truth-evaluable content.
This amounts to the procedural structure of the system. It comprises a pointer (sym-
bolised by ‘♦’) to indicate the current node of the parse (relevant for information
processing purposes) and three main other elements: (i) requirements, (ii) actions
(lexical or computational), and (iii) underdetermined content (e.g. metavariables)
or structure.
Requirements
Roughly, requirements are node decorations that do not yet hold at that node.
They model a temporary stage in utterance comprehension and, in fact, promote the
development of the tree by triggering a series of operations that may achieve the
required decoration (requirements are then written off by a computational rule and
successful tree-building ensues). If requirements are not met, tree building fails and
the utterance is declared as unacceptable, meaning that a representation for it cannot
be produced given the available resources and/or stimulus.
The best example of a requirement is the starting point of the utterance com-
prehension. Simplifying for the sake of exposition, DS models utterance compre-
hension as the task of building a propositional type (which is taken to represent
the speaker’s intended meaning2). Thus, the first stage in tree development is an
instance of the requirement below (called ‘ the Axiom’, from which everything fol-
lows):
(7) {{..., ?Ty(t),♦...}}
Above we have an abstract description (in the same way as (3)c, (4)b and (5)b de-
2Though see Gregoromichelaki et al. (2011) for the idea that something more basic than the
appeal to intentions may underpin some more basic forms of conversational exchange.
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scribe their respective trees) of the type information that should hold at the root
node. As we shall see shortly, the encoded meaning of words or rules of the gram-
mar can use these requirements in procedures that extend the structure of the tree.
Actions (Computational and Lexical)
The procedures or instructions employed by DS are of two types: computational
actions and lexical actions. Both can be considered as what is traditionally defined
as the rules of a grammar. Like the model in Government and Binding (GB) theory
(Chomsky, 1981), computational rules are entirely optional. They constitute the
space of moves and choices that the performance system may draw upon 3. The
general format of such rules is conveniently displayed under the following pattern:
(8) General format of computational rules
Tree Description 1
Tree Description 2
Rules allow certain transitions from an input description (Tree Description 1)
to an output description (Tree Description 2). Transitions can be considered proofs
(suppose tree description 1 contains P → Q,P and tree description 2 contains Q).
By incorporating Gabbay’s (1996) LDS, the language DU can use any decoration
type (e.g. Ty, Fo, Tn, LOFT modalities) in the definition of grammatical rules.
This adds expressive power and a more controlled way of deploying transitions
between tree-structures.
The first rule that we shall look at is Introduction. It is used to break down the
goal of building a type t node into the subgoals of building a type e node and a
type e→ t node. Formally, it is defined as follows (the definitions of the computa-
tional rules are reprinted in an Appendix at the end of the chapter, greyed out text




{...{..., ?Ty(Y ),? <↓0> Ty(X), ? <↓1> Ty(X → Y )...,♦}, ...}
The symbols Y and X stand for any specifications of logical types. Introduction
3In DS the competence - performance distinction roughly mirrors the distinction between a set of
rules that govern tree-building and specific choices of rule application in order to build a particular
(partial) tree.
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effectively creates new requirements at the current node (not on the nodes them-
selves) using the modal vocabulary of LOFT. It basically allows a move from a node
that requires a propositional type (Y ) to the requirements of an argument daughter
of type (X) and a functor daughter of (functional) type X → Y . These repre-
sent the yet to be built subject and predicate nodes, whose construction is done
by another computational rule, namely, Prediction (shown below). It is important
to observe here that type e nodes can accommodate content that represents what
one would intuitively regard as objects and individuals, such as John, Mary, or this
chair, but also, following Gregoromichelaki (2006), entities corresponding to situ-
ations/eventualities (parts of a world). The situation node (represented by Ty(es))
plays a major role in the evaluation of the utterance with regards to truth or fal-
sity (see Papafragou 2000 on the actual world as a default for evaluation)4. After
Introduction, the next rule is:
(10) Prediction (Subject and Predicate)
{...{Tn(n), ...? <↓0> X, ? <↓1> Y,♦}...}
{{Tn(n), ...? <↓0> Ty(X), ? <↓1> Y }, {<↑0> Tn(n), ?X,♦}{<↑1> Tn(n)?Y }}
Prediction establishes two things. First, it creates the daughters (argument and func-
tor) as required by Introduction. Second, it moves the pointer to the newly created
argument node.
At this point, the definitions seem to be quite abstract, so it is best to illustrate
with an example of initial stages in the parse. Consider a person hearing ‘John
smokes’. As a tentative approach to English (an SVO language), suppose that the
subject and predicate nodes are built by a combination of Introduction and Predic-
tion. On the assumption that recognising linguistic stimuli sets the hearer up with
the task to build a truth-evaluable type, the axiom (see (7)) serves as input to In-
troduction. This move is represented by the move from (a), where the partial tree
contains only the root node, to (b) below:
(11) a. Tn(0), ?Ty(t),♦
b. Tn(0), ?Ty(t), ? <↓0> Ty(e), ? <↓1> Ty(e→ t),♦
After Introduction, the application of Prediction creates the subject and predicate
nodes and moves the pointer to the subject node. This makes the transition from
(11) to:
4In this brief exposition, I will currently abstract away from situation arguments, which will be
discussed in later sections.
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(12) Tn(0), ?Ty(t), ? <↓0> Ty(e), ? <↓1> Ty(e→ t)
Tn(00), ?Ty(e)♦ Tn(01), ?Ty(e→ t)
With the pointer positioned at the Ty(e) node, the subject of the utterance can be
parsed. Encoded information is represented by a similar form of procedure, namely,
the lexical actions associated with a certain expression. In a rather simplified man-
ner, let us suppose that the lexical entry of ‘John’ can be modelled along the follow-
ing lines (again I’m simplifying things by assuming that a proper name contributes
a constant denoting a specific person, as tentatively assumed in Cann et al. 2005, ch
2):
(13) Lexical actions for ‘John’
IF ?Ty(e) Trigger
THEN put Ty(e), F o(John′) Actions
ELSE abort Else Statement
Lexical actions have the following structure. First they test whether a given con-
dition obtains in the tree structure. This is stated in the trigger row above. If the
conditions obtain, then a series of actions (represented in the Actions row by type-
script) must be taken. If the conditions of the trigger do not obtain, then the system
aborts through the else statement: the parse is incomplete and a propositional form
cannot be assigned to the utterance. Given that in our example, the conditions are
met, the tree is developed into5:
(14) ?Ty(t), ? <↓0> Ty(e), ? <↓1> Ty(e→ t)
?Ty(e), T y(e), Fo(John′),♦ ?Ty(e→ t)
Note that the lexical actions for ‘John’ satisfy the type requirements of the node
as well as decorating it with a formula value. We need now a rule that removes a
requirement once it has been satisfied. This is performed by Thinning.
(15) Thinning





Note that X, above, ranges over any kind of node decoration. Applying the rule
makes the transition from (14) to:
(16) ?Ty(t), ? <↓0> Ty(e), ? <↓1> Ty(e→ t)
?Ty(e), T y(e), Fo(John′),♦ ?Ty(e→ t)
What we need now is a rule that is able to register at the mother node the fact
that a requirement has been met at a daughter node. This is the task of Completion.
The rule takes as input tree descriptions that have the pointer at a daughter node
containing a satisfied requirement and outputs tree descriptions with the pointer at
the mother node and records the satisfaction of requirements there. The formal
definition of the rule is:
(17) Completion
{...{Tn(n)...}, {<↑i> Tn(n), ...T y(X), ...♦}}
{{Tn(n), ... <↓i> Ty(X), ...,♦}, {<↑i> Tn(n), ....T y(X), ...}}
where i ∈ {0, 1, ∗}
The application of Completion effectively makes the transition from (16) to:
(18) ?Ty(t), ? <↓0> Ty(e), <↓0> Ty(e), ? <↓1> Ty(e→ t),♦
Ty(e), Fo(John′) ?Ty(e→ t)
A subsequent use of Thinning removes the ? <↓0> Ty(e) requirement at the
root and we are now in the position to move the pointer to the predicate node, so
information introduced by the verb can be processed. This is done by a rule that
allows the pointer to move wherever any outstanding requirements exists. This is
done by Anticipation. The rule basically takes as input tree descriptions that have
the pointer at a node with requirements below it and outputs a tree description with
the pointer at the nodes where the requirements hold. Formally, this amounts to:
(19) Anticipation
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{{Tn(n)...,♦}, {<↑> Tn(n), ...?X}}
{{Tn(n)...}, {<↑> Tn(n), ...?X....♦}}
The application of Anticipation makes the transition from (18) to the tree below,
where the pointer is at the functor node:
(20) ?Ty(t), ? <↓1> Ty(e→ t), <↓0> Ty(e)
Ty(e), Fo(John′) ?Ty(e→ t),♦
At this point, the verb can be parsed, resulting in the tree below. The following
is a (simplified version of) the lexical actions associated with ‘sleep’6:
(21) Lexical Actions of ‘sleep’
IF ?Ty(e→ t)
THEN put Ty(e→ t), F o(Sleep′), [↓]⊥
ELSE abort
(22) <↓0> Ty(e), ? <↓1> Ty(e→ t), ?Ty(t)
Ty(e), Fo(John′) ?Ty(e→ t), T y(e→ t), Fo(Sleep′), [↓]⊥,♦
An application of Thinning removes the requirement ?Ty(e→ t) at the functor
node. Then a subsequent application of Completion records the predicate infor-
mation in the root node, and Thinning (represented by strikethrough) removes the
? <↓1> Ty(e → t) requirement at the root. The only requirement left is ?Ty(t).
We are nearly done. Now we need a rule that performs modus ponens on the type-
logical information and functional application over the formula values of the daugh-
ters and also records the result at the mother node. This is done by the Elimination
rule, which ensues the following structure:
(23) Elimination
{<↓0> (Fo(a), T y(X)), <↓1> (Fo(b), T y(X → Y ))...,♦}
{...{Ty(Y ), F o(b(a)), <↓0> (Fo(a), T y(X)), <↓1> (Fo(Y ), T y(X → Y ))...,♦}}
6For purposes of presentation, I am abstracting away from tense (see Cann, 2011) and presenting
a rather simplified entry; [↓]⊥, the bottom restriction, indicates that the tree cannot be developed
further; transitive and ditransitive verbs would involve the creation of more structure to accommodate
object nodes.
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(24) ?Ty(t), T y(t), Fo(sleep′(John′)), <↓0> Ty(e), <↓1> Ty(e→ t),♦
Ty(e), Fo(John′) Ty(e→ t), Fo(Sleep′), [↓]⊥,
One last application of Thinning removes the final ?Ty(t) requirement intro-
duced by the axiom. The parse is complete and a full propositional form has been
retrieved on the basis of the linguistic meaning of the utterance. This ends the in-
troduction to computational and lexical actions.
Content underspecification: Metavariables and pronouns
Metavariables, indicated by bold capital letters, such as U, V, W, represent a
place-holder for an actual node decoration. While they are not proper values for the
Fo predicate and hence need to receive some value from the context (via a process
of Substitution, similar to Recanati’s (1993; 2004) notion of saturation, see chap-
ter 4 section 4.4.2), actual variables - u, v, w - are indeed proper values and hence
can be bound by quantifiers (to be introduced in the next section) or indeed used
in terms that substitute metavariables. Accordingly, metavariables are accompanied
by requirements that will not be satisfied unless a proper value is found. DS as-
sumes that pronouns (and other elements, like auxiliaries, see Cann 2011) introduce
metavariables. The fact that they need the application of further (pragmatic) actions
in order to make their truth-conditional contribution renders their meaning essen-
tially procedural (as argued by Wilson and Sperber 1993, Powell 1998, Breheny
1999, among others). The lexical entry of the third person pronoun, for example,
has the following form7:
(25) Lexical actions for ‘he’
IF ?Ty(e)
THEN put Ty(e), F o(Umale′), ?∃ x.F o(x), [↓]⊥
ELSE abort
Note that the predicate in subscript represents the presupposition that the sub-
stituted formula must satisfy, that is, the gender feature of ‘he’ presupposes that the
relevant formula value for Substitution selects male entities. As we shall see shortly,
7Abstracting away from case.
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I will propose that person features encoded presuppositions about the perspective
from which a formula value is determined. This can account for the Accessibility
property of the data, but for the moment we will abstract away from this bit of en-
coded information. Now, suppose that instead of uttering ‘John sleeps’, the speaker
utters ‘He sleeps’ whilst pointing to John. After Introduction and Prediction ap-
ply, the pointer finds itself in the argument node ?Ty(e) node, where the lexical
actions of the pronoun can be triggered. They introduce type information Ty(e), a
metavariable U (i.e. a temporary formula value) and the requirement ?(∃ x.Fo(x))
that a proper formula value must be assigned to this metavariable. In this con-
text, identifying the person demonstrated may give rise to the formula value John′,
which replaces the metavariable (via the application of Substitution) and satisfies
the associated requirement (via Thinning). The remainder of the structure can be
completed via the application of the same steps as before. Note that Substitution is
not a grammatical operation, and hence should be considered a pragmatic action,
rather than a lexical or computational one8.
Structural underspecification: unfixed node relations
Given the vocabulary DS incorporates from LOFT, many of the structural con-
straints in the logical form of an utterance boil down to the position a node occupies.
Thus, one of the ways in which linguistic underdetermination could be modelled is
by rendering tree node addresses underspecified. This move is able to capture situa-
tions in which an expression occurs at a certain point in the linear order of the utter-
ance, while its truth-conditional contribution is delayed until a compatible tree node
is found (movement like effects). This allows DS to model dislocation phenomena
that are usually captured in terms of movement by more traditional frameworks, as,
e.g. topic-dislocated structures. This form of structural underdetermination is cap-
tured by imposing a requirement on the Tn decoration, that is, a tree node with the
requirement ?∃ x. Tn(x) is an unfixed node. In the tree diagrams, unfixed nodes are
represented by a dotted line, such as in the tree schema below:
(26) Tn(0), ...
<↑∗> Tn(0), ?∃ x.Tn(x), .. Tn(00), ... Tn(01), ...
8Except in cases of grammaticalisation of the process or the resolution of anaphors, like ‘him-
self’, that depend on antecedents found at a particular position in the structure; see Purver et al.
2010.
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Unfixed nodes are introduced by the * Adjunction (star adjunction) computa-
tional rule, which is formally defined as:
(27) * Adjunction
{{Tn(a)..., ?Ty(t),♦}}
{{Tn(a)..., ?Ty(t),}{<↑∗> Tn(a)..., ∃ x.Tn(x), ?Ty(e),♦}}
The rule states that an unfixed node can be introduced, under the assumption
its position resides somewhere under the root node. In addition, it requires that
this node should eventually find a fixed position in the tree (which will replace the
metavariable in ∃ x.Tn(x). It also requires the formula value on this node to have
the logical type e, thus being an alternative starting point to the rules of Introduction
and Prediction.
The parse of an utterance of ‘John, Mary likes’ begins by the application of
the rule to the axiom (the initial ?Ty(t) requirement), resulting in an unfixed node
containing the decoration <↑∗> Tn(0), ?Ty(e), ?∃ x.Tn(x),♦. At this stage, the
lexical material of ‘John’ (see entry in (13)) can be parsed and the unfixed node is
expanded into <↑∗> Tn(0), ?Ty(e), T y(e), ?∃ x.Tn(x), F o, (John′)♦. Thinning
removes one of the requirements at this node. Completion moves the pointer to
the root and records requirement-satisfaction there. With the pointer at the root,
Introduction and Prediction can create the subject and predicate nodes (e.g. Tn(00)
and Tn(01) above). The lexical actions of ‘Mary’ could then be parsed, and the
structure would look like:
(28) Tn(0), ?Ty(t), <↓∗> Ty(e), ? <↓0> Ty(e), ? <↓1> Ty(e→ t)
Tn(00), T y(e), Fo(Mary′)♦
<↑∗> Tn(0), T y(e), ?∃ x.Tn(x), Fo(John
′)
Tn(01), ?Ty(e→ t)
The dotted line under the subject node is a consequence of The Normal Form
Constraint in Kempson et al. (2001) (see also Gregoromichelaki 2006, 85-6). This
means that nodes bearing underspecified modal relations (as introduced by * Ad-
junction) will appear as low as possible in the tree, thus making each argument
position in the linear order of the parse available as a possible site for node-fixing.
Now in the tree above, the unfixed node could be unified at the subject node, but
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this would render the parsing of ‘Mary’ in ‘John, Mary likes’ impossible (we would
be in a predicate node by the time ‘Mary’ is processed), hence ruling out this pos-
sible sequence of actions. The delay in the unification of the unfixed node is what
allows ‘Mary’ to be parsed in subject position. Given the node is type completed,
the pointer can be moved to the root (via Completion) and then to the predicate node
(via Anticipation), where information from the predicate can be parsed.
With the pointer at the node containing a type e → t requirement, the system
parses the verb ‘likes’. Its lexical actions (see Cann et al., 2005, 48) include the
creation of another argument node (‘like’ is transitive) and a functor node of type
(e → (e → t)) with formula value (λx.λy.like′(y)(x)), association is to the right,
if parentheses are omitted. The lexical actions also move the pointer to the internal
argument node with a ?Ty(e) requirement and the dangling unfixed node with it.
(29) Tn(0), ?Ty(t), ? <↓1> Ty(e→ t), <↓∗> Ty(e), <↓0> Ty(e)




′), T y(e), ?∃ x.Tn(x), ?Ty(e)
Tn(011), T y(e→ e→ t)
Fo(λx.λy.Like′yx)
At this point, the requirements of the unfixed node match those of the node from
which it hangs. The computational rule Merge can then be used to fix the node at
this position. Merge basically unifies an unfixed node with a compatible position





where ♦ ∈ ND′ and ND ∪ND′ is compatible.
Above in (29), ND would be the position of the inner argument node Tn(010)
and ND’ would stand for the unfixed node hanging below it. Given that these node
descriptions are compatible, Merge can apply, and we have an internal argument
node for the transitive ‘like’. Successive applications of Thinning, Completion and
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Elimination compile the remainder of the tree9.
5.2.2 Quantification in DS
In the previous subsection, one of the ways in which content underdetermination
can be modelled was done in terms of metavariable introduction. The assumption
that pronouns introduce values that are yet to be specified is the first step towards
an adequate account of identification-based descriptive pronouns. The second step
in this direction consists in a non-standard view on quantification, described by the
epsilon calculus (Hilbert and Bernays, 1939). In a nutshell, it imports two impor-
tant features into the framework: (i) a single logical type for quantificational and
singular terms, and (ii) a characterisation of quantifiers that allows them to reflect
their surrounding environment (via the application of certain computational rules).
Given the complexity of the topic, I will focus the presentation on aspects of the
framework that are relevant to the interpretative properties of descriptive pronouns.
The epsilon calculus adds two new operators to predicate logic: the epsilon
operator - ǫ (closely associated to ∃ ) - and the tau operator τ (closely associated
with ∀ ). According to the DS implementation of the calculus, quantifiers have a
tri-partite structure: (i) a variable x is combined with (ii) a nominal predicate, e.g.
Man′, forming the restrictor of the quantifier (x,Man′(x)), which is then added
to (iii) the binder (i.e. an ǫ or τ operator binding the variable). The structure of a
quantifier like ‘Some man’ would be: (ǫ, x,Man′(x)).
Type-logically, quantifier terms in DS are of type Ty(e). This may seem coun-
terintuitive as utterances containing expressions, such as ‘Every’ or ‘No’ do not
seem to be talking about anyone in particular. However, note that the grammars of
almost all languages do not distinguish between quantificational and other NPs. To
capture this uniformity, on the one hand, with a suitable semantics, on the other,
DS employs epsilon terms. A term like ǫ, x,Man′(x) stands for an arbitrary en-
tity that witnesses the property denoted by the restrictor (Man′). Eventually these
initially incomplete terms will be augmented with further predications contributed
9As an alternative to Introduction and Prediction, Cann (2011) proposes that the parse of En-
glish utterances proceeds via an unfixed node which accommodates the argument introduced by the
subject and then moves to the verb which creates the whole argument structure (including slots for
situations/eventualities) from a ?Ty(t) requirement. I will remain neutral with regards to these pro-
posals for the moment. Moreover, although the * Adjunction rule comprises a general mechanism
for explaining dislocated structures, it seems to be ill suited for capturing right dislocation, which
requires immediate node fixing. This is done by another version of the rule (Cann et al., 2005),
namely: Local Star Adjunction
{{Tn(n)}, ..{Tn(m), <↑∗> Tn(n), T y(X),♦}, ...}
{{Tn(n)}, ..{Tn(m), <↑∗> Tn(n), T y(X)},{<↑∗> Tn(m), ?Ty(X), ?∃x .Tn(x),♦}...}
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by, e.g. verbs and incorporated in their restrictor (see below). Thus, through the
introduction of appropriate operators relating restrictor and nuclear scope (predi-
cate) at a final stage in the parse, the usual relations between sets A and B im-
posed by ∀A B and ∃A B can be captured: if an entity witnesses A, it also wit-
nesses B (τ, x, A(x) → B(x)) and for some entity that witnesses A it also wit-
nesses B (ǫ, x, A(x) ∧ B(x)). The epsilon calculus thus imposes the equivalences
∃x P (x) ↔ P (ǫ, x, P (x)) and ∀x P (x) ↔ P (τ, x, P (x)), so we end up with a
conservative but more expressive version of the predicate calculus10.
This picture of quantification becomes clearer when we consider an example.
Let us assume (following Gregoromichelaki 2006 and Chatzikyriakidis 2010) that
the parse of (31) begins by Introduction and Prediction and that that the pointer is
at the subject ?Ty(e) node (I am abstracting from the introduction of the situation
node for the moment). Suppose now that the speaker utters:
(31) A nurse saw every patient.
The lexical actions associated with ‘a’ decorate the ?Ty(e) daughter of the root
with a Indef(+) feature and create the binder Ty(cn → e) functor node bearing
the formula value λP.(ǫ, P ) and an argument node with a ?Ty(cn) requirement
(where the pointer lies)11. Basically, from the argument daughter, the determiner






Ty(cn→ e), Fo(λP (ǫ, P )
?Ty(e→ t)
10The semantics is defined via the introduction of a choice function Φ to the model < D, I > of
first order predicate logic, where D is the domain of individuals and I is a function that maps basic
elements in the language onto elements in the domain. Φ selects arbitrary individuals in subsets ofD:
the witnesses (type Ty(e)) that stand for the relevant sets. Thus, Jǫ, x, PxKM,g = Φ(JP KM,g), where
Φ is the function given by M =< D, I,Φ >. It is assumed that restrictors that pick no individuals
in the domain denote any arbitrary witness. For further discussion, see Gregoromichelaki (2006,
102).
11Here are the lexical actions for ‘a’
IF ?Ty(e)




The labels in the boxes aim to give a rough description of the noun phrase head,
nominal, and determiner nodes. With the pointer at the NOM node, the common
noun ‘nurse’, can be parsed. Its lexical actions are responsible for creating an ar-
gument Ty(e) daughter with a fresh variable and a functor Ty(e → cn) daughter
containing the formula Fo(λx.x,Nurse′x) 12. The lexical actions unfold the cur-
rent sub-tree into:
(33) ?Ty(t)










Ty(cn→ e), Fo(λP.(ǫ, P )
?Ty(e→ t)
As before, the boxes represent labels for the variable and restrictor nodes. The
pointer now rests at the Ty(e) (VAR) node. Applications of Elimination, Comple-
tion, and Thinning compile the subtree until the NP node where the ?Sc(z) require-
ment lies13. At this node, the computational action for indefinites can kick in (from
Gregoromichelaki 2006)14.
12Here are the lexical actions for the common noun ‘nurse’ (freshput checks for the presence
of a variable at the VAR node and enters that variable into the scope statement, mimicking the
introduction of ‘discourse referents’. For details, see Gregoromichelaki (2006, 110-1):
IF ?Ty(cn)




13The predicate Sc has the following definition Sc(a) =df (<↓0><↓0> Fo(a) ∧ Ty(e)∧ <↑
∗ > (Ty(t) ∧ ∃y (Scope(a < y) ∨ Scope(y < a))). Intuitively, this means that a variable must
appear as a formula value of a VAR node and it also must be dominated by a type t node containing
a scope statement relating that variable to some other variable (scope-taking element) in the tree.
14Scope actions for indefinites
IF Indef(+), ?Sc(x)
THEN gofirst(?Ty(t));putScope(U < x),
?∃ y(DOM(y) ∧ Scope(y < x) ∧ ∀ r(Scope(y < r) → Scope(x < r)))
ELSE abort
where DOM is defined as: Tn |=m DOM(a) ↔ Tn |=m?Ty(t) ∧ [(↓↓∗ [Ty(e)∧ <↓0><↓0>
Fo(a)]) ∨ (<↓0> Fo(a))].
212
The actions check whether the pointer is at a node containing a scope require-
ment plus an indefinite lexical feature. If this is the case, they move the pointer to the
first node containing a type t requirement and enter a scope statement containing the
variable introduced at the (VAR) node. In this case, the decoration Scope(U < z)
is inserted at the root, where U is a metavariable to be replaced by another scope
taking element that occurs in the structure. The scope statement determines the
order according to which the restrictor and nuclear scope will be unpacked (via
computational rules to be introduced shortly). The link between a lexical feature
(Indef(+)) and the determination of the scope statement allows for certain expres-
sions, like indefinites, to induce different readings. In the specific case of indefi-
nites, the associated lexical feature imposes conditions (via the DOM predicate) on
the substitution of the metavariable U that allow for binders that occur later in the
structure to precede the variables bound by the indefinite in the scope statement (e.
g. scope reconstruction effects). Since this topic transcends the aims of the thesis, I
will leave it aside. In summary, the actions discussed here introduce a scope state-
ment Scope(U < z) at the root, containing a metavariable whose value is yet to be
determined15 and satisfying the scope (?Sc(z)) requirement at the NP node.
At this point, the pointer can move (after Completion) to the mother node and
then (via Anticipation) to the functor ?Ty(e→ t) node. From this node, the lexical
actions of the verb ‘see’ (abstracting away from tense) create an (internal) argu-
ment daughter (where the pointer rests) and a further functor daughter, decorated
by Ty(e → e → t), F o(λx.λy.See′yx). With the pointer at the internal argument
node, the material from the second NP, namely, ‘every patient’, can be parsed. The
quantifier head ‘every’ has lexical actions quite similar to ‘a’ with the exception
that it contributes Indef(−) to the NP node and λP.τ, P to the DET node16. Like
‘a’, the universal determiner also creates the ?Ty(cn) argument daughter (where
the pointer resides). At this point, the common noun ‘patient’ is parsed. It creates
a Ty(e) (VAR) node, where a fresh variable is inserted and a Ty(e → cn) node,
where the value Fo(λx.x, Patient′x) (see lexical entry for ‘nurse’). The resulting
tree is (I am omitting the boxed labels introduced previously):
15This form of content underdetermination enables scope to be underdetermined.
16Lexical actions for ‘every’
IF ?Ty(e)




(34) ?Ty(t), Scope(U < z)

























Successive applications of Completion, Elimination and Thinning compile the
subtree until the NP (type e) node of the universal, where the scope requirement
?Sc(s) lies. At this point, the scope action for non-indefinites applies17.
These actions first check for the presence of the Indef(−) feature and the scope
requirement involving the variable s. If the descriptions hold, the pointer moves to
the first ?Ty(t) node and inserts a scope statement about the variable s modulo
the satisfaction of further constraints (e.g. described by the DOM+ predicate).
Intuitively, these further conditions aim to ensure that the scope of determiners with
the Indef(−) feature is determined linearly. In the formal definition, the variable of
interest could depend only on variables of other Indef(−) determiners or situation
variables (not represented in the structure for the sake of simplicity). Let us assume,
that this utterance is being evaluated with respect to a situation v. Thus, the actions
would insert a Sc(v < s) statement at the root, satisfying the requirement at the
DP node and allowing the whole tree to be compiled (via applications of Thinning,
Completion and Elimination).




THEN IF {∃ zDOM+z ∧ Scope(y < z)}
THEN abort
ELSE put(Scope(y < z))
ELSE abort
ELSE abort
where DOM+ is defined as Tn |=m DOM∗(a) ↔ Tn |=m?Ty(t) ∧ [(↓↓∗
[Indef(−)∧ <↓0><↓0> Fo(a)]) ∨ (<↓0>]Fo(a))]
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(35) Ty(t), Sc(U < z; v < s), Fo(See
′(τ, s, Patient′s)(ǫ, z,Nurse′z)),♦

























The only thing needed now is to fully determine the value for the metavariable
U, so the formula value of the quantificational terms can be unpacked in a way
such that the right relations between restrictor and nuclear scope are established.
Note that the conditions associated with the (Indef(+)) feature allow for U to be
instantiated by the situation variable v, resulting in the reading there is a nurse
who sees every patient, or by the variable s bound by the universal, resulting in the
reading for each patient there is a nurse who sees him. Let us suppose that in the
context the second option has been taken (the indefinite would be outscoped by, or
reconstructed below, the universal). Given the formal definition of such conditions
(i.e. the DOM predicate), the resulting scope statement is Sc(v < s < z) (note
that the < relation is transitive and irreflexive). The resulting tree is identical to the
previous one with the exception that the decorations at the root have been reduced
to: Ty(t), Sc(v < s < z), F o(See′(τ, s, Patient′s)(ǫ, z, Nurse′z)),♦.
At this stage, the formula value can be re-structured using the quantifier evalu-
ation rule below (differently from the definitions in Kempson et al. 2001 and Cann
et al. 2005, I follow the definition in Gregoromichelaki 2006, 198):
(36) Q-Evaluation Rule
{...{Ty(t), ..,World(w[x1]), Scope(x1 < ...xn), F o(φ[vxnψn/xn]), ...}}
{{Ty(t), ..,World(w[x1]), Scope(x1 < ...xn − 1), ..., F o(fvnxnψ[vxnψn/xn](φ)), ...}}
where for x occurring free in φ and w[x1] = a world variable x1 or w[x1] = v1x1ψ,
and the values fvnxnψ[vxnψn/xn](φ) for v ∈ ǫ, τ, Q and fw[x1](ψ) are defined by:
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a. fτxψ(φ) = ψ[a/x] → φ[a/x], where a = τx(ψ → φ)
b. fǫxψ(φ) = ψ[b/x] ∧ φ[b/x], where b = ǫx(ψ ∧ φ)
c. fQxψ(φ) = (ψ[c/x])(φ[c/x]), where c = vQx((ψ)(φ))
d. fw[x1](φ) = w[x1] : φ
The rule above takes a node containing a strictly ordered scope statement (for
example, Scope(v < s < z)) as input and outputs a new scope statement omitting
the last variable and a formula value containing a connective appropriate to the
binder of that variable which relates the predications contributed by the noun and
the verb, i.e. the restrictor and the nuclear scope. In our example, the last variable z
is bound by an ǫ operator. According to the definition (b) above, an ǫ term relates its
restrictor (in this case ‘nurse’) to the nuclear scope (the predicate ‘see’ instantiating
ψ in the rule above) via conjunction. The symbol ‘b’ in the definition (b) represents
a name for the arbitrary witness that replaces the variable. Thus, the first application
of the rule results in:
(37) Scope(v < s < z), F o : Nurse′(b) ∧ See′(b; τ, s, Patient′s), where b =
ǫ, z, (Nurse′z ∧ See′z; τ, s, Patient′s).
Note that the equivalence between the name ‘b’ and the complex value is what en-
sures that terms in epsilon calculus reflect their surrounding environment (account-
ing for the incrementality in certain interpretations of quantified antecedents, see
Evans 1977, chapter 1 section 1.5)18. Now, we must deal with variable s, which is
bound by a τ term. As a first step, we must replace all occurrences of τ, s, Patient′s
in the formula in (37) by s (note that ‘b’ is a name containing variables, which will
be represented in subscript). The result is:
(38) Scope(v < s), F o : Nurse′(bs) ∧ See′(bs; s)
Now, this complex formula will be an instance of φ in the scope evaluation rule
above. The next step is replace s by the variable name used in sub-item (a) of
the Q-evaluation rule, namely ‘a’ (Fo : Nurse′(ba) ∧ See′(ba; a)) and apply the
instruction stated there, the result is:
(39) Scope(v < s), F o : Patient′(a)→ [Nurse′(ba) ∧ See′(ba; a)]
18If we replace the name for the full formula description, we end up with the equiv-
alent: Nurse′(ǫ, z, (Nurse′z ∧ See′z; τ, s, Patient′s)) ∧ See′(ǫ, z, (Nurse′z ∧
See′z, τ, s, Patient′s); τ, s, Patient′s). For this reason, I will use the abbreviations.
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where ba = ǫ, z, (Nurse′z ∧ See′z, a), where a = Patient′(s) → [Nurse′(bs) ∧
See′(bs; s)], where bs = ǫ, z, (Nurse′z ∧ See′z; τ, s, Patient′s)]
The formula above means that if some individual is a patient then there is a nurse
who sees him: the intuitive truth-conditions of the utterance. The final variable v
is removed by the specification (d) in the Q-Evaluation Rule. It is designed to take
situations or world variables and state that a given formula value holds at some
situation/world. Thus, the formula is said to hold at a situation of evaluation v (e.g.
the actual world).
This long detour introduced the following elements for an explanation of some
identification-based descriptive uses. The account of quantification proposed here
analyses quantifiers as type e expressions, whose formula values could replace the
metavariables introduced by pronouns (as discussed in the previous subsection).
This amounts to a preliminary account of the Descriptiveness property. Further-
more, the quantifier evaluation rules above unpack the formula values in a way such
that certain dependencies are established. In the formula value above, the nurses
co-vary with patients. This mechanism will be recruited for an explanation of the
Co-variation property. We now turn to the final step towards an account of the data,
namely, the introduction of a DS component that frames the contextual assumptions
used in the substitution operation just mentioned and allows two tree structures to
be connected.
5.2.3 LINKed trees
Since our grammar framework aims to capture linguistic phenomena that is not
strictly confined to string-boundaries, we must introduce a mechanism that is able
to capture cross-sentential dependencies. This is done in terms of LINKed repre-
sentations. Roughly, a LINKed structure means that two tree-structured representa-
tions are connected in virtue of the fact that they have a common truth-conditional
constituent. More formally, LINKed trees amount to an extension of the modal
vocabulary of LOFT (Blackburn and Meyer-Viol, 1994). In addition to <↑><↓>
modalities, the language DU employs < L > and < L−1 > relations. The decora-
tion < L > Tn(m) means that tree node Tn(m) can be found one step across the
LINK relation, whereas < L−1 > Tn(n) means that tree node Tn(n) can be found
one step across the inverse LINK relation (one step backwards through the LINK
relation). This ‘connection’ is established via the sharing of type e terms, as stated
in the rule below.
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(40) Link Adjunction
{{Tn(X)..., T y(e), F o(a)...,♦}...}
{{Tn(X)..., T y(e), F o(a)}{< L−1 > Tn(X), ?Ty(t), ? <↓∗> Fo(a),♦}..}
The use of Tn(X) makes it possible for the rule to apply at any node of type e
with a formula value Fo(a). The application of the rule at a type e node effectively
creates a new LINKed tree structure with the requirement that the formula value
Fo(a) must occur somewhere in it. For purposes of illustration, let us suppose that
the hearer is parsing an utterance of ‘John, who smokes, runs’. After Introduction
and Prediction, the lexical material of ‘John’ can be parsed at the subject Ty(e)










< L−1 > Tn(n), ?Ty(t), ? <↓∗> Fo(John),♦
Given that the next word in the parse is ‘who’ and wh-relatives are usually in-
volved in the interpretation of displaced (i.e. moved) constituents, we can apply
the * Adjunction rule, which creates an unfixed node from a type t requiring node.
The lexical actions of the relative ‘who’ 19 take the pointer at an unfixed node and
recover the formula value at the type e node from which the LINK originates. This
guarantees that ‘John’ and ‘who’ refer to the same person.
(42)
19Lexical actions for ‘whorel’
IF ?Ty(e), ?∃ xTn(x), <↑∗>< L−1 > Fo(x)






< L > Tn(m)
?Ty(e→ t)
< L−1 > Tn(n), ?Ty(t)? <↓∗> Fo(John)
<↑∗>< L−1 > Tn(n), ?Ty(e), T y(e), ?∃x Tn(x), Fo(John′),♦
The requirements that have been met by the lexical actions of the relative are
then removed via Thinning (shown by strikethrough above). The pointer then moves
to the root node of the LINKed daughter and the rules of Introduction and Predic-
tion build the subject and predicate nodes. Merge fixes the unfixed node as the
subject, satisfying the ?∃x Tn(x) requirement. The pointer is then moved to the
predicate node of the relative clause and the verb ‘smokes’ is parsed. Applications









< L−1 > Tn(n), ?Ty(t)




Steps of Thinning, Completion, and Elimination complete the LINKed daugh-
ter and the pointer is moved through the inverse link relation to the subject of
the LINKed mother tree. Completion and Anticipation move the pointer to the
predicate node of that tree, where the verb of the main clause (‘runs’) can be
parsed. After the type and formula values are inserted, repeated applications of
Thinning, Completion, and Elimination compile the LINKed mother. As a result,
we have two complete trees: one, from which the LINK originates, having for-
mula value Fo(Run′(John′)); another (the LINK daughter) having formula value
Fo(Smoke′(John′)).
At this point, one can apply an evaluation rule that combines the formula values
of the two structures. In the case of non-restrictive relatives, the rule is:
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(44) LINK Evaluation 1 (non-restrictives)
{{Tn(n)..., T y(t), F o(a)...,♦}{< L−1 > MOD Tn(a), T y(t), F o(b)}...}
{{Tn(n)..., T y(t), F o(a) ∧ Fo(b)...,♦}{< L−1 > MOD Tn(a), T y(t), F o(b)}...}
MOD ∈ {<↑0>,<↑1>}∗
The result of the application of this rule takes the formula values of the root
nodes of the two LINKed trees, namely, Fo(Smoke′(John′)) and also (Run′(John′)),
and outputs the conjunction of those values at the root node of the LINKed mother
tree, that is, Fo((Smoke′(John′)) ∧ (Run′(John′))). Note that the optional nature
of the rule can account for the intuition that in some cases, non-restrictive relatives
communicate two independent (not conjoined) propositions (see Bach 1999, Neale
1999, Carston 2002, 131, fn. 26, and Gregoromichelaki 2006, 153 fn. 49)20.
In the example above, the lexical actions of ‘who’ played an important role in
guaranteeing that the wh-relative and ‘John’ refer to the same entity. However,
the actions of relatives are not the only way through which formula values can be
shared. For example, the discourse fragment ‘John went to the shop. He bought
fish’ would be explained by the very same mechanism of LINKed structures. The
LINK relation would originate from the node containing Fo(John′), providing an
environment (i.e. a context) for the parse of the second string. Given that the LINK
relation requires the sharing of terms and that pronouns introduce metavariables,
the anaphoric pronoun’s value would be Fo(John′) (via Substitution).
This suggests that the mechanisms of LINKing comprise a very general tool for
modelling a plethora of phenomena, including contextual dependencies where an-
tecedents are provided linguistically, i.e. donkey anaphora. This comes out more
clearly when we consider tree structures which are slightly more complex than the
ones displayed so far. As mentioned in the subsection on quantification, DS trees
also have nodes corresponding to situations/worlds (left unrepresented for simplic-
ity’s sake) to capture the intuition that a formula value describes a situation or even-
tuality, which following Kratzer (1989) are taken as parts of a world (of evaluation).
They minimally include time (subject to tense modification) and place parameters,
but might also include other eventuality aspects. Gregoromichelaki (2006) pro-
20Restrictive relatives are explained by a very similar mechanism, according to which the the
formula value of the relative clause is incorporated as a restrictor on the variable via the following
rule. LINK Evaluation 2 (restrictives)
{...{Tn(Z), ?Ty(cn)...}...{<↑0> Tn(Z), T y(e), Fo(x)}
{<↑1> Tn(Z), T y(cn→ e), Fo(λz.zPz))}, {< L
−1 ><↑0> Tn(Z), T y(t), Fo(Q)♦}...}
{...{Tn(Z), T y(cn), Fo(x, Px ∧ Qx),♦}...{<↑0> Tn(Z), T y(e), Fo(x)}
{<↑1> Tn(Z), T y(cn→ e), Fo(λz.zPz))}, {< L
−1 ><↑0> Tn(Z), T y(t), Fo(Q)}...}
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poses that, with respect to their logical type, situations are a subtype of type e (see
Schlenker 2006, for a common semantic treatment of individuals and situations),
indicated by a subscript s (i.e. Ty(es)) for presentation purposes. As such, situation
arguments can be taken care of by any computational rule that accounts for the pro-
cessing of noun phrases, thus providing a unified account of adverbial and argument
modification. For our purposes here, situation (Ty(es)) nodes can be the inputs of
the LINK adjunction rule, such that two or more formula values can be LINKed
by the fact that they describe the same situation. Thus, the relevance theoretic as-
sumption that context is a set of mutually manifest assumptions can be modelled as
a context set C =def< T1, T..., Tn, >, i.e. a series of structured propositions, against
which a tree under construction T is interpreted (Cann et al., 2005, ch 9.2.1). The
trees could be linked via a situation argument or by any usual type e node as indi-
cated in the anaphora case mentioned above. Extended tree-structures containing
situation nodes will be employed for the explanation of the data proposed in the
next section (5.3.2).
For the purpose of accounting for the descriptive pronominal data, the contextu-
ally salient set of LINKed trees can be regarded as an environment which provides
a term that replaces the metavariable introduced by the descriptively used pronoun.
The only difference is that the term is descriptive. This will be developed for some
instances of descriptive uses in the next section. Before doing so, I would like to
mention yet another way in which context may be structured. DS also assumes that
a record of the actions used to build the parse is stored in the system and may be
recalled for the interpretation of certain utterances, as for instance, elliptical ones.
In fact, a context containing a certain series of LINKed trees can be seen as isomor-
phic to a context containing a series of actions involved in the building of such trees
(Kempson et al., 2011).
5.3 The proposal
In this section, I will detail how the relevance theoretic pragmatic framework (sketched
in chapter 2), the incremental notion of processing grounded on it (proposed in
chapter 3) and the particular grammar model (sketched above) come together in a
unified explanation of the data.
The discussion in chapter 2 established that identification-based descriptive uses
constitute a heterogeneous phenomenon. Accordingly, I will approach the data us-
ing a split account. The basic idea is this. Some uses are captured as instances of
relevance driven implicatures, as sketched in chapter 2 section 2.3. Other descrip-
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tive uses contribute to the utterance’s explicature(s). For the latter case, the gram-
mar formalism detailed here can do much explanatory work. First, it models context
as a set of LINKed trees that provide an environment for the interpretation of the
pronoun. As pronouns introduce metavariables, these can be replaced by concep-
tual representations from the context set. The grammar allows metavariables to be
replaced by either quantified or singular formula values, since both are of type e. Fi-
nally, the tools for modelling context can be extended to capture certain perspectival
aspects of interpretation (via the assumption that grammatical person presupposes
certain perspectival instances), hence explaining why certain representations are not
available for Substitution. The resulting picture can explain all the data in chapter
1 (summarised in section 5.1 of this chapter) without facing the shortcomings of a
variety of theories, as reviewed in chapter 4, and using very general pragmatic and
grammatical mechanisms: both independently required for explaining a plethora of
linguistic phenomena.
I begin my proposal by accounting for the core properties of the third person
singular pronouns and one of the extended properties, namely, Co-variation. I then
move to an analysis of the other pronominal forms. Afterwards, I put forward an
account of the Accessibility property of the data, which partially relies on the use of
multiple pronouns with distinct person features.
5.3.1 Third person pronouns: the core properties
As reviewed in the introduction of this chapter, the basic properties that need ex-
plaining are Descriptiveness - the truth-conditions of utterances containing the rel-
evant pronominal use are descriptive - Identification Dependency - the use of the
pronoun requires the identification of an individual as falling under a concept - and
Connection - the conceptual information used in the identification of the individ-
ual plays a role in the derivation of the right descriptive content. Let us consider a
modified version of the famous footprint example (Schiffer, 1981).
(45) A park ranger, is looking for trespassers in a forbidden part of the park. Her
colleague, Andy, finds something on the ground. Pointing at it, he utters:
a. ‘He is gigantic’.
Following Relevance Theory (Sperber and Wilson 1995; Carston 2002; inter
alia), I assume that the audience makes certain hypotheses about speaker-meaning
based on the ostensive acts performed. For purposes of clarity, I will analyse the
example above as two related ostensive acts: demonstrating something and uttering
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something. Based on the incremental picture of processing sketched in chapter
3, I assume that the comprehension of the demonstration involves the following
representational stages (justifications in square brackets).
(46) The pragmatics of object representation
a. i (bare object representation, i.e. visual index) [audience’s singling
out of an object in the environment based on cognitive constraints
that, if met, output representations in a bottom-up data-driven way].
b. i(Footprint′)21 [conceptual representation that the visual index in (a)
gives rise to, given the assumption that cognition is geared towards
the maximisation of cognitive-effects/processing-costs ratio (Cogni-
tive Principle of Relevance) and that conceptuality is an important
cognitive effect (see chapter 3 section 3.4.3). Identification Depen-
dency is met].
c. Make− a− Footprint′(ǫ, z, P erson′z), Fresh′(ǫ, y, Footprint′y),
Close−By′(ǫ, x, Footprint−Maker′(x)) [propositions made salient
in virtue of the spread of activation from the concept in (b) and top-
down influences arising from the audience’s current expectation of
relevance; licensed by the Communicative Principle of Relevance].
The propositions in (46)c are in the set of mutually manifest assumptions: the con-
text against which the speaker’s utterance is interpreted. Now, the decoding of
Andy’s utterance follows stages similar to the ones discussed in chapter 2 section
2.3, but it also incorporates a DS account of the incomplete logical form of an ut-
terance that is developed into an explicature (see the definition of Explicitness in
chapter 2 section 2.3.2). Here is a summary version of the comprehension process:
(47) Interpreting Andy’s utterance
a. Gigantic′(Umale′) [incomplete logical form that results from the de-
coding of Andy’s utterance in (45)].
b. Gigantic′(ǫ, x, Footprint−maker′(x)) [propositional form that re-
sults from the substitution of the metavariable in (a) by a formula
value in one of the contextual assumptions in (46)c (in underline);
warranted by the fact that the footprint maker is gigantic results in the
optimally relevant propositional content in this context. Descriptive-
ness is met].
21The earlier way of writing concepts, e.g. FOOTPRINT, has been replaced by the equivalent
notation employed by the language DU.
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c. Trespasser′(ǫ, x, Footprint−maker′x), [implications (positive ef-
fects) that the representation in (b) gives rise to].
Note that the cognitive processes sketched in (46) and (47) probably happen in
parallel and proceed as follows. The incremental view on processing, described
in chapter 3 and underwritten by the cognitive principle of relevance, establishes
a continuum from early levels of visual processing to a conceptual level which
can be integrated with linguistic meaning so the utterance’s explicature(s) can be
derived, and from there to the level of the utterance’s implicatures. Early object
representations would surface at a conceptual level at some stage in visual process-
ing, accounting for the classification of the relevant object as belonging to a kind
(Identification Dependency). This concept, in turn, activates associated proposi-
tional information that is fed into the context set, as in (46)c. These assumptions (a
set of LINKed trees) are used to develop the encoded meaning of Andy’s utterance,
i.e. (47)a, into an explicature, i.e. (47)b. This move is similar to the ad hoc concept
proposal reviewed in chapter 2 section 2.3.3, in the sense that a set of assumptions
is used to devise an occasion specific semantic value of a word, but the fact that the
linguistic meaning of pronouns is underdetermined allows for a simpler solution:
the assumptions provide a formula value that replaces the metavariable introduced
by the pronoun, in a similar way to anaphora (see chapter 1 section 1.5)22, that is, an
instance of the substitution-based account sketched towards the end of that section.
Since the replacement term is quantificational, the intuition that the truth-conditions
are descriptive is properly accounted for (Descriptiveness)23. Finally, the inferential
relation between the classificatory concept in (46)b and the term that replaces the
metavariable (i.e. (ǫ, x, Footprint−maker′x)) in (47)b accounts for the intuition
that conceptual classification of the salient object provides the building blocks of
the descriptive interpretation (Connection). The account successfully captures the
core data.
At this point, it would be helpful to show how the grammar framework structures
the context in such a way that the relevant substitution in this example can occur.
Since the demonstration of the tree transitions is also necessary for the explanation
22Many of the descriptive uses discussed in the thesis have been paraphrased as definites. Tradi-
tionally, these expressions are taken to assert or presuppose uniqueness, which would not be captured
by ǫ operator. Two options are available: to argue that definites do not induce uniqueness in virtue of
their linguistic meaning (Breheny, 1999) or to model the data using the DS implementation of iota
(ι) terms, which are ǫ operators that presuppose the uniqueness of their satisfiers (as ‘he’ presup-
poses its referent is male). For the purposes of this presentation, I follow the first option, but could
implement the second, if necessary.
23Note that an important feature of the system is what allows this: postulating the same logical
type for quantifiers and (allegedly) singular expressions.
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of the extended properties of the data, I will leave this for the next section, where
the account relies more heavily on grammatical mechanisms and subsumes steps
that correspond to the explanation sketched above.
5.3.2 Third person pronouns: Co-variation
Although many of the accounts of descriptive uses discussed in chapter 4 could
explain the co-varying readings between the contextually induced descriptive inter-
pretations and other expressions in the utterance, their proponents have not shown
how the relevant readings are properly derived24. The task upon us is to account for
the Co-variation property using the grammar tools sketched above. I will base the
analysis on the following example:
(48) Every time there is a war, he [pointing to the White House] has tough
choices to make.
The utterance in (48) could express a singular proposition about a specific indi-
vidual, say, Bill Clinton, to the effect that he has tough choices to make for each
wartime 25. However, this is not the reading we are interested in. Additionally, the
utterance above could communicate that for every time a war is being waged, the
American President at that time has tough choices to make. The adverbial modifier
‘every time there is a war’ seems to play a crucial role in delivering this reading.
Since this type of expression predicates something about a situation/eventuality, we
must address now how these entities are incorporated into the DS formalism.
Since situations are modelled as individuals (type es expressions), computa-
tional rules that operate on argument nodes can equally apply to situations. Follow-
ing Gregoromichelaki (2006), let us assume that situation nodes are introduced by
the application of Introduction and Prediction and that predicates encode an (extra)
argument slot for the situation argument represented in the structure (although she
discusses the possibility of the situation node being introduced freely)26. Therefore,
from a ?Ty(t) node, the tree-structure is expanded into:
24Elbourne (2008) is an exception to this claim.
25This is a simplification, the utterance is subject to a lot of pragmatics that could in principle
enrich the meaning of ‘war’ [involving NATO] or modulate the domain of quantification of ‘every
time’ [the UN decides]. These will be abstracted away here.
26Alternatively, Cann (2011) assumes that the situation node is introduced by the lexical actions
of verb morphology, which also insert a fresh variable at the situation argument node. My proposal
is compatible with both ways of accommodating a situation argument.
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(49) ?Ty(t), <↓>0?Ty(es), <↓>1?Ty(e→ t)
?Ty(es),♦ ?Ty(es → t)
Following Gregoromichelaki (2006), I assume a Situation Metavariable Introduc-
tion rule, which introduces a situation metavariable whose value should be replaced
by an appropriate formula value in the context. The rule has been independently
motivated by conditionals and successfully captures the idea that determining the
situation described by an utterance constitutes an instance of saturation (see Reca-
nati, 1999).
(50) Situation Metavariable Insertion Rule
{...Tn(n), ?Ty(t), }, {<↑0> Tn(n), ?Ty(es),♦}, {<↑1> Tn(n), ?Ty(es → t)}}...
{...Tn(n), ?Ty(t),♦}, {<↑0> Tn(n), T y(es), F o(S), ?Sc(S), ?∃x Fo(x)}
{<↑1> Tn(n), ?Ty(es → t)}}...
The rule licenses the transition to the following tree:
(51) ?Ty(t)
Ty(es), Fo(S), ?Sc(S), ?∃x Fo(x),♦ ?Ty(es → t)
This would be the point at which the adverbial ‘Every time there is a war’ can
be parsed. Intuitively, the expression seems to focus on certain temporal aspects of
the event described by the main verb. As such, it would be natural to model these
expressions as modifiers of the situation argument. Following Kempson (2010) and
Gregoromichelaki (2006), adjunction can be modelled as the addition of informa-
tion to a tree via trees LINKed to it. Since the occurrence of adverbials (modifiers of
situations/eventualities) is optional, I propose a Situation Adjunction rule that cre-
ates a LINKed structure attached to the situation node. This rule enforces identity
of formula values between the LINK daughter and the value of the metavariable in
the Ty(es) node and is based, in part, on the structure induced by ‘if’ clauses as
proposed in Gregoromichelaki (2006, 207-21), that is, what if-clauses do lexically,
the Situation Adjunction Rule does generally and optionally27.
(52) Situation Adjunction Rule
27Ideally, adjuncts like ‘every time’ would introduce the LINK relation and impose the sharing of
terms themselves, making the rule proposed here redundant. This alternative gives equivalent results
but is more complicated in terms of presentation. Therefore, it will not be discussed here.
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{...Tn(n), ?Ty(t)}, {<↑0> Tn(n), T y(es), F o(S),
?Sc(S), ?∃x Fo(x),♦}{<↑1> Tn(n), ?Ty(es → t)}}...
{...Tn(n), ?Ty(t)}, {<↑0> Tn(n), T y(es), F o(S), ?Sc(S), ?∃ xFo((x) ∧ 〈L〉Fo(x))}
{<↑1> Tn(n), ?Ty(es → t)}}, {< L
−1 ><↑0> Tn(n), ?Ty(es), ?∃ xFo(x),♦}...




?∃x (Fo(x)∧ < L > (x))
?Ty(es → t)
?Ty(es), <↓∗> Fo(S),♦
At this point, the content encoded by ‘Every time there is a war’ contributes to the
LINKed tree. For the sake of simplicity, this complex expression will be treated
as deriving the predicate ‘Every war-time’. As seen in the previous section, the
quantifier head ‘every’ makes the transition from a type e requiring node to a tree
structure where this node has a type cns → es daughter with formula value λP.τ, P












At this point the complex expression ‘time there is a war’ is parsed. As men-
tioned, since the anaphoric choice to be made does not turn on the specifics of this
being a relative clause, for simplicity’s sake I will treat the expression as deriv-
ing a complex predicate of type cns and formula value Fo(s,WarT ime′(s)), i.e.
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as projected by every wartime. According to this simplified exposition, the com-
plex common noun creates two nodes: one containing a fresh variable (Ty(es)) and
another containing the restrictor. (Ty(es → cns)). The actions also requires the
variable to participate in a scope statement. After the creation of the full determiner




?∃x (Fo(x)∧ < L > (x))
?Ty(es → t)










At this point, a member of the family of evaluation rules copies the formula
value of the LINKed daughter up to the situation node, the LINK mother. This rule
has been independently motivated by the effects induced by conditionals 28.
(56) LINK Evaluation Rule: Conditionals (Gregoromichelaki, 2006, 217)
{ { Tn(X), T y(t), ...}, {<↑0> Tn(X), ?Ty(es), ?∃x.Fo(x), ...},
{< L ><↑ 0 > Tn(X), T y(es)Fo(a[x]),♦ } }
{{Tn(X), T y(t), Scope(U < x)...}, {<↑0> Tn(X), ?Ty(es), ?∃x.Fo(x), ?Sc(x),
F o(a[x]),♦}, {< L ><↑0> Tn(X), T y(es)Fo(a[x])...} }
In addition to the copying, the rule has the effect of inserting an underdetermined
scope statement concerning the variable of interest (s as an instantiation of x) at the
root node. We thus have the following structure:
28Note that the metavariable S in the LINK daughter is the same one as in the LINK mother
environment, so providing a formula value for the former means that the same value would be
provided for the latter. This, in a way, dispenses with the evaluation rule above, but given that it
is motivated for other linguistic phenomena, I have decided to state it here. Applying the rule gives
the same results as applying Substitution to both occurrences of the metavariable S.
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(57)
?Ty(t), Scope(U < s)
Ty(es), Fo(S), ?Sc(s), T y(es),
Fo(τ, s,WarT ime′s), ?∃x (Fo(x) ∧ 〈L〉(x)),♦
?Ty(es → t)










The pointer then moves to the Ty(es → t) node via Anticipation. With the
pointer at the functor node, the rules of Introduction and Prediction create new
argument and functor nodes. We thus have:




?Ty(e),♦ ?Ty(e→ es → t)










With the pointer at the subject type e node, the lexical actions associated with
the pronoun ‘he’ can be parsed. The pronoun introduces a fresh metavariable Z and










?Ty(e→ es → t)










Given that the introduction of the metavariable satisfies the type requirement
at that node, we can use Completion to move the pointer to the mother node and
Anticipation to move the pointer down to the predicate node. In this way, we delay
the Substitution operation until we parse the predicate node, so the hearer has more
evidence in order to draw inferences about speaker-meaning. With the pointer at
the predicate node, the verb and its complement, namely, ‘has tough choices to
make’ can be parsed. For simplicity reasons, I will represent this verbal complex
as a single predicate with formula value Fo(λt.λv.MTC ′tv) (abbreviating ‘makes
tough choices’) which takes a subject and a situation variable. Thus, the structure
would look like:






Ty(e→ es → t)
Fo(λt.λv.MTC′tv),♦











The application of Completion moves the pointer to the mother node and the
outstanding requirement that a value for the metavariable must be found allows
Anticipation to move the the pointer to the subject node, so Substitution can take
place. In the next structure, I will present things slightly differently. First, I will
omit the LINKed daughter that represents the adjunct ‘every time there is a war’ and
present instead just the tau term Fo(τ, s,WarT ime′s) that derives from it (via the
evaluation of that LINK transition). Second, I will include the assumptions that the
demonstration towards the White House make salient. As argued previously, these
are propositions LINKed to the tree under development, thus providing possible
values for the pronoun. We have:
(61) Ty(t), Fo(WhiteHouse′(d) ∧WorksIn′(b, d))






Ty(e→ es → t)
Fo(λt.λv.MTC′tv)
where;
d is a logical constant picking out the demonstrated building, and
b = ǫ, x, USPresident′(x)
The LINKed mother tree (whose structure was abstracted away from) repre-
sents two conjoined propositions. The first conjunct describes that the bare indi-
vidual denoted by the individual constant d is a White House. We can consider
the assignment of constants to individuals in the world as a formal modelling of
the psychological process by which visual indices (FINSTs) attach to the relevant
objects (see chapter 3). In this case, the visual index is represented by the constant
d, which refers to the White House (a given object in a model).
The second conjunct in the LINK mother above says that individual b works in
d. Now, as we have seen in the previous exposition on quantification, the epsilon
calculus allows names for arbitrary individuals to have inner structure correspond-
ing to set relations. This means that b can regarded as an arbitrary witness that
stands for the US President. Accordingly, the name b can have its content unpacked
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as Fo(ǫ, x, USPresident′(x))29. The name acts as a shorthand for this more com-
plex, descriptive, representation. Now, as Fo(b) is required to figure somewhere
in the LINKed daughter, we have a strong candidate to replace the metavariable
encoded Z introduced by the pronoun.
(62) Ty(t), Fo(WhiteHouse′(d) ∧WorksIn′(b, d))






Ty(e→ es → t),
Fo(λt.λv.MTC′(t, v))
This example illustrates, how the incremental view of processing, sketched in
chapter 3, and underwritten by the cognitive principle of relevance, presented in
chapter 2, may make available conceptual representations that jointly feed a process
of inference, thus producing assumptions that offer pragmatic contributions to the
development of the logical form of the utterance (i.e. its explicature). After the
Substitution operation takes place, Thinning and Completion move the pointer up to
the mother node and then Elimination combines the values and types of subject and
predicate. Another step of Thinning and Completion moves the pointer to the root
node of the LINKed daughter and the situation term can now be combined with the
remaining structure. A final Thinning removes the ?Ty(t) requirement. The result
is:
29 The terms d and b might be argued to be iota terms as the means of expressing their unique-
ness, but I have opted for formulating these terms as an individual constant and an epsilon term.
Nothing turns on this. There are further alternative ways of cashing out the name contents, in par-
ticular their time dependency. I will mention only two of them. First, as we shall see later, there
are reasons for assuming that nominals carry a situation (meta)variable, so the arbitrary name would
be unpacked as Fo(ǫ, x, USPresident′x, S). Although this might be a more appropriate way to
represent things, as we shall see later, this alternative gives results similar to the position I have
chosen to present. Thus, I rather opt for simplicity. Secondly, one could assume that the con-
tents of the arbitrary name capture a complex term, resulting from evaluation rules; something like:
Fo(ǫ, x, USPresident′x∧Works′x, d). The problem with this alternative is that quantifier evalu-
ation rules presuppose scope related actions triggered by specific linguistic material (e.g. determiner
heads). Since the representations in the LINKed mother result from inference and not decoding, this
alternative does not seem to be well grounded. Nevertheless, I take this as an open topic, which the
study of the epsilon calculus has much to contribute to.
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(63) Ty(t), Fo(WhiteHouse′(d) ∧WorksIn′(b, d))







Ty(e→ es → t),
Fo(λt.λv.MTC′(t, v))
The only remaining issue that we must deal with is the scope statement Sc(U <
s). It is important to observe that the name b corresponds to a complex formula
value, namely, ǫ, x, USPresident′x, which contains a bound variable. This term,
however, emerged as a result of inference rather than by the parse of linguistic
material (no Indef(+) nor Indef(-) are processed). For this reason, the variable x
does not figure in the scope statement above.
The scope statement, as it stands, remains unresolved due to the presence of the
metavariable U. The role of the metavariable is to allow certain terms to outscope
other quantified terms that linearly precede them. Since there are no other scope
taking elements in the structure, we can assume that the metavariable coincides
with the variable s, thus producing the statement Sc(s) 30. This statement feeds
a Scope Evaluation rule that relates the restrictor of the term to its nuclear scope
via the appropriate logical connective. The whole formula value is Fo(MTC ′
(b, (τ, s,WarT ime′s))). Thus the restrictor of the tau term (universal binder) is
WarT ime′ and the nuclear scope is MTC ′(b, s) (where s marks the position oc-
cupied by the quantificational term, thus preserving the binding relation). Since
the term is universal, the quantifier evaluation rule (see section 5.2.2 or appendix)
replaces the whole term and the variables it binds by an arbitrary name a and re-
lates restrictor (antecedent) and nuclear scope (consequent) via the introduction of a
material implication sign. The output of the rule erases the variable from the scope
statement at the root node (Sc(s)) and decorates the root node with the final formula
value of:
Fo(WarT ime′(a) →MTC ′(b, a))
30This is a formulation which avoids any need of explicit representation of the time of the utterance
as a fixed variable introduced by the Axiom, relative to which the tau term is dependent; see Cann
2011. Since I have retained the simpler form of the Axiom, following Kempson et al 2001 and Cann
et al 2005, I adopt this scope-statement simplification instead.
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As mentioned before, the arbitrary names ‘a’ and ‘b’ themselves impose set
relations that reflect the surrounding environment. Thus, a is a shorthand for τ, s,
[WarT ime′(s) →MTC ′(b, s))] and b is a shorthand for ǫ, x, USPresident′x. Al-
though substituting the simple names by their corresponding formula values would
make the representation of the utterance content unnecessarily complex, it is impor-
tant to realise what the set relations denoted by them do. The formula above says
that for any arbitrary situation a that is a wartime, a is a situation in which an arbi-
trary individual b is having tough choices to make. Note that b itself denotes a set,
namely, the non-empty set of American Presidents; thus imposing that whomever
making tough choices at a must also be a US president in that situation. This cap-
tures the Co-variation between wartimes and Presidents at those times, which the
utterance is able to convey. Since there is no other variable in the scope statement.
The formula value corresponding to the utterance content cannot be unpacked fur-
ther. The parse is complete.
We can conclude that the mechanism that generates the relevant formula value
successfully accounts for Co-variation. Note that it does so in virtue of the ability
of episilon terms to reflect their surrounding environment and of quantifier eval-
uation rules to insert the right connectives between representations denoting sets.
This account generalises to cases of donkey anaphora, where the antecedent is pro-
vided explicitly in an overt utterance. Let us now move on to other pronominal
forms which will provide the means necessary for an explanation of the Accessibil-
ity property.
5.3.3 First person singular pronouns
Nunberg (1993) argued that basically any kind of pronoun and indexical expression
(eg. ‘today’ ‘now’) can receive a descriptive interpretation. According to him, these
are derived via a linguistically mandated process (chapter 4 section 4.3.1) that in-
corporates the descriptive truth-conditional content into the proposition expressed.
Here are some of the classical examples found in the literature and paraphrases of
their respective truth-conditions.
(64) a. Uttered by Clinton: ‘The founders invested me with the sole respon-
sibility for appointing Supreme Court Justices’ (Nunberg, 1993, 20).
b. The founders invested the President of the USA with the sole respon-
sibility for appointing Supreme Court Justices.
c. Uttered by a condemned prisoner: ‘I’m traditionally allowed to order
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whatever I like for my last meal’ (Nunberg, 1993, 20).
d. A/the Condemned prisoner is traditionally allowed to order whatever
he/she likes for his/her last meal.
However, in chapter 2, the only reliable test for checking this assumption, the
scope (embedding) test, gave mixed results as regards to whether the descriptive
contents associated with certain uses of the first person singular pronoun fall within
the utterance’s explicature. This tension is exemplified below. On the one hand,
the descriptive interpretation seems to be incorporated into the truth-conditions of
the conditional, but, on the other hand, the first person pronoun does not generate a
descriptive truth-conditional contribution when embedded under an adverb such as
‘usually’. Consider:
(65) a. Uttered by an Artist: ‘If the exhibition had more artists, I’d be in the
basement’ (Barrios 2011, see chapter 1 section 1.7).
b. If the exhibition had more artists, the paintings of the speaker would
be in the basement.
(66) a. ‘He [pointing to St. Peter’s Basilica or Pope Benedict VXI] is usually
an Italian (intended reading: the pope is usually an Italian)’.
b. Uttered by Benedict XVI: *‘I’m usually an Italian’ (intended reading:
the pope is usually an Italian).
Given the mixed status of the alleged descriptive interpretations of first person per-
sonal pronouns, I follow early insights raised in chapter 1 section 1.7 and chapter
2 section 2.3.3 and propose that they should be explained along lines that slightly
differ from their third person cousins. My main claim is that the alleged descriptive
conditions above do not fall within the utterance’s explicature. I take the data in
(66) to support this. Now, let us take a closer look at how the same claim applies to
the other examples.
Regarding the examples in (64), I believe that the descriptive readings allegedly
associated with the pronouns comes from the meaning of the verb. In (64)a, a singu-
lar interpretation containing a mental representation about Bill Clinton is possible,
on a certain understanding of the verb ‘to invest’. If we take it to be a transitive
relation, it is natural to assume that if the founders invest a certain institution (the
American State) with the power to delegate to another institution (the American
Presidency) the duty to appoint the US Supreme Court Justices, then the founders
would have invested Bill Clinton with that power. Note that the interpretation would
be about Bill Clinton, but it also makes highly salient that for it to be true, it is nec-
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essary for Clinton be an US President. This explains the ‘descriptive feel’ of the
utterance. In (64)c, it has been suggested (Recanati, personal communication), that
‘traditionally’ is not a full blown adverb of quantification and rather means some-
thing like ‘From some tradition it follows that...’. Thus, the descriptive feeling of
the utterance would follow from the meaning of that expression and the audience’s
considerations of the type of situations that is properly described by the relevant
tradition, that is, it follows from some tradition that, in a certain type of situation
(one about prisoners), the speaker (Melvin, say) is allowed whatever he likes as a
last meal. Recanati supports this claim by observing that translations of (64)c into
another languages (e.g. French, Portuguese) simply do not convey the alleged truth-
conditions of the English counterpart (i.e. they sound more like the Pope example
in (66)b). The claim is further supported by the fact that, if we replace ‘tradition-
ally’ by other adverbials, such as ‘usually’, the alleged descriptive reading is not so
accessible.
The example in (65) is one of the best cases for supporting the idea that first
person singular pronouns indeed convey descriptive interpretations, for it seems
that descriptive interpretation falls in the scope of the conditional and hence should
be treated as pertaining to the utterance’s explicature. However, as argued in chapter
1 section 1.7 (see the analysis of ‘I’m parked out back’), another process might be
going on in this case. It could be that the predicate ‘to be in the basement’ is inter-
preted as to have one’s paintings exhibited in the basement. Thus, the descriptive
interpretation could come from some form of coercion or metonymic interpretation
of the verb (see also the discussion on Recanati’s REF feature in 4 section 4.4.2).
The truth-conditions of (65) would be paraphrased as If the exhibition had more
artists, I’d be an artist whose work would be in the basement (or else the predicate
could be captured by an ad hoc sense modulation, i.e. TO BE IN THE BASEMENT*).
The pronoun refers to the particular speaker of the utterance.
I conclude that first person singular pronouns do not seem to convey descriptive
interpretations as part of an utterance’s explicature (see chapter 2, section 2.3.3 for
discussion on how a descriptive proposition can be communicated as an implica-
ture).
5.3.4 Second person singular pronouns
Nunberg (1993) also claimed that 2nd person singular pronouns convey descriptive
interpretations. Here are some examples:
(67) a. Chess teacher giving an introductory lesson to a student who has just
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played 4 N x P: ‘According to all the textbooks, you often get in trou-
ble with that move’ (Nunberg, 1990).
b. John, expecting a call from his mother, answers a phone call from his
colleague and says: ‘Oh, I thought you were my mother’ (Nunberg,
1993).
According to Nunberg, ‘you’ in (67)a is interpreted as the chess player and in (67)b
as the person calling. However, as in the first person singular case, the descriptive
feel of these utterances can be explained by other means. In the first case, it seems
that ‘you’ is just used impersonally and thus can be paraphrased by ‘one’. This
strategy however does not work for the second case. Another explanation must be
sought.
John Perry (2001) famously proposed that utterances containing pronouns com-
municate reflexive truth-conditions in addition to other types of truth-conditional
content they determine in a given context. For example, John uttering ‘you are hun-
gry’ to Bill communicates that Bill is hungry (official or incremental content) and
also that the addressee of u is hungry (reflexive content). Perry claims that these
truth-conditional contents play different roles in the cognitive life of communica-
tors. The simplest way to illustrate this is to imagine contexts in which the audience
lacks knowledge about who was addressed by the utterance u. In this case, only
the reflexive proposition is retrieved. Cases like (67)b can be explained by a similar
approach. When the phone rings, the identity of the caller is unknown, but John
assumes it is his mother. Thus, the proposal made for third person singular pro-
nouns can be extended to capture the second person case as follows. Consider a
simple deictic use, as in the utterance ‘You are tired’ said by John to Bill. In DS,
deixis could be captured in terms of LINKed trees that share a situation argument.
Consider the structure:
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(68) Ty(t), T ired′(Bill)(c)




Ty(e→ es → t)
Fo(λt.λ.vT ired′tv)
<↓∗> Fo(c), T y(t), Fo(Addresses′(Bill′)(John′)(c))








Ty(e→ e→ es → t)
λz.λt.λv.Addresses′ztv
Above, we have two tree structures LINKed by a situation node. That is, the
situation c (similar to Kaplanian context) in which Bill is tired is also a situation
in which he is being addressed by John. This way of framing context allows us
to write lexical entries for pronouns that exploit contextual information in the right
way. Tentatively, consider the following lexical entry for ‘you’:
(69) Lexical actions for ‘you’
IF ?Ty(e)
THEN put Ty(e), F o(UAddressee′), ?∃ x.F o(x), [↓]⊥
ELSE abort
Second person pronouns introduce metavariables and presuppose that their ref-
erents are being addressed by someone in the context. Treating grammatical person
in this way is very similar to the DS modelling of gender, as in example (25), where
we took the pronoun ‘he’ to introduce a metavariable and presuppose that the for-
mula that replace it must denote male entities. In effect, the semantic significance
of grammatical person, like gender, can be understood as constraints on proper val-
ues for pronominal expressions. This will play a decisive role in the explanation of
Accessibility.
In the formal treatment of the context above, the LINKed daughter tree provides
information about the satisfier of the presupposition. Since Bill is the addressee
in the context, the metavariable introduced by ‘you’ is replaced by Fo(Bill′), as
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shown in the top tree31. In cases where the identity of the addressee is unknown,
there would be no formula value to replace the metavariable UAddressee′ (this is a
first approximation to the presuppositional content of the pronoun, my definite take
on it will emerge shortly). Still, this temporary semantic value could be taken as
referring to some entity that happens to be addressed in the context. Or else we
can assume that the LINK daughter, in this case, corresponds to Bill (the speaker)
addresses someone, where the existential replaces the metavariable introduced by
the pronoun. We end up with a Perry style reflexive content. Thus, in the example ‘I
thought you were my mother’, the speaker can be taken to communicate that at time
t, John thought that the person who he would be addressing at time t1 (the caller)
would be his mother (see Recanati 1993, ch. 16, for a precursor to this idea, also
note that much of the hard work of relating different temporal situations, which I
am abstracting from here, would be done by the tense of the verb, see Cann 2011).
This proposition captures the descriptive feel communicated the utterance. More-
over, the descriptive expression in italics can be generated by assuming the lexical
entry needed for indexical cases. There is no need for extra semantic machinery
or pragmatic operations of transfer. First person pronouns could be captured by a
similar lexical entry: one which introduces Fo(USpeaker′). However, the presuppo-
sitions suggested here may be a bit too strong. This will be discussed in the next
section and the one about the Accessibility property of descriptive uses, where an
alternative way to state what pronouns presuppose will be sketched.
5.3.5 Plural Pronouns
Intuitively, plurals can be used to denote groups usually delineated by a certain
conceptual representation. For example, a football player who utters ‘We won!’
conveys that a certain football team won, despite the hearer’s lack of knowledge
about the individual members of the team. In this case, the audience’s understand-
ing is mediated via some sort of conceptual representation (FOOTBALL-TEAM, or
Fo(Football−Team′), see Sanford et al. (2008) and Filik et al. (2008) for empirical
support). Therefore, some representation of sets, captured under certain concepts,
is necessary even in the simplest cases of literal uses of plural pronouns. Based on
this fact, one could argue that the descriptive uses of plural pronouns are an epiphe-
31Alternatively, one could invoke richer sets of data holding at each node, including information
who performs and who is addressed by the speech act. In this spirit, Purver et al. (2010) incorporate
elements of type theory with records (TTR) into the DS framework so certain puzzles about speech
acts by many participants can be properly solved. This approach has relevance to the discussion
here, but since much of the contextual structuring brought in by such records can be mimicked by
LINKed structures, I will not discuss it in detail.
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nomenon of plural morphology: plurals require representations that do not denote
specific individuals, but rather sets of individuals or stuff. This would capture the
descriptive feel of the utterances without the necessity for any special semantic ma-
chinery or pragmatic transfer operation. However, in this recent example, the use of
‘we’ refers to a team in the actual world that won the match and the descriptive use
of ‘we’, below, denotes a group of American Justices whose members co-vary with
non-actual worlds/situations.
(70) Justice O’Connor: We might have been liberals.
Based on this difference, one could resist the claim that descriptive uses of plural
pronouns establish interpretations that result from mere plurality. This claim, how-
ever, does not seem to hold. There are reasons to suppose that variables ranging over
worlds/situations (which may not refer to the actual one) are not only restricted to
verbs or predicates. Consider:
(71) Every fugitive is (now) in jail (Enc¸, 1986).
Here, we must interpret ‘fugitives’ with regards to a past time/situation otherwise
we would end up with a clash: an individual cannot be a fugitive and be locked up
in jail at the same time. For this reason, some have proposed that every predicate
expression (including nouns) comes with a situation variable (e.g. Elbourne 2005;
Gregoromichelaki 2006 also mentions that situation arguments should be associ-
ated with all predicates, verbs and nouns alike: this is the reason for assuming the
the representation about the US president in section 5.3.2 might contain a situation
metavariable, see footnote 29). Thus, nominals seem to articulate the representa-
tions of non-actual situations or worlds that are relevant for capturing the intended
interpretation. This idea together with the fact that plurals denote a group entity can
explain the descriptive nature of many of the Nunberg cases. Appealing to a special
semantic machinery to derive the intended readings is simply not necessary.
Let us look at how these ideas are implemented given the framework sketched
above. It must be noted that plurality itself is a very complex topic, so I will limit
myself to very basic observations. I assume that plural morphology induces the
creation of a group individual of (Ty(e)) whose formula value is a metavariable (X)
ranging over sets. Group individuals have individuals (or stuff) as constituents and
so admit certain mereological relations (see Link 1983 for groundbreaking work).
For example, an underdeterminate group Z may have John and Mary as constituents
(Z ∧Mary′ < Z ∧ John′ < Z).
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In the O’Connor case, ‘we’ induces a metavariable X which is replaced by
American − Justice′(S), where S is a world/situation metavariable. The modal
‘might have been’ introduces a representation w about possible worlds accessible
from the actual world w0. Either world representation could replace the value of
the metavariable (S), and thus American − Justice′(w) would denote a group of
American Justices at some possible world, while American− Justice′(w0) would
denote a group of American Justices at the actual world. Thus, we have the means
to represent that the intuitive readings associated with the utterance in (70), which
can be used by O’Connor to mean that he members of either group can be liberals.
A question arises at this point. If, like the 2nd person singular, ‘we’ introduces
a group metavariable with a presupposition that the speaker should be part of the
group (XSpeaker′), then there are two possible interpretations for the pronoun: one
that describes a group of Justices in the actual world that includes O’Connor and an-
other that describes a group of Justices in some non-actual world that also includes
O’Connor. Neither seem to capture a reading in which O’Connor is not part of the
group. Such reading, however, is possible. Therefore, saying that the person feature
of ‘we’ introduces a Speaker′ presupposition is too strong. The initial assumptions
about some of the presuppositional content of pronouns must be revised.
In order to capture the facts right, some perspectival elements may be needed to
be incorporated in the proposal. Instead of the Speaker′ presupposition, I propose that
first person pronouns presuppose that the speaker (or thinker) has a certain perspec-
tive on a given individual in the environment (or aspect of reality, more generally).
This is captured by specific mental predicates (P) that represent a certain perspective
that a given discourse participant has in relation to a (discourse) entity. Perspectives
can be considered as roles in the structure of a dialogue or narrative. The first person
pronoun, for example, presupposes that its semantic value is determined from a first
person perspective: the perspective of the agent of a certain mental or speech act.
The perspectival predicate P could then be prefixed with subscripts that indicate the
specific role presupposed. In the first person case, this is captured by P1 and the
lexical actions induced by ‘we’ look like:
(72) Lexical actions for ‘we’
IF ?Ty(e)
THEN put Ty(e), F o(XP ′
1
), ?∃ X.F o(X), [↓]⊥
ELSE abort
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Presuppositions of perspective can then exploit the structure brought up by
LINKed trees in order to be satisfied, thus determining the right values for the pro-
noun’s metavariable. As in the tree-structure displayed in the 2nd person case, the
tree representation of ‘We might have been liberals’ can be LINKed to another tree
representation (via the sharing of a situation term: the context of a discourse or nar-
rative, say) that captures the perspective of a given participant in the conversational
setting.
Since O’Connor has 1st-person perspectival instance vis-a-vis the group of Amer-
ican Justices, the presupposition of the pronoun is satisfied and the formula value
Fo(American−Justice′(S)) can replace the metavariable introduced by ‘we’. As
a result the overall interpretation of O’ Connor’s utterance of ‘We might have been
liberals’ does not need to include O’Connor in the relevant group in case the world
of evaluation is non-actual. Note that this may also be required by uses that are
more easily classified as literal discourse. The supporter of a football team who
says ‘We won!’ is not included in the team, but induces the same interpretation that
would be induced in case a team player uttered the sentence.
The proposal can be extended to other pronominal forms. Second person plurals
might encode a similar presupposition: one that assumes that its value must be
determined via a second person perspective (the recipient of the utterance/narrative),
that is, they induce Fo(UP2′), and an interpretation identical to the one above could
be induced by a speaker who addresses O’Connor with ‘Youpl. might have been
liberals’. Finally, the perspectival element introduced here plays an important role
in capturing some of the Accessibility patterns displayed by descriptive pronouns,
which we will now turn to.
5.3.6 Extended properties: Accessibility
The only piece of data left to explain is the Accessibility property of descriptive
uses. It involves anaphoric relations between pronouns with different person fea-
tures, among other things. Roughly, explaining Accessibility amounts to account-
ing for the conditions under which certain pronominal interpretations can figure
as antecedents for subsequent pronouns. More specifically, almost all the theories
reviewed in chapter 4 failed to explain the pattern below, introduced in chapter 1
section 1.8.
(73) a. Said by someone: If the Democrats had won the last few presidential
elections, the US Supreme Court Justices might have been liberals.
They would guard public interest better.
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b. Said by Supreme Court Justice O’Connor: If the Democrats had won
the last few presidential elections, we might have been liberals. *They
[said by same speaker]/They [said by different speaker]/??We [said
by same speaker] would guard public interest better.
The contrast is this. O’Connor cannot use the third person pronoun ‘They’ to refer to
the descriptive interpretation of ‘we’, namely, the US Supreme Court Justices, but
another speaker can. This is particularly puzzling because third person pronouns
usually can pick up salient entities in discourse, which is precisely what much of
the data in this thesis suggest, and also because such anaphoric link is allowed under
a different speaker. How can the proposal made here account for these facts?
The idea is to extend the perspectival elements introduced in the previous sub-
section to cover these cases as well. We can assume that the third person feature
presupposes that the interpretation of the pronoun must not be established from
a 1st or 2nd person perspective. The 3rd person feature introduces a metavari-
able with a P ′
3




(not from a first nor second
person perspectives). In the previous subsection, we described O’Connor’s use of
‘we’ as determining the formula value (American − Justice′(w)) via the satis-
faction of the presupposition of a first person perspectival instance. Given that
anaphoric uses are modelled via LINKed trees (see Gregoromichelaki 2006, ch.
8, section 2.c.2), the dependency of the subsequent use of ‘they’ by O’Connor on
the (American−Justice′(w)) value would be established via the sharing of terms.
However, as third person pronouns presuppose that substitutes for the metavariables
they induce cannot be established via the first person nor second person perspective,
the anaphoric relation is blocked. Note that the anaphoric relation is allowed by an-
other speaker’s use of the same expression, because this (other) speaker did not
determine the formula value (American − Justice′(w)) through the first person
(i.e. her) perspective.
At this point, the following objection could be made. To some native speakers,
a second use of ‘we’, by O’Connor, that is anaphoric on the descriptive interpre-
tation of the first use ‘we’, namely, (American − Justice′(w)), is as degraded
as the anaphoric use of ‘they’ discussed above (Robyn Carston, p.c.), but surely
the anaphora in this case should be allowed, since the pronoun presupposes a first
person perspective and the interpretation has been established through this perspec-
tival instance. The point is well taken. However, general pragmatic mechanisms
also play a part in the explanation of why certain representations are more acces-
sible than others. Such an anaphoric use of ‘we’ contrasts with an utterance, by
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O’Connor, of ‘if the Democrats had won the last few presidential elections, we
might have been liberals and guarded public interest better’ which is easier to pro-
cess, given that the coordinated VPs are contained in the consequent of the condi-
tional, facilitating an interpretation where the people guarding public interest better
are a group of Justices (possibly not including O’Connor) in a non-actual situation.
Given the availability of a sentence that demands less processing effort to achieve
the same effects, an anaphoric use of ‘we’ which depends on a descriptive inter-
pretation of an antecedent use of the same expression is a bad word choice. The
proposal sketched here successfully captures the Accessibility property of descrip-
tive uses, meeting a desideratum which was not touched on by previous accounts.
There are other desirable features of the proposal made here. For starters, it
employs two independently motivated mechanisms of utterance interpretation. The
first of them is the structure created by LINKed tree representations, independently
motivated to capture anaphora and other linguistic phenomena, such as the process-
ing of relatives and cross-over effects. Thus, we are simply re-using an already
necessary theoretical vocabulary.
The other general mechanism of interpretation consists in the perspectival pred-
icates that capture specific perspectival stances. These mechanisms have been re-
quired by other linguistic and mental phenomena. For example, Higginbotham
(2002) claims that linguistic competence with (indexical) pronouns enables lan-
guage users to track different perspectives. Tracking of perspectives here would
explain, among other things, the informativeness of uses of different pronominal
forms that refer to the same individual. For example, Perry (1979) considers a
speaker who sees a person whose trousers are on fire and describes the situation by
an utterance of ‘His trousers are on fire’, but unbeknownst to the speaker, he is look-
ing at himself in the mirror. When the speaker is in a position to realise the thought
expressed by ‘My pants are on fire’, an important perspectival shift has occurred:
even though pronominal reference remains the same, the speaker acquired a relevant
piece of information. In the framework above, this difference would be captured in
terms of different tree structures that are LINKed to the tree-structured representa-
tions of the utterances (which presuppose different perspectival stances according to
the pronouns used). Similarly, some linguists (Hage`ge, 1974; Clements, 1975) have
been intrigued by the ability of some pronominal expressions (logophors) to shift
their value according to the perspective of a narrative. This has recently re-surfaced
in the literature, as counter examples to Kaplan’s (1989a,b) theory of indexicals
(against the rigidity facts that Kripke 1972 allegedly raised, see chapter 1 section
1.3). For example, in some languages, like Amharic, a report equivalent to the
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English sentence ‘John believes I am a hero’ could induce the interpretation John
believes John is a hero, that is, ‘I’ in Amharic would determine its reference with
regards to a shifted situation, one in which the agent is the subject of the report
(i.e. the believer) and not the speaker of the utterance (Schlenker 2003; Anand and
Nevins 2004; for the relation between the grammatical person and the representa-
tion of perspectives, see Sauerland 2008). Hopefully, the proposal sketched here
could be extended to cover such shifts as well, but this transcends the aims of this
thesis.
Finally, the proposal has a second explanatory advantage. It strikes a fine bal-
ance between semantics and pragmatics. On the one hand, it leaves pragmatics with
the task of determining relevant contextual information. For the data discussed here,
there are two types of contextually available information that plays a crucial role:
information concerning the terms that provide the descriptive terms that replace the
metavariables introduced by pronouns and information about the perspectival stance
of the conversational participants. On the other, it leaves grammar with the task to
recruit such information in order to deliver the attested co-varying readings (via
quantifier evaluation rules) and also to describe which representations are accessi-
ble given a word use and a particular perspectival stance (via specific contextual
assumptions represented as LINKed structures).
5.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed how the combination of relevance theoretic prag-
matics (chapter 2), the incremental notion of processing (chapter 3) and the lan-
guage DU (the DS grammar framework) explains all properties of descriptive uses
of pronouns. The proposal made here does not suffer from the shortcomings faced
by previous proposals (chapter 4) and explains the data using general and indepen-
dently motivated mechanisms of interpretation. Let me now present some conclud-
ing remarks.
5.5 Appendix: Computational rules
Introduction
{...{...?Ty(Y )..,♦}...}
{...{...?Ty(Y ),? <↓0> Ty(X), ? <↓1> Ty(X → Y )...,♦}, ...}
Prediction
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{...{Tn(n), ...? <↓0> X, ? <↓1> Y,♦}...}





{...{Tn(n)...}, {<↑i> Tn(n), ...T y(X), ...♦}}
{{Tn(n), ... <↓i> Ty(X), ...,♦}, {<↑i> Tn(n), ....T y(X), ...}}
where i ∈ {0, 1, ∗}
Anticipation
{{Tn(n)...,♦}, {<↑> Tn(n), ...?X}}
{{Tn(n)...}, {<↑> Tn(n), ...?X....♦}}
Elimination
{<↓0> (Fo(a), T y(X)), <↓1> (Fo(b), T y(X → Y ))...,♦}
{...{Ty(Y ), Fo(b(a)), <↓0> (Fo(a), T y(X)), <↓1> (Fo(Y ), T y(X → Y ))...,♦}}
Star Adjunction
{{Tn(a)..., ?Ty(t),♦}}




where ♦ ∈ ND’ and ND ∪ND′ is compatible.
Local Star Adjunction
{{Tn(n)}, ..{Tn(m), <↑∗> Tn(n), T y(X),♦}, ...}
{{Tn(n)}, ..{Tn(m), <↑∗> Tn(n), T y(X)},{<↑∗> Tn(m), ?Ty(X), ?∃x .Tn(x),♦}...}
Link Adjunction
{{Tn(X)..., T y(e), Fo(a)...,♦}...}
{{Tn(X)..., T y(e), Fo(a)}{< L−1 > Tn(X), ?Ty(t), ? <↓∗> Fo(a),♦}..}
Q-Evaluation Rule
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{...{Ty(t), ..,World(w[x1 ]), Scope(x1 < ...xn), Fo(φ[vxnψn/xn]), ...}}
{{Ty(t), ..,World(w[x1 ]), Scope(x1 < ...xn − 1), ..., Fo(fvnxnψ[vxnψn/xn](φ)), ...}}
where for x occurring free in φ and w[x1] = a world variable x1 or w[x1] = v1x1ψ, and the
values fvnxnψ[vxnψn/xn](φ) for v ∈ ǫ, τ,Q and fw[x1](ψ) are defined by:
a. fτxψ(φ) = ψ[a/x] → φ[a/x], where a = τx(ψ → φ)
b. fǫxψ(φ) = ψ[b/x] ∧ φ[b/x], where b = ǫx(ψ ∧ φ)
c. fQxψ(φ) = (ψ[c/x])(φ[c/x]), where c = vQx((ψ)(φ))
d. fw[x1](φ) = w[x1] : φ
Situation Metavariable Insertion Rule
{...Tn(n), ?Ty(t), }, {<↑0> Tn(n), ?Ty(es),♦}, {<↑1> Tn(n), ?Ty(es → t)}}...
{...Tn(n), ?Ty(t),♦}, {<↑0> Tn(n), T y(es), Fo(S), ?Sc(S), ?∃x Fo(x)}
{<↑1> Tn(n), ?Ty(es → t)}}...
Situation Adjunction Rule
{...Tn(n), ?Ty(t)}, {<↑0> Tn(n), T y(es), Fo(S), ?Sc(S), ?∃x Fo(x),♦}
{<↑1> Tn(n), ?Ty(es → t)}}...
...Tn(n), ?Ty(t)}, {<↑0> Tn(n), T y(es), Fo(S), ?Sc(S), ?∃ xFo((x)∧ < L > Fo(x))}
{<↑1> Tn(n), ?Ty(es → t)}}, {< L
−1 ><↑0> Tn(n), ?Ty(es), ?∃ xFo(x),♦}...
LINK Evaluation Rule: Conditionals
{ { Tn(X), T y(t), ...}, {<↑0> Tn(X), ?Ty(es), ?∃x.Fo(x), ...},
{< L ><↑ 0 > Tn(X), T y(es)Fo(a[x]),♦ } }
{{Tn(X), T y(t), Scope(U < x)...}, {<↑0> Tn(X), ?Ty(es), ?∃x.Fo(x), ?Sc(x),




It is now time to state the concluding remarks of this thesis. First, I will summarise
the contributions it has made to the debate on identification-based descriptive uses
of pronouns. Then, I will anticipate a possible objection to the proposal sketched in
the previous chapter.
My first task, set out in chapter 1, was to extract the key properties of identification-
based descriptive uses of pronouns. On the one hand, this was done by looking at
previous literature. Since Nunberg (1993), it seems that such pronominal uses de-
pend on the identification of an individual in the context (i.e. a property known as
Identification Dependency) to communicate descriptive information (i.e. Descrip-
tiveness) in a way such that the conceptual representation involved in identification
provide the building blocks (in a rather indirect way) of the descriptive interpretation
(i.e. Connection). On the other hand, this task was also carried out by comparing
such uses to other pronominal and non-literal interpretations. In this comparison, I
have argued that descriptive uses seem to bear closer similarities to cross-sentential
(donkey) anaphora and metonymy.
Like cross-sentential anaphora, descriptive uses seem to co-vary with other ex-
pressions in discourse (i.e. Co-variation), even though such ‘antecedents’ are not
given linguistically. Like metonymy, such pronouns seem to be involved in a sit-
uation where the concept most salient in discourse (e.g. FOOTPRINT) provides a
gateway to the concept relevant for interpretation (FOOTPRINT-MAKER). However,
pronouns encode person features that seem to presuppose certain discourse perspec-
tives, whereas metonymical uses, in virtue of exploiting words (e.g.‘dog’) associ-
ated with concepts (e.g. DOG), are not bound by such perspectival takes. This was
used to show that descriptive uses of pronouns of a given grammatical person can-
not provide antecedents for subsequent pronominal uses of different person features
(i.e. Accessibility). The last two were identified as the extended properties of the
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data, not only because they depend on the core properties, but also because they
have not been discussed extensively in the literature (with the exception of a few
authors). Moreover, the variety of different types of pronominal interpretations ex-
amined in this chapter raised difficulties for a unitary account of such expressions.
The task of chapter 2 was to introduce principles that govern the audience’s use
of contextual information to figure out speaker-meaning (i.e. Pragmatics) and ex-
amine how such principles would explain the core features of the data. Our starting
point was Gricean pragmatics. In a nutshell, a reconstruction of a Gricean expla-
nation of descriptive pronouns treats them as non-literal word uses, and thus would
classify them as instances of particularised conversational implicatures. In order to
derive this level of content, the audience must be able to recover what-is-said by the
speaker and engage rational principles governing communication in order to derive
further levels of speaker meaning. Many difficulties for a Gricean-inspired account
were raised. The most problematic ones were related to (i) the structural depen-
dency between implicatures and what-is-said, given the difficulty of describing how
this latter level of content looks like in the case of descriptive pronouns, and (ii)
the fact that it excluded pragmatically available constituents to figure as part of the
proposition expressed by the utterance, hence making some of the properties of the
data (e.g. Co-variation) very difficult to account for.
Relevance Theory was presented as an alternative pragmatic approach. It does
not inherit the shortcomings of the Gricean view (i.e. i-ii, above), allowing for prag-
matically derived constituents to figure in the proposition expressed by the utter-
ance. However, many of the options it allows, such as an implicature-based account
or the ad hoc concepts construction account seem to be ill suited for explaining
the data in a unified manner. It seems that an account that treats some descriptive
cases as implicatures and some other cases as explicatures fits the data best. Thus,
the thesis has contributed positively to the debate by breaking the taboo that a lin-
guistic phenomenon must be treated either as contributing to implicit or to explicit
content. Within explicature-based possibilities, more specifically, it seems that de-
scriptive uses result from a mere substitution of variable-like component encoded by
the pronoun by the appropriate descriptive representation. Within implicature based
accounts, the variable-like entity would be replaced by a singular interpretation and
implicate the descriptive reading. The problem is how to describe the linguistic
meaning of these expressions in a way such that the substitution operation is both
licensed and explanatory; a task chapter 5 was dedicated to.
In chapter 3, we looked at arguments in the literature against the idea that
extra-linguistic (perceptual) stimuli can provide ‘antecedents’ for pronouns in sub-
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sequent discourse. These arguments motivate constraints, such as, the Anaphoric
Island Constraint (Postal 1969, also known as the formal link condition) or the
Individuative-Representational Constraint. More specifically, we examined how
mechanisms of visual processing make conceptual representations available for a
variety of cognitive tasks, including utterance comprehension, from both concep-
tual and empirical standpoints. Against such constraints, I have argued that concepts
that are indirectly available in a given visual experience can be integrated with the
encoded meaning of pronouns in virtue of the nature in which they emerge from
earlier (possibly non-conceptual) levels of information. Detailing such mechanisms
and how they can be seen in the light of general principles of information process-
ing (such as the Cognitive Principle of Relevance) opens up the possibility of seeing
dependencies on visually available representations in a way similar to dependencies
on linguistic antecedents: another important contribution to the debate. If the avail-
ability of such antecedents is underpinned by an incremental view of processing
and by activation coming from the hypothesis about speaker-meaning, it seems that
developing the logical form of an utterance is an activity that evolves incrementally
as well. Ideally, one would like to see that reflected in a grammatical theory.
Chapter 4 had the task of investigating accounts of identification-based descrip-
tive uses proposed in the literature. These fall within two broad families: heavy-
handed semantic theories or heavy-handed pragmatic theories (borrowing a term
from Neale 2007). The first tended to explain the data by evoking a set of lin-
guistic constraints on interpretation. However, they fail to explain how, in a given
context, a given interpretation is selected as the descriptive value of the pronoun.
As they did not invoke any component of pragmatics in their explanation, these
proposals were partial at best. The latter family had difficulties regarding the mech-
anisms by which identification-based descriptive interpretations co-vary with other
expressions in discourse (e.g. Co-variation). Moreover, both families have diffi-
culty explaining the Accessibility property of identification-based descriptive uses
of pronouns, which requires some combination of pragmatic elements as well as
grammatical ones. The various shortcomings motivate an alternative proposals.
Building on the conclusions of previous chapters, in chapter 5, I have presented
an alternative proposal for identification-based descriptive uses of pronouns. Dif-
ferently from the string-based view of grammatical processes sketched in chapter
3 and the heavy-handed semantic and pragmatic accounts discussed in chapter 4,
the data seem to require (i) a Pragmatic framework different from Grice and (ii)
grammar that allows pragmatically available information to interact with encoded
information on the fly and describes the linguistic constraints on pragmatic opera-
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tions.
The demands on the pragmatic side are met by Relevance Theory (Sperber and
Wilson 1986/95). The demands on the grammar side are met by Dynamic Syntax
(Kempson et al 2001, Cann et al 2005). In a nutshell, DS offer tools that model
the incremental growth of tree-representations on the basis of linguistic stimuli
and contextual information. It represents context, like RT, as a set of (LINKed)
propositions. Identification-based descriptive uses of pronouns can be explained
along the following lines. The demonstration or saliency of an object in the con-
text provides relevant mental representations for purposes of interpretation; hence
explaining Identification Dependency. These representations can provide implicitly
available ‘antecedents’ (captured as LINKed trees) that can replace the metavariable
introduced by the pronoun, in some cases (e.g. third person singular, plurals). Else,
they provide contextual assumptions that implicate some descriptive proposition, in
other cases (e.g. some first person singular uses). The availability of descriptive
representations that replace the pronominal metavariable accounts for Descriptive-
ness and the fact that this process is one of inference accounts for Connection. We
have also seen how the quantifier evaluation rules for the epsilon calculus unpack
the conceptual content of the utterance in a way such that the Co-variation be-
tween identification-based descriptive interpretations and other representations in
discourse is properly accounted for. Finally, I have argued that grammatical person
encodes presuppositions about different discourse perspectives. Possible clashes
between the presupposed perspective on discourse may block identification-based
descriptive interpretations to provide the value for other pronominal expressions.
This explains Accessibility. In conclusion. The combination of DS and RT is able
to explain all the properties of the data without the shortcomings levelled against
other accounts.
I believe that the proposal made here carries interesting consequences for a num-
ber of topics in linguistics and philosophy of language.
First, with regards to the challenge of explaining the various pronominal inter-
pretations reviewed in chapter 1, the proposal in chapter 5 assumes that the different
interpretations (e.g. deictic, bound, or donkey anaphoric) result from substituting
the pronoun’s metavariable by representations that become available in slightly dif-
ferent ways (though they would all be underpinned by the same pragmatic princi-
ples and incremental take on processing). For example, deictic uses would result
from substitutions that target a mental representation that is immediately and di-
rectly available in the perceptual environment, whereas standard cases of pronom-
inal binding and donkey anaphora result from substitutions that target conceptual
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representations made available in previous discourse. The complementary distribu-
tion of bound pronouns and self anaphors (‘him’ vs ‘himself’) could be explained
along the same lines as the explanation of the Accessibility property: ‘self’ would
require a very local antecedent (described under LOFT terms), while a bare pronoun
could be bound by non-local ones. The proposal thus provides a unified explanation
rooted in a underdeterministic view of encoded meaning that is fully compositional.
Secondly and in connection with the previous point, I hope to have suggested
that much of the worries raised by adepts of Semantic Minimalism against under-
deterministic views on the proposition expressed by an utterance, namely, that it is
not fully composition and overgenerates. This is not the case. As I have argued,
according to the proposal, the formula value in the root node derives from the for-
mula values of daughter nodes. Moreover, it includes a description of grammar that
blocks certain representations from being proper values for substitution.
Thirdly, I believe that the data itself, reviewed in chapter 1, and the discussion
in chapter 3, offer a counter argument to the standard orthodoxy that sets linguis-
tic processes apart from other cognitive processes. The metaphor for a specialised
linguistic module that ‘ships off’ content to other modules needs revision. Accord-
ing to my proposal, cognitive processing in general is an effect-driven effort-saving
endeavour: linguistic and perceptual alike. Thus, the top-down expectations about
what an ostensive stimuli means, such as pointing to a footprint on the ground,
can make certain representations available for processing further linguistic stimuli.
This, however, does not deny the existence between specialised systems.
Finally, I believe that data raised by descriptive pronouns suggests that taking a
given linguistic phenomenon and asking whether it should be captured at the explicit
or implicit level of meaning is not a very interesting question. As we have seen,
some descriptive uses contribute to the explicit level, whilst some others contribute
to the implicit level. What seems to be required by the data is: (i) to specify the prin-
ciples by which pragmatic contributions are generated, (ii) to describe the type of
information encoded by specific lexical items, and (iii) to describe the interplay of
information between (i) and (ii). On the one hand, many philosophers of language
and formal semanticists tried to abstain themselves from a description of pragmatic
principles because they took their inclusion into theory making to be a threat of
more important principles, such as compositionality and systematicity, or because
they took formal treatments of indexicality to be the model for context dependency
in general. On the other hand, pragmatists always took the workings of pragmatic
principles to be quite independent from a description of meaning (leaving this job to
syntacticians and semanticists) and a description of other representational abilities.
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However, encoded information might be able to constrain pragmatically available
information in the comprehension process (as highlighted by the Accessibility prop-
erty). Similarly, natural constraints in vision (echoing Marr and Pylyshyn) may
shape the type of representation that emerges in cognition. These play a role in the-
ory building and anyone interested in the study of language should take a description
of representational abilities (linguistic, perceptual, etc..) into consideration.
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